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Title photo 
As soon as a tribe had allied sufficient forces to take over a wing of 
government, it disintegrated in internal strife over its spoils, only to be 
overtaken by another tribe with stronger internal cohesion. Thus 
continued a cyclical mechanism of hostile takeovers, termed “predatory 
redistribution”, redirecting national wealth to a handful of tribes. 
      Noel Foster 
“Mauritanian: The struggle for Democracy” (2011, 33) 
(Quoted page 108)  
 
 
 
We were having this conversation and the President’s secretary, a 
young military man, came up to Zeidane and said, “The President is 
asking for you”… Therefore, off he went and took the lift [to the 
President’s chambers]. He was gone for a minute, and he came back 
almost immediately. He tapped me on the shoulder as he walked past, 
smiled at me and said, “Hey ho! The President says I can do as I please!”
   
 Isselmou Abdelkader  
(Interview 48A, 1 January 2012 - quoted page 152) 
 
 
« Oui, nous aussi nous voulons la démocratie pour notre pays !  
Mais laissez-nous la prendre à notre propre pas, à notre propre 
manière. »  
General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz  
(quoted page 172) 
 
 
La France va créer en Afrique une force militaire d’intervention. Où ? 
Là où elle le jugera opportun… De l’Afrique française, nous sommes 
passés par la France-Afrique, pour revenir maintenant à l’Afrique de la 
France. Les pouvoirs en place [des despotes] y trouvent leurs comptes, 
et la France y a grand intérêt… 
Debellahi Abdeljelil 
Le Quotidien de Nouakchott 16/12/2013  
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However, plagiarism has no clear boundary with what is considered “common 
knowledge”. Therefore, where possible, I have cited references when dealing 
with such topics that have the potential of falling inside the boundaries of 
plagiarism. 
 
My travels in Africa and my close association with West Africans in many 
occupations, form the groundwork for the research on my recent master thesis 
as well as the doctoral research presented herein. The ideas and opinions on 
Mauritania are personal and arise as a result of my efforts in assisting in the 
development of its petroleum and mineral resources over a period of some 35 
years. Most especially, the topic of this thesis is chosen out of the strong 
interest that I have developed through work carried out in the promotion and 
development of Mauritania over a period of 20 years between 1994 and 2014.  
    
Max de Vietri 
22 April 2014 
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Abstract 
This thesis examines the establishment of a petroleum industry in Mauritania, 
from its beginning in 2001 to 2011. It focuses on the interaction of the oil 
industry and the changing political character of the country, and assesses the 
role played by the oil industry in political changes that occurred at national 
and sub-national levels during the period.  
 
The theoretical starting point of the thesis is the debate over what has come to 
be known as the ‘oil curse’, an hypothesis that has taken on differing meanings 
as proponents applied it to various cases. The study examines the argument 
that the discovery of oil contributes to political instability, focusing on 
Mauritania from 2001 to 2011. It argues that contextually grounded root-
causes with long historical linkages are much more important precipitants to 
instability and socio-political upheavals than the development of the oil 
industry. Of particular importance in the understanding of political instability 
is the complex relationship between state authority in its civil and military 
forms and long-standing tribal and ethnic institutions in Mauritania.  
 
Another important precipitant of political upheavals in Mauritania is foreign 
interference in Mauritanian affairs by France and Mauritania’s neighbours, 
which pre-dates the country’s independence. The original contribution to 
knowledge of this research thesis is that it argued that while oil has played 
some role in Mauritania’s political development from 2001 to 2011, it has 
been of minor importance in the competition among political elites for control 
of the state and the wider civil society. 
 
The study is based on primary research in Mauritania using a variety of 
qualitative techniques, including interviews and conversations with a range of 
state and non-state actors, supplemented by documentary and other secondary 
sources.  
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Important Dates and Milestones  
Translated from: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Gouvernement-pays_60_mauritanie 
and expanded by the researcher 
 
• 10,000 BP: Black Africans, the Bafour, inhabit the region, fertile in that period. 
 
• 5000 BP: Climatic changes drive most of the people south, but some remain as   
    oasis dwellers and others as coastal fishermen, today known as the Imraguen. 
 
• From 500 BC: communication with northern landmass and movement of people 
(eg. Vandals) into northern Africa.  
 
• 25 BC: Caesar Augustus grants Kingship of “both Mauritanias” to Juba II, but  
  continued guerrilla warfare between Romanised settlements and nomadic  
  pastoralists until Rome’s retirement from the region (Sigman 1976) 
 
• 8th to 17th century: influx of Arab tribes, possibly due to climatic changes on the  
  Arabian Peninsula. They bring religion, language, Bedouin ways and camels. 
 
• 1649: Establishment of a French trading post at St Louis, at the mouth of the  
  Senegal River. Trading slowly spreads up the river over the next 250 years  
 
• 1885: At the Berlin Conference, France is formally attributed French West Africa. 
Military governance is established and sits in Saint Louis. 
 
• 1903: The French government passes a decree recognising “The Protectorate of the    
  Country of the Maures of the Lower Senegal” in acknowledgement of the  
military support of the pro-French Maures of the emirates of Brakna, Trarza  
and Idouaich. 
 
• 1920: A decree was passed which uses the name “Mauritania” for the first time 
 
• 1947: Last battle fought against colonialism by Maures in northern part of the  
   Territory. Although not designated as a sovereign country, the name  
“Mauritania” is officially used by the French.  
 
• 28 November 1960: Declaration of Independence. 
 
• 20 May 1961: Promulgation of a Constitution establishing a presidential system. 
 
• 20 August 1961: Moktar Ould Daddah is elected President. 
 
• 12 January 1965: The Party for Mauritanian people (PPM) becomes the single  
  parliamentary party. 
 
• 9 August 1971: Election of President Moktar Ould Daddah for a third term. 
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• 8 July 1973: Creation of a new currency, the Ouguiya. 
 
• 26 November 1973: distancing from France and membership of the Arab League. 
 
• 28 November 1974: Nationalisation of MIFERMA. 
 
• 14 November 1975: Agreement with Spain and Morocco on Western Sahara whose  
  territory is divided between Morocco (2/3) and Mauritania (1 /3). 
 
• December 1975: Beginning of the conflict with the Polisario Front over sovereignty  
  of Western Sahara and especially the region of Tiris el-Gharbia. 
 
• 8 August 1976: Moktar Ould Daddah’s begins fourth term as elected president.  
 
• 10 July 1978: Military coup d’état led by Lieutenant -Colonel Mustapha Ould  
  Saleck. 
 
• 3 June 1979: Resignation (overthrow?) of Mustapha Ould Saleck as President of  
the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN). Mohamed  
  Mahmoud Ould Louly succeeded him. 
 
• 5 August 1979: Agreement in Algiers with the Polisario Front. Mauritania  
  renounced its sovereignty over Tiris El-Gharbia. 
 
• 4 January 1980: Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Louly is removed by Lieutenant  
Colonel Mohamed Ould Khouna Haidallah. 
 
• 10 May 1980: Establishment of Islamic Sharia law. 
 
• 5 July 1980: First decree abolishing slavery passed by independent Mauritania. 
 
• 16 March 1981: Failed coup attempt, supported by Morocco, by the Alliance for a  
  Democratic Mauritania (AMD). 
 
• 12 December 1984: Successful coup d’état by Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed  
Taya. 
 
• April 1986: Publication by the FLAM (Afro-Mauritanian movement of the  
"Manifesto of the oppressed black African". Leads to unrest and       
 political repression. 
 
• April 1989: Violent racial clashes in both Mauritania and Senegal. Mass  
expulsions from Mauritania of black Africans to Senegal and Mauritanians 
living in Senegal. 
 
• June 1990: Franco-African Forum, François Mitterrand gives his famous speech  
  tying foreign aid to democratisation, beginning with multi-party rule 
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• 12 July 1991: Adoption by referendum of a new constitution along the lines   
  demanded by the West. 
 
• 25 July 1991: Set up of multiparty system and freedom of the press. 
 
• 24 January 1992: Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya wins Presidential elections. 
 
• November 1994: Researcher’s first visit to Mauritania. 
 
• July 1995: Beginning of interest by Ashton Mining (soon absorbed by Rio Tinto)  
in diamond potential of north Mauritania at researcher’s instigation.  
De Beers and several exploration companies quickly follow, setting up  
offices in Nouakchott over the next twelve months. 
 
• October 1995: At the request of M’Boye Ould Arafa, Director of the Department  
of Mines and Energy, the archives of the department are searched by Dr 
Brian Welch and the researcher for evidence of petroleum potential 
overlooked by pre-1989 explorers. 
 
• July 1996: Submission by Elixir Corporations Pty Ltd and Hardman Resources NL  
of first PSC agreements to government over Blocks 3, 4 and 5. Awarded 
some 9 months later.  
 
• August 1998: Woodside joins Hardman and Elixir in Mauritanian joint venture. 
 
• November 1999: Seismic work begins offshore Mauritania. 
 
• 12 December 1997: Re-election of President Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya. 
 
• 28 October 2000: Crackdown on opposition parties and aggressive repression over  
  several months.  
 
• 9 April 2001: Recognition of six new political parties. 
 
• End-May 2001: Chinguetti oilfield discovery is announced by joint venture. 
 
• Early-June 2001: Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd sells its JV interest to Roc Oil Ltd. 
 
• Late-2001: Applications for offshore and adjacent onshore PSCs multiply beyond  
the wildest expectations of Mauritania authorities. 
 
• 17 July 2001: Return to Mauritania of former President Moktar Ould Daddah after   
  23 years of exile. 
 
• 2 January 2002: The government bans the racist opposition party, Action for  
  Change (AC). Active repression of political opponents. 
 
• Early-June 2003: The viability of the Chinguetti oilfield is confirmed and work  
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  begins on the commercialisation of the presumed recoverable oil reserves.  
 
• 8 June 2003: Violent military coup attempt by Commander Saleh Ould Hanenna  
  against President Taya. Several hundred soldiers and civilians die.  
 
• 7 November 2003: 3rd election victory for President Ould Taya. 
 
• 21 July 2004: Council of Ministers sits to consider proposals for new laws. Minister  
of Petroleum and Energy is allowed “to do as he pleases” by President Ould  
Taya about requested amendments to Woodside Joint venture production-
sharing contracts (PSCs). 
 
• 9 August 2004: Purported foiled assassination attempt against President Ould Taya. 
 
• 28 September 2004: A purported 2nd attempted coup by Saleh Ould Hanenna  
  and Captain Abderrahmane Ould Minnih fails. 
 
• 3 August 2005: Successful military coup d’état against President Maaouya Ould  
Sid Ahmed Taya, overthrown by the head of his presidential guard,  
Colonel Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, General Muhammad Ould Al- 
Ghazwani, together with the head of national security and Aziz’s cousin,  
Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. Aziz is today regarded as the purported  
leader, but his cousin is selected as chair of the “Military Council for Justice 
and Democracy ". 
 
• 4 August 2005: Mauritania is excluded from the African Union, but international  
relations are quickly re-established by Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall.  
 
• October to December 2005: In the course of drafting the 2006 National Budget, 
  and checking proposed flow rates and projected income stream with  
Woodside, a shortfall is discovered and on digging deeper, amendments to  
the original PSC agreements are discovered. However, these were 
unprocessed through the proper parliamentary channels. 
 
• 6 February 2006: Public declaration by Mauritanian Government that Woodside is  
  acting against the wellbeing of Mauritania. 
 
• 24 February 2006: First Oil. Production begins at Chinguetti but a sombre mood  
  prevails.   
 
• 25 June 2006: Ely Mohamed Vall brings in constitution limits to presidential terms,  
  through a public referendum. 
 
• 25 June 2006: Ely Mohamed Vall applies for membership to EITI for Mauritania. 
 
• September 2006: Chinguetti daily production begins to drop from the planned  
75,000 barrels a day to below 40,000 barrels a day by end-2006.  
 
• 25 March 2007: Presidential elections bring Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi to power. 
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• Early-2007: Chinguetti production begins to drop rapidly over the next twelve  
months to below 2,500 barrels a day in mid-2008. Note that viable  
commercial production was only achievable at a daily production rate above 
7,000 barrels a day.  
 
• 10 April 2007: Mauritania is welcomed back into the African Union. 
 
• 8 August 2007: Anti-slavery laws are once again passed by the government. 
 
• December 2007: Woodside announces sale of its Mauritanian interest to Petronas. 
 
• 1 February 2008: The Israeli embassy in Nouakchott is attacked. 
 
• 6 August 2008: President Abdallahi fires General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and  
four other generals from the parliament, but is deposed a few hours  
later in a coup d’état, by the same military personnel. 
 
• 17 January 2009: Diplomatic relations with Israel are frozen. 
 
• March 2009: Closure of the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott. 
 
• 15 April 2009: President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz officially retires from the  
army in order to be able to stand in the presidential election.  
 
• 15 April 2009: Ba Mamadou M'Bare becomes president for the transitional period. 
 
• 18 July 2009: Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz wins the 2009 presidential election.  
  Regarded as a constitutional coup d’état. 5 August 2009 nominated President. 
 
• Mid-2009: Viability re-established at Chinguetti at 8,000 barrels per day by  
Petronas.   
 
• 24 September to 28 November 2011: Street protests against what they call a  
 “discriminatory” national census by the Afro-Mauritanian group "Do  
not touch my nationality". 
 
• 13 October 2012: President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz is shot by a military patrol  
on the outskirts of Nouakchott and evacuated to Paris (France)  
where he was hospitalised. Many believe it is a failed coup attempt. 
 
• March to Sept 2013: Very active campaign to discredit President Abdel Aziz and  
to force him to step down. The pressure is presently continuing. 
 
• 17 September 2013: President Abdel Aziz chooses new ministers, several are  
Members of the Oualad Bousbaa tribe, the President’s tribe and associates. 
 
• 23 September 2013: Samba Thiam, leader of the FLAM returns after 23 years in  
exile, declaring that his organisation has “national” ambitions.  
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• 26 September 2013: Street march by the Afro-Mauritanian group "Do not touch my  
nationality" protesting against the police death of a young Afro- 
Mauritanian on 24 September 2011.  
 
The coverage of the most pertinent events to the present research terminated 
end-September 2013 on submission of thesis to the editor.  
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Map of Mauritania  
 
 
 
Fig 1   Map of Mauritania  
(Retrieved from http://geology.com/world/Mauritania-satellite-image.shtml 1/10/13) 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The thesis examines the period from 2001 to 2011 during which the petroleum 
industry was first established in Mauritania and in which the present 
researcher was involved commercially with the process. It focuses on the 
interaction of the oil industry and the changing political character of the 
country. In particular, it assesses the role played by the oil industry in the 
political changes and the instability that occurred at national and sub-national 
levels during the period. The theoretical starting point of the thesis is the 
debate over what has come to be known as the ‘oil curse’. It adopts a critical 
view of the oil curse hypothesis and argues that the discovery of oil was but 
one of several factors that contributed to Mauritania’s political change and 
instability during this time.  
 
The search for petroleum  
The researcher’s interest in this topic arose out of several decades of 
engagement in petroleum exploration in Africa and the importance of oil and 
other ‘natural capital’ in the economic development of several countries, 
particularly in West Africa. For almost a hundred years, petroleum (and its by-
products) has become the cornerstone of modern industrial civilisation and 
today accounts for 90% of the world’s mineral resource trade by value (Ross, 
2012, 8). The global industry has rapidly expanded from sedimentary basins 
within now-developed consumer countries in the 19th century to increasingly 
more remote petroliferous basins, many of which are found in developing 
countries.  
 
Many of these developing and underdeveloped countries have proven to have 
basins prospective for hydrocarbons, but as the search widens, these countries 
are progressively more remote from the principal consuming markets 
geographically, socially and politically. This development has resulted in a 
number of African countries, including Mauritania, becoming exploration 
destinations and entering relatively recently into the realm of producers in the 
quest to fulfil the growing global demand for oil and gas. 
 Page 19 
 
 
In Mauritania, some exploration was undertaken between the late 1960s and 
1980s by large oil companies: AGIP, Shell, AMOCO and TEXACO. 
However, by 1991 petroleum exploration activity in the country had come to 
a standstill due to disinterest in Mauritania in the foreign investment market. 
This was a result of ethnically fuelled unrest in the country between 1989 and 
1991 (Sy, 2000).  
 
As a maverick pioneer explorer, the researcher had become interested in the 
economic potential of Mauritania’s mineral resources on a first visit in late 
1994. By 1995, the researcher had successfully initiated both international 
interest in the gold potential of Mauritania’s Archaean greenstone belts and 
precipitated a minor diamond exploration rush by majors and junior 
exploration companies into its diamond-prospective northern regions.  
 
Until 1996, the country had watched several of its North African neighbours 
with sedimentary basins similar to, and even contiguous to, those present 
within its borders, gather significant revenues from oil and gas exploration 
activities and production within their territories. In 1995, as an outcome of the 
researcher’s interest in the development of Mauritania’s subsoil natural 
resources’ potential, the authorities granted the researcher’s private company, 
Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd (Elixir), a one-year moratorium on the totality of 
the oil-prospective Mauritanian coastal basin (Tham 2001, 36). This was to 
allow the researcher to promote Mauritania and the potential of its 
hydrocarbon prospectivity to the international petroleum industry without fear 
of circumvention by a third party for the agreed period.  
 
At first unsuccessful in attracting the attention of the larger international 
majors, eventually the researcher was able to attract the interest of a small 
Australian, West Perth-domiciled explorer, Hardman Resources Limited 
(Hardman, listed on the ASX and at the time valued at AUD 6 million). By 
mid-1996, Elixir and Hardman had co-signed with the Mauritanian 
Government on three production sharing contracts, PSCs 3, 4 and 5 (Clarke 
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2008, 251). All parties understood that as juniors, the joint venturers would 
not be able to fulfil normal contractual expenditure obligations but would 
“beat the drum” for the country. The two companies were thus under pressure 
to bring a cashed-up partner into the venture.  
 
It took almost two years for the Hardman-Elixir Joint Venture to come to the 
attention of Woodside Petroleum Ltd (Woodside) in early 19981. By mid-
1998, the Australian “independent” had joint ventured into the project, 
beginning serious exploration as operator by 1999 and discovering significant 
hydrocarbons with the first well drilled in late-May 2001. This unprecedented 
rapid success in the discovery of the Chinguetti oilfield, which was deemed 
commercially viable after some limited appraisal work in 2001-2003, resulted 
in development planning and construction beginning in early 2003.  
 
Woodside was at the time, headed by John Akehurst, a Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) keen on expanding his company’s asset portfolio 
internationally and into more liquid hydrocarbons or oil. On Peter Grant’s 
recommendation, the International Exploration manager at the time, John 
Akehurst and the New Ventures Director, Agu Kantsler, engineered 
Woodside’s first significant move overseas with the Hardman-Elixir 
Mauritanian venture.  
 
On the back of the Chinguetti discovery in May 2001, Woodside acquired 
further prospective coastal basin acreage for the joint venture2, in total 
covering some 75,000 sq km or some two-thirds of the total then-available 
offshore acreage. By end-2001 and given technology’s limits at the time, the 
remainder of the prospective offshore areas to the 2,000 m bathymetric line, 
as well as its onshore extensions, were granted to some 20 oil companies 
attracted to the new frontier. 
 
                                                 
1 Through the efforts of the then-MD of Hardman Resources Limited, Ted Ellyard 
2 Petroleum Blocks 2 and 6 
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Following the Chinguetti oilfield discovery in Mauritania, moreover, some 50 
companies ranging from Australian juniors to the largest multinationals and 
including African national oil companies, sought permits (some successfully 
and some unsuccessfully)  within other basins in Mauritania and surrounding 
African countries. Their search extended over some 1.5 million sq km 
underlain by sedimentary sequences previously not considered as 
hydrocarbon-prospective.  
 
This petroleum rush occurred because Mauritania was especially attractive 
compared with developed industrialised countries with like-prospectivity and 
other African states, as its officials were considered more approachable and 
their terms and regulations much less onerous, reflecting their frontier status. 
More pertinent, their need for foreign investment, allowed not only large 
foreign companies but also small pioneer mavericks such as Elixir and 
Hardman, to negotiate much more favourable terms than in developed 
countries. Thus, when geological resource potential was confirmed and 
economic hydrocarbon reserves proved up, as was the case with Chinguetti, a 
rapid ramp-up of activities could be assured through rapid government 
approvals, or for smaller companies, little government impediment to the on 
sale of their remaining portion of projects to larger petroleum players .   
 
After the May 2001 discovery of commercial oil reserves in the Chinguetti 
oilfield, the long-standing President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya 
demanded a rushed development program. President Taya required such a 
success in order to re-energise the economy, but especially in order to sustain 
his popularity and expand the distribution of rents within the patrimonial 
patronage system that was the norm in Mauritania. According to Max Weber, 
patrimonialism refers to a specific type of authority founded on a specific kind 
of legitimacy organised around the personal power of a ruler and his/her 
supporters and clients. In a culturally specific context, it does not denote a 
corrupt regime as defined by western notions of the proper and often idealised 
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democratic process3. According to Weber (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009, 
125-156) patrimonial relations, include notions of reciprocity and voluntary 
consent and compliance between an elected leader and those that are led4. 
 
High and sustained windfall oil-revenues were expected by government, 
citizens and oil industry companies alike. President Taya was, however, 
ousted in a successful coup d’état  in August 2005, engineered by two of his 
closest military collaborators, the Head of National Security since 1987, 
Colonel Ely (Ould)5 Mohamed Vall, and the general’s cousin, Colonel 
Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz, Commander of the Presidential Guard.  
 
The timing of previous coup attempts and of the successful coup raises the 
question of a possible relationship with the discovery of petroleum and the 
expected windfall revenue stream to the government.  
 
The beginning of oil and minor gas production (First-Oil) was officially 
announced some six months after the coup on 26 February 2006, during the 
period of the first military Junta lead by Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall, which 
ruled from August 2005 to March 2007. With First-Oil, came the promise of 
sustained high flow rates and an expectation of high success rates in future 
exploration that would generate a very long-term, continuing and growing oil-
revenue base for the government. Rich and poor Mauritanians mistakenly saw 
their country’s capital as the new African “Dubai”, a roadside billboard even 
going up showing “Nouakchott 2020” with 150-floor glass-and-aluminium 
                                                 
3 Pitcher et al, do point out that “while patrimonialism  is said to cement social bonds in  
   small-scale situations through a reliance on trust, reciprocity, and material exchanges, it is however  
   believed to distort power, corrupt authority, and fuel personal aggrandisement when it permeates  
   larger political institutions such as bureaucracies and states” (page 130) 
4 The present commonly used ‘neopatrimonialism’ could have been used as it implies the continues  
   existence of pre-modern cultural norms through colonial influences. However, it is avoided as it is  
   presently loosely employed as a handy label by western media, ascribing it to many leaders in  
   present West African states that are suffering economic stagnation or other ills (op. cit.)  
5 Ould (or Mint) , meaning “son (daughter) of” is a Maure (Bidân and Haratin) way of denoting  
   lineage affiliation, but is being increasingly dropped in recent years as the westernisation of   
   surnames increases, most especially in those exposed to the international scene, such as politicians  
   and businesspersons  
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skyscrapers in the place of today’s dusty and unsealed, garbage-strewn streets 
and crumbling cement or mud-brick lodgements 6.  
 
In beginning to draft up the 2006 annual budget in October 2005, the military 
Junta discovered what they considered irregularities in amendments to 
Woodside’s PSCs, and an acrimonious period of claims and counterclaims 
coincided with “First oil” in February 2006.  
 
It is now known that the oil and minor gas drawn from the Chinguetti reservoir 
was being produced from a much more complex, geological structure than had 
been anticipated from the seismic work carried out. Thus, the project should 
optimally have required much greater appraisal work than the simpler, and 
possibly rushed, program that was carried out. However, with what turned out 
to be the false promise of long-term sustained high flow rates, the sudden turn 
of events and the confrontation with the military Junta were a striking 
disappointment to Woodside and did not auger well for a relationship that had 
promised so much for all parties.  
 
The dispute continued until end-2006. In late 2006, Woodside, under the 
leadership of Don Volte, newly appointed as CEO to replace John Akehurst, 
retracted its claim of legitimacy for PSC amendments that had been agreed 
with President Taya’s overthrown government in 2004 and paid US$ 100 
million to Colonel Mohamed Vall’s military junta. In the meantime, after 
some six months of high oil production flow rates beginning in February 2006, 
production rapidly dropped to less than a tenth of that predicted and the 
expected long-term oil-revenue stream to the government began to dry up.  
 
In December 2007, an embittered Woodside eventually sold their Mauritania 
subsidiary at a book loss of some AUD 233 million to the Malaysian parastatal 
company Petronas and over the next two years, the Australian independent 
                                                 
6 Photo gallery: Photo 1 
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exited from several more of its African projects to re-concentrate on its 
Australian gas projects (Woodside 2008, 9). 
 
After the government’s loss of the promised revenue stream caused by the 
unpredicted geological difficulties, a period of social and political instability 
set in. following a seemingly free and fair presidential election in mid-20077, 
Mauritania’s  second elected civilian president, President Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi, was overthrown after one year in office on 6 August 2008. The 
perpetrators were military generals he had sacked from government posts the 
previous day. The coup leaders headed by the (now-General) Mohamed Abdel 
Aziz claimed that they had overthrown “an authoritarian regime” and set up a 
military Junta that, at first, received little international support.  
 
Forcing a formal resignation from the ousted civilian president in early 2008, 
General Abdel Aziz resigned from the military and, donning civilian clothes, 
contested and won the elections in July 2009, His Maure elite opponents 
regard this as a constitutional coup d’état, carried off through pandering to 
popular requests by the poorer Afro-Mauritanian section of the population. 
Although both international as well as major national support appears to 
justify Abdel Aziz’s continued presidency, many influential political parties 
eventually coalesced into the Mauritanian Opposition for Democracy (COD)8. 
Notably, several political public personalities also joined the COD: Colonel 
Ely Mohamed Vall, Abdel Aziz’s cousin and military Junta leader between 
2005 and 2007; the President of the National Assembly, Messaoud Ould 
Boulkheir; and Ahmed Hamza, influential mayor of Nouakchott. These parties 
and elites strongly rejected President Abdel Aziz’s regime and continue today 
to call for his resignation (Diagana, 2013). 
 
                                                 
7 According to the CENI, the independent National Electoral Commission, however contested by   
   many of the present research participants who participated as voters and election contenders 
8 The Mauritanian Opposition for Democracy, which includes notable political elites: Ahmed Ould  
   Daddah (brother of the ex-President, Jemil Mansour, Bab Mamadou Alassane, Mahfoud Ould  
   Bettah and Saleh Ould Hanane    
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The twenty-one year rule of President Taya, had been dictatorial, and although 
not marked by generally known coup attempts, had been a period of political 
instability, notably in view of the racial conflict that erupted in 1989. 
Following the 2005 coup d’état some six months before First-Oil, the country 
re-entered a period of recurring coup d’états, political intrigue, ethnic tensions 
and social upheavals reminiscent of the 1978-1984 period. Contrary to 
expectation, oil revenues dried up, exploration by foreign companies almost 
stopped and the global petroleum industry’s view of Mauritania soured. It was 
only in late 2012 that interest in the country’s petroleum  potential appeared 
to be recovering with the announcements that Tullow Oil plc was planning an 
offshore drilling programme and evaluating the development of a small gas 
discovery for local consumption. The French parastatal company, Total, is 
also evaluating a potentially significant gas discovery in Mauritania’s interior 
basin, although the harsh environment and present regional instability 
suggests that any progress to development will be challenging. 
 
Mauritania 
Mauritania is located on the northwest Atlantic coast of Africa, south of 
Morocco and north of Senegal. Its surface area is about a million square 
kilometres and generally consists of flat, arid plains or low, rolling hills dotted 
by occasional hardy desert shrubs and crossed by vast complexes of sand 
dunes covering several hundreds of kilometres and stretching tens of 
kilometres wide. This sahelian and desert landscape is broken only by 
spectacular ridges and cliffs that are in places several hundred metres high, 
and form the edge of the inland Taoudeni Basin9. 
 
This harsh, sparsely vegetated land is the traditional domain of nomadic and 
semi-nomadic Maures, a mixed-ethnic population of Arab, Berber and black 
African descent. The Maures are historically divided into approximately sixty 
tribes of interconnected descent groups that had lived a Bedouin-like existence 
until the severe drought beginning in the late 1960s. During this 10-year 
                                                 
9 Photo gallery: Photo 2 
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drought, possibly up to 95% of the nomadic Maure population migrated to 
urban centres, rapidly adapting their customs and behaviours to the new 
environment and lifestyle, moving from tents and camels to houses and four-
wheel drive vehicles.  
 
The Senegal River, which forms part of Mauritania’s southern frontier, flows 
within a wide fertile valley. It was and still is traditionally inhabited by 
sedentary black African settlements of several ethnic affiliations, the principal 
ones being, Wolof, Peulh, Soninké and Bambara. Historically, interaction 
between the Maures and the African communities occurred and commercial 
exchange did take place (Abdoul 2008, 31). However, these relations had 
principally been of a predatory nature, the nomads periodically descending 
from the dry north to use the fertile region as a base during the harsher summer 
seasons, and conducting raids for slaves and goods on the sedentary black 
settlements of the river valley. 
 
French merchants first established a commercial presence in 1659 at the mouth 
of the Senegal River. It grew over the years as European demand for Arabic 
gum, slaves and other goods increased. Black Africans of the Senegal River 
valley began to be “civilised” through missionary action and were in demand 
as able and keen workers by the French administrators. Although Christianity 
failed to make great inroads, education was given to sedentary black African 
youths that worked within the French realm of government and private 
activity. Many achieved relatively high office within the administration on the 
south bank of the Senegal River, in what would become the Republic of 
Senegal. After the Berlin Conference and the formulation of the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1885, the French government altered its interaction with the native 
population and began military occupation of the region, extending activities 
deep into the desert region to the north and northeast of the fertile Senegal 
River valley in an effort to subjugate the Maure nomads. Military 
confrontation continued until 1947, when the last battle was fought between 
the French colonising forces and the belligerent Bidân tribes of the region 
north of Tidjikja.  
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Exhausted after two World Wars, however, the French coloniser and the other 
Western powers occupying African soil began to relinquish their hold on the 
African communities. As per the demarcations of the Treaty of Berlin, France 
increasingly granted independence to regions of the continent under its 
control, including that today recognised as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 
or Mauritania for short.  
 
The borders of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania were officially declared 
and demarcated at independence by the former colonial powers of the region, 
Spain and France, on 28 November 1960. As witnessed by the almost straight-
line borders, this was done with little concern for cultural, geographic, ethnic 
or economic realities of the region. The multiple and enduring identities of the 
ethnicities inhabiting the demarcated area of today’s republic and spilling 
beyond it, have gelled over the centuries with differences further shaped by 
relationships between them, as well as resulting from contact with neighbours 
in the newly demarcated independent states around them. Morocco most 
vociferously objected to Mauritania’s independence, until 1969 calling that 
territory “Greater Morocco”, while both Senegal and Mali lost regions, which 
demographically, should have been demarcated as theirs. The citizens of the 
new independent state of Mauritania thus lacked a sense of national unity and 
shared destiny, and people’s loyalties and identities continued to be shaped, 
inter alia, by sub-national allegiances. 
 
Today, despite being rich in natural resources, Mauritania has one of the 
lowest Gross Domestic Products (GDP) rates in Africa. Agriculture and 
livestock is still at subsistence level, as the vast majority of Maure nomads 
and many Afro-Mauritanian subsistence farmers from the harsher more 
marginal regions of the Senegal River valley were forced into the cities by the 
severe, decade-long drought of the late-1960s.  
 
Mauritania has extensive deposits of iron ore centred at Zouérat in the north 
of the country, which account for almost 50% of total export revenues. Gold 
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and copper mining companies opened mines during the resource boom of the 
early 2000s, but at the time of writing, the longer-term future of these mining 
projects is not assured. Industrial manufacturing is non-existent, but fishing 
accounts for some 40% of export revenue and creates some 40,000 jobs, a 
major source of revenue for the state and elite class (Deida 2013, 88-89). The 
significant contribution to the small economy of post-colonial Mauritania in 
the exploitation of its several natural resources, would suggest a fertile ground 
for the emergence of social inequalities. Moreover, the dependence of 
Mauritania on these natural resources for its revenue makes it an interesting 
case on which to study the relationship between political stability and natural 
resource exploitation. 
 
Available background literature on Mauritania 
There is a range of French and English literature on Mauritania, most of which, 
however, does not deal with the role of natural resources and political change. 
Moreover, scholarly literature on Mauritania is more readily available in 
French with relatively few sources in English10. This French literature contains 
background information in a variety of areas including sociology, 
anthropology, history, politics and economics, as well as technical reports and 
articles dealing with petroleum and Africa. It is extensively, although not 
exclusively used and English language references on the politics of 
Mauritania, such as Foster’s “Mauritania: The struggle for Democracy” 
(2011) are also sources used in to the present research. 
 
Although many French sources were acquired and used as reference, one text 
from which the researcher extracted much information and appreciation of 
Mauritania was Mariella Villasante de Beauvais’s “Parenté et politique en 
Mauritanie: Essai d’Anthropologie historique” (1998). In this book, 
                                                 
10 Access to a potentially large source of French literature on Mauritania at the National Library in 
Paris proved to be difficult. The researcher thus personally acquired available and relevant texts in 
French in the course of several trips to specialist research bookshops in Paris and Nouakchott. The 
material acquired in this manner adequately filled the lack of access to more detailed information on 
the colonial period held in the National Library and  the research is believed not to have suffered 
unduly. 
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Villasante-de Beauvais highlights the characteristics of the politically 
dominant white Maure or Bidân society, which makes up some 30% of the 
population of modern Mauritania. She discusses relevant events of the late 19th 
to early 20th centuries that influenced the creation of the modern state. Her 
work also highlights the interaction of the Maure tribal society with the 
institution of democracy and other modern formal and informal institutions 
left in place after the colonial era. Her use of the term “tribe” is taken in the 
context of the Bidân society and is utilised in this sense within the present 
research. It is a translation of the Arabic word qabila, the term used in the 
same manner as the Maures would use it to describe themselves and their 
society. Related tribes are sometimes collectively referred to as “super tribes”, 
and are groups of related individuals linked genealogically, in reality or 
imagined, who develop exclusionary solidarity tendencies, termed Assabiya 
in Arabic. Assabiya expresses itself within the modern political arena with 
strong solidarity expressed between political elites of related tribes and the 
grouping together of Maure elites in general in the interest of ensuring Maure 
political hegemony within Mauritania. Tribal tendencies in the Maure have 
adapted to the socio-political changes that have historically shaped the 
population of the region (Villasante de Beauvais 1998, 16).  
 
“L’étrier, la Houe et le Livre: Société traditionelles au Sahara et au Sahel 
occidental”, by Francis de Chassey (1993) also provides useful information 
on traditional Maure society but also covers the traditions of the sedentary 
Afro-Mauritanian society of the river valley, which he refers to as the 
“Toucouleur”. The social fault-lines within Mauritanian society are also 
touched upon in this work.    
 
The main works in French that deal with military rule, commonly termed “The 
reign of the Colonels”, are Mohamed Lemine Ould Meymoun’s “La 
Mauritanie entre le pouvoir civil et le pouvoir militaire” (2011), and Isselmou 
Ould Mohamed’s “La Mauritanie des changements et de la continuité: 1978–
2008” (2009). The former is a discussion about the change from civilian to 
military rule, its various Maure representatives after each overthrow and a 
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collection of the official presentations and talks given by each presidential 
leader during their reign. Relations between Mauritania and France, its former 
colonial master, are acknowledged with the inclusion of several formal 
presentations by past and present presidents. Ould Mohamed’s work on the 
other hand is wide-ranging, dealing with poverty, resource management and 
international relations. In the conclusion, he asks whether Mauritania is still 
on track towards a true democracy. He considers whether the process of 
democratisation will be highjacked and re-defined in terms of traditional class 
and ethnic loyalties, something he sees as pushing the country towards further 
conflict.  
 
Phillipe Marchesin’s 2010 re-edition of his seminal “Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir 
en Mauritanie” provides a political perspective by a non-Mauritanian on the 
period from 1946 to the late 1980s, but contains no updates in view of the 
events of 1989-1991. Marchesin considers the binary nature of the modern 
Mauritanian society in greater depth than does de Chassey, highlighting the 
dangers of an ethnically fuelled presidential overthrow. He discerns that a 
presidential overthrow or ethnic fragmentation of the state could have 
occurred in the 1980s, and outlines conditions that instead would eventually 
lead to the 1989-1991 ethnic upheavals between tribal Maures and the Afro-
Mauritanians.  
 
An analysis of the specific period of ethnic-cum-racial upheaval of the late 
1980s and early 1990s is developed by the Afro-Mauritanian, Peulh, ex-army 
Commander Mahamadou Sy in “L’enfer d’Inal” (2000). Sy, one of the few 
surviving inmates of the prison of Inal, presents evidence of the involvement 
of ethnically divisive Baathist foreign influences financing the elements that 
precipitated the repressive events of the period, a premise widely believed by 
the Afro-Mauritanian community.  
 
Mohamadou Abdoul’s “Democratisation, ethnicité et tribalisme: Jeux 
identitaires et enjeux politiques en Mauritanie” (2008) delves into the 
trajectory that democracy has taken in Mauritania. His work deals with the 
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practice of politicised tribes and the new formulation of ‘lobbies’ and interest 
groups that he perceives as having grown out of the traditional tribal structure. 
Abdoul also touches on the Bidân-Haratin dichotomy, the fault-line between 
Maures and Afro-Mauritanians as well as the continuing attempts at the 
formulation of an Arabised nation, something that is dividing the population 
along ethnic-racial lines. Abdoul, also a contributor to “L’ouest saharien: 
Regards sur la Mauritanie”, emphasises that tribalism is the social practice of 
the “white” Mauritanian tribes (Bidân), while “observable behaviours” of 
Afro-Mauritanians (Peulh especially, but also Wolof, Soninké, Bambara, etc) 
are, as he calls them, “manifestations of an ethnic characteristic”. Abdoul 
justifies himself by indicating that “cette catégorisation va de soi et est 
évidente”11 (Abdoul 2008, 33), or in other words, that this is a most practical, 
accepted and observable means of categorising and recognising individuals 
and groups. He puts forward that daily life in Mauritania is being governed by 
tribalistic tendencies of the Maure and the somewhat broader ethnic solidarity 
of the Afro-Mauritanian, although inter-ethnic conflict among the Afro-
Mauritanians does erupt at times depending on particular situations.  
 
The potentially disruptive dichotomy between white Maures or Bidân, and 
black Maures or Haratin is analysed by El-Arby Ould Saleck in “Les Haratins: 
Le paysage politique mauritanien” (2003). Saleck’s work is based on the 
earlier “Noirs et beydanes Mauritaniens: l’école, creuset de la nation?” (Ba, 
1993).  
 
Several more works provided a base upon which the present research is 
grounded. “La Mauritanie contre vente et marées” (2003) is an autobiography 
by Moktar Ould Daddah which elaborates on the post-colonial formation of 
the sovereign state and the difficult formative years of the new republic under 
his presidency until his overthrow in July 1978. His widow, a passionate 
political activist pushing for the eradication of poverty and discrimination in 
                                                 
11 “… This classification is self-evident…” (researcher’s translation) 
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Mauritania, was met and interviewed by the researcher in November 2011, but 
she declined to be an active participant in the present research 
 
“Les trajectoires d’un état-frontière”, (2004) edited by Prof. Zekeria Ould 
Ahmed Salem is a collection of academic papers on the political evolution and 
the changing social context of Mauritania as it has evolved until the time of 
writing. Professor Ould Ahmed Salem was one of the most informative 
participants in the present research, throwing light on several aspects of 
Mauritania’s societal complexities, including the relation of his tribe, the 
Smacides, to the political power struggles that occurred between 2001 and 
2011.  
 
Lastly, “Où va la Mauritanie” (2008) by ex-Minister Abdelkader Isselmou 
constitutes a critical evaluation of Mauritania’s path to an unpredictable 
future. Isselmou is also a most prominent participant in the present research. 
He offered insight into the recorded discussions that form a vital part of the 
research, decisive moments of the “Woodside Affair”, and Mauritania’s 
historical legacy in the context of contemporary Mauritania.    
 
The “Oil Curse” 
The oil curse hypothesis, especially as applied to Africa, refers to the apparent 
paradox that those countries with an abundance of natural resources, 
particularly  more abundant point-source non-renewable resources such as 
petroleum (oil and/or gas) or minerals, tend to have economic growth stifled 
and political stability shaken after production starts and windfall revenues 
begin to flow (Campbell 2009, Clarke 2007, Clarke 2008, Collier 2007, 
Ghazvinian 2007, Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007, Nhema and Zeleza 
2008, Soares de Oliveira 2007, Shaxson 2007a and 2007b).  Thus, for 
resource-rich African countries, the results that emerge out of resource wealth 
are worse economic, social, political and security development outcomes – or 
a combination of these – than in countries with fewer natural resources.  
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In addition to reduced economic growth, other purported effects of the “oil 
curse” include: poor governance, a decline in trust between the government 
and the population, erosion of the rule of law, corruption, rent-seeking; an 
intensified struggle for control of political leadership, a lack of diversification 
of industries and the crowding out of investment in human capital (Campbell 
op. cit., and Clarke 2008, 524-541).  
 
However, blaming petroleum for the social, economic and political and 
security ills that befall a country, especially in Africa, has, in the words of 
petroleum economist, Duncan Clarke (op. cit, 4) become “ultra-fashionable” 
and professed by writers who have “composed from afar, without...[their] feet 
getting too wet on the ground” (op. cit, 36). Clarke ascertains that this blame-
game, however, brings no real solution to the issues at hand for Mauritania, or 
indeed those faced by other African countries that are finding themselves on 
a similarly troubled development path. The argument adds to the on-going 
debate in both scholarly and policy literature on resource endowments and 
economic and political stability. 
 
Rather than further discussing the oil curse here, the different considerations 
that the hypothesis takes are more deeply examined in a later chapter dealing 
with the relevant literature. This is done once the historical background of 
Mauritania has been exposed and the time of the discovery of petroleum has 
been reached. The various arguments on the oil curse and the evolution of 
this hypothesis are examined with emphasis given to the complex 
relationship between political instability and resource-endowment.  
 
The review illustrates that the approaches, purely economic, then social and 
contextual, to the most recent global and encompassing discussions that 
review international interrelationships and influences, were each appropriate 
for their time.  
Today’s proponents, and the avenue that the present research adheres to, 
appropriately views political instability in a global context, proposing 
international interference plays a major role in the political instability of 
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resource-rich developing countries. As an outcome of this latest development 
in the resource or oil curse thesis, the realisation transpires that the 
sovereignty of states is not the sacrosanct edifice that the builders of nations 
had originally intended. 
  
The Research Question 
In the light of current debates about resource endowments and political 
stability, the principle research question is as follows: What role, if any, has 
the development of the petroleum industry played in the heightened political 
instability and related social and political effects that have characterised 
Mauritania from 2001 to the present?  
 
This thesis specifically examines the possible link between the emerging 
petroleum industry in Mauritania and the occurrence of various coup d’états 
that occurred between May 2001 (the time of oil discovery in offshore 
Mauritania) and 2011. The thesis also tentatively addresses the significance of 
continuing socio-political disruptions up to the time of writing (mid-2013). 
The conclusion drawn from the present research is that, while the discovery 
of oil may have played some role in heightened ethnic and political instability 
in Mauritania, such instability was largely the result of a complex set of 
interrelated historical and contemporary causes related to a range of problems 
facing the country. These include an institutional system of rent-seeking and 
the unequal distribution of power, pre-oil uneven patterns of economic and 
social development, sub-national loyalties and interest coalitions competing 
for power and resources, a limited development of representative and 
transparent institutions of governance, Mauritania’s place within West 
African regional politics, and continued foreign interference, principally from 
France. It is argued that the discovery of oil in 2001 and the development of a 
petroleum industry in 2005, acted as a minor precipitant to the re-emergence 
of political rivalry centred on ethnic/racial structures of long-standing. In 
particular, inter-tribal Bidân political rivalries, with deep historical roots, 
manifested themselves in other ways until the discovery of oil, and were the 
key catalyst to the socio-political upheavals in Mauritania between 2001 and 
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2011. Initially, the discovery of oil encouraged rent seeking by various Maure 
tribal groups but this was cut short by the failure of the industry to deliver the 
promised windfall revenue stream. The loss of revenue, nevertheless, did not 
result in any decline in inter-tribal Maure rivalry, nor in the potential for ethnic 
upheavals, which continue to manifest themselves in many ways.  
 
The research is guided by the following specific objectives: 
 To provide an historical background relevant to an understanding of 
the present-day social, political and economic development of 
Mauritania. 
 To examine the theoretical and empirical literature on what has 
become known as the theory of the “Oil Curse” in Africa and its 
relevance for Mauritania; 
 To analyse the complex relations of the country’s political and ethnic 
elites over the period 2001 to 2011, and determine the influence they 
have had on Mauritanian’s nascent petroleum industry. The effect of 
the emergence of political upheavals on the industry’s development is 
examined, as well as the effect of the petroleum industry, in its turn, 
on the political landscape of Mauritania. 
 
The thesis points away from the petroleum industry and towards socio-
political events of an ethnic nature with some outside interference. However, 
Mauritania’s ethnic and racial fault-lines manifest themselves in a wide 
variety of ways, including struggles over control of the revenues of the state. 
The windfall revenues that may be generated if the petroleum industry does 
grow in the future will undoubtedly play some role in the country’s politics 
but as one component of a wider political economy of resource appropriation 
and distribution.   
 
Participants and Researcher 
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The researcher has had extensive and close contact with the Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania over some twenty years12. Although an Arabic dialect, 
Hassaniya, is the official language of Mauritania, French is a common 
language spoken by Maures and Afro-Mauritanians alike. The researcher is 
fluent in French, which allowed him to participate in the specific cultural 
context of the study. Advantageous to the present research were the 
researcher’s advanced linguistic ability, mature age, and affable personality, 
depth of previous in-country experience, multicultural background and high 
level of sensitivity towards local people. As a result, much of the knowledge 
of the history, social context and political landscape that are referred to in this 
thesis was absorbed over the researcher’s twenty years of exposure, and 
through long discussions over those years with Mauritanian academics, 
politicians and citizens from all occupations.  
 
Where appropriate or specifically relevant, the source of specific information 
or opinion is acknowledged. Where historical facts are evident or common 
knowledge, they are introduced without acknowledgement of the source. The 
information used includes that exchanged in the course of the interviews 
carried out with participants in this research. As above, where appropriate or 
specifically relevant, information is included as referenced quotes from 
individual participants. This is done especially where the participant was 
observed to place specific emphasis on events and situations that have given 
shape to both Mauritanians’ worldviews, and/or outsiders’ views of 
Mauritania, as with the quotes at the beginning of this thesis. 
 
A review of the most relevant work done by academics on Mauritania and the 
“oil curse” was carried out in order to come to a broad understanding of the 
research question. These sources were approached with a critical eye to how 
much theoretical clarity and coherence they demonstrated, the extent to which 
                                                 
12 In 2006, the researcher was awarded the title of Officer of the Order of National Merit of the  
    Islamic Republic of Mauritania in recognition of his contribution to establishing the petroleum and  
    mining industry. It was at the time the second such award, the first having been granted many years  
    before to President Charles de Gaulle.   
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they are based on actual fieldwork in Mauritania, and the particular 
standpoints of the authors and how these shaped the conclusions reached.  
 
 In the current study, significant weight is given to qualitative analysis of 
primary sources, that is, interviews conducted over the course of 2011 and 
2012 with participants in Mauritania’s recent history13. These participants 
were the real actors and first-hand witnesses in the conflicts of Mauritania, 
people that are often not considered in social science research because 
“indigenes” are believed “not to generally produce documents or to refuse to 
give testimonies of their experiences” to an “outsider” researcher (Bwenge 
2005, 97). The use of interviews enables the best possible access to voices 
with the greatest contextual knowledge of particular events being researched. 
Moreover, interviews enable active and influential as well as passive actors 
involved in socio-political situations and events to have a voice that “has been 
traditionally bypassed [in Africa] and ignored in the production of knowledge 
about [African] societies” (Osaghae and Robinson 2005, 4).  
 
Difficulties were at first experienced in obtaining the cooperation of 
Mauritanians of one ethnic group or another, but especially that of the Bidân. 
In studies such as this, “indigenous” participants often view a researcher’s 
questions as a threat and this would be especially true in this case, of 
participants who had been important actors in shaping the events that shook 
Mauritania between 1989 and 1991. For some participants, giving their 
version of events can feel like a betrayal of the “clique”, or they might view 
questions as an intrusion on personal privacy (Bwenge 2005, 96-98). In the 
current study, the researcher’s familiarity with Mauritania and Mauritanians 
alike, helped to lessen such objections. Thus, it has been possible to portray 
the evolving character of Mauritanian society through the voices of its 
principal actors; actors that have been instrumental in shaping today’s 
Mauritania.  
 
                                                 
13 A list of the participants is presented after the references  
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Preoccupation with “objectivity” often causes researchers to seek “objective 
facts” in order to explain Africa’s conflicts. However, the “study of facts as if 
they were things” undermines the reality that, “on the ground”, participants’ 
worldviews or beliefs about facts, especially those of powerful people, often 
matter far more than the “raw facts” themselves. These beliefs may become 
catalysts for conflict in their own right. For example, “ethnicity”, engendering 
feelings of belonging and exclusion, can give rise to passions, emotions, 
instincts and rancour, but these are not often taken into account because of the 
academic’s wish to remain scientific (Bwenge 2005, 96). The present research 
thus focuses on the beliefs and actions of the more powerful members of 
Mauritanian society in order to draw out differing viewpoints and evaluate the 
capacity of these elites to mobilise support for their viewpoints to create the 
perceived realities “on the ground”. The emotional, spontaneous and intuitive 
expressions of minor and passive actors have also been used in the present 
research. These are views that in the past had held lesser validity with outside 
researchers (Smyth 2005, 18), but which today are being used much more 
frequently to offer real-world solutions to social problems lying at the root of 
the conflicts being researched (Bwenge 2005, 90-109). Complementary to 
Foster (2011), the present study is one of the first, to draw on first-hand 
accounts of political and social events during the period of interest. 
 
Sklar (1993, 83-87) points out political elites of traditional African nations 
involved in certain situations have often been ignored by researchers who were 
examining these African states. Bank and Bank (2013) likewise emphasises 
that there is a need to carry out research “at the ground level” and to come to 
terms with the contribution of the ordinary Africans and their worldviews 
(Bank 2013, 68). 
 
Voice is thus given in the present research to principal as well as minor actors 
that have played both active and passive roles in the events that are the subject 
of this academic enquiry on Mauritania. It relies heavily on participant 
narratives in the course of structured and unstructured interviews as a primary 
source of evidence. The interviews allowed participants to speak about their 
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own experiences in events that were directly related to the coups or past events 
when felt to be relevant to the question at hand. Thus, while still referring to 
important texts and documentation, the emphasis of the present research has 
as its primary concern, an attempt to bring an understanding of the events that 
occurred between 2001 and 2011 through some of the very Mauritanian actors 
that were involved with the social events and political moves that occurred 
during these years.  
 
These participant voices give ‘knowledge of Mauritania produced by 
Mauritanians’, although it is recognised that any account is partial, including 
that of the researcher. The partiality of viewpoints means that participants, 
including members of the political elite, can be blind or unwilling to deal with 
or confront certain aspects of their societies or events that had occurred. This 
can be the result of participants having been too close to a particular event or 
situation they were describing; a lack of interest or curiosity; or in some cases, 
a sense of hopelessness and even anger as a result of the event. In some 
emotionally charged interview situations, the researcher sought to probe 
particular events with caution and to allow participants to express their views 
without unnecessary interference. Emotionally charged responses, 
nevertheless, should not be interpreted as somehow more biased or less 
authentic than those elicited in what may be interpreted as a more calm and 
rational context. The particular nature of responses to questions meant that the 
researcher compared responses across a range of participants to seek out 
consistencies and patterns. If multiple sources agreed or where diverse 
opinions could be explained, the information was used as supporting evidence. 
 
It is also understood, that the researcher’s attitude and standpoint may 
themselves have generated a priori conclusions and filtered data, finding 
supporting arguments to strengthen preferred claims14. This is inevitable as 
the researcher himself has his personal worldview, participating as a 
significant actor in the very industry of exploration for petroleum being 
                                                 
14 A claim levelled at the researcher because he is a geologist and a petroleum entrepreneur   
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investigated and having a personal involvement in the economic and socio-
political fabric of the country through his business activity. Effort was made 
to minimise bias in reporting interviews, supplying data, or in prejudicing the 
selection of participants who held differing views to those of the researcher.  
 
The researcher attempted to include in the interviewing, as wide a range of 
participants as possible so they reflected the known composition of the general 
Mauritania population (30% Bidân, 30% Afro-Mauritanian and 40% Haratin). 
The interviews were carried out in as uniform a manner as possible. 
Significantly, the information collected consisted of some 1.2 million KB of 
transcribed information that was subject to a qualitative analysis using the 
computer-assisted software package, NVivo-9. 
 
Methodology  
The method used was qualitative and based on primary field research carried 
out in 2011-2012. The fieldwork primarily consisted of 53 one-on-one 
interviews with dominantly male Mauritanians and participants in the 
petroleum industry that were both passive and active actors in the 
establishment of the industry in Mauritania between 2001 and 2011. The 
selection process is discussed in detail in the next chapter. In addition, articles 
from Mauritanian daily newspapers and online news websites, and secondary 
academic and popular literature covering the period 2001 to early 2014 at time 
of writing were also used.  
 
The primary research question is explored by first providing an historical 
background to the emergence of Mauritania as a complex multi-ethnic society. 
The narrative goes back to prehistory to show the arrival into the region of the 
various ethnic groups present today, the crystallisation of the ethnic entities 
and moves on to the formation of the independent state of the Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania and the socio-political upheavals that have marked the evolution 
of the state to date. The purpose of examining the historical aspect of the 
research question is to focus the research on three variables, which are 
considered of prime importance. The first is the development and parallel 
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evolution of formal institutions, such as the western-imposed government and 
the army, together with the institutions of ethnicity and tribalism with their 
roots in the pre-colonial past. A second variable is the historically constructed 
social and political context that shaped the actions of elites and actors in the 
events that mark the period 2001 to 2011. The third variable is that of the ways 
in which the formal and informal institutions of governance, rooted in the 
historic fabric of a complex society, shaped the development of the new state, 
and helped frame the actions and choices of active and passive players alike.  
 
Significance 
The significance of the present research is threefold. It will contribute to a 
general understanding of the causes of political conflict and conflict resolution 
in resource-dependent African countries. It will provide new empirical 
material on the relationship between resource dependency, economic growth 
and political and economic instability.  
 
Lastly, it contributes to the wider policy debates on how best to manage 
natural resources development planning in order to ensure balanced economic 
outcomes for developing countries in Africa and elsewhere with similar social 
and political environments to that of Mauritania. 
 
Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 2 outlines the research methodology and expands on the choice of 
research design. The evolving nature of interview methods and questions is 
discussed and key participants are presented.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore the historical trajectory of Mauritania from a 
prehistoric sparsely populated land to a region that has served as a crossroads 
and a final migratory destination for several groups of ethnically diverse 
peoples, including black Africans from the southeast, Arabic tribes from the 
Far East, Berber migrations from the north, and finally French colonialists. 
The French, after only a brief military colonial expansion into West Africa, 
were forced to abandon their imperial possession after WWII. This retirement 
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from active and formal governance was replaced by a new political economic 
relationship that allowed the former colonial master to continue to play a 
major role in the country’s political and economic development from 
independence until the nascence of the petroleum industry today.  
 
Concentrating on the petroleum industry, Chapter 5 examines the varying 
interpretations that various commentators have given to the effects of the 
establishment of such a natural resource industry in an underdeveloped 
African country. Academic debates over the concept of the “Oil Curse” are 
examined. The chapter argues that resource endowment and development and 
topically petroleum endowment, played a less important role in Mauritania’s 
development than some versions of the “oil curse” thesis would assert. It gives 
greater weight to wider sub-national, national and international social, 
economic and political processes in shaping leadership’s behaviour and 
decisions. Chapter 6 specifically examines the relevance of the “oil curse” 
theme to Mauritania.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter 7, summarises the main findings of the research, 
discusses the contribution they make to the relationship between political 
change and natural resource development, and the practical policy 
implications of this relationship for the future development of the country’s 
oil and mineral wealth. The thesis closes with proposed avenues for future 
research, paying particular attention to the need for research on the wider civil 
society and the problems of poverty, unemployment, ethnicity, 
marginalisation and discrimination, problems affecting Mauritania as well as 
other oil-rich underdeveloped countries with similar socio-political 
landscapes.  
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Chapter 2 – Research Design and Methodology  
 
This chapter outlines the research methodology and explains the choice of 
research design and methods used in the study. 
 
In order to meet the research objectives within a set time and situational 
limitations, the design and implementation of the fieldwork research is 
qualitative. This method is suited to the social and cultural environment of 
Mauritania and to the time and personal financial resources available for the 
project.  
 
The qualitative nature of the project involved extensive interviews with people 
of diverse ethnic, economic and political backgrounds. Gaining access to such 
people took time, patience and the use of personal networks. The researcher’s 
long association with Mauritania allowed privileged access to selected 
participants, including many past and present senior government officials 
associated with the 2005 military Junta. Many of the selected participants, and 
particularly high office holders and Bidân elites, were chosen because they 
were in a particular situation, or of a particular group, that gave them a vantage 
point that allowed them to be the most knowledgeable about a particular issue 
or event. The researcher was also able to interview a sample of Mauritanians 
of diverse ethnic background and social class from the wider civil society. 
This was achieved through the researcher’s personal networks built up over 
some twenty years. The researchers’ familiarity with Mauritanian society 
allowed him to move relatively freely in particular private and public spaces. 
In the remainder of the chapter, the research site, recruitment and sampling 
procedures are discussed, including the steps taken to ensure quality, validity 
and reliability of data collection and processing. Both university protocols as 
well as local-situational ethical considerations to do with research in an 
Islamic country, guided the present study.  
 
Research method 
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As advocated by Malinowski (1922), the research approach is to “grasp the 
native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world”15. 
For the present research, it meant bringing out a range of Mauritanians’ 
conceptions of key events and situations that surrounded the establishment of 
the petroleum industry and link those views to past events and developments 
in the country. Participant interviews were carried out in French, a commonly 
spoken language in Mauritania across the many ethnic communities of the 
country. For the majority of participants, French was their second language. 
This meant that interviews were recorded and then transcribed, translating 
selected passages into English text for inclusion in this thesis. Interviews were 
transcribed in most cases verbatim and little paraphrasing was used. This 
brought out the personalised meanings of events and situations, as 
conceptualised and interpreted in the mind of participants.  
 
The researcher carried out interviews in a variety of settings, including the 
home or garden of the participant16, the garden of the hotel residence in 
Nouakchott, and the street17.  
 
Participants were asked a range of questions relating to the current political 
situation in the country and the earlier development of the petroleum industry 
from 2001 to the present. To this end, the appropriate data collection 
strategies, adapted to the environmental constraints of Mauritania, were at first 
conducted through structured interviews and a standard set of questions for 
which specific answers were recorded. As the questioning was carried out 
during the first field research period between March and June 2011, including 
a short pilot-study in Mali, the formal questionnaire18 was successively 
adapted to allow for more open-ended participant responses. Participants 
reacted in a more informal and open manner, sometimes speaking at length, 
                                                 
15 Note that Malinowski only interviewed males. Restrictions on relations between women and  
    unrelated men are strong in Mauritanian society, although this varies across ethnic groups. It was  
    thus decided to focus on male respondents, as they were the key actors during the period covered by  
    this research.    
16 Photo gallery: Photo 3 
17 Photo gallery: Photo 4 
18 Appendix 1 
 Page 45 
 
when dealing with particular questions with which they showed more 
familiarity or in which they saw themselves as being more involved19. As the 
method of interviewing changed over time from relatively structured 
questions to questions of a more open-ended nature, it allowed the researcher 
to probe more deeply into the participants’ views20, and particularly 
concerning important events in Mauritania’s past.  
 
This necessary incremental change in interview style required flexibility and 
adaptability in response to participant-researcher interactions and exposure to 
participants’ multiple perspectives21. The interviews, dependent on 
participants’ knowledge but also on their comprehension and verbal skills, 
rapidly became open, in-depth discussions on specific social, political and 
economic aspects of Mauritania tailored to the participants’ worldviews. 
Three Afro-Mauritanian women out of 53 participants were interviewed, 
reflecting the patriarchal and male-dominated structure of Mauritanian 
society. The only Bidân woman to be heard in the course of this research is 
the wife of Mr Dahi, Chief of Cabinet of Colonel Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall 
and long-standing lawmaker in Mauritania. Cutting into an interview with her 
husband conducted over a Maure meal at his residence, a meal that was 
untraditional in that she and their daughter were present, her blunt and clear 
accusations that Woodside “had done wrong to the community in departing 
from Mauritania” was in contrast to his measured responses.  
 
 Following the initial research-specific visit to Mauritania between March and 
June 2011 in which a majority of Afro-Mauritanians were interviewed, the 
later visit to Nouakchott between November 2011 and January 2012 involved 
mostly Bidân and Haratin participants. 
 
As the field research advanced and interviews with Bidân, Haratin and Afro-
Mauritanians began to be reviewed in the field, it became clear that each 
                                                 
19 Photo gallery: Photo 5 
20 Contrast here Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
21 Photo gallery: Photo 6, 7, 8  
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individual participant’s worldview was grounded in the historical events that 
long preceded the advent of the petroleum industry in 2001. The investigative 
approach thus required a multidisciplinary stance involving aspects of history, 
anthropology, sociology, politics and economics.  
 
There were occasions when participants avoided answering some questions. 
This was respected but raised in the researcher’s mind new questions about 
why this had occurred. One way in which the researcher dealt with this was to 
listen to other people’s accounts or views in order to try to ascertain indirectly 
something about why some participants refused to answer certain questions. 
Another approach was to rephrase the question and approach it less directly to 
allow an answer of a more general nature22. The most delicate issue related to 
the period of government-sanctioned ethnic conflict between 1989 and 1991. 
When questioned, all Bidân without exception and most Afro-Mauritanians 
grew silent and unresponsive. This sensitive subject had touched most 
Mauritanians and the researcher avoided asking direct questions on the 
imprisonment and torture of Afro-Mauritanians by the Bidân government at 
Inal. Other issues that proved sensitive were ethnic disparity in government 
postings, as well as slavery in general. This was especially so with the often 
opulently wealthy Bidân who welcomed me into their luxurious homes and, 
on hearing my questions, felt a level of unease about the dozens of poorly-
dressed black “servants” that tended to their white families and dwellings. An 
issue that also proved to be sensitive with Bidân was the presence of terrorists 
on Mauritanian soil. Nevertheless, Mohamed Fall Ould Bah23 did invite the 
researcher to take part in a presentation by invitation only on the development 
of terrorism in West Africa. In addition, the meaning of the Arab Spring for 
Mauritania was discussed and delivered by Jean-Pierre Filiu, a French political 
writer and commentator, (Filiu, 2009 and 2011).  
  
                                                 
22 Photo gallery: Photo 9 
23 Well-read Bidân accountant interviewed 12 December 2011 (interview 32A) who had completed  
    a doctorate through a French university in 2010 and published a book from his research on banking      
    practices in the Islamic republic of Mauritania 
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In addition, other methods of data collection were adopted including reference 
to standard historical studies of Mauritanian and West Africa. Information 
dealing with Mauritania’s pre-colonial, colonial and contemporary history 
was obtained from standard historical studies of Mauritania and of West 
Africa and from particular recordings of public speeches by political orators 
such as President Moktar Ould Daddah, President Mitterrand and President 
Giscard d’Estaing, and contemporaneous political campaigners such as 
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir and Biram (Ould) Dah (Ould) Abeid24. Other 
sources were radio programmes and opportunistically recorded snatches of 
conversations with members of the Mauritanian community. Importantly, 
various printed newspapers and magazine articles were collected over the 
period November 2010 to September 2013, while pertinent online press 
articles were collected in the course of almost daily access to Mauritanian 
news websites over the period 2010 to 2013. In addition, the researcher was 
able to view, and in one case acquire government documents and company-
approved transcripts that shed light on certain aspects of the core research 
questions. 
 
In choosing the data collection strategies, the informative and organisational 
value, the financial cost and the ethical content of the data had to be evaluated. 
Accordingly, some data was discarded as inappropriate or it remained as 
background information to the arguments presented. This was the case for 
example with an invitation to participate in a meeting of a dissident group, 
following an interview with a member of the “Mouvement du 25 février”25. It 
may have added information to the research, especially regarding 
contemporary political activities in the capital, Nouakchott. However, the 
researcher did not attend this meeting because it involved interactions with 
active political dissidents operating in an autocratic military regime and 
presented a personal security risk for the researcher as well as potentially 
compromising his access to mainstream politicians.  
                                                 
24 Biram Ould Dah Ould Abeid received the UN Human Rights Award on 6 December 2013 for his  
    efforts in denouncing the continuation of slavery in Mauritania (Ait Akdim 2013, 17), .  
25 Photo gallery: Photo 9 
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As a former player in the establishment of the petroleum industry in 
Mauritania, the researcher was conscious of the need to avoid bringing a 
predetermined set of perceptions and underlying beliefs to the research 
process. Although information was sought on the “Mouvement du 25 février”, 
no reliable published information or written works expressing the views of 
this political movement could be accessed on the worldwide web. Refusal to 
attend the “25 février” meeting may indeed represent a bias in sampling by the 
researcher, but ethical and strategic reasons prevailed. The researcher, 
nevertheless, attempted to offset and mitigate this effect by seeking responses 
from as wide a variety of individuals as possible. The researcher managed to 
gather over a hundred personal interviews with individuals that included a 
Hartani night watchman, the Junta leader Ely Mohamed Vall, who led the 
military government between 2005 and 2007, and many others at intermediate 
levels in the socio-economic structure of Mauritania. The interviews obtained 
are considered to have captured a wide cross-section of Mauritanian citizens.  
  
Research design  
 Throughout the period of field data collection, the researcher attempted to 
avoid personal engagement with participants known for almost two decades. 
Nevertheless, a beneficial result of familiarity with the researcher was that a 
number of participants opened up in conversations about certain aspects of 
their daily lives, as they would have rarely done with strangers. One 
participant in particular26, a close friend of the researcher, provided revealing 
information about historical interactions between Afro-Mauritanians and 
Maures. 
 
                                                 
26 M’Boye Ould Arafa was the Director General of the Department of Geology, Mines and Energy   
    at the time of the researcher’s first visit to Mauritania in 1994-1995. He was responsible for getting  
    the researcher interested  in evaluating the petroleum prospectivity of the offshore of Mauritania  
    and facilitating the start of the petroleum industry for his country. Because of personal vendettas  
    and political manoeuvring, he remains unrecognised and unrewarded for his efforts to this day. He  
    is a Torkoz Bidân, whose parents migrated to the Tagant region and were integrated into the  
    Idaouali Tribe.  
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It was made clear at the beginning of each interview that the researcher sought 
to be impartial. Each participant was informed at the beginning of an interview 
that the use of the participant’s name in this thesis and any subsequent 
publications would only be used with his or her permission. Each participant 
was informed that withdrawal from the research was possible at any time 
during the interview or in later encounters until April 2013, when the drafting 
of the research document began, and that access to the recorded information 
was open only to the researcher and his supervisor until 2019. Almost all 
potential participants agreed to participate further.  
 
The first meeting with all participants consisted of presenting the authorisation 
and explanatory forms requested by Curtin University27, including the 
application for ethical approval to show that this university-backed research 
project was for educational purposes only. Then the formal two-page personal 
questionnaire was completed. This introductory part of the interview lasted 
some fifteen minutes. In the course of the fourth interview it was realised that 
much recording time and therefore material to be later transcribed was 
generated which added little value to the research. This portion of interviews 
was thus not recorded in subsequent meetings. 
 
Group interviews were also attempted following some success in the pilot 
study conducted in Mali, which involved at least one paid research assistant 
who acted as witness28. However, most Mauritanian participants preferred to 
conduct their interviews on a one-on-one basis with no witness taking any 
direct part in the session29. Several participants, primarily because of their 
deep involvement in the issues discussed, were willing to pass long hours 
answering questions or expanding on certain topics close to their heart, even  
at all hours of the day or night. A number were willing to meet again for more 
                                                 
27 Appendix 3 and 4 
28 Photo gallery: Photo 10 
29 This may reflect the strong Mauritanian character of distrust of “the other”, an element of their    
    worldview, possibly evolved from living in the Sahara desert in a frugal and frontier manner 
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than one session, allowing the interactive sessions to develop from merely 
answering the formal questionnaire into ongoing in-depth personal 
conversations around sensitive topics.  
  
Field interviews 
The sample of selected participants was intended to draw broad and valid 
conclusions concerning the worldviews of the larger Mauritanian population 
from a qualitative viewpoint. As “saturation point” was achieved in the 
answers received to the key topics, the number of participants, 53, was 
considered representative of the general Mauritanian population and their 
differing worldviews, for the depth of inquiry required of this project. 
 
Two periods of four weeks and eleven weeks were spent in the field, gathering 
information from a diverse range of individuals to saturation point – that is, 
until recounted experiences and stories were repeated and similar answers to 
standard questions began to be recorded.   
 
The approach allowed each participant to provide a personal sketch of 
Mauritania as the participant perceived it. It allowed the mapping of diverse 
responses to the socio-political events that occurred around them, and in which 
they were, at times, deeply involved. Qualitative analytical methods were used 
to tease out answers to the research questions through integrating related sets 
of participants’ verbal, and at times non-verbal, responses.  
 
Pilot Study: Bamako, Mali -.11 to 31 March 2011 
Prior to going to Mauritania, three weeks were spent between 11 March 2011 
and 31 March 2011 in Bamako, the capital of nearby Mali. The purpose was 
primarily to use a similar socio-political environment to test the 
appropriateness of the research approach to be used in Mauritania.  
 
The trial interviews in Mali were officially approved by the government and 
were designed as a pilot study to evaluate the validity of the group 
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participation and the one-on-one interview approaches as means of eliciting 
relevant information from willing participants in this African setting.  
 
Importantly, the pilot study was used to evaluate the feasibility of acquiring a 
significant number of participants willing to be interviewed, through a 
combination of opportunistic, convenience, referral and judgemental sampling 
procedures. In this sampling approach, members of a population were at first 
chosen based on their relative ease of access. For instance, hotel employees 
known for many years were interviewed, followed by subsequent referral 
sampling, where further interview participants referred were judged and 
chosen for their appropriateness or usefulness or expertise in providing 
specific information relevant to the research. 
 
The combined sampling techniques are all considered non-probabilistic, in 
that they do not meet the criteria of the sample being representative, in 
mathematical terms, of the “whole population”. However, the sampling 
techniques used − opportunistic, convenience, referral and judgmental − 
selected participants that did provide information from differing points of 
view and from different social backgrounds in the society. This procedure is 
appropriate where a sample deemed statistically representative of the 
population is impossible or inappropriate to access due to any number of 
reasons, including cultural constraints, problems of determining the base 
populations for sampling, financial consideration, and where access to 
individuals is difficult due to security concerns. 
 
The sampling techniques tested in Mali and subsequently used in Mauritania, 
were rooted in the researcher’s long relationships with people from diverse 
occupations and lifestyles in both countries. In the course of the pilot study in 
Bamako, the researcher opportunistically selected initial willing participants. 
They were hotel employees known over many years, who in turn recruited 
further participants from among their social contacts30. For example, after 
                                                 
30 Photo gallery: Photos 6 
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having discussed the pilot project with and interviewed Mr Demba Sidibé, the 
hotel manager at a Bamako hotel, it was subsequently possible to interview 
some twenty members of his Malian staff chosen for their diverse ethnic 
origins. This sample included Mme Sallama Konaté, the PR Manager, who 
was then herself influential in convincing her uncle, Dr Ba, President of the 
National Assembly, to be interviewed on several occasions.  
 
The first interview with Dr Ba was in a formal sitting in the hotel lobby, where 
he answered the first-draft formal questionnaire list. Subsequently, Dr Ba 
consented to be interviewed and for audio recordings to be made on specific 
sensitive aspects of the socio-political environment of Mali. 
 
Adopting such a contingent approach to sampling facilitated the development 
of the research agenda in both the pilot study in Mali and research in 
Mauritania, and the appropriate level of participant involvement and diversity 
was achieved. In the course of the Malian pilot study, it was found that 
modifications to questions and methods of interviewing were required. In 
particular, religious devoutness, ethnic affiliation, socio-economic status and 
political conviction had to be given greater consideration since they all played 
a vital part in the way the questionnaire was presented.  
 
It was only on rare occasions that any approach solicited a negative response 
and a refusal to participate.  
 
The researcher changed styles of interview as well as the types of questions, 
depending upon participants’ socio-economic status, ethnic characteristics and 
“proximity” (having a pre-existing personal relationship with the researcher). 
 
The pilot study verified that open questions were less productive with 
participants of lower socio-economic standing, in spite of a long acquaintance 
with the researcher. This was due to a lack of knowledge of particular events 
or issues as well as unfamiliarity with the purpose and practices involved in 
interviewing. Such participants were generally unable to express themselves 
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fully or required much prompting to arrive at an answer. The formal 
questionnaire approach was retained for these participants.  
 
The use of open questions was adopted much more widely in the latter stage 
of the field research periods when a greater number of educated Bidân were 
interviewed. This approach was effective especially with better-known 
participants and elicited specific and detailed information on sensitive topics 
from higher-level public servants, professionals as well as privileged 
Mauritanian Bidân elites. It was also used on occasions to gauge the level of 
engagement and truthfulness of participants, especially when posing open-
ended questions touching on events that had affected the individual or his 
family. For example, in Mauritania, the events of 1989 were discussed with 
various Peulh participants, each participant giving an answer dependent on his 
or her rational-emotional approach to the events and their experiences, 
including on rare occasions pure fabrication. Deliberate lying and fabrication 
of events and experiences were identified by cross-referencing the information 
given by one participant and comparing it to information given by like-
participants that had shared the same experience. Although at times difficult 
to filter from accounts by participants recounting information from their own 
frame of reference, such deliberate lies were detected on two distinct 
occasions and the participants discounted as reliable sources.  
 
The non-probabilistic techniques used − judgmental, opportunistic and 
referral sampling − are sampling methods used often by researchers in social 
sciences that approach an inquiry qualitatively rather than quantitatively. The 
present research suggests that it was possible to construct reliable evaluations 
of situations and events from information gathered in the interviews by such 
sampling techniques (a small sample relative to a whole population). The 
information gathered was appropriate to elucidate specific avenues of inquiry, 
despite the complex socio-political network that weaves through the 
heterogeneous African populations of Mali and, most importantly for this 
research, Mauritania. The approach adopted enabled inferences and 
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extrapolations to be made, even though there are limitations in generalising 
the findings to the whole population. 
 
In summary, the three-week pilot study in Bamako enabled the researcher to 
do the following: 
• Develop interview techniques,  
• Alter, change the order or simply remove questions designed in 
the first-pass questionnaire composed in Perth,  
• Discern where questions could be asked in different ways,  
• Gauge the speed at which questions should be put, 
• Regulate the level of empathy or engagement shown towards 
participants.  
 
The opportunistic approach used in soliciting participants in the street of 
Nouakchott, brought some good results, leading for example, to the 
identification and interviewing of several individuals, including an extremely 
knowledgeable small grocery-shop owner, Mohamed Lemine Ould 
Abdallah31. Ould Abdallah had undertaken postgraduate engineering studies 
while self-exiled in Italy as an active political dissident. On returning to 
Mauritania in 2010, he had become a member of the movement, “25 février” 
and was, at the time of meeting, an active anti-government, political agitator.  
 
                                                 
31 Interview 50A, conducted in his shop on 2 January 2012. Also see Photo 9 
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Fig 2-1 Sampling style adopted during the first Mauritanian field period, 1-
22 April 2011 
 
A small number of participants gave unreliable or fabricated answers to certain 
questions. This seemed to be because they felt such questions were socially, 
religiously or politically sensitive in nature. As the researcher became more 
experienced in interviewing, these lapses in the veracity of answers could be 
quickly discerned in the course of an interview and verification done 
immediately. If the particular question was believed not to transgress cultural 
sensitivities, it was repeated or rephrased as the interview progressed. In the 
case of two of the participants, the purpose of the exaggerations was later 
found simply to be the hope of personal monetary gain and their testimonies 
were rejected.  
 
It is, nevertheless, important to remember that each person constructs his or 
her own perceived reality of the world. Therefore, the story of each participant 
was examined and where appropriate, reasons were advanced for the unique 
 Page 56 
 
way in which the individual represented his or her “worldview”. In several 
instances, information that at first appeared contradictory, on closer 
examination was validated for a particular segment of the population and 
retained. 
 
Language 
The national language of Mauritania is the Hassaniya dialect of Arabic with 
several other ethnic languages recognised as national languages, including 
Pulaar, Soninké, Wolof and Serer. Imraguen is spoken by several small 
communities to the north of Nouakchott on the Atlantic coast, but it is not used 
outside the Imraguen villages. 
 
French is widely used as a common lingua franca for business and 
communication between ethnic groups, but its use is widely contested – in 
French – by Hassaniya speakers. Government-ordained education systems 
have seesawed between Arabic and French, and this has affected the country’s 
language over the last several decades. Many of the educated class also speak 
one of several other foreign languages, notably English, Russian or Romanian. 
Many Bidân traders speak Spanish or Italian and more rarely Japanese, 
depending on their profession or trade. 
 
No Bidân will acknowledge an ability to speak an Afro-Mauritanian language, 
because they are widely considered by the Bidân as inferior languages. This 
is the case, even if the Bidân grew up alongside Peulh, Soninké, and Wolof or 
Bambara children and learnt their language as a child. The vast majority of 
educated and uneducated Afro-Mauritanians speak several Afro-Mauritanian 
languages. They all converse openly and frequently in French and 
occasionally in quite good English or Arabic. Haratin, because of their 
traditionally suppressed level of education, generally only speak Hassaniya 
and only some are able to converse in very poor French. The younger Haratin 
generation, however, are often far more educated than previous generations. 
This is especially true if affiliated to a wealthy Bidân. These Haratin are able 
to hold basic conversations in French. 
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Figure 2-2 Ethnic and tribal affiliation of participants in first Mauritanian 
field period, 1-22 April 2011 
 
 
Nevertheless, two participants, in particular, exemplify the social and 
linguistic complexity of Mauritanian society. They are the multi-lingual 
Professor Zacharia Ould Ahmed Salem and ex-Ambassador Mohamed Saïd 
Ould Hamody, both of whom, despite being Hartani, are highly educated and 
respected members of Nouakchott’s social milieu. The night-watchman 
Abdou Salam (Ould) Tabane was a curious anomaly, as apparently an 
uneducated casual worker; he was not only fluent in French, Peulh and Arabic, 
but also spoke at length in an extremely eloquent manner on the complex 
social problem of ethnicity in Mauritania32.        
 
                                                 
32 Interview 44A, 24 December 2011  
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Figure 2-3 Sampling style adopted in the course of the second and third field 
sampling periods, 11 November 2011 to 27 January 2012 
 
The researcher is bi-lingual and able to speak and read fluently in French. For 
the purpose of the research, therefore, all interviews were in French and all 
audio files of these interviews were transcribed in French, with only a few 
translated into English. All Mauritanians are able to speak at least rudimentary 
French, and no potential participant was rejected because they could not speak 
either French or English. 
 
Questionnaire for in-depth interviews 
The original structured questionnaire designed prior to the pilot survey in 
Mali, was based on the principle of eliciting information about certain events, 
situations, individuals and groups of individuals, as perceived and interpreted 
by the participants. Structured, simple and open questions were formulated 
and designed to be asked in a fixed order, interspaced with specific repeated 
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questions used to verify participant credibility. The questions were designed 
to elicit the personal experience and history of participants. These “stories” 
were then coded into several node themes, or “nodes”, that built up to form 
the core of the data used for the present interpretation.     
 
The formal questionnaire began in Section 1, with some general questions. 
These dealt with the participant’s family and their general perception of the 
future for their country. The purpose of this section was to put the participant 
at ease and be open to further questions, some of which related to sensitive 
personal and socio-political issues. It then moved onto questions about socio-
political developments in Mauritania, coups and palace revolts and their 
relationship to the Maure tribes and Afro-Mauritanian ethnic groups. 
 
Section 2 consisted of a short series of questions on the country’s natural 
resource wealth and the ability of the government to manage its revenues, now 
and in the future, with the potential growth of further mineral resource wealth. 
The question of the “resource curse” or “oil curse” and its effects was 
introduced at this stage and discussed. The researcher was conscious of the 
risk of influencing subsequent responses to questions related to this topic.  
 
The next section on the country’s formal and informal institutions proved the 
most interesting in terms of the participants’ responses. In this section, 
questions and comments needed to be handled carefully, taking into account 
participants’ ethnic backgrounds, social positions and personal characteristics. 
Some participants were quite ill at ease discussing particular historical events. 
For example, some Peulh interviewees had difficulties discussing the events 
of 1989-91, and others were sometimes hesitant, guarded and tight-lipped 
when asked to evaluate the government’s “present” performance.  
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Figure 2-4 Ethnic and tribal affiliation of participants in 2nd and 3rd field 
periods, 11 November 2011 to 27 January 2012 
 
In Mali during the pilot study, some participants spoke emotionally and 
extensively on similar sensitive questions. For example, participants revealed 
that the north-south social “fault-line” between Tuaregs and Negro-Africans 
in Mali was a zone of extreme fragility33. This Malian fault-line or unstable 
situation is, in some ways, replicated in Mauritania with the divide between 
Bidân and Haratin on the one hand, and Afro-Mauritanians on the other. 
Although leading questions were avoided, the researcher was aware of this 
social divide prior to the field survey. The next set of questions allowed 
participants willing to develop this theme to offer their views in more detail.   
 
                                                 
33 Compare this to the call for Azawad autonomy which first flared up in 1957, again 1963 shortly  
    after independence and continues to today. 
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In section 4, there were opportunities for participants to discuss further their 
views on the possible links between the sudden influx of resource revenues 
for a government and the phenomenon of coup d’états. Almost all questions, 
including sensitive questions regarding the 1989 events in Mauritania, were 
framed within the realm of a participant’s personal experience within that set 
of circumstances or that event and as it imparted directly on the participant. 
Broader, more abstract questions were avoided with less educated and lower-
income class participants, although some surprises were encountered such as 
the eloquent and informative young Haratin night watchman, Abdou Salam 
Tabane34 referred to earlier.  
 
In addition to these questions, the consistency of participants’ answers was 
evaluated by the inclusion of certain key questions concerning ethnicity, the 
government and certain particular historical events. These were repeated a 
number of times and in different ways throughout the interview. This 
technique gave a basis for identifying the trustworthiness of participants and 
several participants were identified as inconsistent in their views. The 
information gathered from these particular interviews therefore was either 
discarded or used with suitable caution. 
 
While it was envisaged that some 30 individuals of various ethnic and social 
backgrounds would be identified and invited to participate, in the final count 
there were 60 willing participants (53 formally and 7 informally). The 
reluctance of the Mauritanians to discuss certain topics with a non-
Mauritanian was evident, most especially the racialised conflict of 1989-1991. 
This reluctance was overcome in most instances by showing patience and 
empathy towards the particular participants and an understanding of their 
worldviews. 
 
The survey instrument thus evolved over the weeks of interviews from a set 
of relatively straightforward questions to a more complex interviewing 
                                                 
34 Interview 44A, conducted 11:30 pm 24  December 2011 
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process that sought to build up a picture of participants’ views, prejudices and 
overall worldviews. Although the questionnaire formed the base point of all 
interviews and was useful in laying the ground rules for engagement with the 
participants, in the course of the extended one-on-one meetings, an 
atmosphere of trust and flexibility led several participants to return repeatedly 
for recorded conversations on particular subjects. These in-depth interviews 
allowed the documentation of valuable information for evaluation and 
analysis. Not all material is used in this thesis, as it covers a wide range of 
topics, relevant to a much wider appreciation of the country and its people. 
 
The meetings sometimes began as general conversations and evolved into 
deep discussions of interest, but this approach was not so effective in dealing 
with specific targeted topics. More useful in gathering specifically targeted 
information, were sessions of in-depth interviews with purposefully targeted 
and pre-stated aspects of a question requiring interpretation and evaluation. 
The in-depth interview technique was especially suited for meeting with 
politicians and other key high-profile stakeholders with extensive knowledge 
and expertise, and who had more experience and confidence in talking 
publicly. These influential individuals were approached usually through 
referral.  
  
Online Documentation 
Between 2009 and 2012, a regular, and at times daily, watch was kept on 
certain Mauritanian and international information websites. Background and 
current news information, relevant to the subjects discussed in this study, was 
gathered from these websites and used with discretion in the analysis of the 
socio-political events of the period examined.  
 
In addition, several interviews and commentaries were recorded and 
transcribed that dealt with the Arab Spring and international socio-political 
events and were broadcast by RFI (Radio France International; www.rfi.fr/) 
during the period 2010 and 2012. These assisted the research to understand 
Mauritania’s international relations and the efforts of its incumbent 
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government to modernise Mauritania. The information gleaned from these 
sources also helped inform many of the socially and politically oriented 
questions in the interviews conducted between April and June 2011, and 
November 2011 to January 2012.  
   
First interview period: Nouakchott - 1 to 22 April 2011  
The “convenient” selection of participants began at Hotel Marhaba. Mr Sidaty 
Fall, a Hartani and the hotel manager known by the researcher for some ten 
years, agreed to participate in the research and be the first Mauritanian to be 
formally interviewed on 4 April 201135. Several more in-depth discussions 
with Mr Fall followed, focussing on specific topics of interest brought up in 
the course of the first congenial meeting.  
 
Following this first interview, through opportunity and referral sampling, 22 
other hotel employees were interviewed between 4 April and 21 April 2011. 
They came from several ethnic and social groups of Mauritanian society (see 
Figures 2-1 and 2-2). Among the many participants was the visiting African 
director of the hotel chain, Souleymane Niang36, a self-exiled Afro-
Mauritanian Peulh and ex-university history lecturer. Mr Niang proved to be 
the most valuable, if at times biased, source of historical and sociological 
information about Mauritania. In total 23 participants were “conveniently” 
sourced from this hotel. 
 
The sample of 23 participants from the hotel for this first field exercise, were 
all fully employed. The social and cultural setting of Mauritania made it 
difficult to interview the unemployed or those surviving on casual day-to-day 
terms in the capital. Nine out of twenty-three (39% of these sampled at the 
hotel) were Peulh, compared to a national average believed to be closer to 
                                                 
35 Interview 01A, during the course of which we discussed, slavery, the FLAM, the 1989-1991 ethnic  
    problems of Mauritania, Senegal-Mauritania relations and any other aspects of the Haratin’s  
    survival and future in Mauritania as well as their relationships with both Bidân and Afro- 
    Mauritanians 
36 Interviews 19A and 19B, conducted over several sessions over a number of days beginning 14 April  
    2011 and consisting of an aggregate of some 4 ½ hours  
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8%37. Only two, or 8%, of those sampled in the course of this first field period 
were Bidân who make up close to 30% of the national population. The balance 
of those interviewed was made up of Haratin or Black Maures (26%), other 
Afro-Mauritanians (21%), and two participants (7%) from other African 
countries.    
 
Efforts were made to encourage more Bidân hotel employees to participate in 
the survey. Five, from various Bidân tribes, eventually took part. Three 
participants showed strong feelings of unease during the interview and 
provided unclear answers to several key questions38. The last Bidân hotel 
employee to be interviewed was Mr Sidi Mohamed Ould Mohamed Lemine39, 
the hotel’s chief accountant. Sidi was an old friend of M’Boye Ould Arafa’s 
deceased father, and his direct and intelligent approach to questions was 
refreshing.   
 
During the first field period of interviewing, only three out of a further eight 
participants sourced from outside the hotel, were Bidân or white Maures. The 
first was Ely Ould Sneiba40, a political activist willing to speak openly and 
strongly against the present political regime as well as traditional tribalism. 
The second was an old friend, Mr M’Boye Ould Arafa41, who, while at first 
reluctant became a wealth of information and advice through his formal first 
interview and the many subsequent discussions centred on specific topics. The 
third and last white Maure participant was a very knowledgeable language 
professor, Mr Hamadi Ould Mohamed Hamadi42. He was the second person 
in Mauritania, after Ely Ould Sneiba, to refuse to give his ethnic grouping. He 
                                                 
37 This willingness by Peulh employees is because of Mr Niang’s participation, himself being Peulh 
38 Interview 04A, 08A, and 16A 
39 Interview 21A, 15 April 2011 
40 Interview 13A, 10 April 2011 
41 Interviews 28A to 28I, conducted between 20 April and 16 November 201. Mr M’Boye Ould  
    Arafa,  a Bidân of the Idawali tribe from Tidjikja by migration, originally from the Torkoz tribe of  
    central-northern Mauritania. Arafa provided almost four hours of information-packed interview  
    time, and at times delved into the peculiarities of the Maure society 
42 Interview 30A, 20 April 2011 
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said simply that he was of “Mauritanian” nationality, wilfully hiding the Bidân 
tribe to which he belonged.  
 
From 20 April, the date of a rewarding interview with Ould Mohamed 
Hamadi, to 24 May 2011, when the researcher left the field, it proved very 
difficult to convince Bidân to participate in the research. The researcher 
surmised that this reticence was perhaps due to Bidân satisfaction with the 
status quo, in contrast with the more complex feelings of Afro-Mauritanian or 
Haratin citizens. During this time, a further eight participants from outside the 
hotel were interviewed, totalling 31 for the first field trip.  
 
On 24 May, the researcher returned to Perth on the advice of several 
Mauritanian friends, because of unusually larger street protests and some 
minor social disruptions on the streets of Nouakchott.  
 
Second interview period: Nouakchott - 11 November 2011 to 4 January 2012    
The second and last field trip to Nouakchott between 11 November 2011 and 
4 January 2012, evolved differently. The researcher spent the first three weeks, 
between 11 November and 4 December 2011, unable to solicit any further 
participants, especially among the targeted Bidân ethnicity.  
 
The “drought” of interviews ended on 4 December 2011, when contact was 
made with a highly respected accountant and part-time academic, Mohamed 
Fall Ould Bah. Like the researcher, he was a “very mature student” who at the 
age of 58 had just finished his doctorate on Islamic financial institutions in 
Africa. Mohamed Fall Ould Bah was successfully interviewed43 and provided 
referrals to several other individuals. These referred participants were high-
ranking political and business elites and their wish to participate anonymously 
is respected44. 
 
                                                 
43 Interview 32A, 13 December 2011 
44 Interviews 38A and 42A, conducted 20 and 24 December 2011 respectively 
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In addition, Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte of the Paris-based and 
academically renowned ‘Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques’ 
(CNRS/CERI), agreed to be interviewed. This was fortuitous because he is a 
world-famous social anthropologist and author of many books and articles on 
Mauritania and West Africa.45 He informally as well as formally discussed 
Mauritania on several occasions during his visit to Nouakchott in December 
2011. His referrals to several of his Mauritanian colleagues were also of great 
value and his referral to ex-Ambassador Mohamed Saïd Ould Hamody46 was 
most rewarding. Mr Ould Hamody47, a very learned Maure (reputed of Hartani 
origin) was Mauritania’s American ambassador for many years. This is in 
spite of humble beginnings, as revealed in his birthdate record of 1 January. 
This date means that he was born in a tent on an unspecified day, most likely 
the son of ex-slave members of the nomadic Smacide tribe that roamed the 
region of Atar in northern Mauritania. The referral to Mr Ould Hamody led 
subsequently to a referral to ex-President, Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall48, the 
Junta leader co-responsible, with his cousin, the present President Mohamed 
Ould Abdel Aziz, for the 2005 fall of President Maaouya (Ould) Sid’Ahmed 
Ould Taya. 
 
An especially valued participant was Mr Mohamed Lamine Dahi49, whom 
Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall called during the first meeting on 23 December 
2011. Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall instructed Mohamed Lamine Dahi, as his 
chief of Cabinet, to give assistance to this research, and most especially on the 
question of the Woodside payment of US$ 100 million to the government and 
popular claims regarding its misappropriation. Through Mr Ould Hamody and 
the participation of Colonel Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall on 23 December 2011, 
further meetings were fixed with influential Bidân who had served in the 
2005-2007 military government. Mr Dahi, at the ex-President’s request, 
                                                 
45 interview 34A, 5 December 2011 
46 Interviews 36A, 36B and 36C, conducted 13 to 23 December 2011 
47 Photo gallery: Photo 11 
48 Interview 41A and 41B, 23 December 2011 and Photo gallery: Photo 15 
49 Interview 43A, 43B and 43C, conducted 24 to 31 December 2011 and Photo gallery: Photo 16 
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referred me to Mr Mohamed Ould Elabed50, who had been Minister of 
Economic Affairs in 2005, and Mr Mahfoud Ould Bettah51, Director General 
of the Ministry of Justice in 2005, and present President of the Bar. Both men 
had participated to a significant degree in the pursuit of Woodside regarding 
the question of the illegality of the 2004 contractual amendments, and attempts 
to make the company legally accountable.  
 
Through an opportune meeting in the street and subsequent interview with a 
young Bidân student52 and his referral to his lecturer, the researcher was also 
able to meet and interview the influential Hartani Mauritanian writer and 
lecturer in political science, Dr Zacharia Ould Ahmed Salem53. This led by 
“snowball referral”, to a cascade of meetings with the targeted ethnic group, 
the Bidân.  
 
A further opportunity was created when a well-known Peulh academic in 
Nouakchott agreed to be interviewed.54 This participant recounted the 1989 
events in a moderate and logical manner. However, his deep involvement, as 
a Peulh, in these events showed through in his engaging description of the 
institutionalised racism that exists in Mauritania against the Peulh.  
 
A referral by M’Boye Ould Arafa enabled an interview with his friend, the 
famous historian, academic and socio-political commentator, Isselmou Ould 
Abdelkader,55 a Bidân, ex-minister in President Taya’s government, 
researcher and author of the politically controversial, “Ou va la Mauritanie?” 
(2008). The interview with Isselmou Ould Abdelkader was most relevant and 
significant in shedding light on an important facet of the evolution of the 
petroleum industry in the period examined, as well as on the Woodside 
contractual amendments of 2004.  
                                                 
50 Interview 45A, 26 December 2011 
51 Interview 47A, 29 December 2011 
52 Interview 33A, 4 December 2011 (anonymous) 
53 Interview 35A, 11 December 2011 
54 Interview 37A, 14 December 2011(anonymous) 
55 Interview 48A, 1 January 2012 
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Several other individuals from varying socio-economic, Afro-Mauritanian and 
Bidân backgrounds were selectively interviewed in order to complete the 
sample population to saturation. 
 
Third interview period: Perth - 4 January to 27 February 2012 
To complete the sample of people involved with the nascent petroleum 
industry in Mauritania, participants sourced from the petroleum industry were 
interviewed. Key Woodside Petroleum personnel were purposively 
approached and asked if they would agree to an interview.  
 
Although at first Woodside personnel formally involved with Mauritania 
appeared in casual conversation to be keen to assist in the research, an official 
company stance was very quickly taken once the researcher began to make 
definite arrangements for interviews with executives. The reason given for the 
inability of personnel to take part in interviews was that Woodside personnel 
were “strained” from the two years spent explaining themselves following 
Senator Milne’s accusations to the Australian Federal Police of corrupt 
dealings by Woodside in Mauritania.  
 
In addition, no current or past Woodside lawyers who were employed during 
the period being examined were willing to participate in the research, and 
Woodside gave no guidance as to how to contact ex-Woodside lawyers from 
this period. A Herbert Smith lawyer influential in the negotiations suggested 
he could help, but declined to do so, on the grounds of confidentiality when 
requested. All other Woodside personnel declined to be interviewed.  
 
The researcher was eventually referred to a Woodside lawyer, and in lieu of 
face-to-face interviews, a short number of uninformative written answers were 
offered in response to the researcher’s questions. 
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Three key ex-employees of Woodside did agree, however, to be interviewed. 
They were Agu Kantsler56, former Executive Vice President – Exploration at 
Woodside during the period being researched; Peter Grant, the then-Manager 
in charge of Woodside operations in Mauritania57 between 1998 and 2004; 
and an ex-senior manager58 who preferred to remain anonymous. Their 
combined analysis of the interaction between Woodside and the Mauritanians 
between 1998 and 2008 forms an important and integral part of the interview 
data.  
 
Data Collection  
In total, 53 participants were formally interviewed in Mauritania and 
Australia, and a further seven participated on a voluntary but informal basis, 
not willing to complete any forms or give any personal details.  
 
The sampling programme and progress is diagrammatically represented in 
Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-3, and each diagram includes the name (where 
appropriate) and ethnic group of the participants that took part in the data 
collection for this research. Table 2-1 gives some basic details relevant to the 
research study of each formal participant.  
       
All participants whose name appears in this research agreed to their names and 
their comments being used. This includes ex-President Ely Mohamed Vall 
who requested to review any quotations attributed to him before inclusion. 
Those participants, who after a thorough explanation of the purpose of the 
research, decided to have their names suppressed, were few. They are referred 
to as “anonymous” in the body of the thesis. Their details are kept in locked 
archive files by ethical agreement until 2019, together with the primary and 
secondary data used in this research. They are until that time, accessible only 
to the researcher and supervisors, and individuals who obtain express 
permission from the researcher.  
                                                 
56 Interview 51A, 30 January 2012 
57 Interview 52A, 3 February 2012 
58 Interview 53A, 27 February 2012 (anonymous) 
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Of the 53 participants who agreed to be officially interviewed, only five (5) 
were females and all of these were Afro-Mauritanians, reflecting the cultural 
reluctance of Muslim women, especially Bidân women, to be seen in public 
with a stranger and most certainly to speak privately with a male foreigner. It 
has to be said, though, that this situation for Muslim women in Mauritania is 
changing.  
 
The demographic make-up of the sample roughly reflects the make-up of the 
male Mauritanian population, with 32, or 60%, of participants being between 
29 and 49 years old and therefore born after independence in 1960. Most 
participants were quite willing to have their names quoted and be identifiable 
in the final thesis, with only a few reluctant to give details and requesting to 
remain anonymous.  
 
Number of participants Ethnicity 
22 Bidân 
16 Peulh 
5 Mixed 
5 Haratin 
5 Westerners 
Total 53  
 
Table 2-1 Formal interview participants 
 
Over the combined field periods, 22 Bidân from varying tribes were 
interviewed. They range in social background from low-ranked public 
servants (for example, an anonymous Bidân59) to the leader of the military 
Junta between 2005 and 2007.60 In addition, there were five Haratin, a lesser 
number than desired, as this social/ethnic group is estimated to make up some 
                                                 
59 Interview 38A, 20 December 2011 (anonymous) 
60 Interview 41A, 23 December 2011 
 Page 71 
 
40% of the Mauritanian population. This unrepresentative sample of Haratin 
participants is due to the linguistic and social difficulties associated with 
meeting and interviewing Haratin. Haratin are Hassaniya-speakers with, in the 
vast majority, little knowledge of French. They are generally uneducated (with 
notable exceptions) and were extremely suspicious and reluctant to participate 
in the present research. Many of the Haratin in the lowest economic standing 
of daily hired hand would not be interviewed fearing the wrath of the Bidân 
“masters”61.  
 
While the under-representation of the Haratin in the sample was not ideal, they 
were not the focus of interest in the study in themselves, as they did not have 
the same access to high-level dealings in the petroleum industry as the Bidân 
and to a less extent, the Peulh. 
 
Sixteen Peulh were interviewed and only one other Negro-African. In all, five 
participants were of mixed ethnicity, Maure and Afro-Mauritanian or mixed 
Afro-Mauritanian, reflecting intermarriage across ethnic groups. Five 
Caucasians were purposely selected for their potential contribution to the 
database.  
 
Transcription and translation 
All interviews in Mauritania were conducted in French and, along with several 
recordings of panel discussions and commentaries from the Abidjan-based 
French international radio station, RFI, were sent digitally to over a dozen 
selected French transcribers throughout Australia, New Caledonia and New 
Zealand, over a period of twelve months from August 2011 to July 2012. The 
transcripts were sent electronically and finally collated as word-files able to 
be entered into NVivo 9.1, a software programme designed for qualitative 
analysis. Each word-file transcription received via email was immediately 
checked against the audio recording for accuracy by the researcher.  
 
                                                 
61 Bidân elite, pers. comm 
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All quotations in the study were translated into English by the researcher, 
unless otherwise specified, as in the case of six interviews dealing with the 
question of Woodside’s $ 100 million payment to the government of 
Mauritania. In the case of these interviews, it was considered appropriate that 
an official English translation be used and so the selected transcribed 
interviews were translated by an accredited French-to-English translator. 
These formal translations were also checked by the researcher. All formal 
translations were considered adequate for inclusion as received. 
 
In total, 144 transcriptions were completed, including 112 interviews. This 
represented a total interviewing time of 135.5 hours, with some interviews 
taking a few minutes and others longer up to a maximum of three and a half 
hours62. Each one hour of interview recording necessitated an average of five 
hours of transcribing, and thus transcribing hours totalled some 677 hours. The 
transcribing and official translation necessary for the research task took over 
twelve months to complete. Official translations are not included in the table 
below. 
 
Task Hours (~) Result 
Interviews 135.5 Audio-files 
Transcription 677 Raw Word-files 
Review 812 Final Word-files 
NVivo 9.1 1,194 Coded Nodes 
 
Table 2-2. Time spent on evaluation of participants’ interviews 
 
CAQDAS Software 
In order to be able to handle the large database generated by the interview 
data, as well as the online documentation gathered electronically, all word-file 
transcribed interviews, radio recordings and online documentation were 
imported into the qualitative data analysis software, NVivo 9.1 (CAQDAS).  
                                                 
62 Appendix 5 
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It was necessary to select and file selected sections of the interviews into 
themes using this software in order to facilitate review and selection of 
pertinent data. This process took 1,194 hours of selection or “coding” in 
themes to “nodes”.   
 
 
Data storage, ethical considerations and retrieval 
Audio files, transcripts, word-files and translations of the interviews form the 
bulk of the data collected. Printed and digital files of documents, online news 
items, compilations from reference books and copies of selected government 
documents form a portion of the physical material stored on the Curtin 
University campus. The data is collated, documented and catalogued for ease 
of access in a cover report that lists all material and information archived in 
order to facilitate eventual retrieval through a clear working system. 
 
Approval from Curtin University’s Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC) was received and, prior to any in-country activity, written approval 
was received from both the Malian and Mauritanian governments63. In 
addition, as the research involved recording personal information, Ethical 
Approval of Research Involving Humans (Form A) HR 132/2010 was 
obtained. Permission was sought from official channels for accessing 
government files, policy documents and regulations, but limited material was 
collected from government libraries or archives. The principal government 
document acquired for the research, was a document, dated 29 March 2007 
and entitled “Bilan de la Transition – Rapport sur l’activité de Gouvernement 
de Transition (3 août 2005 – 5 mars 2007”64. The hardcopy document was 
given to me by the Junta leader, Colonel Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall, during 
his interview and while discussing the national budget requirements over the 
period with which the report deals and the question of the use of Woodside’s 
                                                 
63 Appendix 3 
64 “Prime Ministerial Office – Report on the Activities of the Transitional government between 3  
    August 2005 and 5 March 2007”, March 2007 
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payment of US$ 100 million. The pages relevant to the present research are 
appended.65  
 
The written consent of each fully informed and willing participant was 
obtained and it was made clear that participation was voluntary and that it was 
possible to withdraw from the research project at any time. They were 
informed that any information collected would also be erased from the 
research data if their permission to use it for research was withdrawn prior to 
31 March 2013. 
 
Some of the data collected for this study are sensitive so fully restricted 
archival access is requested for a minimum of five years from the official due 
date of completion of the research period, officially 12 May 2014. This gives 
open access only after the possible second and last presidential mandate of 
Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz, which will end November 2018. The reason for 
this is that some of the information given by several of the participants deals 
negatively with the incumbent president, his family, his tribe and his political 
entourage. All care was taken in retaining anonymity for the participants who 
requested it. However, if any compromising information was revealed to ill-
intentioned third parties and traced back to the participant while President 
Abdel Aziz remains in office, it could compromise the safety of several of the 
more openly critical participants. Documents that identify anonymous 
participants, such as names or domicile, employment or profession were 
removed from the data files but kept external to the university in a locked file 
by the researcher. Many participants, nevertheless, agreed in writing to allow 
their name to be included in the research material and to be quoted in the final 
research thesis, including some participants who voiced strong disapproval of 
the President.  
 
The request of the incumbent President’s cousin, ex-President Ely (Ould) 
Mohamed Vall, to send any direct quotations to him, or his colleague Mr 
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Mohamed Ould Dahi, for verification and approval was fulfilled, but no 
answer had been received at time of writing.  
 
All information is accessible only with the researcher’s approval, and after 
five years any archived data at Curtin will be disposed of or returned to the 
researcher as deemed appropriate in consultation between the researcher and 
the appropriate university authorities.  
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Chapter 3 – Historical roots of contemporary socio-political divisions 
 
The role of the petroleum industry in the political development of Mauritania 
from 2001 to 2011 cannot be understood without knowledge of the historical 
and socio-political context of Mauritanian society and a recognition that 
political instability is not a new phenomenon that begun with the discovery  of 
oil in Mauritania.  
 
This chapter and the next thus examine the historical and socio-political 
context within which the petroleum industry developed. In particular, these 
chapters discuss the existence in Mauritania of deep divisions or fault-lines 
between communities based on long-standing racial, linguistic and cultural 
differences (Herbst, McNamee and Mills, 2012). French colonial rule sought 
to impose on these differences modernist notions of state sovereignty, fixed 
borders, and an administrative, judicial and military system  in order to 
facilitate colonial domination and carry out French notions of the ‘mission 
civilisatrice’, a French doctrine aimed at  the assimilation of colonial 
territories into French society. In examining the historical development  of 
Mauritania, the chapter shows  that the country’s present-day political 
instability  is an outcome of the interplay between changing traditional 
indigenous social structures, foreign imposed institutions and the actions of 
individuals and communities differentially located within the country’s 
political-economic structure. 
 
It is argued that when Mauritania gained independence from France in 1960, 
it consisted of diverse ethnic communities in which sub-national loyalties 
were stronger than any sense of national identity. Much of Mauritania’s post-
independence politics has consisted of attempts to manage relations between 
different ethnic groups, with the Bidân or white Maure occupying the 
privileged position as the dominant group. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief outline of the formative prehistoric period of 
Mauritania followed by a description of the major ethnic communities that 
 Page 77 
 
have developed over the centuries and today make up the bulk of the 
population. In addition to the Mauritanian writers mentioned above, Raph A. 
Austen’s “Trans-Sahara Africa in world history” (2010) and James L. 
Newman’s “The peopling of Africa: A geographic interpretation” (1995) form 
an integral part of the background literature for the first section of the chapter. 
 
The chapter then provides an historical narrative from the latter part of the 
colonial period to state independence and the changes that occurred in 
Mauritania’s socio-political landscape up to the pre-oil period of the mid-
1990s during the rule of President Maaouya Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya. The 
chapter closes with a brief discussion of some of the socio-political processes 
that have played a major role in the country’s development. These include 
patrimonial governance, corruption, tribalism, economic-cum-ethnic 
divisions, poverty and slavery. 
 
Prehistoric multiethnic society 
A little-known Black African people inhabited the inland reaches of northwest 
Africa at the end of the Late Stone Age, prior to the period of desertification 
beginning some 10,000 years ago (Newman 1995, 31). Throughout 
Mauritania, southern Morocco and Western Sahara, once a fertile region, 
traces have been found of fishing and hunter-gatherer communities, as well as 
later copper extracting, communities dating back 7,000 years66. However, as 
the world’s climate gradually became drier over the next few thousand years, 
this population retreated, evidently  towards the more fertile south and north, 
leaving behind dispersed remnant individual groups landlocked within limited 
watered regions and oases throughout the encroaching desert. As groups 
retreated north, they were probably subjugated to and absorbed by Berbers as 
no apparent traces of them remain. Those that travelled south mixed with 
ethnic groups arriving from the east to form separate ethnic sedentary 
communities. The main communities were the Wolof on the western seaboard, 
Soninké further inland and along the fertile valley of the Senegal River, and 
                                                 
66 Interview 34A with Professor Pierre Bonte, 5 December 2012 
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the related ethnic groups of Sarakolé, Seré, Toucouleur and Songhai tribes 
further to the east and south.  
 
Oasis-dwelling groups left behind in the drying Sahara were subjugated, 
enslaved and absorbed when waves of migration into this region brought new 
settlers. The first known migrants to settle in significant numbers in the drying 
Sahara region were the Berber (Rogerson 1998). These nomadic pastoralists 
were referred to as “Maures” by the Romans who occupied the region in the 
earliest period of the first millennium A.D., a region that would later become 
Morocco. The Romans regarded them as “brigands” that organised guerrilla 
raids on the occupied lands and thus sought to force these troublesome nomads 
south as increasingly larger tracts of land were developed (Sigman 1976). 
Later, in the 7th century, Arab tribes began to arrive, and this continued until 
the 17th century. Thus, major socio-cultural upheavals began some 5,500 years 
ago, not only in contemporary Mauritania, but also in northern Africa and 
other parts of West Africa.   
 
The Black African people who moved south settled as sedentary fishermen 
and agriculturalists along the strip of the Senegal River flood plain. This 
resettlement occurred from the mouth of the river delta on the Atlantic to the 
western hinterland on the Mali border in the southeastern region of present 
day Mauritania. In the desert regions to the north of the Senegal valley, 
intermixing took place between the pale-skinned Berbers, and their Black 
African vassals and neighbours. Such intermixing was already widespread 
prior to the arrival of the various Arab tribes.  
 
As Berber and then Arab tribes traded, fought each other and later intermixed 
in these desertified zones, the settled black ethnicities to the south were 
periodically displaced and pillaged for slaves and supplies by the encroaching 
northern nomadic tribesmen (Poulet 1904, 3). These regional movements 
towards the south later came to be associated with Muslim conquests and the 
spread of Islam. Because of these population movements, interactions and 
conquests, Arab culture and language became dominant in this area of 
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northwest Africa. Islam provided a unifying force in the region, not yet 
defined in terms of sovereign states by the European conquest.  
 
Modern Maure society that emerged from these historical changes retained 
pronounced social divisions between the Beni Hassan Maures of Arab origin 
who occupy the highest social order, the holy men, Marabous or Zawiya 
(Arab-Berber) slightly below them and the Znaga or Senaga (Arab-Berber-
Black) who occupy the next-to lowest position in the hierarchy of the 
Hassaniya-speaking white Maures67. The lowest rung in the Maure hierarchy 
is that of the Haratin (singular; Hartani) who are the freed African slaves and 
descendants of these freed slaves. In present day Mauritania, the Haratin 
occupy low status jobs and fill the lowest rung of society, with certain notable 
exceptions. As the Mauritanian historian, politician and author Isselmou 
Abdelkader points out, an observer might be surprised by the complex socio-
politics of the society: 
 
In which people of apparent Arab origin display cultural practices 
similar to those of ethnically and racially defined Black Africans, while 
equally surprising, the observer might be confronted by individuals of 
apparent Black African origin expressing strongly pro-Arab and 
nationalist leanings. These attitudes can only be understood once one 
recognises that in Mauritanian society…each has become the other, 
forgetting, ignoring or even fighting against what he was 68 
 
Junta leader between 2005 and 2007, Colonel Ely (Ould)69 Mohamed Vall 
gives a Bidân’s perspective on the historical evolution of this region. He states 
that the Western view of the region “before the Europeans’ arrival” was that 
it consisted of anarchic, marauding and unorganised pillaging tribes hell-bent 
                                                 
67 Photo gallery: Photos 11, 12, 13 and 14 
68 Abdelkader 2008, page 11 (Passage translated by the researcher). Isselmou Abdelkader, now  
    retired, is a member of the Idawali tribe, a noted public servant, ex-governor of Zouérat and  
    minister in the latter years of President Taya’s regime and a prolific political writer  
69 ‘Ould’ means ‘son of’ and is traditionally used by all Maures in their surnames. Occasionally, some  
    elites drop the ‘Ould’ from their name , as with General Ely (Ould)Mohamed Vall and his cousin,  
    the ex- General, President Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz 
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on terrorising and enslaving the black sedentary settlers of the region. He went 
on: 
 
I will give you my point-of-view...Why do people feel that before 
colonisation, there has never been a state in Mauritania. Therefore, that 
this area of desert that now includes the borders of Mauritania was an 
“uninhabited” space, an “open” “unlimited” space “without borders”. 
That it was an “ownerless space”? I say, and I stress, the words 
"ownerless…without a master"! A place where no sovereignty was 
exercised in one way or another…No authority existed, and that the 
authority of a particular tribe was determined on the basis of its strength, 
depending on its ability to dominate the individual... This was a place, 
where the “law of the jungle” was played out openly. 
 
I feel that this way of seeing the situation in this region in these times, 
is quite incorrect. 
 
In the first instance, this space that is now Mauritania, the space in its 
totality, including the Arabs, the Arab tribes, as well as the Black 
African space….I tell you that this space has always existed as a 
“virtual” state. 
 
This was not a state, evident as a single politico-administrative structure 
in the tradition of western states, with its official centralised structure 
and an established hierarchy. However, it was a state that was present 
as a "virtual" state... it worked perfectly...without a centralised 
structure, without western-style state structures. Moreover, how did it 
work?  
 
In the first instance...in this region, where no central government 
existed, there was the common use of a primitive currency, which was 
at that time already called “Ouguiya”. Within this region, Mauritanians 
have always counted in Ouguiya, and it was therefore natural for 
Moktar Ould Daddah, the first president of Mauritania, simply to give 
the name “Ouguiya” to the national currency that he created after 
independence. He simply decimalised the traditional currency and 
named it after the virtual currency traditionally used in this region. The 
“Ouguiya” was an old measure of gold used in the pre-Islamic Arabian 
Peninsula. Its use was so entrenched that when the French colonist 
arrived and we began using the French Franc or any other currency, we 
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continued to count in Ouguiya. It must therefore be recognised that 
there was indeed a “national” currency in existence within this region... 
 
In addition, within this virtual state there was a specific language 
spoken. Hassaniya was the common language, uniting all the tribes and 
all the peoples within that space...   
 
In the third instance, there was religion, Islam that united all within this 
region. There was a language and there was a currency.70 
 
The general emphasises that a state-like system existed prior to French rule. It 
was not organised around a centralised government and bureaucratic 
institutions with a monopoly of the use of physical force, as in the western 
sense of the word. Rather, he argues that the Muslim Bidân established a form 
of socio-political control over other groups present in the region (Copans, 
1974). This control was based on the building – through a combination of 
force, tribute, bribery and reciprocal promises of security and support – of an 
enduring system of inter-locking political alliances and allegiance. Colonel 
Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall’s argument seeks to counter colonial notions that 
‘civilisation’ was a creation of the West, by pointing to the integrating role of 
Islam and regional and inter-continental trade linking the region to Europe and 
the Middle East (Mahir 2006, 4). In doing so, he gives greater prominence to 
his own people in the ‘civilising’ of the region and plays down the historical 
role of the Black African population in the economic and political 
development of the region. 
 
It is, however, also because of the colonial period and the self-serving political 
importance given to the Maures by the French that little has remained of the 
Black Africans’ historical presence in Mauritania or of the early interactions 
between Maures and Africans. Mohamed Vall’s insistence on the importance 
of the “white” Maures’ hegemonic presence, as well as his lack of 
acknowledgement of the significant presence of Black Africans, reflects the 
                                                 
70 Interview 41A with ex-junta leader General Ely Mohamed Vall, 23 November 2012 
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general tendency of the Maures to foster their own civilising role in the 
emergence of contemporary Mauritanian society.  
 
A rare and brief historical contribution for Mauritania, in the online daily 
magazine, Le Quotidien, lends credence to the important presence of sedentary 
Black Africans in the southern portion of Mauritania, as well as to their 
interaction and integration with the Arab-Berber tribes that were increasingly 
encroaching on their traditional territory from the north (Oïga Abdoulaye, 
2012). Reviewing literature dealing with the immediate pre-independence era 
of Mauritania, it appears little has been written of the role of black Africans. 
Living as sedentary village-dwelling family groups within the Senegal River 
valley, and especially the delta region where the French established their first 
trading post at Saint Louis in 1659, they had encountered and interacted with 
the French much earlier than the nomadic Maures from the desert regions to 
the north. Sedentary black Africans, in contrast to the nomadic Maures, were 
readily recruited into working for the French administrators and later the 
French military71.  
 
At independence, many Africans worked closely with the Maure elites to 
establish the state of Mauritania, despite having taken a lesser role in the 
leadership prior to independence. One such individual, who was a participant 
in the present research, was the late Gaye Silly Soumaré, a Haïre Sarakolé (or 
Soninké) from the southern province of Guidimakla. He actively assisted 
Moktar Ould Daddah gain independence for Mauritania, acting as his Minister 
for Youth, an important post in the early years of the newly formed country. 
He later served his country as an ambassador in several European countries 
and in his later years as a parliamentary Senator. 
 
Colony to independence 
With the rise of France’s maritime power in the 17th century, French 
mercantile activity spread down the West African coast and became 
                                                 
71 As evidenced by the half million black Africans that took up arms and died for France during the  
    two World Wars 
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established in the southern region of Mauritania in 1659. As commercially 
based, proto-colonial occupation grew, and with the legitimacy lent to it by 
the Treaty of Berlin of 1885, France’s commercial activities were eventually 
matched by the establishment of a military presence beginning in 1902. This 
occurred in what became known as French West Africa (OAF) an area 
covering today’s Mauritania, as well as Mali, Niger, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Burkina Faso. Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte, visiting 
Nouakchott in December 2011, generously participated in the present research 
and spent many hours in discussions on Mauritania, giving depth to the 
historical approach to understanding contemporary socio-political instability, 
developed in the present research: 
 
The Oualad Béiri [an important Zawiya (religious) tribal group of 
“small nomads”] from the Trarza region of Southwestern Mauritania, 
moreover, had had long and quite friendly [commercial] contact with 
the French. Sheikh Sidya Baba was one of those religious chiefs who 
contributed to the French [military] conquest of the Maures’ territory. 
Sheikh Sidya Baba facilitated the conquest by helping the French bring 
the Mauritanian Emirates of Trarza and Brakna under colonial rule in 
the first years of the 20th century… The assistance given to the colonial 
power by the religious tribes secured French protection from raids and 
extortion by the northern warrior tribes of Beni Hassan descent. It also 
gave the maraboutic Oualad Béiri tribes a prominent, coveted but 
unexpected socio-political position in the colonial and post-colonial 
state, including and most importantly, the education in France of 
Moktar Ould Daddah as a lawyer, and his promotion to the position of 
first president of independent Mauritania in 1961.72 
 
In 1903, the French government passed a decree recognising “The Protectorate 
of the Country of the Maures of the lower Senegal” in acknowledgement of 
the military support of the pro-French Maures of the Emirates of Brakna, 
Trarza and Idouaich. In 1920, a second decree was passed which used the 
name “Mauritania” for the first time. The Arab-Berber people continued their 
pastoral, nomadic ways of life, which included trade with each other, but also 
                                                 
72 Interview 34A with Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte, 5 December 2011 
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raids or razzias73 on one another as well as on the sedentary Black African 
communities along the Senegal River. These and other practices had 
developed through centuries of survival in a hostile environment, and continue 
to affect the political stability and institutional structure of Mauritania to this 
day. “Dopage” or the distribution of important government posts to 
individuals belonging to select Bidân tribes that have ancestral relationship 
with that of the President74, is one commonly quoted example in Afro-
Mauritanian circles critical of these practices. 
 
Inter-tribal discontent was generated through the French colonists’ differential 
treatment of the southern Sahel-dwelling “small nomads” and “big nomads”75 
of the Sahara Desert. The ‘small nomads’ of the Brakna, Trarza and Idouaich 
emirates of southern Mauritania accepted, to some extent, the protection of the 
French, while the ‘big nomads’ of the deep desert to the North, who were  
largely descended from the Beni Hassan tribes and were resistant to French 
colonisation, contested the French military occupation until their defeat in 
1947.  
 
In addition, the French differed in their treatment of Arab-speaking Maures 
(Bidân and Haratin) and black Africans. The latter were preferred for their 
ability in the French language but were considered as inferiors in the eyes of 
the “white” Maures, the Bidân as well as the French. A Mauritanian well 
placed to comment on these ethnic relations is the late Gaye Silly Soumaré, a 
Sarakolé (half Soninké from his mother) originating from the Senegal River 
valley in the region of Gorgol, who as a young man was a minister in Moktar 
Ould Daddah’s government and later a Senator and Ambassador for his 
country. He commented: 
 
                                                 
73 Pillaging and raiding, termed “razzias”, was an integral feature of the Bidân desert existence 
74 Interview 34A with Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte, 25 January 2009 
75 These differences were ancient and had been at the core of the thirty-year Char Bouba War (1644- 
    1674) between mainly Arabic Beni Hasan warrior tribes and the Arab-Berber maraboutic tribes of  
    southern Mauritania.  
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If we consider the relationship between the French and the Maures and 
the French and the black ethnic groups, the relationship between French 
and Blacks began long before, because the French were [trading] in 
Senegal since the 17th century... So little by little, they colonised 
Senegal. It was their starting base for dealing with other African 
countries of West Africa, long before their [colonisation] of the Maures’ 
territory... In the first place, it was an inhospitable region, it was the 
desert and it was much more difficult to penetrate.76 
 
The French protected the riverine sedentary and useful “Black” communities 
against the nomadic Bidân tribes. As the nomadic tribes had no fixed 
addresses, no fixed land tenure and no definable boundaries in a vast desert 
land, the French found them difficult to control. In view of their sedentary 
nature, Black Africans became the preferred bureaucratic aides of the colony, 
learning French as well as administrative and related skills valued in the 
administration of the territory. 
 
The establishment of the centralised administrative French system altered 
important elements of governance within the system of nomadic tribes. 
However, the system that the French put in place was in turn affected by local 
socio-political conditions. The French system for dealing directly with the 
Bidân was to spread its power and authority through the established tribal 
leadership system. They only dealt, however, with leaders complying with 
French authorities’ demands or those appointed by the French themselves. 
 
World events were however catching up with France’s colonial empire, and 
after two world wars, France would soon lose the visible control it had of its 
African colonies. 
 
Independence 
Political crisis in France heralded the birth of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and 
of a new constitution that provided for a wider French community whose 
members would eventually become autonomous republics. However, as 
                                                 
76 Interview 11C with the late Gaye Silly Soumaré, 13 April 2011 
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nationalism swept the African continent in the late 1950s, the Territorial 
Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, newly proclaimed in October 
1958, changed its name to the Constituent Assembly, dropped the French 
constitution and adopted a national constitution in March 1959, declaring 
independence on November 28, 1960. This new state was governed by French-
imposed institutions, foreign to traditional Bidân culture, including the 
provision of the constitution itself, elections, political parties and public 
functions (Villasante-de Beauvais 1998, 133). Nevertheless, with the strong 
support of the French, Moktar Ould Daddah was selected President in August 
1961 by the dominant party in the National Assembly, a Bidân politician and 
member of a maraboutic “small nomad” tribe from the Trarza region in the 
Southeastern portion of Mauritania, but a tribe that had consistently assisted 
the French colonisation efforts77.  
 
The support France gave to Moktar Ould Daddah, as well as its involvement 
in his eventual removal from the presidency is documented in his 
autobiography (Ould Daddah 2003). It was a case of France guarding its “pré 
carré” as clearly stated by M’Boye Ould Arafa, a retired high-level public 
servant and close friend of the researcher: 
 
Ould Daddah was educated, prepared and at first guided by France. 
France put him in the position [of President] to take over the baton from 
the colonial power [and to continue their rule].78 
 
Moktar Ould Daddah quickly established himself as a strong autocratic leader. 
He considered that Mauritania, and Africa in general, was not ready for what 
he regarded as a wasteful and divisive western-style, multi-party democracy. 
He correctly predicted that such a political system would easily be usurped by 
tribal influences, and most especially by the strong, warrior tribes of the north 
and east whose powerbase and activities was being curtailed by the 
modernisation of the country and its new political management. Ould Daddah 
                                                 
77 Photo gallery: Photos 15 and 16  
78 Interview 28H with M’Boye Ould Arafa, 21 April 2011 and Photo 14 
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thus saw himself as an agent of change that sought to reduce potential 
instability caused by the coming together of the modern and traditional realms 
of governance, by being autocratic.  
 
However, in this fledgling state and because of the Maure tribes’ strength and 
influence over the individual, the senators and deputies of the government 
were for the most part still composed of traditional Bidân chiefs appointed for 
their influence over the tribes. Comparatively few Afro-Mauritanians were 
selected to represent regions of the Senegal River Valley that had a 
predominant black population. The very divisive forces that Ould Daddah had 
warned against infiltrated the new regime and were eventually to be used by 
Ould Daddah himself. The traditional elites resisted the system of one-party 
rule that Ould Daddah was putting in place, in defence of a social and political 
system much older than the state and the power groups continued to deal with 
dominant elites in semi-traditional fashion (Villasante-de Beauvais 1998, 
141). Thus, while attacking the traditional power structures of chiefdom and 
that of the National Assembly made up of these nobles, Ould Daddah used 
aspects of that old power-base to augment personal power until his overthrow 
in 1978. By the mid-1970s, all of the concerned political participants, 
including French ex-colonial powers, saw that Mauritania would not continue 
to function under a system of one-man rule, and would soon be overrun by 
Morocco, with its intentions over the territory. It must be remembered that 
Morocco had always minimised the formation of the state of Mauritania as “... 
un drapeau, une hymne et un grand méchoui”79 (Ould Daddah 2003, 208). 
This situation, as put by the historian Isselmou Abdelkader, was considered 
“unacceptable by French ex-colonial powers”80. 
 
To the late 1960s, nevertheless, Ould Daddah was fully aware of his reason 
for keeping good relations with France:  
 
                                                 
79 Literally, ‘merely’ consisting of the raising of a flag, the singing of a national anthem and a big  
    celebratory meal  
80 Interview 48A with ex-Minister Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012  
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Mauritania [was] particularly weak. To the North, its very existence 
[was] seriously threatened by Morocco…To the South; Senegal 
[threatens us]... To the East, Mali [disputes our territory…] we [could 
not] defend ourselves and for this reason, we [have to] cling onto France 
and do nothing that might upset her.81 
 
France gives us a flag and a national anthem! So be it! However, it [was] 
understood by all that nothing [would] change in our relationship with 
it.82 
 
However, Ould Daddah did eventually alienate France, through the 
nationalisation of the French iron ore mine in the north of the country in 1974. 
This gained Ould Daddah political favour with his own people at a critical 
time when the political elites erroneously believed their country to be strong 
and ready to expand by annexing part of Western Sahara. Another issue was 
the independent promotion and signature of fishing agreements with other 
major nations’ fishing fleets over some of the richest fishing grounds in the 
world. These policies were not appreciated by France, and for a time, France 
withdrew its support and advice in Mauritania’s dealings with militarily and 
politically much stronger Morocco and Algeria.  
 
By the mid-1970s, led by its pragmatic President Ould Daddah and through 
the political rapprochement to its Maghreb neighbours, Mauritania decisively 
turned towards reasserting its Arab roots. 
 
Although there is some disagreement among the politicians interviewed, it is 
evident that Ould Daddah alienated the elders and traditional leaders in the 
Bidân society who increasingly viewed the President as a threat to their 
traditional power. They notably resented his truism that tribalism had divided 
the Maures and facilitated the entry of a foreign power, each accusing the other 
of destroying Bidân hegemony in assisting France, the colonial power (Ould 
Daddah 2003, 105).  
                                                 
81 Ould Daddah 2003, p 164 
82 Op. cit., p 206 
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Drought and forced urbanisation 
As the state of Mauritania was emerging as a fledgling political entity in 
Africa, major droughts in the early 1970s drove the nomad Bidân and their 
black Maure slaves into the fledgling capital of Nouakchott, as well as into the 
principally Black-populated towns of the Senegal River valley. The massive 
movement of population because of deteriorating climatic and associated 
socio-economic conditions brought growing social tensions between 
ethnicities over the distribution of wealth.   
 
As this climate-related social change occurred, the existing Bidân feudal social 
structure also changed. Bidân masters, who had ruled a retinue of slaves from 
their nomad tents, had to move into urban houses83. Survival within a 
regulated social system of exchange based on monetary value rapidly 
propagated a more commercial mentality throughout the newly settled 
population. The abolition of slavery and the shift to urban living changed the 
relations between Bidân and Haratin. While the latter were legally free to seek 
employment where they wished, many continued to work in quasi-master-
servant relations, for their former Bidân masters who had adjusted to a new 
mode of living and production of wealth.  
 
The largest part of the freed slave population84, generally having no 
possessions and no recognised social standing became a pool of cheap labour. 
They formed a new urban social class called “Haratin” (singular, “Hartani” or 
“ex-slave”) and their numbers, already large, swelled to represent 40% to 45% 
of the Mauritanian population (Ould Saleck 2003, 12). This large population 
is considered a potential but unrealised political force, an important factor in 
Mauritania’s present socio-political landscape and a potential driver of future 
political change85. In particular, the Bidân consider the Haratin a threat to their 
                                                 
83 Photo gallery: contrast Photo 1, 17 and 18 
84 The time of the great drought, the late 1960s to late 1970s, was a period of voluntary release of  
    slaves. This practice, entrenched in the Bidân and Peulh society has survived until today in spite of  
    increasingly stronger attempts at abolishing the practice in 1905, 1981 and 2007 
85 Photo gallery: Photo 20 
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hegemonic socio-political dominance, as inequalities in the distribution of 
national wealth between white Maures and Afro-Mauritanians is believed to 
have the same roots as the inequality between Bidân and Hartani. This 
apprehension is especially felt today, with the “triumphant” return on 23 
October 2013 of Samba Thiam, the exiled President of the radical Afro-
Mauritanian movement FLAM, and his public declarations of “national 
ambitions” after meeting Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Haratin and president of 
the National Assembly (Cissé, 2013).  
 
As the devastating, decade-long drought took hold in the late 1960s, the urban 
population changed. The predominantly Afro-Mauritanian population 
declined to about 30% by the late 1970s, as the stream of Bidân and newly 
freed slaves fleeing desertification into urban centres continued unabated for 
ten years. The freed Black slaves, or Haratin, as well as those still attached to 
their original masters, now constituted 40% to 45% of the urban population. 
This large population of Blacks, over which the Bidân were determined to 
maintain their dominance, rang alarm bells in the white Maure population and 
in the leader of the new State. With a common “racial” heritage, and a common 
religion, the only “ethnic” parameter that separated and kept Afro-
Mauritanians and Haratin from becoming a socio-political behemoth – as 
perceived by the Bidân – was their separate language; French was spoken by 
the river valley Blacks and Arabic was spoken by the Black Maures (Ogot 
2012, 91). In view of the chasm between Bidân and Black sub-national 
identities, President Ould Daddah found it difficult to promote a sense of 
“imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) centred on a new Mauritanian 
national identity86. The Haratin continue to have strong ties to their former 
masters and retain a strong sense of superiority as “Arabs” over Afro-
Mauritanians. At the same time, there is growing Afro-Mauritanian-Haratin 
competition for work and economic security in the city centres. These, and 
other factors, militate against the growth of a stronger sense of civic belonging 
to a new state, contrary to what Anderson refers to as an imagined community, 
                                                 
86 Interview 11A with the late ex-Senator Gaye Silly Soumaré, 7 April 2011 
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where  “... regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation  that may 
prevail..., the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ 
(1991, 7). 
 
Ould Daddah’s attempts to build a multi-ethnic community appeared to be 
genuine as there is no evidence that he sought to introduce any discriminatory 
ethnic policies at the time Nonetheless, he states in “La Mauritanie, contre 
vents et marées” that: 
 
The bi-ethnic composition of Mauritania is a reality that no leader can 
ignore without the risk of jeopardising the very existence of the country. 
Its recognition and acknowledgement by Mauritanian officials are 
essential for the construction of a Mauritanian motherland based on 
solid foundation. 87  
 
Ould Daddah recognised that ethnicity would continue to play a major role in 
Mauritanian politics. Except for a few passing comments, however, he failed 
to address the situation of the Haratin in the post-slavery context and their 
increasing demographic dominance in the cities. Many elite and non-elite 
Afro-Mauritanians that took part in the present research, nevertheless, 
considered that Ould Daddah, at least at the beginnings of the republic, 
regarded Afro-Mauritanians (Peulh, Soninké, Wolof and Bambara) as equals 
to the Bidân. He sought to create equal opportunities for them in both 
government and quasi-government positions, evidenced in the mix of typical 
ethnic names in listings of government postings of the time. As explained by 
Ly Ciré88, a highly educated Peulh and the son of a high-ranking Senegalese 
government elite, whose father at the time and for personal reasons, was 
closely following ethnic developments in Mauritania:  
 
                                                 
87 Ould Daddah 2003, page 151 
88 Ly Ciré, a Peulh and long-time colleague, dedicated over 14 hours of recorded time in thirteen  
     interview sessions (Interviews 07A to 07M, 6 April to 7 December 2011 and Photo gallery: Photo  
    12). He provided background historical knowledge and offered his opinions on some socio-political  
    characteristics of Mauritanian society, including on the very sensitive subject of the 1989-1991  
    conflict between Maures and Afro-Mauritanians 
 Page 92 
 
Moktar Ould Daddah put Peulh and Soninké [the predominant black 
ethnicities] everywhere [in the government]. It is only once the coup of 
1978 occurred that there was a turnabout. 89 
 
Ly Ciré’s words are echoed by Ould Daddah himself (2003, 296) when he 
reports that at the time of independence, the majority of public servants were 
“from the South” (Afro-Mauritanians), a situation which changed as Bidân 
became increasingly selected to send their children to attend “l’école des 
Nazaréens”90 (op. cit., 65) 
 
 Distancing himself from France, the old colonial power, Ould Daddah sought 
cooperation with other strong partners. Arabisation and the choice of Arabic 
as the national language, whether intended or not, was considered by many 
Afro-Mauritanians as a means of marginalising them and keeping Haratin and 
Afro-Mauritanians separate (Abdoul 20048 48-49). Despite the desired 
rapprochement between Mauritania and its Maghreb neighbours, attempts at 
Arabisation brought about significant problems. From the very beginning of 
its colonisation efforts, France regarded the Arabisation of its North African 
colonies threatened its presence in the region (Ould Daddah 2003, 169). 
However, on 12 January 1966, ignoring the fact that some 30% of the 
population of Mauritania were non-Arab speaking Afro-Mauritanians, Ould 
Daddah pushed through a decree to increase the usage of Arabic, or rather the 
locally spoken dialect Hassaniya, establishing a compulsory Arabic language 
teaching system in primary and secondary schools. Ly Ciré remembers these 
days vividly as a schoolboy: 
 
It was [Ould Daddah]. He began this “Arabisation”! He went to France 
for finance [over and above the 60% of the national budgetary 
requirement that France was carrying] and was rejected. He then went 
to the Arabs. He had been getting along very well with my community, 
the [Afro-Mauritanian] community, the Harpulaar, Soninké, Wolof... 
All was going well until 1966, at which time things began to go wrong. 
                                                 
89 Interview 07M with Peulh bank employee Ly Ciré, 7 December 2011 
90 Meaning “school of the Nazareans”, followers of Jesus Christ the Nazarean or Christians 
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He was being pushed around by “others”... the people he was dealing 
with in the Maghreb. 91  
 
Ly Ciré suggests that Ould Daddah was pressured into arabising the country 
as the price of greater support from Muslim states. Daddah was aware of this 
but in his memoirs states he resisted this pressure. He states: 
 
…a wish for total Arabisation of the Mauritania administration ... is not 
logical in view of the multiethnic nature of the country, and of its 
geographical position adjacent to Senegal and Mali that are both 
Francophone. 92  
 
In response to the language decree, in February 1966, the new capital 
Nouakchott saw its first serious racial confrontations between Hassaniya-
speaking Bidân students (backed by uneducated Arab-speaking Haratin) and 
French-speaking black African students of the Wolof, Soninké and Peulh 
ethnic affiliations. Although the decree was not rejected, the government 
realised that it should have taken heed of the ethnic diversity of the population, 
pulling back on moves to arabise all primary schools and much of secondary 
school teaching (Abdelkader 2008, 34). It placated the Afro-Mauritanians, but 
language differences remain to this day and continue to be a source of 
marginalisation for Afro-Mauritanians, a catalyst for dissent. To this day, 
language remains a source of continuing political instability, and a symptom 
of a wider rift along racial-cum-ethnic lines. 
 
In that same period, Ould Daddah continued to attack the “traditional” 
powerbase of Mauritania. In the earliest days of the new republic, the majority 
of Bidân were still living nomadically in the interior of the country. 
Nouakchott was a fishing village of some 2,000 inhabitants until 5 March 1958 
when it was officially selected as the capital of Mauritania. It grew from a 
village in the early 1960s to a population of some 135,000 by the late-1970s 
(Villasante-de Beauvais 1998, 153)93. The political order remained strongly 
                                                 
91 interview Q07L with banker Ly Ciré, interviewed 7 December 2011 
92 Ould Daddah 2003, page 297 
93 Today, Nouakchott has a population of over 1.5 million or almost 50% of the country’s citizens 
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based on segmentary and fractional divisions within the nomadic Bidân tribal 
system, with each tribe and their tributaries voting “en masse” in western-style 
elections according to a chief’s selection. Despite Ould Daddah’s efforts to 
reduce tribalism, the formation of the state itself was based on support from 
tribal groups, the importance and even the presence of which was vehemently 
denied in public (Abdoul 2004, 54-57).  
 
The Drought of the 1970s 
The major drought of the late 1960s and 1970s was a pivotal factor in forcing 
the vast majority (possibly up to 98%) of the nomadic Bidân tribes with their 
tributaries and slaves, to leave their traditional desert way of life and move to 
the capital, Nouakchott, and to towns along the Senegal River valley. The 
event both strengthened and weakened the power structure of traditional chiefs 
and of the newly formed state. On the one hand, the distribution of government 
aid and food could not have occurred without the support of the chiefs who 
used this opportunity for broader political ends. At the same time, the shift to 
the town led to the creation of new communities that sometimes transcended 
traditional tribal clan groups or segments and appeared to decrease the power 
of the traditional chiefs.94   
 
Some of the more significant outcomes of the early 1970s drought were those 
ensuing from pressure on ownership and use of agricultural lands along the 
Senegal floodplains. Traditional land usage had never been officially recorded 
in written form, apportioned by tribal chiefs under old rituals, altered over the 
centuries by practices based on the Sunni Malekite legal code. This 
apportionment implied legal ownership of land, but only through membership 
of a tribe and, most significantly, along specific patrilineal lines. This 
arrangement implied that even sons of slave-women could own land, although 
in practice they were apportioned less fertile areas of the flood plain compared 
to the Black tribes or the new Bidân proprietors. Yet, in the early 1970s, of 
deeper concern to the ruling Bidân elites, was the growing number of freed 
                                                 
94 Interview 48A with ex-Minister Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
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slaves, or Haratin, who settled en-masse in more remote corners of the fertile 
valley or became tradesmen in the major centres.  
 
The abolition of slavery had been formally advanced in independent 
Mauritania for the first time, in October 1961 when the government joined the 
United Nations (UN) and ratified the UN’s Universal Declaration of the Rights 
of Man. This gave grounds for the President to change Mauritanian society 
“from the top”, stifling tribal dominance over tributaries and introducing new 
ideas and practices. Ould Daddah did attempt to give greater legal and political 
rights to the wider population, moving away from preferential statutory 
treatment and the tribal segmentary feuds that led to bitter divisions as climatic 
conditions worsened. The stated aim was to form a nation in which all 
individuals were free and equal with a direct link to the State and without 
intervening traditional social and political structures. He at first imagined a 
semi-presidential representative, democratic system similar to that of France, 
with himself as President and head of state and a Prime Minister as head of 
government, a position he soon abolished. His guiding proposals to the 
dominant political party he headed at pre-independence were at first ridiculed 
by the traditional elites in and affiliated to the party (Ould Daddah 2003, 154). 
Eventually, his proposition was accepted by the party, but only because of 
strong support given by Yvon Razac, Administrator of the French colonies in 
West Africa and Director of Political Affairs in Mauritania at the time. This 
support came on Ould Daddah’s declaration to resign from the party if his 
proposals were rejected (Ould Daddah 2003, 102).  
 
By the mid-1970s, there was growing realisation by the Bidân elites that the 
Hartani, comprising some 40% of the population, might rediscover their 
African roots, siding with the Afro-Mauritanians and upsetting the balance of 
power. If rapprochement occurred between the Blacks, that is, between the 
Haratin and the Afro-Mauritanian communities, the latter constituting up to 
30% of the population, the balance of power could indeed shift, which would 
threaten the Bidân’s long-standing social and political dominance (Ould 
Saleck 2003, 144).  
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Ould Daddah’s objective of creating a modern and more egalitarian society by 
the 1980s, translated into moves towards formal government decrees 
abolishing slavery that were eventually signed in 1981. The continued 
emphasis on Arabic as an official language, which was used by both the 
Haratin and Bidân, as well as by their mostly uneducated and still servile black 
slaves, was the wedge used by the Bidân elites aware of the possible if distant 
threat of political alliances between the two black communities. The division 
was further widened by the Bidân in the late 1980s, contributing significantly 
to the precipitation of the 1989 crisis.  
 
Drought was a key factor in initiating rapid change in the Mauritanian socio-
political system. It brought about a change in commercial and economic 
activities throughout the society, now not solely based in the traditional 
tributary system, but driven by more commercial and capitalist demands of 
wealth creation. It altered the interaction of the state with the tribal system of 
the Bidân, between the various Bidân tribes, as well as between the Bidân and 
the Haratin, their former slaves. The unprecedented and massive movement to 
a sedentary lifestyle changed the interaction of the Bidân amongst themselves, 
as well as altering their interactions with the Afro-Mauritanian population. It 
altered the relation of free men and women, ex-slaves and those that until then 
were still considered as slaves. It created a large pool of dissatisfied, young 
people with no gainful means of activity. This included young, 
underprivileged Bidân from “smaller” tribes, Afro-Mauritanians, as well as 
their ex-slaves or sons of ex-slaves scrambling to make a living by adapting 
to a different set of commercial and social circumstances in the new urban 
society.  
 
The divide between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ had arisen out of the Bedouin social 
hierarchy based on political bonds and as a labour control mechanism within 
a multi-ethnic setting. This black-white division now began to acquire more 
radicalised overtones. The similarity between the Arab word “abd”, meaning 
“slave” or “servant”, the word “abid”, meaning “black”, attests to the long 
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established lowly social position for the people of black origins in traditional 
societies. Based on this language-rooted evidence, it can be assumed that such 
“racial” divisions pre-date the European slave trade and the European racial 
discourse of the 19th century.  
 
Thus in 1957 the stage was set for the Bidân to dominate within the new, 
purportedly egalitarian society declared by President Ould Daddah early in his 
political career:  
 
Mauritania will no longer be this vast desert once so difficult to cross.... 
Tomorrow, our country will have the place it deserves in this [new] 
world. It will be a country with a modern economy, wisely and 
democratically managing its own affairs through capable elite…. [It 
will be] A country that, resting on its most eminent doctor of "Islam,” 
sees its spiritual authority universally recognised [a reference to the pre-
eminence of the Zawiya elites]... With Allah's help, Mauritania will 
tomorrow be a meeting-place where men of all background, all 
civilizations and all cultures, will meet and live peacefully together.95 
 
The rhetoric of equality and legal rights for all contrasted with the actual 
ethnically and economically based inequalities that continued to characterise 
the society. The Bidân, as well as wealthier Peulh, continued slave practices 
and many black Mauritanians were treated as property rather than legally free 
agents, voters and the legal equals of all others. 
 
Western Sahara: “La Grande Erreur” 
The annexing of the Spanish-controlled Western Sahara into a “Greater 
Mauritania” had been on Ould Daddah’s mind for a long time. He considered 
the Western Sahara population as nomads with the same religion, culture and 
language as those that inhabited the desert of northern Mauritania, as well as 
seeing Western Sahara as a ‘natural’ extension of their nomadic desert realm. 
In the eyes of the grands nomads, this was largely correct, as they continued 
                                                 
95 Part of Moktar Ould Daddah’s 1957 speech as newly elected Vice-President of the national political  
    party, quoted in Ould Daddah (2003) 
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to move across what they saw as arbitrary state frontiers set by foreigners. As 
early as July 1957, newly elected Vice-President of a fledgling Mauritanian 
Territorial Assembly, Ould Daddah spoke about this union. He implied that 
such a union was natural and desired by all inhabitants, including “our brothers 
from the Spanish Sahara”. He considered the partition of the two groups to be 
meaningless and indeed almost immoral, dividing those “of the same tent” 
(Ould Daddah 2003, 5). 
 
In 1975, the Spanish dictator General Franco died, and Spain began a process 
of decolonisation from its overseas territories. It relinquished control of 
Western Sahara and turned it over to Morocco and Mauritania at the Madrid 
Accords in November 1975. This generated a violent uprising by the Western 
Saharan Sahrawi National Liberation Movement, unexpected by Ould 
Daddah. The Polisario, as the Sahrawi National Liberation Movement became 
known, attacked what it saw as the new African colonialists at their weakest 
point, Mauritania’s national capital and the iron-ore mine of Zouérat, the 
principal source of national income. Gaye Silly Soumaré puts it this way:    
 
Mauritania claimed Western Sahara as part of its territory and 
Moroccans demanded the same...When Mauritania and Morocco finally 
agreed and signed a secret agreement [with Spain] for the devolution of 
Western Sahara and agreed to share the territory, war against us began... 
 
The Polisario was strong, but in fact, it was Algeria [we were fighting 
against]. Algeria was waging war against Mauritania through…the 
Polisario... 
 
It was a war over an extended length of the Atlantic shoreline... That 
was the real reason why Algeria participated, and especially opposed 
Morocco… There was a border dispute between them...between Algeria 
and Morocco… However, more importantly, Algeria also wanted to 
have direct access to the Atlantic Ocean...It was the Atlantic Ocean that 
was key... [Iron ore, phosphate and petroleum]…to national resource 
wealth, it influenced this conflict... The mining industry influenced this 
conflict. There are extensive deposits of iron ore, phosphate and oil 
shale in this region. It had a very significant impact on the desire to 
 Page 99 
 
control this region. Moreover, there is the Atlantic deep-water port of 
Ad Dakhla [that is of major strategic importance for the loading and 
evacuation of these bulk minerals]. 
 
[The Algerians] also wanted to oppose the Moroccan expansion and 
obviously, that was the concern of Mauritania. In addition, [the 
Algerians] were seeking direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, which 
would allow them to have access to the sea for their ore export, for their 
oil and their gas. There is also iron-ore maybe, in the Tindouf region.96 
 
Forced sedentarisation of the nomadic Maure and Peulh tribes because of the 
early 1970s drought had created a large pool of unemployed youth in the main 
urban centres. President Ould Daddah’s drew on this growing pool of young 
unemployed men as part of his move to strengthen the armed forces, which 
until then, he had deliberately kept small for his presidential security. The 
armed forces rapidly swelled in numbers from 3,000 to 30,000.  
 
Mauritania was the only ex-colony of French West Africa which had not built 
a professional army and even with many officers training in France, the army 
was poorly equipped and weak, being made up of zealous, but poorly trained 
Haratin and Afro-Mauritanian soldiers often led by equally poorly trained 
Afro-Mauritanian officers.. The Afro-Mauritanians and newly freed slaves 
had readily volunteered to join the army “on the call of the nation”, most likely 
for the ready employment it provided. The Bidân, on the other hand, had not 
moved to join the army “en masse” and when some joined at the beginning of 
the Western Sahara War, tensions mounted, as they could not adjust to serving 
under black officers. By 1978, however, the number of top black officers had 
effectively been reduced, replacing the meritocratic model to one “perfectly 
adapted to the specific realities of Mauritania” (Ould Daddah 2003, 392).  
 
By February 1978, 10,000 Moroccan soldiers were stationed throughout 
Mauritania, to “help and give protection” (Foster 2011, 26) and in 1977 the 
French air force under Operation Lamantin gave strong support by attacking 
                                                 
96 Interview 11A with Gaye Silly Soumaré, 4 April 2011 
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Polisario military incursions into Mauritanian territory (Pazzanita 2008, 537). 
France gave this support despite strong dissatisfaction with Ould Daddah’s 
growing relationships with communist China, with the Arab League and 
particularly with Morocco. For President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, 
Mauritania’s impasse played into French hands. Ex-Minister Isselmou 
Abdelkader put it this way: 
 
Mauritania could not win the war without the strong involvement…of 
France. However, there was something more fundamental. The 
cooperation between Ould Daddah and the Moroccans had reached a 
point that very much bothered the French!  
 
There is something almost fundamental and permanent in French 
politics. In French politics, what is permanent is that... They do not wish 
for Morocco to cooperate too closely with Mauritania. That's a 
given...Because they think that Morocco...is already too influential a 
country, and has too great nationalistic ambitions. It is an Arab country. 
This country had been the starting point to the invasion of Europe, in 
the 8th century! Do you understand? 
 
The French have therefore always wanted to keep Mauritania as a buffer 
zone, a neutral region that would not fall under either the influence of 
Algeria or that of Morocco.97 
 
The drive for personal and national recognition from his Maghreb neighbours, 
Algeria and Morocco, as well as his desire for national acceptance in the Arab 
world, caused Ould Daddah to equivocate in his relations with Morocco and 
Algeria (Ould Daddah 2003, 451-480). The eventual decision to side with 
Morocco, and thus ignore President Boumediene’s warning that Algeria 
would support the Sahrawi Polisario against Morocco and Mauritania, resulted 
in a protracted and abortive war. The President also alienated many 
Mauritanians with the Moroccan alliance and, as the war progressed, with the 
tacit support he gave to France’s attacks on Polisario forces in support of a 
weakened Mauritania. Many of the Sahrawi killed by the French in these raids 
                                                 
97 Interview 48A with Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
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were relatives of northern Mauritanians. Moreover, the Mauritanian armed 
forces felt humiliated by their inability to defend their country and blamed the 
President for their predicament.  
 
This dissatisfaction of the army directly led to Ould Daddah’s overthrow in 
July 1978. Many Hartani and Afro-Mauritanians, as well as some Bidân 
conscripts had been drafted into the army and given their lives in the north of 
Mauritania. The presidency of Moktar Ould Daddah was discussed at length 
with ex-Ambassador Mohamed Saïd Ould Hamody, a Maure of reputed 
Smacide Hartani origin, and Mauritania’s ambassador to the United States for 
many years: 
 
The “Great Fall” of Ould Daddah was his persistence since 1957, to 
wish and to say that Western Sahara was part of Mauritania. His 1957 
speech on “unification” as he called it.…Yes, I was there…at the time 
I was in Grade 6….Ould Daddah was persistent on this idea of 
unification with Western Sahara. In fact, I do not understand totally. 
The Sahrawi, overall, did not wish to be unified with Mauritania. The 
Oualad Delim, who inhabited the Sahara as well as the North of 
Mauritania, in fact, did not wish to be “unified”.…To me, this was the 
great error of Ould Daddah, this drive for unification, this war. This is 
what brought Ould Daddah down....   
 
In 1976, the "War of the Sahara" was in full swing…. This war plunged 
Mauritania in a situation that was unexpected. She thought that she 
would merely be confronting [some minor militant] Sahrawi nomads. 
She in fact was faced with Algeria….It was a fatal error... a fatal error 
[on the part of President Ould Daddah] that could have brought down 
Mauritania…The coup d'état that took place in 1978 [and overthrew the 
president], even if Ould Daddah was charismatic, intelligent, etc... This 
coup saved Mauritania! It ended the war.98 
 
For Mauritania, 1978 was a difficult year. In spite of the desire to make 
Mauritania a “united country, with solidarity and brotherhood, prosperity, 
                                                 
98 Interview with ex-Ambassador Saïd Ould Hamody, 13 December 2011. Photo 11 
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considered and respected by the world” (Ould Daddah, 2003, 403) the 
President was toppled from power.  
 
The specific incident that led to the overthrow of President Moktar Ould 
Daddah came because he attacked Bidân elites within his own government for 
graft and corruption. In a presidential career-destroying move echoed by 
President Abdallahi in 2008, Ould Daddah campaigned against graft. He fired 
two ministers and threatened several senior army officers (Foster 2012, 27), 
upsetting the tribal balance agreed to by elite elders. Ould Daddah had also 
recently appointed Colonel Mustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck as Army Chief 
of Staff in January 1978, a career army officer from a Beni Hassan warrior 
tribe from the east. As a member of a warrior Beni Hasan tribe, Colonel Saleck 
was at odds with the reasoned and diplomatic approach to life of an individual 
from a maraboutic tribe of the south. The security and the economic situation 
of Mauritania rapidly worsened and elites as well as the general population 
became increasingly alarmed. This precipitated Ould Daddah’s deposition by 
Colonel Saleck on 10 July 1978, who had no close relationship with his 
President. The President was replaced by a military council with the support 
of the French. Many believe that there was strong involvement of “external 
forces” in the political upheavals that occurred then, and subsequently, in 
Mauritania. 
 
In all three cases, Ould Babana, Ould Daddah, [and later] Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya, we say that there has [to be] external influences.... 
[With] Babana, there was fear...we did not want people from outside 
[interfering with our politics], but the French backed Ould Daddah and 
Ould Babana left. We did not want [but!] there is very likely “something 
external” that brought Ould Daddah and which also took Ould Daddah 
away.  
 
The French were…in it. Did someone become “bothered” with Ould 
Daddah [and his politics] in the end? Was it the French President 
Valerie Giscard d’Estaing]?  
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Yes, perhaps the French once again...In 1978, it is the French who 
[backed] Saleck.99 
 
The eighteen years of Moktar Ould Daddah’s presidency and the subsequent 
six years of military rule, which ended the disruptive attempt at annexation of 
Western Sahara, was a period in which the state of Mauritania begun to take 
form quite rapidly and became recognised on the world stage. The late Gaye 
Silly Soumaré, a young minister within Moktar Ould Daddah’s government 
asserted that: 
 
Indeed, [in the beginning] Mauritanians did not have a very clear idea 
of the meaning of “the State” at that time... They were more or less 
independent tribes...Bedouin tribes such as my own sedentary tribes 
[Seré and Sarakolé] and the nomad [Maure and Peulh] tribes...For a 
time the tribes got along fairly well...Moorish and African.100 
 
In summary, the first President of Mauritania, Moktar Ould Daddah, elected 
on 20 August 1961, was deposed in a coup d’état on 10 July 1978. The clear 
conviction held by the majority of Mauritanian government elites and many 
ordinary Mauritanian citizens, was that France played a pivotal part in Ould 
Daddah’s downfall. France’s involvement is downplayed but acknowledged 
by ex-president Ould Daddah himself: 
  
Given the following events in Mauritania, some have asked whether 
France took any part in the putsch of 10 July 1978.... Not being in 
possession of direct positive information, I gather that France was an 
accomplice by omission....  
 
My overthrow offered France an elegant opportunity to disengage from 
the Saharan conflict.... [In view of France’s relationship with 
Francophone African presidents and its promises of help towards 
independence and democracy]…To go back on its promise [by 
interfering] in Mauritania, would have been for France to discourage its 
African friends and once more lose, their confidence in the promised 
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protection of the “French umbrella“.... A change of political regime in 
Nouakchott, of course, a change they would not be actively involved 
with, but which they would “allow” to take place, seemed the best 
solution that would allow France to withdraw without any undue effect 
from the conflict in the Sahara....  
 
Having been taken out of the picture, the Mauritanian army would retire 
from the war and there would be no talk of reunification [between 
Western Sahara and Mauritania].101 
 
President Ould Daddah’s overthrow furnished France with a way of avenging 
itself for Mauritania’s nationalisation of its iron ore mine at Zouérat. It also 
allowed it to extricate itself from a situation that had forced it to take sides 
between a strong Moroccan nation, and an Algeria that was becoming a 
significant world-player in the petroleum industry. Both Morocco and Algeria 
were valuable neighbours, albeit both watched with some geopolitical caution. 
Geopolitically of importance, petroleum resources did not play a part in this 
coup d’état, although a tenuous link may be argued through the delicate game 
of ‘cat-and-mouse’ France was playing with Algeria over its petroleum riches, 
at the time.  
 
The “Reign of the Colonels” 
Between 1978 and 1984, four military regimes ruled for various lengths of 
time, each in turn changed by coup d’états. These coups were sudden 
depositions of the ruling body of military elites by small factions within the 
military establishment. The ruling body of elites was in each case replaced 
with a differing set of military elites, but the system remained the same.  
 
Mustapha Ould Saleck, the new president after Ould Daddah, was a Bidân 
from eastern Mauritania, and head of a military Junta dominated by Bidân (the 
CMRN or Comité Militaire de Redressement National). As Head of State, as 
of 20 March 1979, he appeared to reconcile with pro-Algeria France. Saleck 
failed, however, in his attempts to reconcile with the Polisario, whose 
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members are related to the northeastern warrior Bidân tribes, the Ould Delim. 
Disquiet increased in Mauritania as Ould Saleck focussed on Arabisation and 
failed to address racial tensions between French-speaking Afro-Mauritanians 
and Hassaniya-speaking Bidân (Ould El Haycen 2009). Ould El Haycen, a 
respected political writer, states that Ould Saleck was deposed as head of the 
Junta on April 6 1979 because of dissatisfaction within the military elites.  
 
This [was a] difficult and impossible situation, fruit[s] of alliances 
‘against nature’ {perhaps referring to unusual tribal alliances}…. In 
order to keep or eliminate opponents would result in the sudden 
departure from power of Colonel Moustapha Ould Saleck.... Thus, the 
bond that officers had formed on 10 July 1978 [with the overthrow of 
President Ould Daddah] rapidly fell apart, opening the way to the 
formation of factions and differing ways of thinking that were emerging 
within the army. This brought Mauritania “in the eye of the storm” for 
a very long time, full of surprises, reversal of friendships or of alliances, 
betrayals as well as violence among fellow citizens.102 
 
The coup that ousted Ould Saleck was carried out by Colonels Ahmad Ould 
Bouceif and Mohamed Khouna Haidallah. Tribal rivalry was the main motive 
behind it, and the question of natural resources and derived revenues were of 
no direct significance at the time. Bouceif was from a southern-based semi-
nomadic and Maraboutic tribe, while Ould Haidallah hailed from a nomadic, 
warrior tribe of the Ould Delim group from the far north and was related to 
the Sahrawi tribes of Western Sahara. Ould Bouceif, reputed to have been the 
preferred successor to Saleck, was killed under suspicious circumstances in an 
airplane accident in Dakar in May 1979, one month after the coup. His 
possible murder may have been motivated by tribal rivalries since he too 
originated from the southwest, as had Saleck, and would favour the 
relationships: 
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Unfortunately, the reign of Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif experienced 
a regrettable and tragic end…not adequately investigated and which 
remains inexplicable in many respects.103 
 
Ould Bouceif was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Mahmoud Ould 
Louly, also from a semi-nomadic southern maraboutic tribe. He became 
Chairman of a renamed military Junta and Head of State on 3 June 1979. Ould 
Louly also did not last long and was unceremoniously ousted on 4 January 
1980 and replaced by the northerner, Prime Minister Lieutenant Colonel 
Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah. Haidallah had disagreed many times with 
Ould Louly concerning relations with Ould Louly’s southern “small nomads”, 
a traditional dichotomy of ideas and beliefs between warriors and marabouts. 
In view of Haidallah’s northern roots, it is not clear whether he disfavoured a 
close relationship with the Moroccans in opposition to Louly’s most likely 
political position. It is more likely that close relations with the Polisario and 
the Sahrawi tribes began to flourish once again. This together with his strong 
Islamic and pro-Arab leaning as well as a rapprochement to the Algerians 
alarmed France and clear evidence exists for France’s involvement in his 
overthrow by his Prime Minister Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed (Ould) Taya. 
 
While the 1978-overthrow of Ould Daddah was aided by the French, but 
precipitated by a need for Mauritania to extricate itself from the Western 
Sahara war, the two palace coups that occurred in the overthrows of Ould 
Saleck and Ould Louly were driven primarily by inter-tribal differences: 
 
Despite taking all possible measures, President Moustapha had not been 
able to take control of the rudder and redress the drifting ship of state… 
He was undeservingly “disembarked at the dock” by his new colleagues 
without having been able to come to grips with the situation.... He was 
removed from power, but he went from his brief presidential tour with 
a clear conscience and a quiet resignation, ousted by the devouring 
ambitions of his army compatriots.104 
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The political leanings of the Mauritanian elites vacillated between pro-
Polisario (and therefore pro-Algeria and pro-French), and losing the backing 
of the French because they had the tacit approval of Morocco in the 
partitioning of Western Sahara. The seesaw politics ended with the 12 
December 1984 overthrow of Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould 
Haidallah. This palace coup was led by Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed 
Taya, Prime Minister at the time and initially against the annexation of 
Western Sahara to Mauritania. This resolved a thorny issue, Ould Taya’s 
government renouncing any claim to the territory: 
 
In 1978, the army has become a very strong socio-political and 
economic class, increasingly dominated by the Bidân. Therefore, you 
see, between 1978 and 1984, there were a lot of coups and palace 
revolutions… [And] There was a succession [of Bidân army leaders]... 
[Saleck], Louly, Bouceif… [Haidallah]... And up to Maaouya [Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya]. There was [continuous] instability at the top of the 
state. It was related to the pro-Moroccan to pro-Polisario 
[seesaw]…The [tribal] links [of the leaders] were with Morocco [or] 
Algeria and Western Sahara, [and that] created instability.105 
  
Internal political turbulence had marked Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed 
Khouna Ould Haidallah’s period as head of state106. Measures to have slavery 
abolished were cosmetic as in reality they merely reflected the need of Bidân 
masters to rid themselves of tribal obligations towards their former slaves. 
Haidallah also brought in land tenure reforms, passed in 1983, to regularise 
and modernise the development of the fertile agricultural lands along the 
Senegal River (Pazzanita 2008, 289-292). These reforms, however, were seen 
by the sedentary and traditional Afro-Mauritanian occupants as a land grab by 
the Bidân to commercialise land that had been family-owned by Blacks for 
centuries, creating yet another reason for the fault-lines in the Mauritanian 
socio-political landscape.   
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The land grab could have been an opportunity for the possession of land by 
exploited labourers and impoverished tenant farmers, principally made up of 
Haratin. The reality, however, was that as well as helping shift ownership to 
new Bidân owners (who continued to use cheap Haratin labour) the move 
began to fan the flames of Arabisation and resentment, which worsened the 
conflict between French-speaking Afro-Mauritanians and Arabic-speaking 
Haratin. Additionally, the passing of Sharia Law by Haidallah, a fervent but 
moderate Islamist (as he continues to be to this day) did not go down well with 
the former colonial power. An impromptu interview with Mohamed Lemine 
Ould Abdallah, long-time political dissident exiled between 2002 and 2009, 
and member of the activist movement, “25 février”, gave insight on this part 
of Mauritania’s history: 
 
It is widely known that Haidallah…at one of the meetings where all the 
presidents from the former French colonies meet with the French 
President said”...we are sick of the French language! We are going to 
[establish] English [as the official language]...ok?” …He had indeed 
thought that at a certain time, but it is at this time that the French began 
to distance themselves from him…and helped [Taya] with the [12 
December 1984] coup....  
 
There were several reasons why Haidallah was [not appreciated by the 
French]... There was Sharia [law].... He was pro-Algerian…pro-
Polisario [and contrarily on the side of the French since they opposed 
Morocco’s claim to an expanded territory]... Sharia changed 
[Mauritanian society]… However, [the application of Sharia] was also 
[a move] against the poor [Haratin and Afro-Mauritanians]... Do you 
understand what I mean? Haidallah began to preach on the practice of 
Islam, and began with that. [The application of] Sharia law 
[however]...was brutal... If you were stopped [by the police], they may 
denounce you as [a thief], and cut your hand or “shave tips” for women, 
torturing people who drink alcohol, etc… But this Sharia which 
[Haidallah] had applied to the Mauritanian people was not applicable to 
everyone evenly…They may cut off the hand of this one [pointing to a 
Hartani working in his shop] but this one may not have his hand cut off 
[pointing to a Bidân passing by]...  
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Overnight, you cannot adjust a country that yesterday was a free and 
sovereign state, where everybody drank [alcohol] and where a liberal 
system was in place... In the time of Moktar Ould Daddah, there were 
clubs and discotheques everywhere... [With Haidallah], you now begin 
to beat people as if it were Afghanistan! It should not have been like 
that.... The fact was that many people thought he would make Sharia 
law applied to everyone…create an egalitarian society... [He did not] 
apply it evenly, using it only to persecute the poor [the Haratin and 
Afro-Mauritanians]... That meant that many people were now against it 
and against Haidallah, and there were many attempted coups against 
him... 
 
France realised that within their ‘pré carré’ a majority of people were 
now against Haidallah and that there was internal dissent... 
Additionally, having made an enemy of François Mitterrand, and 
[ridiculed] French politics… [Haidallah] had added to his problems.... 
 
You should know that the French are smart; they will not do “things” 
without consulting their Mauritanian [political allies].107 
 
Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah, Head of State and Chairman of the 
Military Committee for National Salvation between January 1980 and 
December 1984, was a strong man from a nomadic tribe from the northern 
reaches of Mauritania and southern Western Sahara who sought to reconcile 
his country with Algeria and the Polisario.  
 
With this pro-Algeria turn in international relations, Mauritania once again 
angered Morocco, almost coming into open warfare. Indeed, Morocco was 
again ready to annex the whole of the Mauritanian territory to the Senegal 
River. This may have happened, had not France been ever watchful of 
Morocco becoming too strong a Mediterranean force. As the pro-Arab and 
autocratic style of Haidallah also did not go down well with France, it is 
widely believed by Mauritanians that France was implicated in his removal as 
Head of State on 12 December 1984 by Col. Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya. 
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Isselmou Abdelkader, as a historian, political observer and writer, gives 
credence to Mohamed Lemine Ould Abdallah’s insight on Haidallah: 
 
Haidallah had been overthrown “by the French”… It was very clear… 
General Jeannou Lacaze, Chief of Staff of the French army, came [to 
Mauritania] and concocted a scheme with Maaouya [at that time Prime 
Minister]. They said it had to be a coup while Haidallah was out of the 
country. They set a date for the summit in Bujumbura and in a short 
time repaired Haidallah’s plane [which had needed repairs for a long 
time]. They made it easy for him to leave, and managed to remove from 
the scene for a short period, several key figures in the administration 
that were pro-Haidallah... In addition, when...Maaouya came, he was 
“France’s man”. Everyone knew it.108 
 
In his study on Mauritania’s political development, Noel Foster summarises 
well the unstable period of military rule from 1978 until 1984:  
 
There were Mauritanian military juntas that took power, each with a 
self-appointed mandate to redress the country’s endemic problems. 
However, they found themselves unable to resolve them, much less, 
those they themselves had created… [They] brought their worldviews 
to the ministries they took over. The point is that they were unschooled, 
unprepared for governance, and without a political base… Naturally 
inclined to enter into marriages of convenience with tribal 
aristocracies…the rise of tribal elites harkened…a veritable period of 
primitive capital accumulation through the pillage of the state…acts 
understood in the logic of…a tribalistic worldview, with its own values 
and morality.109  
 
The fall of the Ould Delim president, Haidallah, and the ascension of Colonel 
Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya as military head of state on 12 December 
1984 were generally hailed by Mauritanians as a victory for and by the people. 
This is affirmed by a majority of participants to the present research that were 
questioned on this particular aspect of Mauritanian history. Some astute 
observers among them, nevertheless, also saw the strong hand of the French 
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secret services behind only a handful of young officers. These officers were, 
it must be emphasised, both Bidân and Afro-Mauritanian, and one of them 
was the already notable young Captain Ely Mohamed Vall, at the time 
commander of the sixth military division, a decisive force behind the coup 
d’état (El Haycen 2009, 133)  
 
From the very beginning of his ascension to power in 1984 until his overthrow 
in 2005, Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya did attempt to improve 
Mauritania's poor socio-political and economic performance. He sought to 
address some of the thornier dilemmas Mauritania faced in joining the modern 
world: tribalism, fraud and corruption, land tenure, poverty and slavery 
(Pazzanita 2008, 307-308)110.  
 
Corruption, tribalism and fault-lines  
Historically and to this day, racially and ethnically based discrimination has 
been a central feature of Mauritania’s society and has generated considerable 
discontent among those affected negatively by such an institution. It was 
exacerbated from the mid-1970s with the urbanisation of the nomad Bidân and 
their efforts to ensure continued socio-political and economic control of the 
country. 
 
Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya’s presidency in the 1980s saw his tribe 
and allied tribes and lobbies consolidate their power over formal institutions, 
such as government, army and police, to wealth-producing institutions and 
industries such as banks, land resources, fisheries, mining and other activities  
(Samuel, 2011). It extended to the formation and control of less apparent and 
informal markets and institutions, such as employment, elite networks, 
international links, the illegal traffic of cigarettes, alcohol, drugs and arms 
through the desert and many others. These actions took on an increasingly 
racialised character with the systematic removal of Afro-Mauritanians from 
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positions of power, culminating in 1989 in the systematic and organised 
physical violence wrought against them. 
  
President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya declared in his inaugural 
speech at the advent of the coup on 12 December 1984, that he would end 
autocracy, corruption and tribalism, which had paralysed the country. Yet one 
party rule dominated by Bidân elites continued. In spite of Taya’s initial – and 
in hindsight – weak efforts at curbing tribalism and nepotism, these became 
entrenched as ex-minister Soumaré explains: 
 
Yes, the Smacides was a small tribe. However, the president, the man 
who is in power, he does everything for his family in order to gain spoils 
from state market [opportunities]... In addition [with President Taya], 
this is how these people became rich... At the beginning, they were not 
affluent, but they accumulated much wealth with [Taya] while he was 
in power... There is the example of Abdallah Ould Abdallahi, whose 
wealth was created by Taya…An uncle of President Ould Taya was 
from the tribe of Abdallah Ould Abdallahi [and is now one of 
Mauritania’s wealthiest men]. This person benefited from everything 
that could come from the state... This is [a clear case of] nepotism... The 
State is the principal source of wealth that Mauritania always has had... 
You know initially there were no businessmen, there was nobody... The 
state that gave out all...it is the State that hired people and who gave 
them work...It was the state therefore that could give wealth to people 
and [made the Smacides and related Bidân tribes, wealthy tribes with 
newfound social nobility]. 111  
 
Observed from the “outside” as above by ex-Minister Soumaré, the Bidân’s 
social and political behaviour is seen as entrenching the factional power of the 
Smacides power in a manner contrary to officially stated aims of greater 
equality and fairness in government. This contradiction is commented on by 
ordinary Mauritanians such as a Peulh and a Hartani hotel employee who 
participated in the research:     
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It is rare to see a political leader or anyone like the man at the head of 
a[n]… administration or ministry to be there for the good of the 
people…it is also unheard of…Yes, including Maaouya Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya…Yes…Ould Taya very much favoured his ethnic 
group. He did a lot for his ethnicity [tribe], the Smacides. He developed 
[their] city, Atar. He very much helped his relatives and neglected 
others. As a result, “the others” [Bidân] at some point began to feel 
frustrated, and this is what led to divisions, coups, petitions, and all 
that.112 
 
 
During the time of Taya, when someone was nominated in the 
government, that person was nominated not for his or her skill, but for 
their ethnic membership... There is also a definition [that I give to these 
people]; "all senior officials who served under Ould Taya, they became 
so rich that they will never be [poor again] in 50 years"... I give this 
definition to them!113 
 
As Foster notes, the failure of the state to provide security and well-being to 
all its citizens, promoted a sense among many that, it was only through kinship 
and ethnic relations at the sub-national level that security could be assured. 
This, in turn, enhanced feelings of solidarity between tribal members and 
ethnic groups. Foster (211, 320) gives this view: 
 
The modern state itself in these tribes’ vision appeared as an alien entity 
that demanded loyalty and exacted demands while providing few 
services… Loyalty was [therefore] owed [only] to real entities – one’s 
family, clan, tribe – rather than to imagined communities such as the 
nation or the state. The state failed to provide services to citizens largely 
because resources were embezzled, which in turn brought Mauritanians 
to rely even more heavily on tribal solidarity networks that distributed 
embezzled earnings.114 
 
Greed and grievances intensified and internal strife between Bidân grew in 
proportion to the systematic embezzlement of public resources that was 
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occurring to the highest level. Foster attributes this to Maure traditional 
practices adapted to the new circumstances. He explains:  
 
The Maures view had been shaped by the tradition of razzias. This 
fostered an economic system of redistribution grounded on raiding 
others and sharing of the loot in the name of tribal solidarity or 
Assabiya115… This tradition was reinvented in an unprecedented 
fashion in the 1970s... The state, an alien, adversarial entity constituted 
the most appetising prize, prompting tribes to compete over hijacking it 
and pillaging its resources for internal allotment… The pretext of 
Assabiya did not occur in the framework of a benevolent tribal welfare 
state.… As soon as a tribe allied sufficient forces to take over a wing of 
the government, it disintegrated in internal strife over its spoils, only to 
be taken over by another tribe with stronger internal cohesion…in a 
cyclical mechanism of hostile takeovers termed “predatory 
redistribution,” redirecting national wealth to a handful of tribes.116 
 
However, the worst was yet to come for President Ould Taya. The division 
between Haratin and Afro-Mauritanian, which had been made wider by the 
new land reforms, became more intense. Within President Ould Taya’s own 
tribal and personal circles, there were many who did not approve of his 
openness and participatory approach towards blacks. Isselmou Abdelkader 
gives a personal view of his president’s relationship with Afro-Mauritanians, 
a relationship that, to some of the older Bidân and Afro-Mauritanians known 
to the researcher, was a natural outcome of the man’s character, and of the 
relationships that he formed as a young man. As a minister in Taya’s 
government, Isselmou Abdelkader throws light on the deteriorating 
relationship with blacks and the increasing paranoia suffered by Taya as an 
outcome of the ill advice he received from ill-intentioned Bidân politicians:  
 
Taya and I were friends… He was at ease with the blacks, having grown 
up playing with Hartani and black children. He worried more about 
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certain Bidân elites, who always thought their nemesis were “the 
blacks”. 
 
This is because at the time of independence, the blacks were in the 
majority within the public service. They had had long contact with the 
French, for centuries, as they were sedentary and were settled close to 
St Louis, it had been easy for the French to deal with them and educate 
them in the French ways. They knew the French language, whereas, the 
Maures knew only Arabic... Above all else, they had been made into 
French citizens, while the Maures had even “snubbed” the French 
schooling system. The only Maures who did adapt to the French system 
[of schooling]...were the Oualad Béiri, the “small nomads” from the 
southwest, a few Smacides [including Taya’s close tribal family], some 
Idawali, and minor tribal elements of the Oualad Bousba...mainly these 
merchants that were settled in Senegal. 
 
The Baathists in the Maure society, seeking the dominance of Arab 
culture in Mauritania, reflected that, “Maaouya is beginning to rely too 
much on the blacks. This will mean the return of the French language 
to the exclusion of Arabic and Arabic culture!” 
 
They began to deal with the secret services.... The Iraqi intelligence and 
Gadhafi’s secret services became involved with them, and they 
constructed an extraordinary scenario [a trap] for Maaouya.... 
 
They began by involving…the National Security Corps, at the time 
under the leadership of Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall, who was among the 
many military officers sympathetic to the Arab nationalist theme. There 
were [others] in the Directorate of State Security, who were also 
supporters of Arab nationalism. One was in charge of the police…The 
plotting was going on at all levels...It was everywhere... All the 
intelligence services began to cooperate... 
  
They decided, “We will [engineer a situation] so that Maaouya and the 
blacks will come to a brawl!” …And they staged a military parade on 
November 28 (1986), a parade...in which only Haratin and Afro-
Mauritanians, in other words, all and only blacks, took part. There was 
not one uniformed service member of clear complexion [of Berber, 
Arab or mixed-Berber-Arab descent]. They photographed the military 
parade and gave a report [to the President] saying that "62% of the 
military command was under the control of Afro-Mauritanians (Peulh 
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and Soninké)”, and that more than 70% of the army consisted of these 
ethnic groups. They implied that “this was extremely dangerous, 
because the black Africans were up to something, etc, etc”... 
 
So ... President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed  Ould Taya…becoming 
somewhat alarmed, immediately put an army chief, his right-hand man 
and an intimate friend, Djibril Ould Abdallahi to investigate the 
situation and find a solution to the problem...  
 
Djibril and his team made their proposal, which was to trim the number 
of blacks [in the army]. They “denounced” a number of people. They 
proposed 1,050 soldiers - 1,000 were blacks and 50 were Maures. This 
was amazing! These individuals were to be summarily dismissed from 
the army! 
 
At the same time, others [Maures] were stirring up the [Afro-
Mauritanians]. They were warning them, saying, “Ah, Maaouya, 
he...will remove you all. He will remove all the blacks! He will show 
the door to all [the Afro-Mauritanians]!”  
 
It was then that the [blacks] began to feel threatened…And naively, they 
began preparing a coup against Maaouya! [A small group of] Afro-
Mauritanian [mainly Peulh officers] began plotting in 1987... 
 
When the Afro-Mauritanian plot to overthrow President Ould Taya was 
uncovered before execution, the Baathists convinced Ould Taya that the 
perpetrators should be sentenced to death in order to “deter any other 
such events from recurring from ‘that’ quarter” [While in reality] it was 
because when you kill your opponent, there is no chance of 
reconciliation...  
  
The “Manifesto of the Oppressed Black Mauritanian” which had been 
published in April 1986 by the Peulh-dominated activist group FLAM 
(African Liberation Forces of Mauritania)117 did not help the situation 
by endorsing a coup d’état against President Taya and from that 
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moment, Maaouya "went to war”. He had developed a phobia... It was 
a real fear of blacks... It was a mortal fear of blacks! Some 50 Afro-
Mauritanians (mostly Peulh) officers were arrested and tortured. Three 
were hung and the rest were given very long prison sentences or large 
fines.  
 
Thus began the vicious cycle of action, counter-action and spiralling 
ethnic tension that led to the bloody events of 1989.118 
 
Ly Ciré, a Peulh whose Afro-Mauritanian relatives, some army and police 
officers and their families, suffered in the ethnic violence, again clearly 
exposes the ethnic violence of 1989-1991: 
 
They’ cleaned up ‘their’ army…That is to say; [the Bidân] removed all 
Afro-Mauritanian officers, all black officers. They killed many.… 
There were some who were killed, others were deported, others died in 
prison and others simply disappeared, presumed dead…It was a purge 
of the army. I have many friends who are currently in Paris, Belgium, 
the United States or Canada…. They were all senior officers. There are 
plenty, [because] the more senior officers, you could not kill them all… 
It would be an extremely grave matter – to kill captains, 
lieutenants…They used Haratin [henchmen] against us…After the 
events of 1986, they were conscripted into the police and did all the 
“dirty jobs”: the killings, the evictions [during 1989-1991]… All this 
was done by them [the Haratin]… The Bidân could not have done it. 
They are physically incapable…. The Haratin ex-slaves were many and 
are physically very strong....119 
 
Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte adds authority to Ciré’s accusations and 
confirms the involvement of the Bidân as instigators and the Haratin as the 
executors of the persecution suffered by the Afro-Mauritanian section of the 
population between 1989 and 1991: 
 
Who is it that killed the Afro-Mauritanians? It was the Haratin, because 
they were incited to do so by the Bidân. They were duped! Moreover, 
they are unrefined people who have the ability to do “rough” acts... Can 
                                                 
118 Interview 48A with Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
119 Interview 07C and 07E with Peulh bank employee Ly Ciré, 8 April 2011 
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you imagine white Maures of religious origin doing these acts? Can you 
imagine even one of them with a machete cutting up a black African? 
This sort of work required people who are rough, who are acquainted 
with physical action.120 
 
Professor Bonte’s account of the 1989-1991 pogroms draws on somewhat 
stereotypical notions of the Bidân and Haratin to explain violent action. The 
scheming Bidân are portrayed as manipulators of the rough and ready Haratin. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from what Professor Bonte says and from other 
sources that Bidân were in charge of the killings and persecution that were 
committed; they gave the orders. 
 
The Bidân who had plotted against Ould Taya and against the Blacks were the 
same persons who had influenced the passing and implementation of land 
reforms initiated by the former President Haidallah. These reforms had 
precipitated the appropriation of fertile land along the Senegal River 
traditionally held and tilled by Afro-Mauritanian families. Gaye Silly 
Soumaré, originating from the north bank of the Senegal River, well 
remembers the government-backed violence against the Afro-Mauritanians, 
mainly targeted at the Peulh, but sometimes felt by the Seré, Sarakolé and 
Soninké of the Gorgol and Guidimakla regions:  
 
In 1989, the Mauritanian government expelled many Afro-
Mauritanians [from the river valley]. They were forced to cross the river 
to go to the Senegalese side for protection [among their relations].... 
The Bidân took these blacks’ traditional land.... That is to say, the Afro-
Mauritanians’ land becoming “vacant” on their departure, so to say, and 
the Bidân elites came to occupy and develop it as newly released 
farmland.121 
 
Confrontation in Mauritania between Bidân and Afro-Mauritanians has deep 
roots (Boukhars 2012, 7) and the Arabisation of education that had brought 
confrontations in 1966, also brought tension in the 1980s when the land 
                                                 
120 Interview 34A with Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte, 5 December 2011 
121 Interview 11A with Gaye Silly Soumaré, 7 April 2011 
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reforms to deal with the problem of desertification were adopted by the 
Government (op. cit., 8). Ordinance 83.127, enacted 5 June 1983 had begun 
the process for all land not clearly the property of a documented owner. It 
abolished the system of land tenure traditionally practised by the Afro-
Mauritanians of the river valley. Moreover, the ordinance forbade any 
collective lawsuit regarding property rights, rendering impossible any legal 
action on the grounds of traditional rights of tenure by a collective tribe, 
village, clan or family. By the late 1980s, much of the fertile land formally 
held under these traditional arrangements was reassigned to Bidân developers, 
who now formally and privately owned large tracts in the river valley, and 
were favoured by the World Bank that was targeting financing of agricultural 
development schemes (Boukhars 2012, 8). 
 
One of the root causes for the expropriation of traditional land, however, goes 
much deeper than the relationship of Mauritania with the international 
financial institutions. A major reason for the Afro-Mauritanians’ expulsions 
and expropriations, that occurred in earnest between 1986 until 1990, was 
purely economic. The traditionally nomadic Maures had lost their main source 
of revenue with the terrible drought of the 1970s. The drought devastated the 
Maures’ livestock, the only real possessions of the Bidân to that time. Camel, 
goat and cattle herds disappeared and the mass migration for survival to 
centres of food distribution began a very rapid process of urbanisation. 
Moreover, the Mauritanian part of the Senegalese river valley is the most 
fertile part of the country, and the creation of the Organization for the 
Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) on 11 March 1972, enhanced its 
potential, with the construction of several dams greatly increasing the 
available area of irrigable land within the valley. Marginal lands were 
gradually becoming viable as the climatic environment became less erratic, 
and the OMVS achievements began to be felt. These lands also began to be 
acquired legally or merely squatted on by large destitute and desperate groups 
of Hartani who were landless and released by their desperate masters as they 
fled for survival away from the desert and towards the sanctuary of cities and 
town.  
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Although ethnic tensions were mounting in the urban centres of Mauritania, a 
brutal, bloody ethnic pogrom began as a simple argument in a field between 
Hartani camel herders and black Senegalese farmers on 9 April 1989. The 
dispute was over the right to graze the herd on a plot of untilled farmland near 
the small village of Diawara, on the southern Senegalese side of the Senegal 
River. Mauritanian guards became embroiled in the argument and killed two 
of the Senegalese farmers.  
 
Riots in Senegal immediately followed news of the shootings. In Dakar, the 
looting, raping and killing that ensued was directed principally against the 
Haratin, the visible individuals who worked for the Bidân shop owners who 
dominated the local retail business. However, the Dakar riots played into the 
hands of the Bidân plotters in Nouakchott. The memory runs deep in 
Mauritania with Afro-Mauritanians, Haratin as well as Bidân who were ill at 
ease discussing the subject. An anonymous member of the Bidân elite, well 
placed to remember the events of 1989-1991, made these comments: 
 
It is the black Maures who were killed the most in Senegal...Very many! 
This is because they were the most visible in the places where the 
Maures lived, in these neighbourhoods [of Dakar]... They [the 
Senegalese] first killed many black Maures, and they mutilated their 
wives. When [the UN-aided urgency repatriation of Mauritanians 
came], when the planes arrived with people who were gravely burnt and 
mutilated, and many Haratin women whose breasts had been cut off and 
were still flowing with blood… The event was mediatised [by the white 
Maures in the newspapers and on TV]... 
 
It attracted the “great” rage of the black Maures [Haratin]…. The 
Haratin [became] very violent against the black Afro-Mauritanians. 
They [especially] badly treated the Peulh, [the dominant ethnic group 
in Senegal]... 
 
It [became] pillaging and lynching. These were people who [were 
enraged but] also people who just wanted to take the property of others. 
This is [because, as Haratin] they had nothing themselves and their envy 
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had been stirred….People [Haratin] took taxis [from Peulh drivers], 
they commandeered cars [from Peulh families], they saw you [and if 
you were a Peulh], they attacked, tortured and robbed you and if [the 
participant makes a throat cutting motion]. It was irresponsible 
looting.... They were bandits.... 
 
However, it must also be said that there were extremists. Many [Bidân] 
army officers acted irresponsibly…. They were racist. It was said that 
they were very pro-Arab [Baathists].... The [social] context was 
favourable to have a social explosion.... 
  
Moreover, the man you interviewed today, [ex-president Colonel Ely 
Mohamed Vall] has a great deal of responsibility… because [in 1989], 
he was the director of national security and intelligence.... He knows 
what he did.... He has administrative and moral responsibility for what 
happened.122 
 
The event brought to a head the deep tension that existed between Bidân and 
Peulh, over power and the scant resources of the state (Boukhars 2012, 8). A 
portion of the Bidân government officials did their part and brought fear of the 
black “foreigner” to the boil. Adding to already existing tensions, a popular 
campaign of terror, condoned by the authorities, was declared against Afro-
Mauritanians in the country. It was especially targeted at the Peulh, who were 
denounced as “Senegalese” or “Senegalese sympathisers” regardless of their 
actual nationality or sympathies.  
 
In an impromptu interview with a young Hartani night watchman, Abdou 
Salam Ould Tabane, he explains the events of 1989 through his experience as 
an aggrieved young man manipulated by Bidân agitators. His eloquent 
narration (for a presumed uneducated night watchman) attempts to remove 
Haratin responsibility for the suffering and deaths that occurred, placing it 
squarely with the Bidân ‘masters’. Tabane strongly implies that the Haratin 
were ‘misled’ by Bidân and should be held unaccountable for their actions, 
drawing on racial stereotypes to explain behaviour: 
                                                 
122 Interview 42A with anonymous Bidân elite, 24 November 2011 
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In retaliation, the black Maures attacked by ignorance….By total 
ignorance! White Maures fed us information and led us to believe that 
Senegalese had attacked Mauritanians… There you are.... The black 
Maures raised themselves [without knowing the full story]… We were 
“used” by the Bidân... They used us to ‘beat’ [loot, burn, rape and kill] 
the black Africans, the Afro-Mauritanians…. The Bidân divided us [the 
Blacks Africans] to conquer us…Because when, for example, you take 
a Hartani like me, an illiterate who does not understand, you let him 
know that Senegalese have killed Maures, we react, we must [retaliate 
and] do the same…. This is how it happens here. In general, the white 
Maures are weak, not financially, but weak “physically”…And so they 
encouraged and cheered us on, the Haratin, against “the Senegalese”, 
the foreigner, and there you are! This is what happened in 1989 to 
1991....  
 
The Peulh were caught between the true Senegal foreigners and the 
henchmen [the Haratin]! They were true citizens of Mauritania, but they 
were blacks… They “suffered” because the Peulh…You know, they 
were strong in the army and wanted to make a coup d’état in 1987… So 
this was an opportunity for the Maure elites who did not like the Afro-
Mauritanians, to make them pay…To teach them a lesson! Yes, indeed, 
it was a good lesson!  
 
There were genocides in Kaédi [a city inhabited by many Peulh]. There 
were deaths in Nouakchott.... There were dead bodies 
everywhere…There were dead bodies everywhere! [Emotional 
outburst] 
 
It is a shame when you do not understand...incomprehension. The 
others, they did not understand. The Haratin [we] did not have a deep 
understanding, of what was happening and how we were being 
[manipulated]…You know, there are so few intellectuals among us. 
 
It is also that there exists a link between white Maure, the Bidân and his 
traditional slave, the Hartani… They prefer to act together because they 
are, or at least have come to believe that they are, both Arabs. 
 
Yes, indeed, you know, the black Maure has a “weakness” for the white 
Maure...he is dependent on him”...If you lend me your eyes, I will see 
where you want me to see!” ...It is like that…I have to look where my 
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master wants me to look! The black Maure, the slave...he is 
obligated…he has adopted his white Maure master’s culture and thus 
feels the world around him as his master wants him to feel the world 
around him.  
 
[For the Bidân] “Necessity compels”, and even in the modern urban 
setting, they have kept closer ties with the Haratin than with the Afro-
Mauritanians. This is because the Hartani protects the Bidân master. 
When there is danger, for example, the Hartani will listen to his white 
master…. Taking the example of a guard, as I am now, the guard can 
be told not to let anyone enter on pain of being beaten. The guard will 
savagely beat another black should he enter, Peulh, Wolof or anyone, 
because he listens to his master! He will listen to his former Bidân 
master because he very well knows that this white Maure has been the 
master of his father, and of his grandfather before that. 
 
When will it end? When will the Hartani, the black man wake up?  
 
Maybe his son or his grandson will have gained the intelligence to 
understand that this is not ...the way things should be!123 
  
As conflict with Senegal continued into 1990, the Mauritanian government 
engaged in and actively encouraged acts of violence and seizures of property 
directed against Blacks. 
 
Villages [on the North bank of the Senegal River] were razed and 
communities expelled en masse across the river into Senegal...some 
300,000 Mauritanians fled Senegal, while some 90,000 Senegalese 
were expelled from Mauritania and fled to Senegal and Mali.124 
 
Another impromptu discussion with a Peulh taxi driver on 21 April 2011, 
brought on an emotional response, generated by memories of 1989, in his case, 
those of a very young teenager watching the carnage around him:  
 
                                                 
123 Interview 44A with Abdou Salam Ould Tabane, 24 November 2011. Tabane’s educational level  
      would indicate that he may have been brought up in an elite Bidân household in his youth  
124 Foster 2011, page 35 
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Oh no, no, no! I can still remember all that so clearly! I have images 
that I see of certain events during 1989! [Clearly emotionally 
disturbed]... There, once...it was just there, at Medina 3, the district 
where the house... [Almost in tears]...I swear... This is... This day...Even 
I cry. They beat people there, in front of me...me. That is...Oh! I was 
restrained and it happened in front of me...No... It is too painful to think 
about it, I swear... There are people... There are some who lost their 
friends...myself, there were friends...I had friends before...Not even 
Senegalese, [but] Mauritanians! I do not know where they are, I do not 
know where they are…Yes I swear...I swear... There are [many] people 
who [were killed]…! [By then, the taxi driver was openly crying and 
the impromptu interview ended].125 
 
The argument over grazing land was used by Bidân elites as a pretext to crush 
and expel the black Mauritanian community in a violent act of persecution 
officially sanctioned by the government. It had become a deadly and 
internationalised ethnic clash, culminating in an airlift arranged with 
international help, and agreed to by both Senegal and Mauritania, coming 
under international pressure to prevent further violence (Foster 2011, 35 and 
Samuel 2012, 10).  
 
Under the pretence of returning Senegalese to their own country, the 
Mauritanian Government expelled tens of thousands of Afro-Mauritanians, 
including intellectuals, civil servants, professionals, businessmen and militant 
trade unionists, those suspected of opposition, and farmers and cattle-herders 
from the fertile valley on the north bank of the Senegal River.  
 
In villages of the south where long-standing relationships and ties existed with 
families just across the river, an imagined colonial-era frontier, Blacks were 
indiscriminately expelled by Mauritanian security forces. Their identity cards 
and valuable belongings were confiscated, and they were forced south across 
                                                 
125 Impromptu recorded interview with unnamed Peulh taxi driver, 21 April 2011. The taxi driver was  
     unschooled and would not even look at the ethics documents the researcher presented to him, in  
     shame of being found to be illiterate 
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the Senegalese River. Those who resisted or who tried to flee were arrested, 
imprisoned and sometimes executed.  
 
In the larger towns and cities, black civil servants, employees of private 
institutions, trade unionists, former political prisoners and their families, as 
well as any visibly well-to-do Africans were targeted. The persecution was 
sanctioned and officially aided by the police and the army. According to one 
study126, some 21,500 Mauritanian Peulh were wrongly expelled from the 
country along with the numerous Blacks of Senegalese nationality. This is a 
significant portion of a particular ethnic group in a country with a population 
of less than two million at the time. It is acknowledged by Bidân and Afro-
Mauritanians alike that the torture and killing of 503 Afro-Mauritanian 
soldiers at the infamous Inal detention centre did occur (Sy, 2000). It is 
moreover, estimated by many of the reputable Mauritanian in-country sources 
used in the present research that possibly up to 5,000 Afro-Mauritanians were 
arrested, tortured and murdered by security forces and by authority-sanctioned 
Haratin vigilante groups, between 1989 and 1991. 
 
Democracy - Mauritanian-style 
The tumultuous period of 1989 to 1991 was marked by President Taya turning 
to Baghdad, with Iraq becoming an ally and providing military advisors and 
materials. By now, Mauritania was clearly becoming a dictatorial regime with 
an uncommunicative and uncompromising leader, increasingly repressive 
towards the non-Bidân sections of the population, that is, the Haratin as well 
as the Afro-Mauritanians. A member of the Bidân elite who preferred to 
remain anonymous had strong connections in the political hierarchy of 
Nouakchott, and understood the political terrain: 
 
Taya’s regime became very pan-Arabic at that time. Saddam's victory 
over Iran fuelled the rapprochement…He gave us tanks and other 
                                                 
126 “Le repli Peul en Mauritanie à l’Ouest de l’Assaba” edited by Christian Santoir for a French  
      research company (ORSTOM, 1991) 
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military material direct from his army.... The context of the country was 
very favourable for... [Arm gestures to indicate ‘a civil war’].127 
 
With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the new hegemonic position of the 
USA, the relationship of African political leaders with former colonial masters 
and post-colonial friends changed. For many African nations, the need for a 
continuation of foreign aid meant bending to the requirements of Bretton 
Woods’ institutions and the emerging neo-liberal approach to global 
development headed by the USA and its allies. Foreign assistance became tied 
to improvements in governance and a shift towards more democratic forms of 
government. Ex-colonies were urged to clean up their act, as “traditionally” 
acquired foreign aid would not be so forthcoming to regimes that did not move 
towards a democratic model. French Président Mitterrand explained that : “Le 
mot clef est ‘démocratie’ et l’aide française en tiendra compte”128.  
 
Democracy, free and fair elections and “the multiparty system” were words 
that were being heard by the African participants, but these were not 
interpreted in the same way by all at the Franco-African summit at La Baule 
on 20 June 1990129. Each African leader recognised change was required but 
reacted in a way particular to their circumstances, consistent with the domestic 
needs of their particular environment. For example, at the time President 
Moussa Traoré of Mali publicly rejected the call for multipartism. He was 
deposed less than a year later in March 1991, allegedly with the involvement, 
or at least with the assistance, of France and the withdrawal of economic and 
military assistance. This withdrawal brought about general economic hardship 
and an increase in the general population’s grievances. It also brought about a 
weakening of Traoré’s hold on the armed forces and his eventual overthrow 
by the army, which brought in civilian rule and multipartism within a year, as 
demanded by France, their ex-colonial master (Meredith 2005, 410).  
 
                                                 
127 Interview 42A with anonymous Bidân elite, 24 November 2011 
128 “The important word is ‘democracy’, and French aid will take its development into account”.  
     Taken from the speech by President Mitterrand at the La Baule, 20 June, 1990 
129 See the Glossary for a deeper explanation of Mitterrand’s speech   
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President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, in his own pragmatic way and 
within the confines of his particular environment, took steps to bring in at least 
a semblance of democratic procedures. This meant adaptation to the Maure’s 
tribalism that permeated the society and the way the country was run – 
formally and informally. As a result, Mauritanian democracy took on a 
different appearance.  
 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the major western powers and the global 
governance agencies such as the IMF and World Bank added better 
governance as a condition of continuing aid support to many Sub-Saharan 
African countries, including Mauritania. Good governance is an umbrella term 
covering a number of changes in the governing institutions of a society, 
including more transparency, improved provision of services, better financial 
management, more effective legal systems and improved political and 
economic access for the wider population. At this time, Mauritania ranked low 
on these indicators but there were growing but guarded expectations among 
the population of a shift to a more open and democratic regime. For example, 
M’Boye Ould Arafa, at the time an energetic and successful technocrat who 
wanted to see progressive changes in his country, remarked: 
 
It was 1991, and after La Baule130, “everyone in Mauritania wanted 
democracy”. Therefore, this system was “taken up”.... [President Taya] 
opened to the multiparty system.... However, in any multiparty system 
you have to have a support base, [in the Mauritanian environment] the 
easiest means for you to have a support base and be a successful 
political candidate was to retreat to the “umbrella” of your tribe …. This 
is where there was a resurgence of the importance of the [Bidân] tribe. 
Because, although in the past there had been moves to abolish the tribal 
system and the tribe had become less important, it had nevertheless 
continued to exist....  
 
                                                 
130 The La Baule speech of 20 June 1990 by French President Françoise Mitterrand was given within 
the context of the 16th Conference of African and French Heads of States at La Baule-Escoublac, 
Loire-Atlantique. Mitterrand tied French development aid to the democratic efforts that the former 
French colonies had to show. These included a representative system of government, free elections, 
multipartism, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary and the abolition of censorship. 
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From 1992, however, this traditional system began to take on a renewed 
significance and influence the politics of the country…. The problem 
also, is when it comes to talking about democracy “on the ground”... 
When you have people who are not educated, who do not have 
employment or the prospect of employment, how can there be a 
democracy? 
 
Let us say I lived next to your tent, next to your encampment, but I do 
not have anything to eat. You give me food to feed my children and 
myself. If I am ill, you lend me your camel to go to the doctor in town… 
How can someone come and tell me that I should not vote for you? Can 
they tell me that I should not vote for you because of this or because of 
that? Is that democracy? 131 
 
Ex-minister Soumaré also gave his impression of the democratisation of 
Mauritania:  
 
In 1991, there was a movement for democracy in all African countries, 
which followed the conference of African heads of state and the speech 
by the French President, Mitterrand. He made a statement to the effect 
that France’s foreign aid in favour of African countries would now take 
consideration of their degree of democratisation... 
 
However, how do we vote here? This is not democracy, as the West 
knows it, where the state and the individual have a direct link, with no 
institution in between…. Here the individual finds comfort and 
protection from the family, the tribe and the super-tribe... Therefore, 
there are these [sub-national] institutions between the state and the 
individual.... 
  
Here, a chief could say, “We should vote for this candidate”. Everyone 
in the tribe must and would vote for him. Yes, that is to say, Mauritania 
had experienced election even before independence... In addition, at 
that time, the tribe had a [very] strong influence…over the individual. 
The chief would say that we will vote this way, and we voted this way. 
However, the tribes may be are beginning to lose their influence? They 
are maybe becoming less important.132 
 
                                                 
131 Interview 28F with ex-director of Mines department M’Boye Ould Arafa, 23 November 2011 
132 Interview 11A with the Late ex-senator Gaye Silly Soumaré, 7 April 2011 
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Ly Ciré highlights the corrupt practices that continued to operate beneath the 
official show of compliance, for the benefit of western aid donors: 
 
In 1991, there was a sudden wave of democratisation in Africa, but the 
Mauritanian soldiers returned to the dance with Colonel Maaouya… 
Maaouya allowed them to move fully into the state apparatus at all 
levels, in one way or another... 
 
Officials falsified the polls [in the 1992 Presidential elections]. They 
stuffed the ballot boxes, and this is the only reason why Maaouya was 
re-elected uncontested as President133... 
 
In addition, another fraud was realised at the time, people denounced 
Maaouya for having many “naturalised” Tuaregs from the East into the 
country…It was the same for many other [illegal] voters [from Senegal 
and Mali]. 134 
 
We even had a village that became famous… You say “Kobenni” and 
everybody knows what you mean…It is located when you go towards 
Taoudeni [in Mali]…This village became famous for the [falsified] 
elections [results] from there… There were many more voters’ results 
than there were officially recorded inhabitants that voted from the 
village... it seems there were not even 500 people [in the village], and 
some 2500 voting papers were returned [and 98% had voted for 
President Taya]…So you see now, when you talk about “Kobenni”, 
everyone knows what we're talking about! “The effect Kobenni…!" It 
was on TV! 
 
[Taya] received 98% [of the votes]…! Well, maybe that was so, or it 
was not…But we now had the trappings of “democracy”. 135 
 
                                                 
133 Their wider motive was to ensure the continuity of the Bidân hegemony over Afro-Mauritanians,  
      but their immediate objective in doing this was to maintain President Taya, his tribe and wider  
     business, tribal connections and political entourage – themselves – in the seat of power and first in  
     line in the distribution of rents and privileges 
134 Illegal voter enrolment and ballot box stuffing could suggest that the President or at least the key  
     political actors behind him were worried that votes might not go their way in free and fair  
     elections. Nevertheless, in Mauritania at the time, it may have been crudely done, thus bringing  
     close to 100% of votes for the incumbent (and higher in some regions), in order to ensure a win 
135 Interview 07E and 07F with BCI Bank employee Ly Ciré, 23 November 2011 
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The massive fraud and corruption perpetrated by the Taya government is an 
accepted fact in Mauritania, so much so that government statistics presented 
to the World Bank and IMF are  referred to as “economic fiction” (Samuel 
2011, 9). Even a Hartani hotel employee – albeit a well-connected young man 
given his level of education and his position in the hotel – spoke openly about 
such practices:  
 
There was a total lack of governance. When money flowed, some 
profited enormously at the expense of the others... People in power were 
the fraudsters… That is, the team made up the government’s 
administration itself! That is, the administration of President Ould 
Taya! In a broad way, this means the Smacides tribal relatives... They 
benefited greatly during the reign of Maaouya... 
 
It is also true that Smacides were preferentially selected for positions of 
power136, and be around the President, the Prime Minister, etc... But 
after and below that: ministers, managers, project managers, and all 
that, the positions were also filled by Smacides, Oualad Bousbaa [and 
other allied tribes]…They were all white Maures... The Smacides and 
their associates profited enormously during the reign of Ould Taya.137  
 
After the ethnic unrest of 1989-1990, Mauritania continued through the 1990s 
with only the appearance of a progressive democratic country. The important 
Franco-African forum at La Baule in July 1990 heralded multipartism, 
freedom of the press, “free” elections and other trappings the West saw as 
important signs of modernity and wanted to see emerge in Africa. However, 
France, the purportedly well-meaning ex-colonial power at the forum, gave 
little thought to how these changes would come about. It did not seriously 
consider the suitability of these institutions to the African context or offer to 
assist in the evidently difficult transition to democracy. Mitterrand’s 
memorable speech certainly made it clear that without visible democratic 
change, foreign aid would not materialise. 
                                                 
136 There are some sixty Bidân tribes in Mauritania and these further congregate as loose super-tribes.  
     Their unisons are fluid and political and economic control was with the Smacides of Atar at the  
     time, backed by the Idawali of central Mauritania and Oualad Bousbaa of Akjoujt and Inchiri  
137 interview 22A with Hotel employee Isselmou Mohamed Lemine, 16 April 2011 
 Page 131 
 
 
Maaouya seemed willing to accept the democratic changes demanded by 
President Mitterrand in exchange for continued foreign aid. However, and 
notwithstanding the 12 December 1984 stated objective of ridding the country 
of undemocratic practices, the Mauritanian state continued to operate 
according to formal and informal practices such as despotism, nepotism, 
tribalism, corruption and embezzlement. There also remained endemic 
poverty, a problem related to the deep, pre-colonial ethnic and socio-cultural 
fault-lines, as well as intra-tribal competition among the Bidân for the spoils 
of power, and rents from fishing activities and iron ore mining. These 
widespread undemocratic practices of government actors and Bidân 
institutions, active agents in corruption, paralysed the state and prevented a 
fair and economically improved outcome for the general population. An 
anonymous informant with relatives in the military at the time stated:  
 
In 1992, Maaouya wanted Mauritania to be shown to have “free and 
fair” elections, but [my relative] was a general in the army… and he 
opposed it… 
 
He pointed out that this position was to ensure that the army elites of his tribal 
group remained in a position of authority and believed Taya could lose to 
Ahmed Ould Daddah, the ex-President’s brother: 
 
A coup d’état was attempted, led by my relative and some of Taya’s 
cousins. It failed, [but] Taya understood [the implications] and he 
ensured that he would win the elections. 138   
 
In saying that Taya would ensure he won the elections, he implied that he 
would use every available means necessary, including electoral fraud.  
 
Taya’s autocratic reign became harder and widespread fraudulent behaviour 
at all levels of the society accompanied by unrelenting institutionalised inter-
racial discrimination became customary. By 2003, it is estimated that the 
                                                 
138 Interview 42A with anonymous high-ranking Bidân, 24 November 2011 
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falsification of the macroeconomic accounts had reached a sum twice as large 
as that shown in the official statistics, the “economic fiction” constructed at 
the insistence of the World Bank and the IMF in order to give formal 
procedural substance to their statistics and generate ‘appropriate’ financial and 
economic policies (Samuel 2011, 9). These data and statistics masked the 
illegal use of public funds, the provision of public funds to private individuals, 
fraudulent access to the currency reserves, extra-budgetary expenditure and 
privileged access to the exchange market for some ‘connected’ individuals. 
These were the principal methods used in syphoning public funds into the 
pockets of the chosen few (op. cit., 9-14). Samuel notes:  
 
Many administrative relationships were contingent on the small details 
of everyday office life... and tribal relationships... credit facilities at the 
Central Bank were opened illegally, and all those who were in a position 
to do so ‘helped themselves from the till’. 139 
 
In many of the interviews, with people of varying occupational and political 
backgrounds, as well as with varying links to government, the pillaging of 
state funds by the president’s tribal entourage and political retinue was 
regularly mentioned. By the time of Taya’s Government, Gaye Silly Soumaré 
had served Mauritania as an Ambassador in several positions in North Africa 
and Europe. In spite of the honours bestowed on him by the Bidân 
government, he openly expressed his disgust at the behaviour of the “younger” 
leaders, and at the institutional environment imposed by the Bidân tribal 
system: 
 
 Taya, he “worked” solely for his family and those around him. The 
wealthiest businessmen in Mauritania are from his tribe, the Smacides. 
[They are] from his closest family... Ould Nouegued is his uncle… 
Abdallah Ould Abdallahi is also from his tribe and in fact from his 
closest family.… With Taya there was a lot of [government] favours 
granted to members of his tribe.…It is not that the tribe influences the 
individual.…It is the individual which influences the tribe, who uses the 
tribe and his associates as his powerbase in order to consolidate his 
                                                 
139 Samuel 2011, pages 10 - 11 
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power. He places his tribesmen and associates around himself in order 
to use their support.140  
 
There was a series of attempted coups against the president, until his 
successful overthrow in 2005. Ely Ould Sneiba, an educated member of the 
Bidân elite, independent member of the opposition, and political agitator from 
a warrior tribe originating from the east, spared no words in condemning the 
Taya regime:  
 
Taya lasted 21 years in power….It was his relatives that profited from 
the system he put in place. They profited on the back of and 
impoverishment of the general population. They “raided” the coffers of 
the country… It is a fact that the repercussions are very grave if a 
country loses two decades of development! Taya created a system based 
on the embezzlement of public funds and the enrichment of his 
tribesmen and close collaborators.141  
 
The President was also a Colonel, and the army used the situation to its own 
advantage. Ly Ciré’s word below echo the embezzlement and fraud 
highlighted by Samuel (2011): 
 
[Favoured] Maure colonels dealt directly with them [business people]. 
This is what they did. They remained in the army and had many favours 
being in the army… Let us take an example. I am a colonel, I am from 
a certain influential tribe [affiliated to the President]… I create a road 
building company, I create an insurance company, I create all sorts of 
enterprises and demand [through my tribal relatives in the government] 
to be given access [and contracts] to the markets in which the companies 
that I have created can operate....   
 
This is how it was done. They [the Bidân army officers] became rent-
seekers. This is how it happened. When the government would have a 
tender for a project, this tender would be put out [to the general public] 
but everyone knew in advance, who would win the bidding round. A lot 
of money was to be had, and that is how it was done....  
                                                 
140 Interview 11A with Gaye Silly Soumaré, 7 April 2011 
141 Interview 13A with Bidân political activist Ely Ould Sneiba, 10 April 2011 
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Moreover, never would an Afro-Mauritanian win such a market in a fair 
manner. All these projects and lucrative deals were allocated to the 
Bidân elites within the army and specifically those that were favoured 
[within Taya’s entourage]. 142   
 
President Ould Taya did attempt to open up his country to the outside world 
for resource and other developments, and some continue to admire him, 
especially his tribal relatives. A high-ranked government official from the 
Smacide elite, who preferred to remain anonymous, excuses Taya for the 
excesses perpetrated during his term as president:  
 
It was President Taya who “opened the door” for you [and allowed you 
and your foreign colleagues to begin petroleum exploration]. 
 
He really wanted to develop his country… Nevertheless, it is hypocrisy 
that reigns in our country, especially among politicians… The people 
around Taya profited a lot… They exploited him, do you understand? 
Once they were done, they got rid of him. They abandoned him… 
Nevertheless, the world forcibly becomes more modern [around us], to 
the detriment of these [greedy, sycophantic Smacide elites (from the 
gestures rather than words)]....  
 
Today, people are in awe of Abdel Aziz because he has cleared the dust 
from the old tarmac, which the French laid down during independence. 
He patched a few holes in the road and made sure he was seen 
supervising the work in the streets. However, this show of concern for 
development and the betterment of people’s lives, palls in comparison 
to what Ould Taya achieved in the development of telephone and 
mobile communication, tourism, and the petroleum industry....  
 
He wanted to be a “true son of Mauritania”, but to me, he was too 
gullible, he was too naïve. He had surrounded himself with certain 
people who gave him the information that they wished for him to hear, 
and he never made the effort to verify its credibility.143 
 
                                                 
142 Interview 7E with Ly Ciré, 8 April 2011 
143 Interview 16A with anonymous Smacide, 11 April 2011 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the roots of Mauritania’s political instability are 
of long-standing and exacerbated by the creation of the modern state after 
1960. 
 
The principal drivers of this instability were both internal and external to the 
country. Internally, they included the country’s low level of development at 
independence, its lack of an established and efficient set of national 
institutions capable of providing nationally acceptable economic, social and 
political outcomes, the persistence of pre-independence sub-national loyalties 
as well as that of institutions that favoured specific ethnic communities over 
others. The principal external drivers for instability were its continuing 
dependence on France, its ex-colonial master, dependence on the wider 
foreign aid community for financial and wider political support, as well as 
continuing political misunderstandings with its near neighbours. The 
imposition of a Westphalian state-system by France, the colonial power, on a 
society lacking the institutional history and experience required to sustain such 
a structure, created further instability. Tensions arose as historical links and 
institutions adjusted to the imposed socio-political landscape. The colonial 
power had manipulated pre-colonial sub-national loyalties during the brief 
period of active colonial rule in order to consolidate French power in the 
region144. As power and resources became concentrated in the hands of the 
Bidân after independence, the persistence of precolonial, subnational loyalties 
at the level of the tribe and ethnic community, for Bidân and Afro-
Mauritanians intensified the economic and political gap between them. 
 
The unfavourable economic and political conditions of the country were 
further exacerbated in the 1970s during a period of rapidly deteriorating 
climatic conditions and the migration of a large proportion of the previously 
nomadic Maures into the major urban centres. Disputes with its neighbours 
                                                 
144 The term “active” colonial rule is used to differentiate the post-colonial control that France  
      exercises to present in Africa, through overt and covert actions and relationships popularly termed  
      “La Francafrique” 
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over delimitation of its borders and the very legitimacy of its existence as the 
state of Mauritania, caused regional and international tensions, which 
culminated in the overthrow of the first President. The establishment of an 
enduring military dictatorship in 1978 by the Bidân, a demographic minority 
of the population, and the control of wealth and resources by dominant Bidân 
tribal factions, resulted in abuse of power, inequalities in distribution of 
resources and ethnic discrimination and oppression. The struggle for political 
control of the state by rival tribal groups and the army, institutions unadjusted 
to the socio-political realities of the Bidân tribal system with its fluidity in 
allegiances, resulted in systematic and institutionalised embezzlement and 
corruption, and general poor governance to the highest level of authority. As 
various tribal groups took control of the state, whether maraboutic Bidân from 
the southwest, or warriors from the east or the north, each gorged themselves 
with the spoils of public wealth. 
 
A growing fault-line in the post-independence politics of the country was that 
between the Bidân, the Haratin and the Afro-Mauritanian population, which 
culminated in the ethnic pogroms of the late 1980s. Underlying these tensions 
was a history of slavery, slave raiding, shifting tribal and ethnic allegiances 
and diverse political systems that were brought together within the confines 
of an arbitrary set of boundaries imposed by outsiders. Today, these tensions 
still exist as potentially explosive fault-lines underlying Mauritania’s socio-
political landscape, despite the appearance of harmony and democratic 
goodwill that the Bidân elites present to the outside world (Spiegel 2013, 70-
73).  
 
This brief historical account of the emergence and development of Mauritania 
has sought to demonstrate that political instability pre-dates the oil discoveries 
of later years. It was in this unstable political environment that oil was 
discovered at Chinguetti in 2001.   
 
This chapter has identified the key problems of tribalism and ethnic 
instabilities in past and present Mauritania, instabilities that predate the 
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discovery of any oil resource. These realities have been part of the Mauritanian 
socio-political landscape since the first Bedouin tent made its appearance in 
the Sahara region.  
 
The next chapter examines the emergence of the petroleum industry and its 
engagement with the Mauritanian state. 
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Chapter 4 – The petroleum industry in the modern era 
 
The previous chapter provided an account of the political history of Mauritania 
up to 2000. Its main purpose was to support the argument that political 
instability pre-dates the search and development of the petroleum industry in 
the country.  
 
In this chapter, the focus shifts to the period from 2001 to 2011 during which 
time oil was discovered and developed. It focuses on the 2001-2007 period 
during which Woodside Petroleum developed and established the petroleum 
industry in the country with production at the Chinguetti Oilfield beginning 
on 26 February 2006. Its main purpose is to locate the emergence of the oil 
industry within the socio-political context of the time. It takes into account the 
main political developments of the period, state, leader and elite politics and 
behaviour, the interaction of the state with the oil industry players and the 
relationship of Mauritania to wider regional and international forces that 
impinged upon its development.  
 
Although there is much academic and other writing that deals with the “Oil 
Curse”, Mauritanian-specific information on the socio-political impact of oil 
discovery is extremely limited. The analysis is thus principally based on 
interviews conducted in 2011 and 2012 with several of the key political figures 
and commentators of the time as well as ordinary people affected by the 
establishment of this new industry, academic sources, and articles from the 
online Mauritanian daily press. 
 
Active oil exploration had been encouraged by the various governments of 
Mauritania. This encouragement began with the government of Ould Daddah 
in the late 1960s, and continued until 1989. However, exploration drilling by 
the largest international oil companies had found only traces of oil in eleven 
wells drilled offshore within the Coastal Basin and two wells drilled onshore 
within the Taoudeni Basin. When the ethnic problems of 1989 erupted, two 
planned wells by Amoco and Mobil were abandoned and by 1991, all 
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companies that had created even some minor revenue for Mauritania through 
their exploration activities, had left the country145. 
 
The departure of these companies was criticised for several years by the 
Mauritanian government, and it was pleased when in mid-1995, Elixir 
Corporation Pty Ltd began to promote Mauritania as a viable investment 
destination to a number of petroleum exploration companies. Encouragement 
had come from high-ranking members of the local elites of the Smacide and 
Idawali tribes, seeking new means of revenue for the state other than the iron-
ore mine at Zouérat. At that time, Zouérat had been starved of investment for 
many years because its major Libyan and Iraqi government shareholders had 
been preoccupied with their own domestic problems.  
 
Isselmou Abdelkader, a member of the Idawali tribe, served as a minister in 
President Maaouya Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya’s government, until he was 
removed from office. In an interview, he argued that the promotion of renewed 
oil exploration had only one objective, which was to enrich the governing 
elites and not the general population: 
 
The ruling power had, as its primary mission, the protection of the 
economic interest and the continued accumulation of wealth of certain 
groups of people…. The state had become the “policeman” that 
preserved the economic interests of certain [favoured] tribes, and 
principally the tribe of the president himself, of Maaouya Sid’Ahmed 
Ould Taya.146 
 
By mid-1996, Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd had succeeded in attracting the ASX-
junior Hardman Resources NL147 to take an interest in Mauritania, and had co-
signed the first three Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) with the 
Mauritanian government since the early 1980s. All the terms of the contract 
had been negotiated and agreed to between the two Australian companies148 
                                                 
145 Ex-Texaco geophysicist Gary Jeffery pers. comm. 2010 
146 Interview 48A with ex-Minister Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
147 See page 19 
148 Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd was represented by the researcher as principal of the private company,  
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and representatives from the government149 over several days in London 
between Friday 21 June and Wednesday 26 June 1996. The terms were 
considered fair and just by all parties, later testified by the 2005 Junta’s 
insistence that the 2004 amendments should be reversed in the legally binding 
contractual arrangement between the holders of the Production Sharing 
Contracts (over Blocks 3, 4 and 5) and the Mauritanian government.  
 
In the view of the government, it had granted somewhat easier terms than it 
might otherwise have done in order to attract investors in the resources sector 
after years of being shunned by the international oil companies. Both Hardman 
and Elixir were very small companies within the international petroleum 
industry, but the willingness of the Mauritanian government to deal with them 
testifies to the difficulty Mauritania was having in attracting investors. From 
their perspective, the junior oil companies had ceded a larger than usual 
proportion of potential returns on future production to the government, in 
order to encourage the Mauritanians to grant them permits over some 75,000 
sq km or close to half the surface area of the prospective offshore basin along 
the Mauritanian coastline. 
 
Both government and companies understood that the expenditure 
commitments exceeded the capacity of either companies and therefore a larger 
partner would have to be attracted to join the project. By mid-1998, Woodside 
had joined the Hardman-Elixir joint venture as operator and, within the next 
three years, other international companies had taken up acreage in offshore 
and onshore Mauritania in a rush to acquire permits. By early 2006, an 
unprecedented total area of some 1.5 million sq km was marked for 
exploration across the hydrocarbon-prospective basins of offshore and 
onshore Mauritania and onshore Mali.  
 
                                                 
     Ted Ellyard, Managing Director represented Hardman Resources NL and M’Boye Ould Arafa, as  
     Director General of the Department of Mines and Hydrocarbon together with a technician known  
     as Itawal from the department represented the Mauritanian government 
149 According to Mohamed (Ould) Lemine Dahi, member of the 2005 Junta and Chief of Cabinet of  
     General Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall,  
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The Mauritanian community, as a whole, began to experience the “cascade 
effect” of this activity, reflected in the increase in internet use and number of 
mobile phones. For example, Internet usage increased from just above 0% of 
the Mauritanian population in 2001, to 0.25% in 2005, 1.8% in 2008 and 3.1% 
in 2011. More dramatic rises were seen in mobile phone usage, which 
increased from  just above 0% in 2000, to 5% in 2001, and increased steadily 
to stabilise at 67% of Mauritanians owning and regularly using a mobile 
communication device by 2009 (World Bank data, 2013a).  
 
In current US dollars, unadjusted for inflation, Mauritania’s net Foreign Direct 
Investment inflow, which had seen very little activity since the early 1970s 
with the development of the Zouérat iron-ore mine, rose in the five-year period 
between 2000 and 2005 from US$ 40.1 million to US$ 804.1 million. In 
addition, nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for that same period 
increased from US$ 1.3 billion to just below US$ 4 billion (World Bank data, 
2013b). While GDP remained high, as measured by the World Bank, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) dropped very rapidly back to some US$ 300 million 
in 2007, and it continued to decrease to steady in 2011 to a pre-2005 level of 
less than US$ 50 million.  
 
Whatever the figures, given the “economic fiction” perpetrated by the Taya 
regime150, the researcher’s hotel accountant, himself a well-connected 
Smacide, was enthusiastic about the contribution that Woodside and other oil 
companies made to the economy of Mauritania. Revenues from this activity 
cascaded into much peripheral business and to the Nouakchott community in 
general. For the accountant, it was highlighted in hotel occupancy largely 
through long-term residency and the flyin-flyout of technicians and other 
personnel and contractors associated with the establishment of the AUD 1 
billion Chinguetti oil operations:  
 
                                                 
150 According to Samuel (2011, 8 – 9) “the sharing out of rents was central to the economy of  
     misappropriation... [and] ... the falsification of macroeconomic accounts had reached an impressive  
     scale”  
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I cannot tell you exactly how much [of this bonanza] is to be directly 
attributed to the petroleum activities. However, I know that during the 
years 2001 to 2005, at this hotel at any rate, the petroleum industry 
generated a huge increase in revenue. 151 
 
By May 2001, Woodside had completed its maiden well in Mauritania, the 
first since the mid-1980s. This was also the discovery well for the first 
commercial operation in Mauritania, the Chinguetti oilfield. Several other 
discoveries rapidly followed, highlighting the potential of the offshore basin 
and sparking an investment rush into Mauritania that gave a large boost to the 
economy, as well as – for a time – the morale of the general population. Sidaty 
Ould Fall, a local hotel reception manager and a Hartani from the Smacide 
tribe, gave his view of the effect that the petroleum discovery had on the 
general population: 
 
Let us say that the [discovery of] petroleum in Mauritania generated 
great pride in each of us Mauritanians. A great feeling of excitement 
and joy [grew in us]…It also gave direct employment to some 2,000 
people and was a support base for many, many families in Nouakchott. 
It created a cascade effect [on the local economy] felt by everyone.152 
 
By 2003, the petroleum industry, dominated by Western companies, began to 
experience the effects of operating in a society with its own particular cultural 
and political character and its own internal political concerns. The Woodside 
Mauritanian operations were directed from Perth by Agu Kantsler, a stoic, 
strong-willed person who may not have understood, or more likely did not see 
the relevance of coming to terms with the historically rooted, social 
complexity and specific cultural practices of Woodside’s hosts: 
 
We had, I thought, a good relationship when we started…given that the 
country was very keen to see investment. The Oil Minister at the time 
was a charming older man, who was quite good to deal with… [Ould] 
Rajel! We had no problems with him at all. The bureaucrats in the 
                                                 
151 Interview 25A Sidi Mohamed Ould Mohamed Lemine, 18 April 2011 
152 Interview 1A with Sidaty (Ould) Fall, 4 April 2011 
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department that we were dealing with were also supportive, and there 
was the guy who was there for quite a long time, a black African with 
very curly hair, his name was [M’Boye Ould] Arafa.153 
 
He was supportive as well. Both Arafa and Wane [Arafa’s successor 
and a Peulh or Afro-Mauritanian] were straightforward to deal with. We 
did not have any problems.... 
 
There were some issues when we were doing things…Working out of 
the harbour, the harbour master was an “interesting” man to deal 
with.…There were extended negotiations that took place over our use 
of the wharf and rental of a warehouse at the harbour for our 
operations....  
 
However, by and large, each time we ran into problems like that, we 
just went back to the government and sort of said, “Well, you need to 
sort this out; we can’t work in this way!” or “Do you want this to 
happen, or do you not want it to happen?” …We generally got through 
things ok.154 
 
The commercial discovery of oil and gas in 2001 was used between 2003 and 
2005 by President Taya as a means of diverting the attention of the wider 
population from pressing social problems and failed coup attempts. The 
operator of the international joint venture, Woodside Petroleum Ltd, was put 
under great pressure by the presidency to accelerate the development of the 
Chinguetti oil discovery. Oil thus became a political weapon to divert people’s 
attention from pressing economic and social issues, and the government 
neglected to seek investment into other potentially productive activities that 
could likewise be initiated. This political use of the oil potential of Mauritania 
can be seen in some respects as a ‘curse’ as far as it contributed to a delay in 
developing a more diversified economy and became embroiled in the political 
horse-trading of the governing elite. However, its importance should not be 
overstated, as the study seeks to show. 
 
                                                 
153 Arafa is a white Maure with very dark skin and crispy black hair, mistakenly taken for an Afro- 
     Mauritanian by Agu  
154 Interview 51A with Agu Kantsler, 30 January 2011 
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Woodside’s well-travelled International Exploration Manager, the instigator 
of Woodside’s presence in the Hardman-Elixir joint venture, understood the 
complexities that emerged in working with Mauritanians at all levels. His 
affable, but forthright manner was well appreciated by the Mauritanians in the 
Ministries he dealt with, but his task was not made any easier: 
 
The government had no understanding of the time it takes to go from 
discovery to first production [as well as] the amount of investment that 
has to be put in…We therefore had to first of all educate them on these 
topics. We also spent an enormous amount of time in making sure they 
had some sort of government processes before we set sail on doing the 
development of Chinguetti. The worst thing we could have done would 
have been to proceed with no government governance or agencies to 
regulate [the industry], and we could just have gone “slipshod over 
everything”.... 
 
We [thus] spent an awful lot of time making sure they had both an 
“Environmental Plan” in place, [and] a “Maritime Plan” in place. We 
brought them over here to Australia to see how we conduct our 
operations. They talked to the government here to make sure that they 
understood that what we were doing there was similar to what we would 
do in Australia…And they [informed themselves] about the regulating 
system here in Western Australia. We, therefore, proactively tried to 
make sure that [some sort of petroleum] governance was in place.... 
 
The PSC-terms that were originally negotiated with the government [by 
Hardman and Elixir]…were acceptable…to Woodside [at the time of 
entering the joint venture in 1998]... [However] once you were 
developing Chinguetti, you realised how problematic it would be....   
 
So, prior to actually “fabricating steel” for Chinguetti, there were 
[several] issues because of vagaries in the PSC terms [which] we had to 
“iron out” [in 2004] prior to putting our own financial investment in 
place155. 
  
In addition, there was tremendous pressure from the president to begin 
production as soon as possible!  
 
                                                 
155 This refers to the amendments discussed below 
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I remember a meeting with our then-MD/CEO...He had had a meeting 
with the president and reported that the president wanted production 
within two years [by end-2005]!  
 
We had to explain to the president that that was not actually possible, 
but that we [would] endeavour to get it as fast as possible. We had to 
educate him on what we would have to do to get to that point....  
 
Moreover, there was tremendous pressure put on us to start delivering 
hydrocarbons…straight away! 156  
 
The coup attempt of 2003  
On 8 June 2003, a faction of the army mutinied and marched tanks and heavy 
artillery into Nouakchott. The rebels were led by ex-Major Saleh Ould 
Hanenna, an officer belonging to an eastern Beni Hassan or “warrior” tribe, 
who had earlier been suspended from the army for allegedly plotting a coup, 
purportedly motivated by tribal grievances dating from precolonial times and 
the struggle between warriors and marabouts157. He had received a public 
dressing down on his demotion and this had not gone down well with him and 
his supporters.  
 
He was, according to “radio-trottoir”158, reduced to driving a taxi in 
Nouakchott. Although the purported coming bonanza of petroleum revenues 
may have played a role in motivating the mutineers, Foster (2011, 50) argues 
that personal humiliation and feelings of vengeance played a much greater 
role. In the course of the present research, no evidence could be found that oil 
or its revenues were on the mind of the plotters when they organised the 2003 
coup. The popular Hanenna readily mobilised the elite and well-armed troops 
who had served close to him to take up arms against their fellow soldiers, 
certainly motivated by other motives than simply revenge.  
 
                                                 
156 Interview 52A with ex-Woodside International Exploration Manager, 30 January 2012 
157 Since the Char Bouba War of 1644-1674, animosity had festered and tainted all relations between  
     tribes descendent from Arab Beni Hassan warriors and maraboutic Berber tribes of the southeast  
158 Literally “gossip heard on the streets” or commonly known fact 
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The fighting which lasted several days was bloody and left hundreds dead 
among both soldiers and civilians. Foster (2011, 51-52) points out that there 
was noticeable ambiguity associated with this coup within Taya’s 
administration, and no one dared at first condemn or applaud the coup. Dr 
Zacharia Ould Ahmed Salem, a political science lecturer at Nouakchott 
University and prolific author and editor of noted publications on Mauritania, 
in spite of his Smacide tribal kinship, clearly points to the root cause of the 
attempted coup as President Taya himself: 
 
May 2003, there is a coup d’état.... It fails… However, I do not think it 
occurred because of the discovery of offshore petroleum…  
 
It may have played a role, but…I do not think it did so.…No, it is due 
to the exhaustion of a reign that has lasted beyond its due date! That is 
all! He was twenty-one years in power! The longer Maaouya remained 
in power, the greater was the grip his entourage had over him and the 
greater the embezzlement159. As an example, his second wife was 
becoming ever more rich and powerful!160 
 
The embezzlement and fraud committed by Taya’s entourage was no secret, 
and ordinary people felt powerless under its weight: 
 
Power! That is to say that the power in place wished by any means, to 
monopolise everything and govern all as it felt, something which not 
everyone agreed with.… It caused much dissent and hence the repeated, 
attempted coups that took place…between 2003 and 2005… 
Effectively on top of all that, poor governance and the wish to amass 
everything of value by the president’s people created discontent… 
Their wish was to corner all avenues of wealth creation for [themselves] 
and leave the general population to suffer.161 
 
The French, at least in an overt manner, stayed out of the struggle. Although 
Taya’s rapprochement with the United States did not please them, the faction 
                                                 
159 Dr Zacharia is emphatically putting blame on the entourage and not on president Taya, a tribal  
     relative 
160 Interview 35A with Zacharia Ould Ahmed Salem, 11 December 2011 
161 Interview 22A with Isselmou Mohamed Lemine, 16 April 2011 
 Page 147 
 
that led the 2003 coup belonged to the Oualad Nasr, a tribe that believed in 
the Arabisation of Mauritania and the need to return to Islamic roots, an 
ideology much feared by France.  
 
It is reported that on 8 June 2003, President Taya took control of the situation. 
Foster relays a story of the president leading his troops in an assault against 
the mutineers (op. cit., 51). However, reliable primary research sources from 
Bidân elites who wish to remain anonymous dispute this view. Amadou Dia, 
a Peulh fearful of a renewal of ethnic blame for the attempted coup, suggests 
that the coup shook the president. From that time on, the president became 
intensely and personally fearful, inhibiting his exercise of power as head of 
state.  
 
He had seen “the end” from very close…He felt that there would be 
another coup... He was very afraid in the end. He was even afraid of his 
close relatives.162 
 
It was widely circulated on the streets of Nouakchott at the time163 and 
subsequently confirmed my many of the Bidân elites interviewed, that the 
attempt on his life drove Taya to retreat in fear from even his closest 
relatives. He closed himself off in his presidential palace, surrounded solely 
by his presidential guards – headed by Colonel Mohamed (Ould) Abdel 
Aziz, today’s head of state. 
 
Nevertheless, petroleum wealth was coming. The priorities for the Bidân in 
power, the Smacides and their allies in Oualad Bousba and Idawali tribes, 
were to maintain the status quo at all cost, and be ready for the coming 
financial tsunami:  
 
Prosperity also appeared just around the corner, with estimates in 2004 
that oil would begin flowing [at a rate of 75,000 barrels a day] by the 
                                                 
162 Interview 26A with Dia Amadou, 19 April 2011 
163 As a director of Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd, by 2005 renamed Roc Oil Mauritanian Pty Ltd, the  
     researcher spent time in Mauritania between 2001 and 2006, during the development of Chinguetti  
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end of 2005 and some $150 to $250 million would flow into the 
[government’s] coffers by [end] 2006. In anticipation, Nouakchott was 
undergoing a boom, as new hotels sprouted for foreign businessmen, 
SUVs proliferated and immigrants from across West Africa flocked to 
the city, which sprawled into the surrounding dunes.164 
 
The coup d’état of 3 August 2005 
On 3 August 2005, Taya was overthrown by his closest military colleagues 
while travelling overseas. The coup lasted less than three hours, and no shots 
were fired.  
 
Woodside personnel confirmed that representatives of the (future) Junta 
visited their office the day prior to the coup and warned them in a firm but 
friendly manner that something was about to happen and that it would be 
advisable for all personnel to stay indoors. These representatives strongly 
emphasised that they would do nothing to jeopardise petroleum operations, 
and they guaranteed a smooth return to normal activities without any delay. 
This action of the coup perpetrators indicates that they were aware of the 
immediate economic and political importance of this fledgling industry for the 
country, including their supporters and allies. 
 
Once the coup was over, Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall from the Oualad 
Bousbaa tribe, Head of National Security and a close collaborator of the ousted 
President, was selected to head the Military Council for Justice and 
Democracy (CMJD) and nominated as state leader or President165. 
Mauritanians generally saw this as an opportunity to improve the country’s 
stability (Abdelkader 2008, 140). The new military state leader166 established 
the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and promised a 
                                                 
164 Foster 2011, page 57 
165 And cousin to Colonel Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz, head of the Presidential Guard and  
     collaborator in, if not the leader of, the coup d’état which overthrew President Taya.  
166 Ely Mohamed Vall maintained that he was not a President, as he argued that this title should be  
     reserved for democratically elected national leaders  
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return to civilian rule in less than two years. However, he added, “he [would] 
then watch over the diligent management of the state”167.  
 
This first coup of the new millennium in 2005, with the promise of petroleum 
revenue in its wings, was followed by two more in 2008 and 2009. The 
motivation was not oil per se but the retention of the reins of power, access to 
sources of government rents, the retention of the privileges of position as well 
as ethnic hegemony in general. 
 
Foster infers (2011, 89) that this first coup may have occurred as a result of 
expectations of petroleum revenues and rents, arousing the appetites of well-
placed elites to acquire a controlling stake in the coming wealth from an 
already weakened regime. However, deeper causes were at work. While the 
expected oil wealth failed to materialise, what persisted were the root causes 
of the socio-political upheavals that occurred in 2005, 2008 and 2009. As 
already discussed, Mauritania has a unique tribal ethno-political history. The 
Maure tribes had developed their own specialised set of political and social 
inter-relationships in order to deal with each other’s claims for power. The 
coups and the socio-political disruptions of the period under study emerged 
from the fluid intra-Maure tribal relationships, and from the fragile 
relationships that had evolved over a lengthy historical period between Bidân, 
Haratin and various Afro-Mauritanian ethnicities. 
 
The ousting of President Taya had taken an ironic twist. The president had 
recruited tribal members and allied tribesmen to serve in his presidential 
guard. He had dispatched them to keep control of the rebellious Oualad Nasr 
and related Lemreighty tribes who were Hanenna’s relations, in the far east of 
the country. This region is far removed from the coast where offshore 
petroleum reserves were being discovered, and one in which the historically 
dominant warrior Bidân tribes were increasingly feeling marginalised from 
the centres of rent seeking; fish, iron ore and now petroleum. However, this 
                                                 
167 Personal communication at meeting on 5 November 2006 with Junta-leader M. Vall on the day the  
     researcher was decorated as Officer of the Order of National Merit for service to the country 
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move by President Taya proved to be a mistake, and the Taya regime’s last 
days came in early August 2005. The irony of the situation is not lost on Ly 
Ciré, a Peulh resident of Nouakchott and keen political observer: 
 
If Maaouya was watching the Oualad Nasr, [he was] monitoring the 
wrong ones! Because it is in fact his closest, most trusted colleagues, 
from an Inchiri tribe, the Oualad Bousba, who were the ones who 
carried out the coup [on 3 August 2005].168  
 
Despite its apparent multiparty setting and bicameral parliament, the regime 
had remained deeply militarised and autocratic, with power increasingly 
wielded by President Taya. So-called republican institutions were stripped of 
any power and they were simply used to legitimise a flawed democracy. The 
coup of 3 August 2005 was generally hailed at the time by the wider 
population, as an opportunity for the country to emerge from a situation 
commonly described as “a military regime in a civilian three-piece suit”.  
 
On 3 August 2005, Taya was removed from power by Colonel Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz, Head of the Presidential Guard, General Muhammad Ould Al-
Ghazwani and Abdel Aziz’s cousin, Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall, Head of 
National Security. The new government introduced certain cosmetic 
institutional and functional arrangements in order to retain its socio-political 
pre-eminence. Importantly for each coup member, but especially for Colonel 
Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall, such institutional and functional changes would 
shelter them from any future legal action. Holding ultimate power allowed 
these Bidân military elites to protect themselves from any future obligations 
to render account for their past actions and particularly their handling of the 
1989-1991 ethnic clashes.  
 
They protected themselves after removing Maaouya by ensuring that the next 
president would grant presidential amnesty from prosecution to all 
government and army officials involved in the ethnic persecutions of that 
                                                 
168 Interview 7E with Ly Ciré, 8 April 2011 
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period169. A participant in the research is ex-2005 military junta Minister of 
Economic Affairs and graduate of the elite ENA institution in Paris, Mohamed 
Ould Elabed. Ould Elabed is a member of the Idawali tribe, a tribe that shared 
power during the reign of Taya and the Smacides. He had been Adviser to the 
Prime Minister for many years during Taya’s reign, right up to the 2005 coup 
that ousted Taya. Ould Elabed, the “eminence grise” of many economic 
“reforms” by the government since the 1990s, is today a highly paid 
independent consultant to the government – as many high-ranking, ex-public 
servants continue to be (Samuel 2011, 25A): 
 
It is clear that there were very strong popular feelings against the 
Maaouya regime. He had had more than 20 years at the helm of the 
country. People were fed up with his rule…And not only that, but he 
had been managing the country very poorly, and especially after the 
attempted coup of 2003. He had handled that explosive situation very 
badly, throwing many people in prison, seeking revenge on particular 
tribal groups and throwing their sons out of the army. It was too much, 
there was strong social resentment against him and it was clear that the 
Taya regime was living its last hours…  
 
I thought it was Ely, but the more I think about it, the more it seems to 
me that the instigator of the coup was indeed [Mohamed Ould Abdel] 
"Aziz", and it is [Aziz] that brought Ely to the leadership of CMJD170… 
[Although] I do not think it is completely like that, some say that "Ely 
was completely out of it”. As Aziz [is said to] claim, "he had awakened 
[Ely] at three in the morning to offer him the presidency or, [if he did 
not accept] to throw him in jail".  
 
I think that that is a total invention…Because those who know both 
cousins as I do, well know that the night of the coup, the evening of 2 
August, Ely was clearly in contact with all protagonists of the coup and 
that he may have coordinated [some of] the action…I do not see Ely as 
a puppet.171 
 
                                                 
169 An amnesty for these crimes is believed to have passed into law  
170 Le Conseil Militaire pour la Justice et la Démocratie (The Military Council for Justice and  
     Democracy) 
171 Interview 45A with Mohamed Ould Elabed, 26 December 2011 
 Page 152 
 
Political instability and discovery of viable petroleum reserves  
In the context of the discovery of petroleum in Mauritania, Foster (2011, 88) 
in a passing statement refers to an “oil curse” as “...a double-edged sword that 
eventually wounded rulers as well as ruled”. He thus suggests a link between 
the first discovery of petroleum, or “first oil”, in May 2001 and the several 
successful and unsuccessful coups that occurred in the following ten years. 
The majority of the Mauritanian participants in this study (87%), from an 
Afro-Mauritanian taxi driver to a Bidân Junta leader, rejected or were doubtful 
of any link between the coup d’états and the discovery of petroleum172. They 
pointed out, with varying emphases, to the dissatisfaction that the population 
felt with the autocratic regime as the main driving force of the 2005 coup. All 
participants felt that, despite the advances during President Maaouya Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya’s regime, that regime no longer ruled effectively. Only 13% 
pointed to petroleum as the necessary and principal pre-condition of the socio-
political upheavals that Mauritania suffered since the May 2001 discovery of 
the Chinguetti oilfield. The researcher expected a stronger stance against Taya 
and the power-grab by Smacide and Idawali elites from Mohamed Fall Ould 
Bah, a highly respected academic and writer on Islam, Islamic financial 
institutions and Mauritanian history, and member of an elite maraboutic tribe 
from Trarza:    
 
No. For me, the discovery of Chinguetti and Taya’s overthrow do not 
seem linked. Maaouya was overthrown because we were fed up with 
his rule after twenty-one years. I think that that was the real problem…. 
With the overthrow, the military came, held civil elections and left… In 
my reckoning, we must say that petroleum was not present in 
Mauritania’s political reckonings.173  
 
Another participant, a Hartani youth, Abdou Salam (Ould) Tabane, thought 
oil had played a role in generating dissatisfaction with the regime but within 
the context of a wider concern over mismanagement over a long period. He 
                                                 
172 Appendix 9 and 10 
173 Interview 32A with Mohamed Fall Ould Bah, 13 December 2011 
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acknowledges that petroleum may have played a part, but that it was secondary 
to the root problems of poverty and social inequality: 
 
Yes, there have been policy changes because of oil. There was political 
instability.... The power that was in place wanted, at all cost, to 
monopolise [government revenues] and make “its own management” 
[as it did in everything], which did not suit everyone....It created a lot 
of problems, and repeated coups that took place...2003 to 2005. 
Actually [more than the thirst for petroleum revenues] all this is due to 
the mismanagement of the state [by those] who wanted to monopolise 
all [government activities and revenues]... And let the other segment of 
the population suffer...Haratin, Harpulaar, Soninké and Wolof174. 
 
The Oualad Bousbaa, the Smacides and all [around President Taya] are 
the richest in Mauritania! These are the “whites”... The white 
Maures…they are the richest in Mauritania! They are the people who 
hold the power, the Smacides and Oualad Bousbaa... As President, as 
Prime Minister, and on “down” to ministers, managers and project 
managers…They are all Smacides and Oualad Bousbaa175. 
 
In the time [of Ould Taya], there was mismanagement. When the money 
flowed, some profiteered enormously.... These people made up the 
administration of Ould Taya. They were Smacides [plus individuals 
from the Idawali and the Oualad Bousbaa tribes] and they benefited 
greatly during the reign of Maaouya. The administration was rotten! 
  
[This coup of 2005], it is a simple “change of chair”…. The Oualad 
Bousbaa tribe was there with the Smacides. The Oualad Bousbaa tribe 
has now moved Ould Taya’s tribe and it is on top, but it is always the 
same people, the same white Maure [Bidân] tribes! 176 
 
The opinionated young Hartani’s comments clearly downplay the role of 
petroleum and suggest that the coup was just another example of corrupt elite 
politics, which excluded the mass of the population. Petroleum discovery had 
indeed raised expectations among the population, but especially that of the 
                                                 
174 This list would include poorer, less well positioned (more ‘distal’) Maure tribes not involved with  
     The president’s entourage 
175 This is an exaggeration on the part of Isselmou, but was said to emphasise a point 
176 interview 44A with Abdou Salam (Ould) Tabane, 24 December 2011 
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elites (Foster 2011, 88-89). Their scramble for the reins of power, as Foster 
suggests, may indeed have found some further impetus in the potential of 
future petroleum revenues. However, their hopes were dashed when 
Woodside departed in 2007.  
 
The root of this retreat by Australia’s largest petroleum company, then a new 
player on the African scene lies in the misadventure that began in early 2004. 
The Chinguetti oilfield was trumpeted by Mauritanians as a boon that would 
bring “Saudi Arabian wealth” to their country. However, the oilfield was far 
more complex geologically than anyone had anticipated. Complex geological 
challenges meant that extraction of hydrocarbons and development of the 
Chinguetti reservoir would require much greater efforts and expenditures on 
the part of the joint venturers than originally anticipated. This additional 
expenditure would make it financially unfeasible unless certain clauses were 
changed in the contractual arrangement that the joint venture held with the 
Mauritanian government.   
 
The problems began with Woodside requesting amendments in the contractual 
terms of the original 1996 PSCs in 2004, terms that had already been revised 
in 1999 when, having entered the Hardman-Elixir Joint venture, it demanded 
easier terms then had been negotiated by the junior companies. By 2006, the 
confrontation between Woodside and the Junta of Ely Mohamed Vall had 
deteriorated to the extent that, having put down $ 100 million on the table, 
Woodside finally “walked out” of Mauritania. The Australian Federal 
Government Senator Christine Milne, under parliamentary privilege, 
requested that the Australian Federal Police investigate Woodside because of 
suspicion of fraud and corruption. As detailed later in this chapter, these 
allegations resulted in an exhaustive two and half year inquiry into 
Woodside’s dealings.  
 
The exact terms of the original PSCs that came under review are not known, 
although certain terms that were supposedly altered are enumerated in an 
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official governmental note, dated January 2006177. These terms were also 
publicised in a press release that the government of Mauritania distributed to 
the international media178.  
 
Woodside would not discuss the contract directly, and nor would the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) respond to the researcher’s calls for 
information. It has therefore been necessary to rely almost exclusively on the 
above-mentioned documents for confirmation of details. Nevertheless, 
participants in this research who had intimate knowledge of the Woodside 
operations in Mauritania were sought. These include one of the ex-Woodside 
Country Managers quoted below, who offered the further explanation that the 
amendments of certain clauses revolved around difficult operating conditions: 
 
It occurred after I left, [but] I would hazard a guess that it was to do 
with the split-up of revenue and the terms and conditions for [the] 
deeper water [blocks].… When you explore, you find and you do your 
assessment of a reservoir, [and] it needs to work in terms of value and 
the investments it is going to take you to put in there to bring oil and/or 
gas “on stream”. In addition, if any of those assumptions changed 
[since] you negotiated the contract, then you need to be able to go back 
to renegotiate… The parties need to sit down, talk about it and say, “Is 
this still economic? Do we still want to do it?” If the figures do not tally 
up, then there will be no desire to go forward with the development! On 
the other hand, if…from an oil company viewpoint [and] from a 
government viewpoint you are desperate for development…it is in the 
interest of both parties to agree [to new terms]… 
 
Now, to answer your question, I do not know what the terms, [or] what 
the specifics of it, were because I was not there. However, I would 
hazard a guess that it revolves around “things” like that.179 
 
                                                 
177 Appendix 8, “Mémorandum sur le differend opposant la République Islamique de Mauritanie à  
     la société Woodside” (Memorandum on the dispute between the Mauritanian Government and the  
     company Woodside) 
178 Appendix 7, Press release by the government of Mauritania on 6 February 2006 
179 Interview 53A with one of the ex-Woodside Country Managers, 22 February 2012 
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The requested amendments that Woodside believed would make the 
Chinguetti oilfield potentially viable were discussed with concerned ministry 
professionals and subsequently were duly presented to the then-Mauritanian 
Minister for Petroleum and Energy, Zeidane Ould H’Meida, the first interface 
with the government for industry participants. The ex-Woodside Country 
Manager kept close contact with the ministry and was aware of the procedural 
requirements to pass a decree or an amendment to a law: 
 
We were always negotiating! It would have been with the ministry and 
the Minister [himself]…It would have gone to the Council of Ministers 
in the end. You know in that process, the Department, [the] Minister, 
[then from] minister to Council of ministers…then to the parliament [to 
the National Assembly and the Senate]… [Subsequently returned to 
Woodside and endorsed by parliament as a new decree].180 
 
The amendments were however returned “within a few weeks”, according to 
a reliable but anonymous ministry source. They were accepted by Woodside 
as having completed the official circuit, the amendments bearing an official 
signature purportedly indicating that they had been ratified as a decree. In view 
of the extremely short timeframe in which the signed document was returned 
to Woodside, it is unlikely that the official channels had been used. Onsite 
Woodside officials familiar with government interactions and processes 
should have been alarmed and called for an investigation into the ratification 
procedure that had been adopted for the amendments.  
 
The official route for processing such a document is as follows:  Firstly, once 
the document and its contents have been discussed with the Minister, it is then 
presented and approved for review by the Council of Ministers. It is then that 
the text of the proposed amendments is passed onto the Lower House of 
Parliament, the National Assembly. Thirdly, once approved by this Lower 
House, it is forwarded onto the Upper House or Senate for endorsement or 
rejection. Fourthly, if passed by both houses of parliament, it is returned to the 
                                                 
180 As above 
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President for his final signature and promulgation as a new decree. In reality, 
this extensive and time-consuming procedure, which can take anywhere 
between six months and a year, seems not to have been followed.  
 
Colonel Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall, the 2005 Junta leader, blamed Woodside 
for failing to follow due procedure. However, the situation was not clear-cut, 
as testified to by participants intimately involved with the government at the 
time such as Mahfoud Ould Bettah. A minister of justice during the Taya years 
and one of 17 lawyers working on the Woodside dossier for the 2005 military 
junta, Mahfoud Ould Bettah indicates that it was not a simple matter of 
assigning blame to one side or another: 
 
Investors [into Mauritania] must accept to work in full transparency.… 
During the negotiations, it became most evident [to us] in the way 
Woodside was insisting on the amendments, that it had colluded with 
the administration of that time over the amendments of these 
contracts.… Our objectives [in the subsequent negotiations of 2006] 
were [in the first instance] to lead Woodside to accept returning to the 
original contract… [Secondly], we wanted to make them pay a 
supplementary penalty fine to the Mauritanian state, but over which 
there were some negotiations.181 
 
Disregarding the possible negative consequences for the continuity of the 
project if the amendments were rejected182 or even unduly delayed, Isselmou 
Abdelkader squarely put the blame for not following due process onto 
President Taya and the Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy, Zeidane 
Ould H’Meida. His testimony as an actor intimately involved with the 
government process, is compelling: 
 
There were [Woodside] amendments [that were] “behind the scenes”, 
as it were. These amendments had not been passed by the [National] 
Assembly. That is why I was removed from the government. Because 
of these [amendments] and so, I should know... 
                                                 
181 Interview 47A with Mahfoud Ould Bettah, 29 December 2011 
182 As they were eventually 
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I was removed from the government on 25 July 2004.   
 
On 21 July 2004, when Maaouya [President Ould Taya] was still in 
charge, we were at a regular [weekly] meeting of the Council of 
Ministers. Zeidane [Ould H’Meida] was the Petroleum [and Energy] 
Minister.183 It was Zeidane’s turn to speak and he made a submission to 
the Council of Ministers saying that he wanted the Council's 
authorisation for him to approve [amendments to Woodside’s PSC] 
agreements without going through the official channel. He was asking 
the Council of Ministers for authorisation to approve these agreements 
without going through the [due process of the council and subsequent 
submission for review by the two houses of parliament; the National 
Assembly and the Senate]… Ould Taya asked us, “What do you think 
of that?”184  
 
He [Zeidane] did not actually want to present it to the Council at all. He 
did not want to inform the Council of the agreements he was signing.185 
   
Taya put his question to all the ministers….He asked all the ministers 
to state their point of view. None of them spoke up, except me! I said 
to him, “Mr President, these oil resources do not belong to us. They 
belong to future generations. We have to manage them to defend the 
long-term national interests that are at stake. We have to be kept 
informed of what the minister is doing with this resource, these oil 
resources of ours”. 
 
To which Ould Taya replied, “That's right, I agree. Isselmou is right”.   
 
When [the] Council of Ministers' meeting ended, we went downstairs. 
Zeidane, the Oil Minister, came up to me and he said, “Isselmou, why 
are you always obstructing me? I've never obstructed you!” To which I 
replied, “I'm here to represent a country, I'm not representing a lobby… 
I represent the government, not Ould Taya's party”. 
 
                                                 
183 Zeidane Ould H’Meida is either a Smacide tribal relative of President Ould Taya or from a tribe  
     closely related to the Smacides 
184 Note: The risk for Woodside was that the amendments would be publically debated at length,  
     potentially lasting months, at a time when rapid development decisions were required. The  
     amendments also risked being rejected without parliament comprehending that such a rejection  
     would create an unviable situation for the joint venturers, forcing them to abandon the project. 
185 Or maybe had already signed as Minister of Petroleum and Energy? 
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We were having this conversation and the President’s secretary, a 
young military man, came up to Zeidane and said, “The President is 
asking for you!” Off he went and took the lift [to the President’s 
chambers]. He was gone for a minute, and he came back almost 
immediately. He tapped me on the shoulder as he walked past, smiled 
at me and said, “Hey ho! The President says I can do as I please!” 
 
I was speaking with the Minister of Defence, Baba Ould Sedikh….Ould 
Sedikh is from a warrior tribe that's been in alliance with my own [the 
Idawali] since the 17th…18th century....He said to me, “May God 
preserve you, my marabou, from what we've just 
heard...[Inaudible]...I'm certain something bad will come of this!” 
 
Three days later, I was out on my ear….I did not resign; I was 
“relieved!” I was fired. I was removed from office.186 
 
Even given the depth of information at the disposal of the researcher, it cannot 
be determined if Woodside pressed, persuaded or influenced the Minister 
Zeidane Ould H’Meida to push for the amendments to be ratified without the 
due process of parliamentary review, as per Senator Milne’s accusations . Nor 
can it be ascertained that this may hide rent-seeking behaviour by a privileged 
few in government. However, it is clear that President Ould Taya acted 
autocratically and allowed Zeidane to sign the amendments in his place 
without parliamentary approval and, in addition, relieved Minister Abdelkader 
of his post for not towing the line.  
 
Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall strongly supports the view that Woodside 
exhibited naivety and unprofessional behaviour. He may have personal or 
political reasons for criticising Woodside as a way of diverting attention from 
the 2005 Junta’s mismanagement of the “Woodside affair”. However, in 
interview, he argues that Woodside personnel were unfamiliar with the proper 
ways of doing business in Mauritania and that it was this that led to the failure 
of the negotiations: 
 
                                                 
186 Interview 48A with Isselmou (Ould) Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
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In this affair, Woodside’s way of operating was totally opaque…[In 
addition] the Mauritanian public servants who were responsible for this 
[Woodside] file also worked in total opaqueness.….Zeidane [Ould 
H’Meida, the Minister of Petroleum and Energy] didn't actually want to 
present [the amendments] to the Council [of Ministers] at all. He did 
not want to inform the Council of the amendments he was signing [with 
Woodside]. 
   
I believe that…examining this [mishandled] Mauritanian affair, they 
[Woodside] exposed themselves as total amateurs…Fumbling amateurs 
of the worst kind! 
  
These events in Mauritania...It is pure amateurism…. They were really 
handled with the greatest of amateurism.… This means that they are 
people that have absolutely no idea…of what must be done [in handling 
people from another culture]! Do you understand? 
 
What is sure, in my opinion is that in examining this file, it was very 
poorly managed....Even if they [Woodside] had wished to be 
dishonest…They acted like pure amateurs…They were very naïve and 
amateurish.187 
 
Woodside acted in a manner that frustrated the Mauritanian government, by 
being “less open and participatory than they might have been”188. Woodside 
personnel were – and generally are – uncommunicative about internal 
proceedings and affairs unless and until necessary. This was despite the fact 
that the company’s internal proceedings and affairs would often influence 
relations with outside parties, including joint venture partners and the host 
government. As a general comment, Woodside typically passes on 
information to joint venture partners in a formal manner, for instance, at 
technical and operating committee meetings. This leaves partners, and 
possibly in this particular case, their host government, uninformed concerning 
operations for most of the operating year189.  
                                                 
187 Interview 41A with Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall, 23 December 2011 
188 Interview 43B with Mohamed Lemine (Ould) Dahi, 24 December 2011 
189 The researcher  personally experienced this lack of communication as a partner in this particular  
     project (as Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd) and can  understand the frustration felt by the Mauritanian  
     technical representatives that were personally involved with the operations 
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For the remainder of 2005, the Junta leader, President Mohamed Vall, left 
some ministers in place, most notably the Minister of Mines and Energy, 
Zeidane Ould H’Meida, as some system of management was required for 
dealing with the anticipated bonanza of petroleum funds.190 The first task of 
the Junta was thus the drafting of the 2006 annual budget proposal for 
ratification by parliament, as well as the determination of the allocation of part 
of oil revenues to a Petroleum Fund “...for the good of future generations”191. 
The annual budget included the repayment of loan funds to Sterling Energy 
PLC192. 
 
As originally negotiated with the authorities under President Taya, the 
Mauritanian government had a 5% free-carried stake after cost-oil193. The 
agreement, as per normal practice, also allowed the government to opt to 
increase its participation in any development project through a pro rata 
acquisition from each of the partners, to an agreed aggregate maximum which, 
in the case of Mauritania’s offshore, had been amended in 1999 to a maximum 
of 17.5%, as reported by the ex-Woodside Country manager.  
 
Realising by 2003 that an early entry would be advantageous for Mauritania, 
Taya’s government had set about to acquire the extra participation through 
Société Mauritanienne des Hydrocarbures (SMH), a newly formed parastatal 
company in which, it is commonly believed in Nouakchott, Taya’s tribal 
relatives and collaborators had a substantial personal stake194.  
 
Given that the government had no real ability to raise the required funds, an 
arrangement was negotiated with the UK-based Sterling Energy PLC to 
advance the required US$ 100 million for this acquisition, repayable out of 
                                                 
190 Interview 43B with Mohamed Lemine (Ould) Dahi, 24 December 2011 
191 As above 
192 Public Limited Company, quoted on the second, AIM market in London. 
193 Cost-oil is the portion of produced oil that the operator applies on an annual basis to recover  
     defined exploration and development costs as specified by the original 1996 PSC agreements  
     associated with the offshore project. 
194 Personal communication, Ly Ciré 2011 and many others, Bidân and Afro-Mauritanians alike 
 Page 162 
 
future proceeds of offshore production. The request put by the government 
during the government-Woodside standoff during 2006 for a payment of US$ 
100 million by Woodside to the Mauritanian government was considered by 
some as a way of inflicting “punishment” upon Woodside. This was 
apparently attested to in government documents to have entered into the 
budget of Mauritania for 2006, although this “punishment” approach by the 
Mauritanian government towards Woodside is contested as hearsay by some 
Mauritanian and foreign actors involved, including the ex-Woodside 
International Exploration Manager: 
 
The Mauritanian government had exercised their right to increase their 
equity to something like 17.5% equity in the [Chinguetti] project. They 
exercised those rights and they used a company called Sterling [Energy 
plc] out of the UK to finance the deal for them.… My understanding is 
that within their 2006 and 2007 budget, they had assumed that they 
would get adequate revenue from their equity participation.…However, 
I understood that they hadn’t factored in that they had to pay back their 
loan to Sterling, which, I believe, was $ 100 million195…within one year 
at the flow rate [predicted by Woodside].196  
 
The researcher brought up the entry of these funds into the government coffers 
with several key participants of the 2005 to 2007 Junta, including the leader, 
Colonel Ely (Ould) Mohamed Vall, the person most often accused of 
embezzling Woodside’s US$ 100 million. If Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall was 
indeed guilty of embezzlement, the “greed” displayed by this highest-ranking 
Bidân elite could well be held up as an example of the “oil curse”.  
 
At some risk to the researcher’s wellbeing, the General was openly asked if 
he had embezzled, in total or in part, the funds obtained from Woodside.  
 
                                                 
195 Unrecorded casual discussions with high-placed individuals point out the government had  
     scheduled this sum to be totally repaid within the following 2006 “bonanza” year, during the  
     course of which some 75,000 barrels per day were expected to flow and generate over $150 to  
     $250 million for the government 
196 Interview 52A, 30 January 2012 
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The question precipitated an emotionally charged answer, the General soon 
producing a, albeit poorly reproduced, photocopy of a 2007 official 
government document that detailed the entry of “Woodside’s” funds into the 
Treasury’s accounts197. This document allegedly attests to his innocence. 
Several ex-ministers and opposition participants were also questioned over 
this issue. All participants in the research gave very similar accounts of the 
“Woodside Affair” and of the eventual destination of the US$ 100 million. 
The most coherent was that of Mohamed (Ould) Lamine (Ould) Dahi, the 
General’s Chief of Cabinet, and the Head legislator for the country between 
1992 and 2007, serving under both President Ould Taya and General (Ould) 
Mohamed Vall. In a long passage that negates one aspect of the purported oil 
curse, embezzlement, he gives this account of the situation at the time:  
 
Regarding the origins of the “Woodside Affair”, it all started when the 
government was doing the groundwork for the 2006 Annual Budget. In 
order to prepare for this legislation, it needed to programme all its 
available resources. This preparatory work for the budget would have 
begun around end-October, early-November 2005. The Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Economic Affairs and Development, together 
with the Ministry of Energy at the time, were involved, as was the 
governor of the Central Bank. This team worked on the draft of the 
annual national budget. Anyway, the President (Ely Mohamed Vall) 
asked them to draft the budget on the basis of the legislation that was 
purportedly currently in force at the time and with regard to the legal 
entitlements due to Mauritania, as included in the Chinguetti production 
sharing contract.… The starting point for their calculation was the 
[1999] Act [of law] that determined the agreement between the 
Woodside-led joint venture and Mauritania198.  
 
And so, they calculated the national budget on the basis of this 1999 
Act and everything it provided for by way of revenue distribution, from 
the point of view of taxation revenue, direct taxes, indirect taxes and, 
and all the other benefits. They worked out an amount [due to the state 
                                                 
197 Appendix 8 « Bilan de la Transition – Rapport sur l’activité du Gouvernement de Transition; 3  
     août 2005 – 5 mars 2007 avec une mise à jour au 29 mars 2007 » 
198 The original simple terms of 1996 had been officially amended with the government in 1999, on  
     Woodside entering the Mauritanian venture, and the terms along with amendments had become an  
     Act or a law 
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and available for the budget] in consultation with several ministries, 
consultations at which I represented Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall, the 
leader of the “Military Council for Justice and Democracy”199.  
 
As Director of the President's cabinet, I attended the various meetings. 
We were asked to check the budget entries pertaining to the PSC 
revenue allocations with Woodside before any assessment was 
incorporated into the [final] draft of the Finance Act [Annual Budget] 
and before being presented to the Council of Ministers....It was thought 
wiser to check [our figures] with the company directly.  
 
We, therefore, asked to discuss the [petroleum] revenue stream with 
Woodside for comparison with the amount of revenue that they were 
anticipating [for the 2006 operations]. We approached them, and the 
response...was “No, our figures don't agree with yours, because the PSC 
conditions have been amended! We have amendments here...1, 2 and 
3…We have amendments here dated 2005. January, I believe. February 
2005...Or it was March 2005…These amendments involved a 
substantial cut in your [revenue] figures. They involved a substantial 
cut in the government's share as provided for in the '99 law…in the '99 
PSC decree”. 
 
There appeared no malicious intent on the side of Woodside. Nor was 
there any from us….We were merely putting together the Finance Act 
[the annual budget] because oil production was due to begin in February 
2006…. This petroleum revenue stream was to have been considered in 
the 2006 annual budget from the end of February 2006.  
 
This was the groundwork carried out in preparing the annual budget200. 
When we told Woodside that, I believe the Head of State actually asked 
them to examine the issue with the government once more and more 
thoroughly [and] in complete confidence.… I believe it took something 
like two and a half months…from November through to December, 
January, Woodside continued to take a hard line with us, [saying] “The 
amendments are [in place], we've got the amendments”. …They 
insisted point-blank on applying the 2005 amendments…  
 
                                                 
199 General Ely Mohamed Vall never referred to himself as “President” because he insisted that this  
     title should refer only to elected leaders 
200 And the ground work which exposed the problem of appropriate funding through government’s oil  
     revenues as calculated by the Finance Department, but negated by Woodside 
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In the meantime, we started reviewing [our government documents] by 
ourselves. Woodside eventually gave us copies of the 2004 
amendments. We started looking for traces of these, because in order to 
amend the 1999 Act [PSC decree/law] it would have been necessary 
[for these new amendments] to have gone through [and be presented 
and agreed to by] parliament. We looked everywhere, the National 
Assembly, the House of Representatives.…. 
 
What did we found? We found no trace of anything… We found no 
trace whatsoever! Not with the Council of Ministers, not with the 
National Assembly, not with the Senate, and not with the Council of 
Ministers secretariat that maintains a register and numbers all 
correspondence pertaining to legislative texts…[The document 
presented by Woodside] wasn't even numbered!...  
 
So in the light of all that, we said to them, “Look, let’s be careful here…. 
We've checked, but there's no trace of anything to do with these 
documents”. Woodside showed us that the document was signed by the 
Minister of Petroleum [Zeidane Ould H’Meida]. It had indeed been 
signed by the Minister of Petroleum.  
 
So we said to them, “Okay, but as a minister, the actions of Zeidane 
aren't binding on the government...His signature isn't binding on the 
government in this context. This is not a regulatory issue. It is not 
something that is determined by regulation! This acceptance of the 
amendments has to be determined by law. And, if you are going to 
amend a law, you have to follow the proper procedure! You are 
operating within a sovereign state!”  
 
[Woodside] insisted that, in their view, the amendments were effective 
and had duly been executed according to the proper procedure. 
Therefore, if that is what we wished, the matter could be taken to the 
international court in Paris, or the international court in New York for 
arbitration. Our answer was a simple “Okay!” 
 
 The suggestion to do that, in short, came from them…Yes, it did. We 
wanted to avoid any conflict. We wanted to reach an amicable 
settlement. This wish was, in the first instance, because Woodside was 
the leading investor in this area, and secondly, [because the company] 
was [a] highly sensitive, and a very important operator in the country. 
We were thinking of the country's future. We were therefore prepared 
 Page 166 
 
to treat Woodside with “kid gloves”, and to show the greatest 
understanding for their position…. This was a highly sensitive industry 
as Woodside was a strategically important investor…. 
 
So, for the greater good of the country, we were prepared to go to great 
lengths to satisfy their demands and ensure they had a workable and 
stable climate in which to operate. We also wanted to encourage them 
to continue in this important work for the future of the country.…  
 
They were adamant, however, and they insisted on continuing to 
arbitration. So we said, “Okay. We will go to arbitration. In any event, 
carry on working as if nothing has occurred, we will not bother you. In 
regards to the Finance Act [annual budget], we will essentially put in 
what had been agreed [in 1999]. [Although] you refuse to accept 
anything else, we'll include in the terms of our Finance Act [annual 
budget]”. …This is what we told them201. “The law will in any event 
take its course, and on that basis, once the arbitration has been settled, 
we'll be in a position to redress the shortfall in our budget. But we'll do 
so in the spirit of legality, of respect for the legislation, of our reciprocal 
obligations as well as respect for the rights of both parties, not only the 
rights of the Mauritanian State but also those of the company”. 
   
This dialogue went some way towards defusing the situation, 
[especially] when they realised that we were not trying to settle any 
scores, either against individuals or against the company. It was a 
combination of circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Finance 
Act [annual budget], which led us to the discovery that changes had 
been made to the legislation. The amendments we requested and were 
authorised without going through the normal legislative process….  
 
That is how the “Woodside Affair” came about…Although the problem 
had already presented itself back in November [2005], it was not 
officially disclosed by the government until the President delivered a 
speech on the subject around mid-January 2006. Nevertheless, at the 
same time he also declared that the government was committed to 
protecting Woodside. He made a commitment to respect all their rights. 
He nevertheless also insisted that [Woodside] in turn should respect 
their obligations to the Mauritanian people and the Mauritanian State. 
                                                 
201 There is some confusion in understanding Mr Dahi at this moment, but the gist of the conversation  
     is retained 
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He insisted this was the context in which the two parties should go into 
arbitration. It should follow the most appropriate course, and in an 
atmosphere of mutual respect. So it was not a belligerent speech in any 
way, it was essentially a speech concerning the rights [of the parties] 
and their “positions”. At that point, having embarked on the process of 
arbitration, “the leader” nominated some 17 lawyers on the [arbitration] 
committee… Along with the Minister of Finance, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Development, the (new) Minister of Energy and 
Petroleum [the Junta replacement and newly appointed], the Minister 
of Justice and the Governor of the Central Bank.…These made up the 
inter-ministerial committee that oversaw the affair on each occasion 
with the lawyers, with Woodside, and their international 
representatives.  
 
There was indeed a lot of parallel mediation, going on in an amicable 
basis, going through particular individuals, going through... This all 
carried on until finally, after 2 months I believe, they came to us and 
said that the arbitration process was going to be an expensive exercise 
for both the company as well as for the Mauritanian State, and that it 
would be preferable to reach an amicable settlement! 
  
For the purposes of reaching this amicable settlement, the same 
committee as before put forward its proposals. The principal [proposal 
envisaged] was to retain what was in the amendments changed by 
Woodside, or at least certain aspects of these, above all regarding the 
[altered] timeframe, because there were some scheduled deadlines that 
were obstacles that needed to be [rescheduled] for the permits! An 
acceptable accommodation was finally reached between the two parties 
with regard to finding a solution that would on the one hand not be too 
onerous, while, at the same time, allowing the Mauritanian state to be 
able to fulfil its budget obligations. Woodside was “ordered” to pay an 
additional premium in the context of the   US$ 100 million.202 
 
This settlement, eventually reached after much internationally visible 
bickering and acrimonious interchanges – accepted by the Mauritanians as 
“normal bargaining” – hit Woodside very hard. It was a heavy fine to pay for 
the company, whether negotiated by a new hardnosed CEO hell-bent on 
getting the company out of a difficult situation, or whether it was truly, a 
                                                 
202 Interview 43A with Mohamed (Ould) Lemine (Ould) Dahi, 24 December 2011 
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calculated sum coerced from them by able negotiators in order to match the 
government’s future revenue shortfall that came about because of the 
unlawfully obtained amendments.  
 
Woodside did pay US$ 100 million believing the Chinguetti project to be an 
economically viable operation, and not knowing it would very soon pull out 
of the technically problematic project. At the time, Chinguetti was perceived 
as a success model of Woodside’s international exploration expertise and an 
example of the company’s ability to engineer, build and operate a complex 
operation in a remote international location. 
 
Were there other reasons that compelled the President of Mauritania to bypass 
proper parliamentary procedure? At that particular time, Woodside was no 
longer an “inexperienced and small international player from Australia”, but 
a medium-sized international exploration and production company made up 
of highly trained petroleum professionals203. Many of these professionals, 
including its CEO, had had long and successful international careers. Thus, 
the accusation of a lack of cultural sensitivity levelled at Woodside and used 
to criticise its activities could be interpreted as a cover or an expedient 
“umbrella term” for other possible explanations. 
 
One possible explanation is that the accusations of naivety levelled at 
Woodside by the Mauritanians, was a smoke screen related to the internal 
politics of its ruling Maure elites. The key question as to whether the 
government or individuals in the government sought to extract rent from the 
company as an adjunct to a political deal cannot be given a definite answer. 
  
Political pressures at home 
For Mauritania, the period of 2006 to 2009 was internally a politically 
tumultuous period. The country received a great deal of negative press from 
the international media, particularly the industrial press. It suffered so much 
                                                 
203 Between 1998 and 2006 Woodside had grown in value from around AUD 9 billion to some  
     AUD 65 billion, making it a mid-sized independent on the international scene. 
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criticism that Mauritania’s country risk profile was raised by the international 
financiers’ community after its honeymoon period of 2001 to 2005, and the 
raising of funds for exploration activities planned for Mauritania, became very 
difficult. 
 
Woodside had not counted on a second threat during 2006, this time in the 
form of Australian Senator Christine Milne accusing Woodside of bribery and 
corrupt practices in Mauritania. It was “the straw that broke the camel’s back”, 
as far as Woodside’s executives were concerned. The allegations of 
wrongdoing contributed to the myth that Mauritania was not a destination for 
the faint-hearted investor or operator. The researcher knew from his own 
experiences and his business and professional affiliations with many of 
Woodside’s in-country personnel at the time that this idea about Mauritania 
was intensifying.  
 
Senator Christine Milne’s allegation of bribery and corruption was based on 
the claim that the payment of the US$ 100 million made by Woodside to the 
Mauritanian government constituted, and was possibly part of further corrupt 
practices in Woodside’s dealings in Mauritania (Augé, 2007, 125).  
 
After some initial months of the predicted 75,000 barrels per day flow rate, 
production rapidly began to drop as the unexpectedly compartmented 
reservoir began to lose pressure204. On 29 June 2006, daily production had 
fallen to a low of 7,409 barrels per day. It recovered marginally for the rest of 
the year, but in 2007, it plummeted to 2,500 barrels per day.  
 
Woodside did not carry out remedial work as the company tried to fend off 
the corruption allegations. The Woodside executive team headed by Don 
Voelte, the new Chief Executive Officer, lost heart because of mounting 
technical and human resources difficulties with the Chinguetti oilfield 
operations. Voelte began to make plans to concentrate the firm’s activities on 
                                                 
204 Woodside country manager pers. comm., 2012 
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LNG from Australia’s greater Northwest Shelf area and pull out of Africa as 
a whole, beginning with the sale of the Mauritanian exploration and 
production assets. The sale of the totality of Woodside’s Mauritanian holdings 
to Petronas for A$ 418 million was announced in December 2007. The sum 
was far below the Chinguetti partner’s share of the approximately A$ 1.5 
billion spent on the exploration and development of the Chinguetti Oilfield205, 
and Woodside lost an estimated A$ 233 million on the sale. More 
significantly, Woodside lost some credibility as an international player and, 
for a while, its appetite for ventures outside Australia, particularly into Africa. 
Agu Kantsler, the Director of Exploration for Woodside, recounts “the 
beginning of the end” for Woodside in Mauritania: 
 
I only became aware of the demand on 6 February [2006] when Don 
Voelte disappeared and people said he was in Mauritania....He showed 
up a few days later saying that he'd done this US$ 100 million deal.  
 
After that, we had allegations by the Greens Senator Christine Milne 
that there was “obviously something untoward” happening. She 
accused...Woodside of bribery and corruption.… 
 
My personal belief was that she had taken legal advice as to what she 
could say and what she could not say, because she was very careful only 
to name the company. She got a very, very big headline out of that for 
a couple of days and then left us to pick up the pieces.  
 
For Woodside, it was difficult in many, many ways206  
 
Senator Milne’s accusation was made very publicly in the Senate and 
was publicised in the media for a few days, [so that] we [then] had to 
deal with it publicly207.  
 
                                                 
205 Report accessed on the industry blog, Rigzone 27 December, 2007 ”Woodside completes sale of  
     Mauritania interest to Petronas”  
206 Strong emotions showed on the face of this normally stoic individual as he recounted this period of  
     his career in Woodside 
207 Senator Milne was not approached for her views on the result of the AFP investigation 
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Our first action was to cooperate fully with the Australian Federal 
Police whom Senator Milne had requested to come in and investigate 
her allegations.…  
 
They spent 2 to 2 1/2 years going through all of our records in the Perth 
office and from the Mauritanian office… I do not know whether they 
went [to the Mauritanian office] but they certainly would have had 
access to it! They did find it was difficult to get any information from 
the Mauritanian government. I do know that was part of their report, but 
nonetheless after 2 to 2 1/2 years going through everything, we had, in 
a fairly thorough manner, they could not come up with any evidence of 
anything untoward.  
 
Nonetheless, the damage that [Senator] Christine Milne did to the 
morale of our own staff, who felt that something might have happened, 
was incalculable.  
 
Very, very disappointing for the management team to have to deal with 
something of this nature, especially given that the allegation was 
completely unfounded.208  
 
For Mauritania, Woodside’s departure in December 2007 precipitated a 
departure from Mauritania by other key oil and gas explorers who perceived 
a sharp increase in country risk. The inflow of investment dried up, and the 
effect, despite the now proven offshore oil and gas resources, manifested itself 
in years of delay in the generation of significant capital revenues for the 
government. No other activity approaches the revenue-generating capacity of 
the petroleum industry, including the country’s iron-ore and fledgling gold 
mining industry combined, and today, in contrast to the roadside panels that 
appeared in 2002 heralding the new “Dubai of West Africa”, Mauritania 
relinquished its hope of becoming a wealthy nation in the short to medium 
term. 
 
The oil curse hypothesis perpetuates a view that a country touched by the 
“devil’s excrement” is doomed to suffer disruptive socio-political and 
                                                 
208 Interview 51A with Agu Kantsler, 30 January 2012 
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economic problems, while the “wrongdoers”, whether evil oil company or 
greedy home-grown elites, are able to either continue to receive advantages 
plundered from the country and its ordinary citizens or retire free of any 
negative effects. The above narrative has shown otherwise, at least in the 
context of Mauritania. Foster’s offhand remark stated above, must be viewed 
in the context of a historically established and continuing political mechanism 
anchored in social institutions that are evolving but retain the primary 
character of the Bidân society developed over millennia of desert dwelling.  
 
President Abdallahi and civilian rule 
To understand the relationship between the modern institution of the military 
and the coup d’états from 2001 to 2011 and the seesaw between civilian and 
military rule, it is necessary to examine the civilian election of 11 March 2007 
that brought the “old marabout from Brakna”, Sidi Sheikh Ould Abdallahi, to 
the presidency. Ely Mohamed Vall had stated that one of his main objectives 
was “the installation of a genuinely democratic form of governance, one on 
which the president – unlike before – would be limited to two five year terms” 
(Pazzanita 2008, 16). At the time of the 2007 elections, such talk was widely 
believed in the streets of Nouakchott to be political spin, a claim sustained in 
many conversations with people in varied occupations. Most Mauritanians 
believed that it was masking the true objective of the wealthy Colonel Ely 
(Ould) Mohamed Vall, perceived to be a desire to emulate President Touré of 
Mali209.     
 
Additionally, the “democratic transition” of Sidi Sheikh Ould Abdallahi 
(Foster 2011, 131) was soon used to mask a forging of new paths to power 
and wealth for the traditional elites, and it led to a regrouping of Mauritania’s 
tribal powerbrokers into lobbies that linked specific tribes such as the Oualad 
Bousbaa and the Smacides, or the Smacides and the Idawali. As already 
discussed, Mauritania’s political landscape is characterised by ethnic, tribal 
                                                 
209 In March 1991, the then-Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré had ousted a long-standing    
     despot, Moussa Traoré. After a year of military rule to bring order to the country, Touré had  
     ushered in a period of peaceful civilian rule that lasted twenty years during which time he was  
     elected for two terms as president from 2002 until the Mali coup of 22 March 2012 
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and family alliances. Thus, in the setting of the colonially imposed 
Westphalian state and the institution of a professional army, the country’s 
powerful lobbies became a contemporary extension of the traditional social 
forces “enveloping” Mauritanians. These lobbies are the formal and informal 
institutions that influence tribal competition between Maures, as well as build 
and break alliances between ethnic groups in Mauritania today.  
 
It is not surprising, then, that Abdallahi is perceived to be subject to 
manipulation by his political allies. M’Boye Ould Arafa commented that 
Abdallahi was a good man, “motivated by good will”, and yet:  
 
The problem [for Abdallahi] was, as always [the presidential] entourage 
... Maybe his time was not ripe? He was not the ideal man for the job. 
Abdallahi nevertheless was motivated by goodwill...But then, the 
timing was not for him. The political environment was not suited for his 
style of government.... I think that he did not have the strength to impose 
his ideas on the [military] elites around him.210 
 
The Oualad Bousbaa and the Smacide elites became “tribal powerbrokers”. 
This was an outcome of their existing wealth and influence built up through 
traditional activities as ubiquitous “commercants” from Senegal to Morocco, 
greatly increased through their virtual monopoly of activities peripheral to the 
development of the iron ore at Zouérat since the early 1960s. Many in this 
group were also high-ranking army officers, including then-Colonel 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Meanwhile, Abdallahi, member of a maraboutic 
tribe of “small nomads” residing in the Brakna region south of Nouakchott, 
was viewed by the public as weak and merely a proxy for the “military elites”. 
Several participants in this research painted unflattering portraits of Sidi Ould 
Cheikh Abdallahi, describing him as the “silly, old marabou from Brakna”. 
Foster quotes the magazine Le Monde on Abdallahi (op. cit, 143): 
 
[Although] some came to believe that…their presidential elections 
actually constituted a [democratic] model for the rest of the Arab 
                                                 
210 Interview 28A with M’Boye Ould Arafa, 20 April 2011 
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world… There was no ambiguity as to how Abdallahi had been 
elected.... [President] Abdel Aziz “confessed” [to a French journalist] 
to interfering in the election along with other officers in favour of 
Abdallahi.…“in a country where tribes and clans still structure society, 
the military was able to weigh in to make ‘Sidiaco’ 211 win the elections, 
a man virtually unknown to Mauritanians.” 212 
 
Others commented on the compromised political status of Abdallahi. For 
example, M’Boye Ould Arafa and Hamadi Ould Mohamed Hamadi, both 
respected members of the Nouakchott Bidân community, commented quite 
negatively on the civilian president and his military overseers: 
 
In 2007, there was a return to “suit and tie”….It was the period of 
“Sidiaco” under the watchful eye of the military. Because it is they, who 
placed him there and eventually removed him. It could have been 
Ahmed Ould Daddah and it would have been the same…. The reason, 
to tell you the truth, is that the military, with everything [bad] that they 
had done, did not feel safe with a civilian president.213 
 
 
 
Abdallahi was a puppet…It is [Abdel Aziz and his lobby] who had 
chosen him…for [their] personal interests. Abdel Aziz was behind 
Abdallahi.214  
 
As Foster points out (2011, 137) Abdallahi was a weak figure, whom most 
power elites assumed could be manipulated as they saw fit. However, while 
“Abdallahi was soft-spoken and unfailingly courteous”, he did not continue 
long to play the puppet to Colonel Abdel Aziz and his military “keepers”, nor 
to his Oualad Bousbaa entourage which included his wife, a relative of Aziz 
and Ely. Mohamed Fall Ould Bah recounts: 
 
                                                 
211 Nickname used by the Mauritanian press for President Sidi Sheikh Ould Abdallahi 
212 Quote in Foster (2011) from Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ”Les putchistes mauritaniens confortent leur  
     pouvoir”, Le Monde 6 October, 2008 
213 Interview 28A with M’Boye Ould Arafa, 20 April 2011 
214 Interview 30A with Hamadi Ould Mohamed Hamadi, 20 April 2011 
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On taking “The reins of power" [on 19 April 2007], President Abdallahi 
was not as docile [as they had hoped]. He soon began to deal with 
people, who were not “simple” people215. Close Friends and personal 
advisors suggested that he rid himself of the military [in government].... 
 
The soldiers were very much weary of him, as he grew increasingly 
self-reliant, introducing policies they did not agree with. They tried to 
shield him from reality outside [of the presidential palace]. However, 
after a certain time, he began to “stand on his own two feet”.216  
 
[The military elites] began an operation of parliamentary destabilisation 
around him…. They created a situation of “parliamentary confusion” 
… MPs who wanted to destabilise the government made a motion of 
censure and, after a certain time, the conflict [between the army elites 
and Abdallahi] reached a very high level…  
 
In the end, He fired four of the army generals217 and a couple of 
ministers from the government... There you are. In any case, among 
them were two very important and very close generals, the current 
President, and Ghazwani, the current Chief of Staff.218 
 
The highest seat of power had been coveted by both cousins, Colonel Ely 
(Ould) Mohamed Vall and the newly elevated General Mohamed (Ould) 
Abdel Aziz, upgraded by Abdallahi himself as the first acting general to serve 
in a government in the short post-colonial history of the country.  
 
It had thus served then-Colonel, and now General Abdel Aziz well to have his 
“puppet” elected through the manoeuvring of the military. Abdallahi, 
moreover, incapable of extracting himself from his patrons, was also 
powerless to implement urgently needed reforms that he wished to enact 
(Foster 2011, 161). Graft and corruption became rampant and the population 
became displeased, with increasing public displays of protest marches, sit-ins 
                                                 
215 For example, inviting Islamists into the government against the wishes of Abdel Aziz, whom he  
     had  recently promoted to general 
216 This created a new arena of conflict of interests that appeared between Abdallahi and the Military  
     elites who had placed him there 
217 The four generals included General Mohamed Abdel Aziz, General Muhammad Ould Al- 
     Ghazwani, General Philippe Swikri, and Brigadier General (Aqid) Ahmad Ould Bakri.] 
218 Interview 32A with Mohamed Fall Ould Bah, 13 December 2011 
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and other expressions of public disobedience. Abdallahi’s mistake was in 
calling for a “government of national unity”. For this new government, he 
insisted on membership for parties that did not conform to the military’s view, 
such as an Islamist party in which it was claimed that several of his relatives 
held membership. His insistence angered General Abdel Aziz.219  
 
Abdallahi’s most successful accomplishment – but also his second-most 
serious mistake – was initiating procedures for the repatriation of Afro-
Mauritanians who had been forcefully exiled from Mauritania to Senegal 
during the ethnic violence of 1989 (op. cit., 164). Related to this, he began to 
question the blanket amnesty declared for all crimes committed by military 
and security personnel between June 1989 and June 1992. Personnel involved 
in these crimes had for the most part been soldiers and police of Haratin origin. 
Much more significantly, however, were many Bidân involved as inciters and 
leaders who now belonged to the high-ranking Bidân military and government 
elites, including General’s Abdel Aziz and Ely Mohamed Vall. Finding 
himself opposed at every turn, the President Abdallahi fired his principal army 
patrons early on the morning of 6 August 2008.  
 
General Abdel Aziz acted quickly “in order to attain his objective of being 
president after Sidioca” (Foster 2011, 141) as well as continuing to shield him 
and his Maure collaborators from accusations of ethnic wrongdoings in the 
1989-1991 events.   
 
Palace coup - 6 August 2008 
Five hours after their dismissal, and using the presidential guard, the generals 
under the leadership of Abdel Aziz easily and peacefully removed Abdallahi 
from the presidency and incarcerated him in his home. Several research 
participants cynically acclaimed the popular saying that might have been a 
piece of propaganda circulated by General Abdel Aziz’s entourage: “Better a 
good dictator than a poor democracy!” 
                                                 
219 Personal communication with an anonymous member of Abdallahi’s tribe, December 2012 
 Page 177 
 
 
Abdallahi’s presidency was a time of the further resurgence of strong tribal 
loyalties, with the newly formed modern lobbies becoming increasingly 
repolarised through narrowing Bidân parochial interests (Ly Ciré pers. comm., 
2011). Abdallahi’s weak rule and the threat of renewed political upheavals 
encouraged self-preservation and a return to the safe haven of the tribe. Self-
enrichment among the government bureaucrats became the order of the day, 
and many members of the governing class sought close ties to the military 
hierarchy for protection. This rapprochement of the government and the 
military was driven by the military men’s need for legal protection, but also 
by the government’s ability to bestow financially rewarding privileges. The 
government and the military were merged once again, despite the façade of 
“suits and ties”.  
 
Abdallahi’s presidency also resulted in worsening conditions of the country’s 
poor. As described by several research participants, the emergent oil industry 
generated rampant inflation and housing shortages but few benefits to the 
general population. 
 
In a way, petroleum affected the presidency but in a somewhat different 
manner to that attributed to a classic case of the “oil curse”. The promised 
wealth from petroleum had not materialised, generating much dissatisfaction 
in the Mauritanian population with few opportunities outside the oil sector in 
part a result of poor government decisions, but also because of the production 
failure of Chinguetti. Woodside, having suffered through a humiliating period, 
had departed Mauritania by late 2007. The late Gaye Silly Soumaré, a 
Sarakolé independent of the Bidân power play but well placed to understand 
the political climate of the times220, succinctly relegates the effect of 
petroleum to a minor role, overshadowed by the quest for position in the 
Maures’ tribal hierarchy: 
 
                                                 
220 Gaye Silly Soumaré had been Minister in the first government after independence, later nominated  
     as an Ambassador and more recently, acted as an independent Senator in the parliament 
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Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdallahi cut wages and retrenched military 
personnel because there was no money... Money [from oil] had begun 
to flow [as promised by Woodside] at 75,000 barrels per day. 
[However] it quickly fell to 3,000 barrels per day, “nothing” compared 
to what was promised, of course! Many projects had been signed up, 
people recruited, trained, everything... All of a sudden, you cannot pay!  
 
Is the second overthrow of civilian government [in 2008] due to oil? I 
do not think so…. People do not talk about oil… No!   
 
The principal motivation for the 2008 coup d’état was that there was a 
man [General (Ould) Mohamed Abdel Aziz] who wanted power. The 
man wanted to be in power and he removed [Abdallahi] who was old, 
frail, and had not really wanted [to be president]… Yes, the promise of 
oil wealth may have, if you insist, [been a factor in this coup], but, I 
believe, a minor factor within the scheme of things?221  
 
In December 2007, the Malaysian state-owned company, Petronas, bought out 
Woodside’s share in the joint venture, but failed to implement the large-scale 
projects that Woodside had planned or the remedial work that was needed. 
Foreign Direct Investment dropped from an unprecedented high of US$ 814.1 
million for 2005 and the period of construction of the Chinguetti facilities, to 
US$ 139.4 million in 2007, to reach the lowest level since 1998, of US$ 3.1 
million in 2009.222 Woodside’s activities had created unprecedented 
employment and commercial activity that had touched everyone in 
Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. Its sudden departure was a severe blow 
to the whole economy. 
 
At the political and business elite level, the removal of President Abdallahi 
was loudly applauded by all, in the true Mauritanian style of paying tribute to 
the strongest:  
 
Immediately a “Group for the Defence of Democracy” was formed, 
acclaiming the Army’s “sincere endeavour” aiming to end “the corrupt 
                                                 
221 interview 11A with Gaye Silly Soumaré, 7 April 2011 
222 World Bank 2013, Google online data, 
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regime of Sidi Mohamed Ould Sheikh Abdallahi that was deviating 
from the democratic path”… In typical fashion, the next day, supporters 
of the coup held a demonstration…a giant portrait of the Junta leader 
Abdel Aziz, materialised that morning and car-stickers expressing 
unfailing support for the coup appeared throughout Nouakchott.223 
 
Long-time Smacide and Idawali supporters of Taya, together with traditional 
opponents of the Oualad Bousbaa, including the wealthiest businessmen in 
Mauritania, went to the palace, “humbly” paying their respects and pledging 
allegiance to General Mohamed Abdel Aziz. This shift in tribal alliances to 
“the strong” is the modern expression of basic survival learnt in the desert by 
a people renowned for their ability to adapt and prosper in the harshest 
conditions: 
 
 The soldiers are always [in power]! Nothing has changed! One time 
they come in uniform, the next they come in “suit and tie”... They are 
always there! 224 
 
 
Constitutional coup - 18 July 2009 
Soon after the coup, General Abdel Aziz, as head of the High Council of State, 
was greeted with open arms by French President Sarkozy on the tarmac of the 
Paris airport. A story is commonly told in Nouakchott of what Aziz said to the 
French president: 
 
Oui, nous aussi nous voulons la démocratie pour notre pays. Mais 
laissez-nous la prendre à notre propre pas, à notre propre manière.225  
 
Abdel Aziz knew and well understood France’s possible involvement in all 
ten coups that had disrupted Mauritania since independence. He was also 
                                                 
223 Foster 2-11, page 186 
224 Interview 7A with Ly Ciré, 6 April 2011 
225 “Yes, we too wish for democracy in our country, but allow us to be able to adopt it at our pace and  
     in a manner suitable to our needs”..., a quote attributed to General Abdel Aziz and commonly  
     repeated on the streets of Nouakchott 
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cognizant of France’s continued presence and involvement in what was, and 
is still is, openly called “La FrancAfrique”: 
 
Unlike the Anglo-Saxons, the French did not leave “their colonies”... 
Ever…They helped Jean-Bédel Bokassa because it suited them, and 
when they no longer wanted him, they helped to chase him out…. 
 
The French are typical of this sort of interested behaviour; they do not 
leave their colonies. They continue to meddle and to keep their fingers 
in everything. Here in Mauritania, they still have power…Except during 
the period of Maaouya! It was after '98, I think he was angry with them 
over the issue related to the “Negro-African problems”. …He was 
smart, and went to see the Israelis because he knew the Israelis would 
bring the Americans.... He kicked out all French officers from 
Mauritania. He closed everything French. He arabised the country. As 
well, he tried to kick out the French language and generally made life 
difficult for the French between 1996 and 2005. For almost ten years, 
he made life difficult [for them]…  
 
In the end, they were not beaten…. They stayed low until they could 
“help” with the coup [of 2005]… The French were behind [the coup of] 
2005... As well as behind 2008! As well as in 2009! 226  
 
By 6 June 2009, the military had obtained a formal resignation from 
Abdallahi, paving the way for the coming presidential contest. Destabilising 
his opponents by manipulating the timing of the electoral campaign, Abdel 
Aziz once more donned “suit and tie” as a civilian and wooed to his cause 
influential opponents in the country, as well as international support from 
France and Algeria. Having retarded the election process until he had acquired 
the support he needed, on 18 July 2009 Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz became 
an elected civilian President of the country and began his first 5-year term, 
which formally ends in April 2014, with a renewal to 2019.  
 
Abdel Aziz soon proclaimed himself “President of the poor” (Armstrong, 
2012). He had quickly recognised that the most important problem of 
                                                 
226 Interview 42B with anonymous elite Bidân, 24 November 2011 
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Mauritania was poverty and that for a sustained presidency, he would have to 
win over to his side not only elites, but also the wider population. His policies 
at least in the initial period, certainly touched the poor population of 
Nouakchott, attested by the long testimony given by this low-paid, Afro-
Mauritanian casual worker, of which the following is a small extract:  
 
Aziz is donating city land blocks and constructing housing for the poor, 
[and get them out of slums]… He is opening shops that sell daily needs, 
staples at low price for the poor.…He sends fish and meat at low price 
for the poor. We are very happy...227  
 
Abdel Aziz also publically acknowledged the fault-line between Bidân and 
Afro-Mauritanians. In an historical move, and in order to be able to stand as a 
candidate in the 2009 presidential election, Abdel Aziz was required to step 
down as Head of the High Council of State. He did so, but nominated Ba 
Mamadou M’Baré, an Afro-Mauritanian Peulh, to temporarily take his place 
for the elections. This was an unprecedented move, but the nomination of an 
Afro-Mauritanian Peulh as, albeit interim, Head of State impressed the Afro-
Mauritanian population and won many of them over to his cause.  
 
In 2010, President Abdel Aziz acknowledged the errors of the past, the 
injustices of 1989, Inal and the legitimacy of the deep grievances held by Afro-
Mauritanians (Samuel 2011, 10). The ordinary Peulh in the street recognised 
the President’s unprecedented move towards national reconciliation. 
However, even ordinary citizens understood that not all Bidân had that same 
objective: 
  
I insist on the point that Abdel Aziz on his nomination as president went 
to the Afro-Mauritanians and said “sorry” for “Inal” and the 1989-1990 
massacres…. 
 
On his choice of government, every Afro-Mauritanian was happy, but 
the Maures were not. We were happy because of a very good [ethnic] 
                                                 
227 Interview 20A with anonymous very low-waged Peulh hotel employee, 15 April 2011 
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mix in the nominations to governmental posts…. However, the [white] 
Maures were saying the Afro-Mauritanians had voted Aziz in!228 
 
Abdel Aziz also won the Haratin, continuing to refine his approach to the 
“poor” population. He also recruited Messaoud Ould Boulkheir to his side. 
 
Aziz scored well with the Haratin in Nouakchott [in the 2009 elections]. 
He had the correct political approach ready for that229. However, he 
failed to tailor his political arguments for the interior [of Mauritania, 
populated principally by Maures, their slaves as well as Haratin] and 
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir definitely obtained many votes from there. 
230 
 
Indeed, in spite of some very acrimonious periods between them, President 
Aziz had also kept Messaoud Ould Boulkheir as President of the National 
Assembly, a Hartani from the Atar region and affiliated to the Smacides. 
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the most prominent and militant Hartani of the 
1990s, had been named President of the parliamentary National Assembly by 
Maaouya Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya, and had remained in the post for reasons that 
are maliciously said by Bidân opponents of President Abdel Aziz, to be solely 
to appease the Haratin population. 
 
Over the years and as he got older, Ould Boulkheir became increasingly 
conciliatory towards Bidân rule. He remained quiet throughout the period of 
Ely Mohamed Vall’s military Junta to the overthrow of President Abdallahi 
by General Mohamed Abdel Aziz. He began to speak out in militant tones, 
becoming quite outspoken on the constitutional coup of July 2009 and Abdel 
Aziz’s continuation as a civilian President.  
 
In late April 2013, as President of the “Progressive Popular Alliance” (APP) 
and party member of the “Coalition for Pacific Change” (of government) 
(CAP), Boulkheir called on President Abdel Aziz. He requested that the 
                                                 
228 Interview 20A with Ali Lamine Diallo, 15 April 2011 
229 Retaining Messaoud Ould Boulkheir as president of the National Assembly 
230 Interview 42A with anonymous Bidân, 24 December 2011 
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President allow the formation of a coalition of the leading political parties to 
come together and govern the country (“Mauritanie: le président de 
l’Assemblée nationale milite pour un gouvernement de coalition” 2013). His 
widely recognised calls for a government of unity and reconciliation were 
ignored to end-November (Spiegel, 2013). He could be striking now and 
urging this political position in order to sweep aside the weakening of 
leadership of a Bidân-led government. The government of Abdel Aziz has 
been racked by claims of; 1) nepotism (“Encore un proche de Aziz qui 
bénéficie de privilèges” 2013); 2) corruption (“Wikileaks: Encore des 
révélations génantes” 2011) and; 3) embezzlement (“Mauritanie: Le président 
dans le collimateur d’une commission d’enquête sur les biens mal acquis” 
2013). Politics is an everyday event in Nouakchott, one facet of life in which 
everyone has an opinion, to the humblest of citizen: 
 
As I have told you, [Messaoud Ould Boulkheir] is a Haratin of 
[political] force to be reckoned with... If he [Aziz] had [publicly] 
sanctioned him, [the elections] may have turned out very different….It 
may have flared up ethnic unrest... Things would have turned out very 
differently, because the Blacks231 would have said, “The President is 
going back to the old ways of thinking and acting, he does not give 
credence to “Blacks” and the “Whites” are [as usual] always favoured”. 
Today, look at the government, there are many Blacks. There are many 
black ministers. Nevertheless, there are still grave problems.232 
 
Isselmou Ould Didi Ould Tajedine, president of the “Banque pour le 
Commerce et l’Industrie” (BCI), along with many of the business elites in 
Nouakchott, came to pay Abdel Aziz tribute and express their support, even 
though many had strongly opposed Aziz’s candidature. In spite of this 
sycophancy, Aziz replied by cracking down on the unchecked practices of 
these elites, although wisely choosing to target firstly wealthy individuals 
from within his own tribe. He then took to still noteworthy elites, but more 
distant from his entourage, such as Isselmou Ould Didi Ould Tajedine of the 
                                                 
231 Note that here, the participant (a Peulh) is very significantly ‘lumping’ Afro-Mauritanians and  
     Haratin together as one political force to be reckoned with 
232 Interview 8A with Habib Ould Adaya Ould Jiddou, 6 April 2011 
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Idawali tribe, who had to repay the Government the equivalent of several 
million US dollars, allegedly of funds “borrowed” on loan from the Reserve 
Bank, but more likely consisting of many years’ of unpaid taxes. Aly 
Coulibaly a chief waiter at a Nouakchott restaurant well known to the 
researcher made the following comments about Aziz and Mauritanian politics: 
 
Aziz seems to have begun well when we said to ourselves “wait, he has 
caught all these ‘big wigs’ and has made them pay or put them in prison. 
It is sure that he will do well for Mauritania”... However, was this just 
“theatre” for our sake, for the sake of the masses? I just do not know. 
They were soon all released in any case…Bouamatou, he was 
campaigning with Aziz, and yet he was caught… Your friend the 
banker, Isselmou Ould Didi Ould Tajedine from the Idawali tribe, he 
too was also caught along with Nouegued and others.233 
 
However, just as Mauritanian elites were paying homage to the powerful, 
fishing licences, exploration permits, services to the newly nascent mining 
industry, participation in renewed petroleum activities, as well as lucrative 
banking, insurance and foreign exchange services, began to flow once again 
to certain favoured lobbies and individuals (Bouna Chérif 2013, Moussa Diop 
2013).  
 
In the current era, the favoured individuals are often tied by tribal links to the 
Oualad Bousbaa, the President’s tribe. They may also now be linked to them 
through business ties, new ties that transcend established and traditional tribal 
affiliations, and dominate the economy of the country today. Abdel Aziz may 
well be praised, but corruption and nepotism have not disappeared from 
Mauritania, and the humblest of citizen recognises this:  
 
Take the tarmac outside, for example. Who do you think had the 
contract for that? Of course, it is someone close to Abdel Aziz 
{laughter}.... There are even some who say it is [a company owned by] 
Aziz himself {laughter}.... You may ask “what about the steamrollers?” 
These are his! The trucks belong to the President! Those are his! Again, 
                                                 
233 Interview 31A with Aly Coulibaly, 21 April 2011 
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is it corruption? This is why I say it depends... There are several forms 
of corruption, I believe.234 
 
An anonymous interview with the son of one of the senior members of the 
Bidân elite supports the view expressed by many that the country continues to 
be run in a manner that is undemocratic and based on tribal and class-like 
lines: 
 
He [Aziz] is the boss.... It is a dictatorial system of government [that he 
runs]...I personally know the new president Aziz.... My personal 
wellbeing depends on the president, because he is a friend of my 
family.… 
 
This is the truth, to be honest...! I am not going to tell you that I 
underwent competitive recruiting to acquire this job…. I was hired 
because I am known to the president and his family…Exactly the 
truth!235 
 
There is a clear willingness among today’s foreign donors to support president 
Abdel Aziz’s Government and an understanding in the World bank and the 
IMF that their departments are under current instructions not to pay too close 
attention to Mauritania’s weaknesses “because it is dealing with certain 
difficulties” (Samuel 2011, 31). However, Ely Ould Sneiba, the Bidân 
political activist and a member of today’s opposition, is adamant that serious 
corrupt practices continue, and that the West’s policy of “closing its eyes” will 
one day backfire:   
 
[In the days of Taya] everyone was plundering the country.... Taya 
based his system on the diversion of public funds. Aziz now comes 
along, and he is trying to do the opposite but not as you think... Aziz 
has not stopped this behaviour [of corruption and embezzlement]; he 
has reduced the circle of those who benefit! Taya was only one of many 
who benefited within his long administrations….Everyone in 
government was involved in defrauding funds…. The cake was shared 
                                                 
234 Interview 31A with Aly Coulibaly, 21 April 2011 
235 Informal interview (AUNS 110420) with a willing but anonymous participant, son of a wealthy  
     Bidân Nouakchott businessman , 20 April 2011 
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by all [Bidân for the greatest part]. The spreading of pilfered 
government wealth was [much] broader.  
 
With Aziz, that circle of people who benefit from embezzled funds has 
contracted, but the volume remains huge! 
 
Whereas many [government] people were content to divert small sums 
of money in the time of Taya, with Abdel Aziz this is no longer possible. 
It is now only parents and collaborators close to the president those are 
able to divert funds. When they do, it is at least 500 million Ouguiyas, 
1 billion or even more!  
 
The funds that are now being diverted by these people are much larger 
than the funds diverted in the time of Taya.236 
 
In mid-2013, Bouna Chérif and Moussa Diop both point out elite privilege in 
the Nouakchott-based online news website, “Le Quotidien”. Their comments 
reflect the general awareness of elite behaviour by the Mauritanian population; 
the ubiquitous involvement of the president’s tribe in the affairs of state; and 
the fact that fraudulent involvement in the extractive industry does not end 
with petroleum. At the newly acquired Kinross’s Tasiast gold mine, the 
Oualad Bousbaa tribe is alleged to have recreated a monopolistic business 
situation in which its members enjoy total supremacy, as reported by the 
French-based online  “African Intelligence” (“Mauritania – Oulad Bou Sbaas 
deep into mining” 2013). Ex-minister Isselmou Abdelkader, an Idawali that in 
his youth had served as provincial governor stationed in the iron-ore mining 
town of Zouérat, understands first-hand the involvement of tribal factions in 
the extractive industry237:  
 
There are ministers; there is a tribe, who grab money [illegally from the 
extractive industry]…  
 
                                                 
236 Interview 13A with Ely Ould Sneiba, 10 April 2011 
237 Under the French in the 1970s and in the early period of independence, tribal members of the  
     Smacide and Idawali tribe most especially benefited from the peripheral business activities  
     generated by the iron ore industry centred in Zouérat  
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What is happening now is extremely serious, because if…tomorrow 
Ould Abdel Aziz is removed from the presidency... [Kinross] the 
Canadian company [who owns the] Tasiast Gold Mine will not pass a 
day longer [in Mauritania].... They will be “thrown in the sea”! 
 
If [President] Abdel Aziz is removed from office, the people of Tasiast 
[Kinross] will not last! There are too many insinuations of wrong-
doing.… How is it that all service contracts for the mine go to members 
of the Oualad Bousbaa tribe? 
  
The Oualad Bousbaa, as you may already know, are also involved in 
the offshore operations [with Tullow Oil]? They are deeply involved in 
the offshore operations! They are everywhere and in every aspect of the 
business!  
 
Today, in [the port city of] Nouadhibou, the international logistics and 
transportation company Schenker, has created a situation where all 
other transit agencies have gone out of business.... The company 
Schenker is associated with an Oualad Bousbaa businessman and it has 
taken all the transit contracts… It has taken everything! It is taken 
absolutely everything! [Very emotional outburst] It has taken all the 
transit contracts! It has taken all the work... All the markets in 
Nouadhibou for outsourcing contracts in the provision, of supplies, all 
of these are with the Oualad Bousbaa!  
 
[When] there will be a change of president from (Ould) Abdel Aziz, the 
Oualad Bousbaa will be thrown out and there will be a strong backlash 
against the owners of Tasiast [Kinross]. [The company] will be thrown 
into the sea! 238 
 
Conclusion 
The petroleum industry established itself in Mauritania in a decade of renewed 
socio-political turmoil akin to that of the 1978 to 1984 period. Through the 
1990s, there were moves to a more democratic system of government, but 
tribalism, nepotism, embezzlement of state funds, as well as racial 
discrimination continued, as strongly as ever.  
 
                                                 
238 Interview 48A with Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
 Page 188 
 
The regime of the autocratic President Ould Sid’Ahmed (Ould) Taya was 
overthrown on 3 August 2005 by close collaborators who promised to bring 
democracy. After 18 months of military rule under the Junta leader Ely (Ould) 
Mohamed Vall and a stormy period for the petroleum industry, a civilian 
government headed by a weak president, Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdallahi, ruled 
for some 15 months. Corruption and embezzlement of public funds reached 
new heights and the shortage of funds generated by the non-performance of 
the new oil industry created a difficult environment for a weak president and 
a divided parliament subtly domineered by the military.  
 
The coup that ousted Abdallahi on 6 August 2008 was termed a “Democratic 
Rectification”. General Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz took the helm and once 
more on 8 July 2009, in what can be termed a “Constitutional Coup”, he 
donned “suit and tie” to become a civilian president, his rule continuing to 
date.  
 
As self-proclaimed “President of the poor” and for the benefit of the country, 
President Aziz from the beginning of his ascent to power, encouraged an 
expansion of the extractive natural resources industry principally in gold and 
petroleum exploration and production. Attempts were also made by Saudi 
entrepreneurs to amalgamate and develop agricultural lands in the Senegal 
River valley, but this has seen little progress with strong resistance from the 
traditional inhabitants, the Black population of that region.  
 
Despite recent advances in the mining and petroleum industries, however, the 
infiltration and involvement of the president’s tribe and collaborators in the 
industry, with overt nepotism, corrupt business practices, and the 
embezzlement of funds, augurs badly for the continued stability and long-term 
commitment of investors in exploration and exploitation in Mauritania. The 
promises of the petroleum industry fizzled out after being so great upon first 
discovery in 2001. The population has lived through petroleum industry-
induced inflation and the collapse of the Smacides with the fall of Taya, with 
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revelation of massive and systematic “fraud and embezzlement” by the elites 
(Samuel 2013, 13). 
 
This chapter has argued that political instability pre-dates the discovery and 
development of oil resources in the 2000s and that continuing political 
instability from 2001 to date is the result of a range of factors of which the 
promise of oil revenues is only one. 
 
While petroleum discovery and development in the period 2001 to 2011 
played a role in encouraging rent-seeking behaviour among sections of the 
ruling groups, such behaviour has many causes rooted in the history of pre-
colonial, colonial and independent Mauritania. Chief among these causes are: 
the relative poverty of the country, the patrimonial nature of the state centred 
on personal and tribal politics, the on-going political and military influence of 
France, the domestic political supremacy of the Bidân and their economic and 
ethnic domination of the state and key revenue sources, and the continuing 
centrality of sub-national loyalties in the country’s social, political and 
economic life. 
 
In the next two chapters, a more detailed examination of the oil curse idea is 
provided and its applicability to Mauritania. 
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Chapter 5 – The “Oil Curse” theory 
 
In the literature on the relationship between political instability and natural 
resource development, considerable attention has been given to what has come 
to be known as the ‘resource curse’. The term refers to a number of arguments 
centring on the presumed detrimental economic, social, political and security 
changes, or a combination of these, associated with the discovery and 
development of natural resources, particularly oil, natural gas, or other 
valuable mineral deposits. Proponents of the “resource curse” paradox, or the 
“oil curse” paradox if specifically referring to petroleum, claim that countries 
with abundant natural resources, and specifically those that have or will 
generate wealth from point-source non-renewable natural resources like 
diamonds, gold or petroleum, suffer retarded or distorted economic, social, 
political and security growth paths (Bates 2010, 90). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the varying oil curse debates that have 
emerged and have culminated to the present debate on the relationship 
between oil development and political instability in Mauritania. It provides the 
conceptual background to chapter six, which examines the application of this 
presumed relationship to Mauritania’s period of socio-political instability 
from 2001 to 2011. It was during the early part of this period that attempts 
began to be made by the industry players, in conjunction with the Mauritanian 
Government, to establish and develop a viable oil industry.  
 
The petroleum industry  
The global petroleum industry has increased rapidly in size and influence, 
especially over the last 50 years, and today accounts for 90% of the world 
mineral trade by value (Ross 2012, 1). It is the single most valuable 
commodity traded on international markets (Colgan 2013, Kindle Loc 161). 
Oil and gas are needed for energy production but they are also vital to many 
industries such as the food, medical and transport industries. This continuous 
worldwide rise in demand has led to an increasingly wider search for crude 
reserves.   
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Increased worldwide demand for oil and gas means that, as traditional reserves 
deplete, exploration companies intensify their efforts to find resources in other 
countries. This has resulted in an increasing number of poor and 
underdeveloped countries more distal to end-user markets entering the realm 
of exploration, production and worldwide distribution (Hicks, Mthembu-
Salter and Ware 2013, 80). Demand has been steeply accelerating, especially 
in Asia, and particularly China and India, where reliance on imported 
petroleum has increased substantially over the past 25 years. Since China, for 
example, became dependent on imported petroleum in 1993, it has overtaken 
Malaysia to lead the charge of Asian interests into Africa.  
 
Meanwhile, numerous companies – juniors, independents, supermajors, 
private, public and parastatal – from developed countries have also increased 
their activities in all parts of Africa. Junior public and private exploration 
companies have proliferated in the United States, Canada, the UK and 
Australia. With regard to Mauritania, some 40 of these companies scrambled 
for permits after the 2001 discovery of the Chinguetti oilfield. 
 
Many developing countries have comparatively moderate fiscal terms, which 
have made them attractive as investment destinations. In addition, they are 
particularly attractive because their environmental and other regulations are 
generally less stringent than in developed states. Furthermore, their need for 
foreign investment allows foreign oil companies to negotiate favourable terms 
and early start-up dates.   
 
The preference by explorers over the last few decades for pioneering ventures 
into less restrictive developing countries partially explains the perceived link 
between the increased discovery of oil (and minerals) and economic growth 
in low-income countries (Ross 2012, xiii).  
 
Mauritania is an example of a poor developing country that has only lately 
become the focus of significant petroleum and mining activity. The country 
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was ignored as a suitable exploration and development destination for many 
years. Then in 1998, Woodside joint-ventured with the private company, 
Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd, and the junior ASX-listed Hardman Resources 
Ltd, to begin an extensive exploration program in the search for offshore 
petroleum (in offshore petroleum Blocks 3, 4 and 5). Mauritania had re-
entered late as a destination for petroleum activities. However, the discovery 
of a viable oilfield with the first well drilled by Woodside in 2001, only three 
years after exploration activities had begun, marked the country out, at the 
time, as a most attractive investment destination. 
 
Approaches to the resource curse thesis  
As the frontier of prospective regions expands, many developing countries 
have indeed proven to be rich in natural resources, but have also proven to be 
prone to political instability and varying levels of social and political unrest. 
Several commentators, and most prominently proponents of the “oil curse”, 
draw a close but at times questionable connection between petroleum finds 
and political instability as well as other negative conditions. These links are 
perceived to exist whether or not the instability was already entrenched in a 
country, as in the case of Mauritania, or whether it arose only with the 
discovery of petroleum. The increasing tendency for petroleum explorers to 
target more “distal” underdeveloped and developing countries is considered 
by some commentators as a major problem for these countries. For example, 
Ross states that: 
 
Petroleum wealth is overwhelmingly a problem for low-income and 
middle-income countries, not of the rich, industrialised ones.239  
 
He goes on to state that; 
 
                                                 
239 Ross 2012, page 2 
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These countries suffer from authoritarian rule, violent conflict and 
economic disarray because240 they produce oil and because consumers 
in oil-importing states buy it from them.241    
 
Clarke enumerates the ill effects attributed to the “oil curse”, especially as it 
purportedly applies to Africa. He pinpoints poor governance, a decline in trust 
between the government and the people, erosion of the rule of law, corruption, 
rent seeking, struggles for political leadership, lack of diversification of 
industry and the crowding out of investment in human capital. However, he 
also argues that an African nation’s unique socio-political landscape and 
history need to be given serious consideration:  
 
What is considered bad for the rich and liberal societies elsewhere in 
the world, does not always have the same resonance within Africa.…I 
see it as…a [lack] of recognition of the balance of socio-economic 
forces embedded in the [African] historical landscape… [And] Western 
impatience to “fix” Africa in its own image...is at the root of this 
problematic situation described as the oil curse.242  
 
Clarke also challenges the negative link between petroleum and economic, 
social and political instability: 
 
It became ultrafashionable to blame the development and 
commercialisation of petroleum for the social, economic and political 
ills that befall a country, especially in Africa…. Attributing a country’s 
ills to the revenues derived from an important natural resource can have 
profound deleterious implications for the government policies 
formulated to reducing underdevelopment and for sustained 
development of indigenous resource.243   
 
Clarke argues that the direct link between weaknesses in governance, 
dishonest government officials and the oil industry is at best tenuous, requiring 
empirical evidence (2008, 526). More recently, Revers (2013, 64) attests that 
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many African countries have thoughtful and wise governance, including 
sound plans for the future path of their nation. They are also judicious in their 
formulation and application of resources policies. 
 
The ‘resource curse’ thus refers to the paradox that many countries with an 
abundance of subsoil, point-source and non-renewable natural resources such 
as minerals or hydrocarbons, tend to take a distorted development path as this 
endowment is discovered and developed usually for export. This distorted 
development path is said to manifest itself in various economic, political and 
social ways, depending on the particular research focus and theoretical 
orientation of the researcher.  
 
When referring to hydrocarbon endowment, this detrimental effect is termed 
the ‘oil curse’. Below are reviewed the various approaches to the oil curse, 
focusing on the relationship between oil and political instability. 
 
An early economic approach 
The earliest approach is referred to as the ‘Dutch Disease’. It is based on the 
economic consequences of a ‘disease’, following the 1950s discovery of 
hydrocarbons in the Netherlands that include inflation and distorted economic 
activity in which windfall hydrocarbon revenues, for a country when applied 
generically, led to exchange rate appreciation and a flight of human capital 
and funding from other economic activities towards the emerging petroleum 
activities. Other detrimental effects can be excessive borrowing during 
relatively short boom times, followed by debt-overhangs caused through 
international market downturns and sharp increases in the cost of borrowing. 
This was especially evident with African petroleum producers in the 1980s 
when escalating interest rates in the US and the utilisation of anti-inflationary 
measures by the Federal Reserve sparked a sharp global downturn in economic 
activity and trade (Bates 2010, 70). Other economic ill effects claimed to be 
associated with resource abundance include a lack of interest in nurturing 
economic diversity (Le Billon 2005, 19) and the formation of economic 
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enclaves surrounding the extractive industry to the detriment of other 
industries (Basedau 2005, 10). 
 
The general concept of economic ill effects resulting from an abundance of 
natural resources is not new. This is evident in Ross’ reference to Jean Bodin’s 
satirical comparison of “effeminate and cowardly…men of fat and fertile soil” 
with “industrious, temperate men… [made so by] barren land” (Ross 1999, 
309). Development debates from the 1950s to the early 1970s were dominated 
by competing models, including dependency theory, with each proposing 
different ways of raising living standards in developing countries, some 
arguing that the prospects for poorer countries to raise their living standard 
were constrained by the control of their economic and political development 
by richer nations and transnational corporations. One of the early proponents 
of this last viewpoint was the Director of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America, Raúl Prebisch (1959). He reviewed the 
economic performance of South America and suggested that natural resources 
had a negative impact on economic development (Lederman and Maloney 
2007, xiii). Initially, he argued for import substitution policies to enhance 
national manufacturing capacity and reduce dependence on high priced 
foreign manufactured goods produced in richer countries. This view changed 
to a wider critique of the global trading system in which it was argued that 
poverty in developing countries was a product of dependent development over 
several centuries rather than an original condition. He emphasised the 
inequities in the global terms of trade and the importance of increasing the 
political power of developing countries as a means of promoting improved 
national economic outcomes and reforming the global trading system. 
Dependence on raw material exports, particularly agricultural and mineral 
products, was a symptom of wider historically generated inequalities in the 
political economy of global power. 
 
Prebisch’s dependency view of economic development, which focused on 
state-led strategies out of poverty resurfaced in Terry Lynn Karl’s “The 
paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states” (Karl, 1997). Karl emphasised 
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that the capacity of a state to fashion its own social, economic and political 
development trajectories is dependent on the origin and management of its 
revenues, as exemplified by the Netherlands in the 1970s (1997, 222).  
 
Several commentators analysed the negative economic and social effects of 
gas production in the Netherlands in the second half of the last century, and 
the effects were collectively referred to in The Economist as the “Dutch 
Disease”244. The production of gas from the giant 100 TCF245 Groningen 
gasfield discovered in 1959 at first negatively affected the social and economic 
trajectory of the Netherlands. In the immediate aftermath of the unprecedented 
discovery of this large reservoir of natural gas − the largest gasfield in Europe 
and the tenth largest in the world (Whaley, 2009) − the government was unable 
to contain inflation caused by the labour and material demands of the newly 
established petroleum industry. The Dutch currency grew rapidly in value, 
which in turn hampered the country’s ability to export other primary and 
manufactured products. The finite domestic and foreign investment pool 
became increasingly focused on this new industry, putting further constraints 
on more traditional economic activities.  
 
However, over the longer term, gas from Groningen provided an important net 
benefit to the country’s economy, a reality contrary to the ready impression of 
a “curse” of long-lasting detrimental effects. While the Dutch petroleum 
industry expanded, inflationary pressures did initially create a recessionary 
environment. However, timely remedial action taken by the government 
averted a full-blown recession. The discovery at Groningen encouraged 
further exploration, resulting in the creation of significant long-term wealth 
for the Netherlands as well as for other countries surrounding the North Sea. 
In the Netherlands, pipelines quickly spread across the landscape and most 
houses rapidly converted to using cheaper and cleaner natural gas as their 
primary energy source. Gas from Groningen, the first gas producer and 
exporter in the North Sea, is still being produced today, enabling the Dutch 
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government to use foreign revenue to maintain a high standard of living for its 
growing population, as well as continue encouraging diversification into other 
wealth-producing activities as a means of reducing dependency on 
hydrocarbon revenues. While there were negative economic impacts during 
the initial establishment phase of the petroleum industry in the Netherlands, 
implementation of appropriate government policies and the resolve to follow 
them, resulted in far more significant longer-term benefits for the Dutch 
economy. 
 
Groningen has now reached maturity and other gas fields and industries are 
beginning to replace it. The Groningen windfall discovery brought huge 
benefits to the then-impoverished Netherlands, benefits that are now taken for 
granted by the wealthy developed nation.  
 
Thus, while natural resource development can have negative impacts on a 
country’s economy and society, proper management can turn this around and 
result in major gains for a country.  
 
The purported link between petroleum and economic volatility is claimed to 
be observable in many other countries. Auty and Pontara  (2008) suggest that 
perceived natural resource abundance produces institutional weakness, but 
they do not elaborate on whether there may be a reverse causality operating, 
that is, that some petroleum explorers may, by choice or through necessity, 
choose to explore in institutionally weaker, more ”distal” states. A pertinent 
example is the involvement in Mauritania of Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd, a very 
small, maverick African pioneer, and the equally small and insignificant 
petroleum explorer, Hardman Resources Ltd. Although these companies are 
small by world standards, they were nevertheless able to obtain major 
petroleum concessions in Mauritania because of Mauritania’s poor economic 
circumstances and its corresponding readiness to facilitate the start-up of a 
potentially revenue-generating project. It can thus be argued that perceived 
institutional weakness that already exists in such countries attracts investors 
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who believe they can operate more easily under such circumstances, and not 
the reverse causal argument that such investment weakens these institutions. 
 
In a paper reviewing economic data used by Sachs and Warner (1995) to argue 
the resource curse thesis, Brunnschweiler acknowledges that in some 
countries the seizure of resources rents by incumbent politicians is unlikely to 
promote economic growth. However, emphasising disparity between 
abundant resources rents and resources dependence, she goes further in 
suggesting that resource wealth does not impede economic growth. She finds 
a positive, direct empirical relationship between natural resource abundance 
and economic growth, with particularly strong positive resource effects in 
subsoil mineral and petroleum wealth (Brunnschweiler, 2008). Likewise, in 
the foreword to Lederman and Maloney’s “Natural Resources: neither curse 
nor destiny” (2007, xiii), Guillermo Perry, Chief Economist for Latin America 
and the Caribbean states, “it is true that wealth can be wasted and lead to 
destructive behaviour... ‘rent-seeking’ activities and even civil strife... the 
conclusion seems quite robust: overall, natural resources wealth is good for 
development”.   
 
Resource development and socio-political effects 
Social and socio-political ill effects are also considered potential results of 
petroleum discovery and exploitation. These may include decreased 
investment in human resource development and a growing disparity between 
rich and poor (vertical inequality) and between localities and groups 
(horizontal inequality), causing intercommunity grievances and leading to 
unrest and potential conflict (Brown and Stewart 2012, 254). Other proposed 
negative effects of the petroleum industry are increases in human rights 
abuses, distorted fiscal regimes, dissociation between government and 
citizens, and sharp increases in corruption, embezzlement, fraud and nepotism 
(Clarke 2008). 
 
Campbell (2009) suggests that a crowding out of investment in human capital 
because of a concentration on capital-intensive export-earning activities, 
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results in regional and community socio-political imbalances between 
resource-wealthy and resource-poor parts of a country (op. cit., 15). Caselli 
(2006) takes the view that oil wealth shapes the actions of the ruling groups of 
a country. He argues, “Political scientists have long held the view that the 
reasons for the resource curse are to be found in the behaviours of those that 
control the state” (Caselli 2006, 2) . He goes on to say:  
 
“Natural resources are more easily appropriated by the governing elites 
than other sources of wealth, such as the output of the industrial 
sector”.246 
 
This leads to growing political instability:  
 
“as a result, countries with large amounts of natural resources 
experience power struggles, in the sense that potential challengers have 
a stronger incentive to seek to replace the existing government by 
means of coup d’états, or other forms of forced change in leadership”.247 
 
Caselli builds his case with examples from sub-Sahara Africa. He examines 
activities that influence the flow of consumption goods, and focuses on both 
larger scale exploitation of natural resources and small-scale agricultural and 
artisanal production. He also appraises the revenues that a government obtains 
from these activities and examines the available methods that can maximise 
the value of use of these revenues. He then reviews these parameters in the 
light of the possible behaviour of “talented” agents, leaders and would-be 
leaders, and the choices that are available to them. The empirical evidence he 
brings to his model suggests that a natural resource “curse” operates through 
the behaviour of political elites that do not invest in the long-term 
development of their country. Nevertheless, he concedes, touching on the 
present argument, that the mechanism through which the “curse” operates is 
not readily discernible. He concludes that explanations as to how or why 
instability occurs are often based upon assumptions because, in reality, the 
                                                 
246 Caselli 2006, page 2 
247 Caselli 2006, page 1 
 Page 200 
 
causes of political instability are opaque and complex and the data to support 
the precise identification of a root cause, difficult to identify.  
 
Collier and Hoeffler focus on the link between primary commodity 
dependence and the risk of civil conflict. They affirm that resource rents are a 
catalyst for conflict, and that:  
 
Whether or not natural resources increase the risk of rebellion, they 
change its intent: Opportunistic rebellions presumably are even less 
likely to lead to good eventual outcomes than ideologically motivated 
rebellions.248 
 
They contend that ill effects are present, nonetheless, only where institutional 
structures - as opposed to individuals actors - are weak and public governance 
is low (op. cit., 630). Collier further contends that conflicts are especially 
provoked when different groups and factions fight for their share of returns on 
resource revenues (Collier, 2007). Contrary to several proponents of the 
resource curse, Collier finds explanations for conflict neither in the behaviour 
of elites nor in immediate political circumstances that he regards as merely 
symptoms of underlying causes. Instead, he points out that unequal economic 
apportioning is detrimental to socio-political stability, and specifically states 
that “[being] poor is dangerous”249 and that underlying all symptoms of 
conflict are grievances in the wider community.  
 
As in the present thesis, rather than blaming the petroleum industry for 
political instability, Collier postulates that the answer may be found in the 
historical, geographical and socio-political context of divisive ethnic groups 
and conflict-prone formal and informal institutions (Collier 2009, 121-137).  
 
Humphreys seems to argue that there is no such thing as a natural resource 
“curse”. In its place, he postulates that the structural features of a state and its 
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social relations pave the way for detrimental socio-economic and political 
effects. Indeed, the purported curse could be thought of as brought about by 
crooked, opportunistic elites, as it may act through the desires and calculations 
of a small number of political actors, constrained, nevertheless, within the 
political and economic institutions in which they exist (Humphreys 2005, 
522). This “curse”, however, could occur within any society, resource-rich or 
not, and oil is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for instability. 
Caselli (2006) likewise finds empirical evidence to suggest that conflict 
operates through the behaviour of political elites that fail to invest in 
sustainable, long-term development. It is not an oil curse operating, but it is 
the ineffective nature of a political system and the aspirations of individuals, 
oil becoming a weapon of elite domination and reinforcement to their power. 
The oil does not cause the domination of elites but intensifies it, allowing 
further consolidation of elite power. 
 
Lowi (2009, 34) explains that when the principal activity of political elites is 
the distribution of rents and not the promotion of productive activities, then 
the arrangement becomes a self-propagating institution. A system of rent 
distribution to influential powerbrokers becomes permanent because it gives 
long-term political stability to rulers and their allies, and to the distributary 
system including rent-seeking tribal, clan or family relations. Thus, the system 
of rent-distribution is created in order to lengthen the tenure of power by the 
strongest of the paternalist political leaders. She concurs that there are many 
examples of oil states that take the “allocation” path instead of the 
“production” path in situations where economic incentives to access oil 
revenues are perceived by political elites to outweigh production activities. In 
such cases, the political elites have the choice of adopting either an 
“allocation” or a “production” avenue.  
 
The final agency decision taken is, nevertheless, guided ‘invisibly’ within the 
context of a complex of nested and interrelated institutions and institutional 
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requirements and limits250. Despite an apparent freedom of choice, whatever 
the decision, leaders are fundamentally constrained by their own community’s 
traditional values and behaviours. Elite power in the face of petroleum 
industry revenue does not necessarily result in unbridled political warfare over 
the wealth at stake. Power is exercised and wealth is distributed in developing 
African countries in a far more sophisticated manner, albeit often foreign to 
Western custom. If there is wealth to be had, then its journey into the hands of 
the people traverses deep and complicated socio-political structures that often 
have centuries-long histories.  
 
Lowi (2009) does modify her initial perception of the importance of elite 
agency, and gives increasing attention to matters of institutional and 
contextual control guiding leaders’ choices and outcomes. She asserts that oil 
is not “naturally cursed”, and points out the diversity of responses to oil 
wealth: 
 
 Oil rents have been pointed to as the cause of political quiescence 
(Crystal 1990), but also the rise of opposition (Okruhlik 1999); political 
instability (Karl 1997), but also stability (Hertog 2006); the turn to 
democratisation (Levine 1978), but also the persistence of 
authoritarianism (Crystal 1990; Vandewalle 1998).251   
 
Shaxson, the principal proponent of the “oil curse” theory in Africa, is the 
author of the provocatively titled, “Oil, corruption and the resource curse” 
(2007b) and “Poisoned wells: The dirty politics of African oil” (2007a). He 
argues that mineral dependence is indeed a curse for developing nations 
because, adhering to the Dutch Disease model, it stunts economic growth. He 
asserts that it also leads to increased frequency of conflicts, reduces the 
possibilities for more democratic forms of government and increases 
corruption (Shaxson 2007b, 1123). Clarke (2008) criticises Shaxson’s 
argument for exaggerating the role of petroleum and underestimating pre-
existing social fragmentation, traditional forms of political authority organised 
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around sub-national political loyalties and other inherited social structures 
such as tribalism. Clarke also points to the role of endemic and 
institutionalised ethnic poverty as a driving force - and not an outcome as 
Shaxson argues - in weakening state authority, contributing to low-level and 
high-level corruption and pertinently, intensifying sub-national rivalries.  
 
Nevertheless, Shaxson’s argument is echoed by several other commentators 
who simply seem to accept the idea of an oil curse without the need to argue 
the case and possibly having their own agendas. For example, in a popular 
blog article entitled “Rethinking the oil curse” (Tierney Lab 2008), John 
Tierney argues a country with poor institutions that “suffers” an oil windfall 
will succumb to power politics and be torn apart by civil unrest. He proposes 
a plan to distribute wealth directly to citizens, through a “pension scheme of 
payments similar to Alaska’s”. He makes the point that this would divert 
resource wealth away from the government and avoid “corrupt influences”. 
Thus, as Tierney sees it, this plan is the best way to stop the ills caused by 
“blighted filthy crude” (Tierney, op. cit.). Another oil curse proponent is 
Thomas Palley, a prominent United States-based economist who served as the 
chief economist for the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission and is currently the Schwartz Economic Growth Fellow at the 
New America Foundation, a US think tank. Both Shaxson and Palley argue 
that while oil can be a curse, its effects can be mitigated by wealth distribution 
schemes. Pally argued that after the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq, oil 
revenues be distributed by the US army (Palley, 2003). Such suggestions 
implicitly support the idea that some oil-rich countries do not possess the 
institutional structures and political leadership to decide what is in their best 
interests and that such decisions must be left to ‘wiser’ foreign - read 
‘Western’ - governments and even to the oil corporations themselves. 
 
Shaxson and Palley, and other proponents of the “oil curse”, take a 
paternalistic and US-centric approach towards resource windfalls in 
developing countries and in their advocacy of foreign interference in internal 
affairs and governance. Collier’s thinly veiled “International Supply of 
 Page 204 
 
Security” or Over-The-Horizon guarantees as he also refers to it, is a similar 
violation of sovereignty that deals with the political process divorced of the 
question of resources, but goes even further in suggesting that “...coups need 
to be harnessed, not eliminated” (Collier 2009, 227). As enchanting as an “oil 
curse” sounds; it does not befall all developing nations in which a petroleum 
industry is established, neither are all such nations inherently incapable of 
managing their own internal affairs, nor is the oil curse something that 
powerful nations have managed to cure with their own counter-measures.  
 
The research attests to the importance of foreign companies and governments 
having a solid understanding of the importance of each unique culture they 
meet in the course of their international business activities and political 
dealings.   
 
Ross takes up the theme of wealth distribution and conflict in a refinement of 
the notion of the “oil curse”. He points out “oil and gas revenues seem to 
magnify the ability of governments to do both good and bad things for their 
citizens” (Ross 2007, 237). He argues that inequality in vertical distribution 
(rich and poor individuals) may lead to retarded development and increased 
poverty, and that the unequal distribution of resources to diverse ethnic and 
other groups in a country (horizontal distribution) can be harmful and may 
lead to violent conflict. Ross implies that oil is simply a further means to 
perpetuate already existing inequalities. 
 
Collier (2009, 26) contends that in countries with low-income levels voters 
have little knowledge and are unaware of their civil rights, political elites 
disregarding the plight of the uneducated population. He argues that the low-
income level masses thus “retreat into familiar territory”, finding protection 
within their ethnic group. The manipulation of identity of these disadvantaged 
people and their shepherding into sub-national institutions in which they find 
support and protection, whether through ethnicity, tribe or religious affiliation, 
creates a situation ripe for opportunistic elites to serve their own interests. 
These elites are able to attract, extract, coerce or even “buy” votes through 
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patronage politics, organise support through tribal means and group pressure, 
and often generate tension along pre-established ethnic fault-lines (op.cit, 45). 
He thus views the nature of the political system, including political mistrust 
and subnational allegiances, as a paramount factor in the emergence of 
distorted national development, which may have nothing to do with oil. 
 
Shaxson, on the other hand, emphasises oil rents, rent seeking and the action 
of domestic political elites as central to the understanding of the deleterious 
effects of oil revenues, he focuses on the present and pays little attention to 
historical roots of such actions. Nor does he assign importance to the formal 
and informal institutions such as tribal affiliation and political lobbies that 
influence and channel the behaviour of elites within the oil rich states he 
evaluates, drawing rather tenuous links between the oil curse and global 
terrorism, as illustrated in the following comment: 
 
West Africa’s oil is generating a mix of grievance, instability and great 
wealth that is not unlike the noxious cocktail that motivated and 
financed the September 11 2001 hijackers….Oil and gas pay for the 
intelligence services and armies that keep the boiling anger at arm’s 
length.252   
 
Lowi provides a less superficial view of the oil curse idea when she 
emphasises the value of acknowledging differences between countries and the 
economic and political pressures they face. With specific reference to “oil 
curse” theories, she explains: 
 
Without factoring agency, cultural peculiarities and historical legacies 
more systematically into their analysis, earlier studies of the resource 
curse could not account for some of the very interesting variations 
among oil exporters in terms of both strategies and performance, nor 
could they provide compelling explanations for political outcomes.253     
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Speaking in broader terms than the oil curse idea and elaborating on endemic 
inequalities in societies, glossed over by popular writers, Brown and Stewart 
(2012, 255-256) draw attention to the fact that both vertical and horizontal 
inequalities between groups influence the perceived wellbeing of individuals, 
as well as their ability to participate in the political life of a country. 
Inequalities manifest themselves in political appointments, voting patterns, 
government spending, as well as the distribution of public and aid funds. 
“Horizontal inequalities” are, according to Brown and Stewart (op. cit., 281), 
strongly correlated with socio-political instability, although they stop short of 
claiming a direct causal connection. Basedeau contends that such inequalities 
and the organisation of state power are in fact “…characteristic of poor 
countries in general” and do not need oil in order to manifest themselves 
(Basedau 2005, 13). 
 
Lederman and Maloney (2007, 1) argue that natural resources, including 
petroleum, are neither a curse nor a blessing. They claim that the ability to 
create institutions that increase a population-wide knowledge base and that 
engender economic entrepreneurialism, given time, will normally lead to 
greater societal welfare and to socio-political stability. In other words, there is 
no “oil curse” per se when a seemingly “cursed” situation – which was the 
case in the Netherlands − is viewed in the context of long–term outcomes and 
takes into account the changing political and economic circumstances that a 
country faces and the ways it responds to them. 
 
A contextual approach 
Conceptualising the relationship between resource development and political 
instability, these observations show that in debates around the oil curse, 
political development and instability, while oil can be a politically 
destabilising force in a country, this is not always the case. If a short time 
perspective is taken, it is possible to observe the negative impacts of oil 
resources on a country’s political and economic institutions but a country can 
overcome those problems through proper development planning. There is also 
the question of the order of causation. Some observers assert a direct link 
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between oil and political instability, with oil as the key cause of such 
instability. However, this somewhat crude notion of causality fails to embed 
political change within a wider spatial and historically grounded analytical 
framework. For example, an important line of inquiry is to compare resource-
rich countries with regard to whether they manifest symptoms of the oil curse. 
Using major oil (and diamond producers) in Sub-Saharan Africa, Basedau 
(2005) argues that the sum-effect of resource abundance on a state’s socio-
economic and political development will depend on a number of contextual 
variables, subject to country-specific as well as resource-specific conditions. 
These include the type of resource, the level of its abundance, the companies 
and investors involved and the management of revenues by government. In 
other words, he supports the importance of the history of a state and of the 
contextual parameters of its development as in the present study, proposing 
future research should be better designed and extend the case study approach, 
and calls for more systematic research. He contends that: 
 
“... future research agenda needs to examine the complex interplay of 
these contextual variables by adding more sophisticated comparative 
research designs, especially ‘small and medium N’ comparisons, to the 
tool box which has been widely confined to the juxtaposition of ‘large 
N’ and country case studies”.254  
 
In the case of African countries, Caselli (2006) argues that most models that 
examine the negative impact of natural resources on resource-rich countries 
are erroneously constructed on variations of the “Dutch Disease” concept. 
They do not take into account the behaviour of ill-intentioned (or poorly 
advised) political elites that do not plan and build for the future of their 
country. He further argues that oil itself does not constitute a “curse”. Rather, 
the manner in which political elites govern largely determines whether the 
discovery and production of petroleum turns out to be a positive, negative or 
a mixed phenomenon for a country. He points out that government decisions 
in African and other countries are not always transparent, and that researchers 
                                                 
254 Basedeau 2005, page 4 
 Page 208 
 
make assumptions, rather than actually do the necessary empirical research, 
on how a government has made its decisions. He further contends that because 
governments control revenue inflow, natural resources wealth increases the 
power of governments and also the risks of how best to use such  revenues. 
 
In Caselli’s view, government elites thus have three choices. They can 
maximise the present value of the resources for themselves and their allies, 
they can invest in the country for the immediate social and economic welfare 
of their people or they can seek to invest in longer-term development 
programmes that may not have immediate benefits but promise to do so in the 
future. Caselli is pointing out the importance of context in understanding what 
choices are made by elites; which choice (or combination of choices) is 
exercised is not readily understandable without knowledge of the wider socio-
political factors and parameters facing these elites. They do not have the 
freedom to make decisions with impunity; they are constrained within their 
socio-political environment with real limits placed on their very existence. 
 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) take a more nuanced view by 
suggesting that it is the interaction of the discovery and development of oil 
resources with the major political institutions of a state that need to be 
considered. In other words, it is the existing political and other institutions 
within which elites operate, that interact with the petroleum industry. The 
nature and the course of these complex relationships determine the 
development and influence of the petroleum industry and in turn, the 
development path of the host country itself.  
 
Lowi argues that one of the features of states with oil curse problems is that 
they are already institutionally weak. Signs of this institutional weakness are 
rent-seeking and misappropriation of government revenues by the elite class 
in an unstable political landscape, which are seen by them as essential to 
survival, and thus encouraged in times of general economic stress. 
Recognition of this political backdrop is vital for researchers who wish to 
understand how the petroleum industry interacts with, rather than simply acts 
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upon, a developing country (Lowi 2009, 10-11). Lowi supports the thesis that 
leaders’ choices are paramount in shaping the path that a state takes in its 
development strategy, at the same time acknowledging the importance of 
structure and context in shaping agency behaviour within unique socio-
political landscapes. She states: 
 
Outcomes turn on leaders’ decisions relative to the particular context 
they find themselves in255, the “structured” environment composed of 
sources, institutions, social systems and social forces.256    
 
Humphreys (2005) also recognises that effects, which might at first seem 
related solely to the presence of the petroleum industry, may originate in 
deeper and historically shaped political and economic structures that show 
themselves through the actions of elites. Humphreys takes the view that the 
socio-economic metrics used to identify the presence or absence of a “resource 
curse” may be unreliable measures because they are, in effect, merely a 
snapshot of decisions made by a small number of elite political actors that are 
bound by their membership of a specific societal group. These elites act 
opportunistically in opposition to their traditional opponents by seeking 
control of actual or anticipated resource revenues. These elites, in essence, are 
driven by their immediate environment of demanding tribal relations and their 
political entourages. The broader national interest is neglected in sub-national 
competition between ethnically defined and institutionalised elites in the 
course of their struggle for control of the state and its resources. 
 
The fact that political instability and conflict are found in countries without 
natural resource wealth suggests that such endowment is not a necessary 
condition for instability and conflict. However, Humphreys suggests that, if 
natural resources are present, resource grievances are sparked and at times 
provided with support through six distinct mechanisms that may work in 
isolation or in combination, dependent on the relationship between country-
                                                 
255 The researcher’s italics 
256 Lowi 2009, page 44 
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specific parameters, outlining these mechanisms and assessing the value of 
each in selected cases. Three mechanisms are most applicable to the present 
case and may occur singularly or simultaneously. The first, referred to as the 
“greedy rebel mechanism” is based on the idea that natural resources provide 
an incentive for like-minded political elites to seize control of the state. The 
second or “grievance mechanism” involves the perceived unjust distribution 
of natural resource wealth, thus creating inequalities and resulting in 
grievance-driven civil unrest and socio-political upheaval. While the third, 
termed the “greedy outsider mechanism”, comprises a situation, in which the 
existence of natural resources may be an incentive for a third party to foster 
civil unrest as a means to gaining access to the resources.  
 
Humphrey’s mechanisms suggest that political elites operate within particular 
sets of conditions not of their own making, Lowi arguing a similar point when 
she says that political leaders should be regarded as actors constrained by the 
stage on which they are acting: 
 
Actors that choose from among alternative possible responses to a set 
of conditions they face: conditions that provide a structure and impose 
constraints257. In responding as they do, actors contribute to fashioning 
the outcome that eventually results.258     
 
Lowi’s emphasis here is upon leaders as contributors within complex 
political and social environments. In her view, leaders cannot be regarded 
either as omnipotent reality-makers or as pawns of more powerful interests.  
 
Foreign interference and domestic politics 
Less has been written about the political factors involved in “the greedy 
outsiders mechanism” (Humphreys 2005, 511) or more generally to foreign 
influence in the resource curse literature. More specifically, there has been 
limited discussion of the political role of foreign industry participants in a 
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country’s political process from within the resources curse debate. While 
important contributions have been made by Sachs and Stiglitz (2007) and 
Lederman and Maloney (2007), their emphasis has been predominantly 
economic. They have analysed economic trends such as in currency 
appreciation, fluctuations in commodity prices and the like, neglecting the 
factors of international relations, foreign and national political institutions, 
their history, their interactions and interrelationships, as well as the effect of 
agency in the actions and non-actions of political elites of influence.  
 
Yates (2012, 7), like Humphreys, argues that the unequal distribution of 
resource revenues that generate grievances may lead belligerent parties to seek 
external assistance. He refers to the example of former South Sudanese rebel, 
John Garang, and argues that a foreign third party, oil company or government 
from a developed oil-consuming state, may not be receptive to genuine 
grievances in a belligerent such as Garang. Yates takes a different tack to 
foreign interference and claims that a foreign third party may be likely to 
advocate for a return to peace rather than justice, very likely promoting and/or 
prolonging social, economic and political injustices and the ensuing 
instability. In other words, the outsider may be less concerned with a just 
settlement of a country’s domestic conflict than ensuring the momentary 
cessation of hostilities, promoting peace-building measures or the use of 
diplomacy to provide opportunity for the outsider’s own immediate 
objectives. Advocating an “outsider” concept, Yates’ approach touches on the 
interference by foreign powers through non-involvement in the conflicts 
experienced by underdeveloped, oil-producing countries. 
 
Karl’s argues in a similar manner, in stating that petroleum:  
 
...turns oil states into honey-pots – ones to be raided by all actors, 
foreign and domestic regardless of the long-term consequences 
produced by this collective [domestic and foreign] rent seeking.259  
 
                                                 
259 Karl 2007,  page 257 
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Maass, in his more recent populist treatise on the oil “curse” entitled “Crude 
World” (2009) apportions most blame to coercive domestic elites in oil-rich 
countries, but concedes there are many factors that shape a country’s oil 
development: 
 
I was flummoxed by the differing fates of countries that lived off oil. In 
one, there was invasion. In another [there was] poverty. Nearby, [there 
was] fundamentalism. Not far away, [there was] empire. Across the 
world, [there was] pollution. In the distance [there was] anarchy. Over 
the border, [there was] civil war.260   
 
Maass goes further, however, and opens an important line of inquiry regarding 
foreign stakeholders’ involvement when he describes American activity in 
Baghdad on April 9 2003, the same day Saddam Hussein’s statue was toppled 
in Baghdad’s Firdos Square:  
 
There was an oasis amid this anarchy. American soldiers had piled 
sandbags around the Ministry of Oil and were patrolling its perimeter… 
protecting little else.261  
 
Humphreys refers to two examples that highlight the interplay between 
foreign interference and domestic elites (2005, 509-511). In the case of the 
Republic of Congo, where the former French parastatal oil company, Elf, had 
been operating for many years, Humphreys argues that the company carried 
out covert and coercive actions with the knowledge of the French government. 
These actions led to the escalation of conflict between troops loyal to Denis 
Sassou Nguesso and those led by the incumbent President Pascal Lissouba. 
Humphreys also refers to the role of political intrigues in Chad as the US and 
France carried out covert political activities that contributed to renewed and 
extensive civil unrest and to presidential overthrows beginning with the 
discovery of oil in Chad in the early 1970s. Hissène Habré, strongly pro-West 
and seen as a force to contain Libya’s Gadhafi, received the military and 
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financial backing of France and the US in successfully chasing Colonel 
Gadhafi’s forces out of newly oil-rich Chad. Sanctioned and supported by both 
the US and France, Habré’s overthrow of President Goukouni Oueddei in June 
1982 did to some extent settle a country that was politically unstable and 
whose regime was a deterrent to  investment. However, it also brought in a 
corrupt and violent dictatorship that relied on death squads and the killing of 
some 20,000 to maintain control until his overthrow in 1990 (Meredith 2005, 
356). 
 
Humphreys (2005) commenting on Chad and the Republic of Congo, 
concludes that regime breakdown often occurs in cases of socio-politically 
unstable resource-rich states, precisely because of the involvement of self-
interested outsiders. He foreshadows the later work of Karl and Lowi on 
foreign intervention as a significant component in the development of social 
and political unrest and upheavals in resource-rich states. Lowi goes further 
than suggesting that foreign interference interacts with domestic forces to 
generate instability. She points out, that concentrating on the mismanagement 
of factor endowments to explain African state failures can divert attention 
away from an understanding of the ways in which domestic political and 
institutional processes themselves shape political and business elites’ 
behaviour (Lowi 2009, 33). These comments suggest that both domestic and 
international political and economic processes play singular, parallel and 
combined roles in the exploitation of a country’s sovereign resources and the 
degree of political stability under which they are developed.  
 
Resources and international politics  
A wider negative political effect suggested to arise from petroleum abundance 
and petro-wealth, is international conflict. This can be the result of belligerent 
petro-aggression on the part of some oil-rich states as put forward by Colgan 
(2013), arguing that some ‘petrostates’ can and do initiate international 
conflicts, or the development of ‘resource wars’ in an international 
environment in which resources are perceived to be finite and diminishing 
(Yergin, 1991).  
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With regard to petro-aggression, Colgan, using Iraq, Libya, Iran, Venezuela 
and Saudi Arabia as case examples, states that developing nations with 
relatively recently realised petroleum endowments, “show a remarkable 
propensity for instigating international conflict” (2013, Kindle loc. 530). 
However, such actions are not confined to petro-states and he exaggerates the 
power of developing countries to cause external conflict, while neglecting that 
many of these conflicts are prompted and often driven by the developed world. 
In his case studies, Colgan omits to include the United States for example, 
itself a developed oil-rich country that has matured beyond total resource-
dependence, as the external influence if not the external aggressor, the actions 
of the US compounding the original internal unrest of several of these 
developing petro-states. This adds to Humphreys’ argument that interested 
foreign actors and “greedy outsiders” could be regarded as “one and the same” 
in that they influence the socio-political outcomes of oil-rich developing 
countries, whether the interest is in maintaining geopolitical relationships, 
ensuring resource supplies or maintaining regional strategic balance of power.   
 
Lowi (2009, 41), argues in her work on energy politics in Algeria that foreign 
interference can play a role in the political instability of a country. She points 
to three conditions acting in combination that lead to political instability and 
often result in regime breakdown. The first of these conditions is a distinct 
lack of cohesion between the personal objectives of state elites, the aims of 
state institutions and the needs and wants of the general population. This 
usually comes about because the state has failed to provide basic or promised 
services and investments for its citizens’ wellbeing. The second condition is 
that opposition elites withdraw their support for state leaders, as criticism 
increases over the real or perceived unfair distribution of rents, often resulting 
from failure in the first condition. The third condition is that these same 
dissatisfied elites mobilise internal support from aggrieved factions of the 
population. Most importantly in the context of the present discussion on the 
ill effects of petroleum, support is sometimes mobilised externally from 
foreign powers ready to help their cause. Moreover, the motives for foreign 
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power support vary and these may be linked directly to continuing access to 
valued resources as well as to their wider geopolitical concerns.  
 
Karl (2007) likewise contends that the resource “curse” is primarily a political-
economic phenomenon. She argues that the discovery of petroleum and the 
associated increase in value of the developing country’s assets precipitates 
unusually high levels of external interest and potential interference. In some 
cases, such as those already mentioned by Humphreys as well as more recent 
events in Iraq, actual political interference by foreign private interests and 
interested developed nations is potentially aimed at maintaining a significant 
major interest in, or complete control of, the petroleum resources of a country. 
It has to be said, however, that Humphreys is very cautious in identifying any 
actual intentions or potentially desired impact of the international actors in the 
cases he examines (Humphreys 2005, 533).  
 
Until scholars such as Humphreys and Collier began to bring into focus the 
effects of the international socio-political context and of international relations 
on the political stability of petro-states, there was low scholarly interest in 
their importance. This can be explained by the emphasis that early researchers 
placed purely on economics in studying the effect of petroleum on a country’s 
development (Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 
1999, 2001). This early focus on economics is also addressed by Karl, 
emphasising that resource-rich Western nations such as the Netherlands, UK, 
Norway, Sweden, USA and Australia for example, grew through the 
development of their natural sub-soil resources in an environment generally 
free of detrimental socio-political pressures. On the other hand, she points out 
those oil producers in Africa such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Angola 
and Sudan, were only beginning to establish themselves as nations in the late-
1970s and 1980s as they attempted to begin as petroleum-exporting states. 
That period was a time of restricted global economic activity and trade, 
resulting from tight US monetary policies. These policies had been introduced 
by the Federal Reserve in order to battle US inflation, irrespective of 
consequences to the global economy. As a result, the resource-rich countries 
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of Africa experienced dramatic drops in the price of their natural resources 
exports, sharp rises in export competition, as well as increases in the cost of 
borrowing and debt servicing (Bates 2010, 69-70). This global situation thus 
reflected on the internal situation and brought on hardships and socio-political 
competition for survival and for control and distribution of needed resources 
within the increasingly impoverished population of the resource-rich states.  
 
Le Billon (2005, 21-27) argues for a direct link between the health of the 
internal politics of an oil-rich state and the nature of its external influences. 
He suggests that conflict can occur at any stage of the development of a 
project, whenever a segment of the population considers itself to be at risk of 
missing potential advantages or losing existing advantages. Therefore, Le 
Billon contends that a section of the population must be aggrieved in order for 
outside influence to occur, having a reason or excuse to intervene on their 
behalf, using many examples from Papua New Guinea to the former Zaire. 
The outside influence is often the ex-colonial power waiting for an excuse to 
intervene, intent on gaining economic and political advantage out of the 
developing nation’s unhealthy internal state of affairs.  
 
Causality 
As the present research findings indicate, Le Billon, Basedau and others, 
repeatedly point to the profound influence of contextual and pre-existing 
internal and external conditions in determining whether natural resources will 
be detrimental or beneficial to a country’s socio-economic and political 
development. In the case of Mauritania, the historical and socio-political 
context of the country that preceded the arrival of the petroleum industry 
played a major role in shaping the country’s subsequent development in the 
post-colonial period.  
 
Basedeau proposed that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a “resource 
curse” (2005). While Le Billon borrowed the words of an Angolan journalist 
in order to reinforce his argument that political forces have greater weight than 
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resource abundance in determining whether a ‘windfall’ resource becomes a 
curse: 
 
It is fashionable to say that we are cursed by our mineral riches. That is 
not true. We are cursed by our leaders.262      
 
With the many circulating assumptions about political instability and natural 
resource causality, Clarke’s perspective is that it is important to evaluate the 
political and other mechanisms through which any purported “curse” may 
work and to base conclusions as to the existence of a “curse” on relevant 
empirical evidence. Clarke points out there are many cases of misidentified 
causality and that analyses that discount endogenous drivers behind socio-
economic and political changes, run the risk of blaming oil for all social, 
economic ills and political instability of an oil-rich country:  
 
The flaws of the most sophisticated curse theories have been further 
exposed in research by World Bank economists on Equatorial Guinea 
(often claimed to be a cause célèbre for evidence of accentuated 
malady). These studies concluded that pre-existent conditions were 
critical to any presence of the oil curse: in the case of Equatorial Guinea, 
its overall industry stood at <1% of GDP - hardly a candidate for 
deindustrialisation. There, it was found that the oil industry had fuelled 
structural transformation, income per head grew fast, added capacity 
emerged as oil value chain grew, net savings and investment expanded, 
state revenues and exports enlarged and capital formation improved, as 
did the technology coefficient in the economy. Meanwhile, poverty was 
eroded and oil development created huge potential for further poverty 
alleviation. Conclusion: the oil resource endowment and industry 
presence with the growth were an economic blessing.263 
 
However, Clarke also states, “Corruption remains…Anxiety remains about 
the management of the oil industry by political elites, [as well as] issues which 
surround presidents, families, ministers, [and] clans”264. Like Basedau, Clarke 
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argues that it is rare for the political issues of a country to be connected directly 
to the industry’s action, or of its corporate players.  
 
Summary 
Focusing on political instability at the elite level, the key point made in this 
chapter in evaluating the causal link between resource endowment and 
political instability of a resource-rich state is that a purely economic approach 
as in the early proponents of the “oil curse” is an inappropriate stance to adopt 
in the light of emerging evidence. Socio-political conditions have influence 
on resource development, but these conditions are also influenced by such 
developments. In spite of agency decision being taken by individual political 
elites, these decisions are guided ‘invisibly’ within the context of complicated 
socio-political structures that often have centuries-long histories and have 
developed their own particular institutional requirements and limits. Despite 
an apparent freedom of choice, elite power in the face of an emergent 
petroleum industry and its promises does not necessarily result in unbridled 
political warfare over wealth, or the promise of wealth. 
  
The debates around the oil curse, political development and instability 
demonstrate that it is not always the case that oil discovery and development 
is a politically destabilising force. If a short time perspective is taken, negative 
impacts of oil can be conceived, but a longer-term view of development in a 
resource-rich country, a petro-state, may demonstrate that problems can be 
overcome through appropriate development planning. The fact that political 
instability and conflict are found in countries without natural resource wealth 
suggests that such endowment is not a necessary condition for such instability 
and conflict. 
 
Lastly, the discussion centres on the role played by foreign participants in a 
country’s political process, and the interplay between foreign interference and 
domestic elites is examined. The approach stresses that unequal distribution 
of economic apportioning of resource revenues, and the resulting conflict over 
the appropriation of these, may lead to a call for foreign assistance by 
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belligerent parties. Taking a different perspective, Humphreys’ argument is 
that interested foreign actors and “greedy outsiders” could thus be regarded as 
“one and the same”, their interest being the maintenance of stable geopolitical 
relationships, the assurance of resource supplies for themselves or merely 
tipping regional strategic balance of power to their advantage. 
 
This chapter has shown that an immediate causal link made between natural 
resource endowment and socio-political instability is an error committed by 
many academics as well as non-academics. In the light of the above 
discussion, the next chapter looks more closely at the place of oil in the 
political development of Mauritania between 2001 and 2011 and the role it 
may have played in the country’s political instability over that period. 
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Chapter 6 – Mauritania and the “Oil Curse”  
 
The central argument of this chapter is that while the discovery and start-up 
of the petroleum sector played some role in the political events and 
developments in the 2001 to 2011 period, they were the outcome of a complex 
interplay of a number of contextual variables. These variables include 
individual elites, leadership styles, ideologies, cultural interplays, formal and 
informal institutions and Mauritania’s historical and contemporary 
geopolitical relations with other regional states and its former colonial master, 
France.  
 
Oil discovery and its potential development played some role in the political 
instability of the period but its importance should not be over-emphasised. 
Reviewing Mauritania’s political development prior to oil, political and social 
instability was primarily caused by an enduring and endemic search for the 
control of revenues and rent by various Bidân descent groups. However, the 
failure of oil to flow in significant quantities at Chinguetti from early 2007 
and thus for important revenues to be generated, did nevertheless contributed 
to political changes at that time. It did so in ways different to what some 
versions of the oil curse hypotheses put forward. It was the failure of the 
industry to deliver that affected government and political elite behaviour 
rather than windfall revenues. This behaviour, however, was rooted in 
Mauritania’s history and the socio-political institutions that had grown up over 
many decades, even centuries and channelled through the institutional 
structure of the modern state. Paramount among these behavioural traits was 
the endemic search for hegemonic power among competing Bidân descent 
groups. 
 
The chapter seeks to show that mono-causal explanations found in some 
versions of the oil curse hypothesis are too simple to capture the socio-political 
complexities of Mauritanian society. Most specifically, the research 
challenges Forster’s notion that the oil curse descended on Mauritania, as 
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suggested in his general observation of the consequences of oil for a society’s 
development. He states:  
 
The oil curse was a double-edged sword that eventually wounded rulers 
as well as the ruled. Increased state revenues fed the networks of 
corruption and patronage, while leading to growing public demands for 
a stake in the wealth that could not be met....265 
 
Foster’s specific observation suggests that revenues, which to present have 
proven to be ephemeral, had not reached the wider population and that this 
population, and especially the underprivileged Afro-Mauritanians and 
Haratin, had begun to be aware of its importance and were demanding a 
greater stake.  
 
Traditional and historical roots 
Political instability in Mauritania in the modern era should be assessed with 
an eye to its pre-colonial character and the environment and events that 
characterise the “proto-modern” sovereign state established in 1960. As 
previously discussed, Mauritania has a history of Maure domination. In 
Mauritania between 2003 and 2011, frustrated Bidân tribes staged “palace” 
coup d’états, and it was obvious to all that the Mauritanian state was unable to 
control wider civil unrest and violence.  
 
Prior to French colonial rule, in the region that became known as Mauritania, 
the population was subjugated through the dominant Bedouin structure of the 
Arab-Berber tribes. With French colonial rule, this tribal structure developed 
into a tributary-like distributary system that was embedded within the new 
sovereign state model. When the French departed, a Bidân-dominated regime 
remained in place and exhibited characteristics similar to pre-colonial 
patrimonial clientelism. In Mauritania, Maures continue to live sedentary 
existences under a modernised Bedouin system, which remains part of their 
cultural landscape, even if it is denied or unacknowledged by some Western 
                                                 
265 Foster 2011, page 88 
 Page 222 
 
observers (Bellow 2003, 5). As an example, in the past, razzias, or raids, had 
been carried out by the nomadic Bidân tribes on each other, as well as on the 
sedentary Black communities of the Senegal River valley. Aspects of the 
behavioural pattern of razzia continue in the modern context but in the form 
of rent seeking, embezzlement and at times more fraudulent behaviour by 
strongly positioned Bidân state elites and members of their entourage. Such 
blurring of the distinction between private and public spheres of activity is 
common in Mauritania where resources are distributed through both bone fide 
government activities and through embezzlement and privileged acquisition 
of rents. It should be noted that Mauritania ranks 119th out of 177 countries on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Index for 2013 
(http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/ results/ country#MRT), political 
corruption being just one of the parameters monitored. The index also takes 
into its calculation the private interests of political elites that influence public 
policies, and it attempts to measure the transparency and accountability that 
these leaders and the government that they control have towards the 
population they govern. 
 
The manner of distribution of resources adopted by the Mauritanian political 
elites, principally Bidân, has created a wide gap between rich and poor and a 
divide between privileged and underprivileged groups. The UNDP’s 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) for 2007 shows that almost 62% of the 
population at the time of the survey, lived in multi-dimensional poverty, 
including very poor levels of education, health and standard of living (UNDP 
Human Development Report, 2013). The divide is largely between Bidân 
tribes, on the one hand, and between Haratin and Afro-Mauritanians on the 
other, although there do exist economic and other inequalities within each of 
these groupings.  
 
When it became known that there were potential windfall revenues from the 
foreign petroleum industry’s activities in Mauritania, these inequalities were 
perceived by the lesser privileged and underprivileged to have worsened. 
Frustration and grievances were thus generated in disadvantaged individuals 
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in an environment of relative scarcity and conflict ensued with the 
mobilisation of previously silenced social forces, a situation comparable to 
that of oil-rich, pre-civil war Algeria of the 1980s (Lowi 2009, xiii).  
 
Coup after coup 
Coup d’états and government upheavals of various sorts had been part of the 
Mauritanian political landscape for many decades before the discovery of 
petroleum in 2001, and it is important to recap, the manner in which past 
presidents were chosen and relieved of their duties since independence.  
 
Ould Daddah had strained his country’s resources, brought the national army 
into disrepute and had nationalised French iron ore assets at a time this 
commodity was a significant lever in Mauritania’s relations with Europe. His 
overthrow was due to internal dissatisfaction among the ruling elites, but the 
ex-colonial power, France, is certainly believed by the majority of educated 
and uneducated Mauritanians to have played a major part in his removal. 
 
While the 1978 overthrow of Ould Daddah was aided by the French, it was 
precipitated by a need for Mauritania to extricate itself from the Western 
Sahara war. However, the two palace coups that ousted Ould Saleck and Ould 
Louly were driven largely by deep inter-tribal differences. These differences 
reflected the contrast of the ideas and customs, but also of the needs and wants, 
between warrior tribes from the north and east, and maraboutic tribes from the 
southwest. It is thus timely to recount Foster’s words to understand the 
mechanisms and objectives that formulated in the minds of these leaders: 
 
The state, an alien, adversarial entity constituted the most appetising 
prize, prompting tribes to compete over hijacking it and pillaging its 
resources for internal allotment…. the pretext of Assabiya [however] 
did not occur in the framework of a benevolent tribal welfare state…. 
As soon as a tribe allied sufficient forces to take over a wing of the 
government, it disintegrated in internal strife over its spoils, only to be 
taken over by another tribe with stronger internal cohesion… in a 
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cyclical mechanism of hostile takeovers termed predatory 
redistribution, redirecting national wealth to a handful of tribes.266   
 
The overthrow of Ould Haidallah in 1984 was precipitated through France’s 
intervention in order to counter the strong pro-Arab leanings increasingly 
demonstrated during his reign. It brought in Colonel Maaouya Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya to rule as President for 21 years until 3 August 2005, a rule 
marked by major socio-political upheavals, as well as political fraud, 
widespread embezzlement, corruption by the dominant Bidân tribal groups 
and continued ethnic dominance and exploitation of the Haratin and Afro-
Mauritanian segments of the population.  
 
Did oil play a part in the continued occurrence of coups? 
It is only towards the end of the reign of an increasingly autocratic and 
patrimonial President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya that the oil industry 
began to emerge as a potential prize for the ruling elites and their modern-day 
tributaries.   
 
The failed coup of 2003 against Taya was fuelled by traditional rivalries 
between warrior and maraboutic Bidân tribes, and was sparked by ex-Major 
Saleh Ould Hanenna’s personal resentment. It shook Taya but did not dislodge 
him. His close associates, Ely Mohamed Vall and Mohamed Abdel Aziz, 
however, saw the signs of a failing, long-enduring autocrat. Perhaps bolstered 
by, but certainly not solely motivated by the promise of oil revenues, Vall and 
Aziz resolved to ensure their continuity at the helm of power and abrogate any 
opportunity for adverse judgements concerning past crimes or embarrassing 
revelations of possible involvement in the “economic fiction” perpetrated by 
the Taya regime (Samuel 2011, 13).  
 
Bidân-Moroccan political analyst, part-time lecturer at the University of 
Nouakchott and Nouakchott journalist Mohamed Fouad Ould Barrada 
comments on the August 2005 overthrow of President Taya and the possibility 
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of a link with the nascent oil industry. He especially points out the continuity 
of the elite entourage around the president, but leaves the question hanging as 
to the significance and the implications of this situation:  
 
It indeed was a coup d’état.... As a researcher and a journalist, I think 
there may have been a link between the arrivals of oil in the state in 
2005 and the coup.  
 
There was an issue with oil arriving, this is what is often said. However, 
I cannot confirm it 100%.... I am just saying that there could have been 
a link between the coup and the discovery of oil, but it cannot be 
ascertained, as at the same time there was a build-up of anger and 
frustration in Mauritania.... As a journalist and analyst, I cannot confirm 
it. Indeed, I cannot confirm it... We are not able to consider uncertainties 
with this socio-political phenomenon... It must be inserted in its historic 
setting. There was a build-up of frustration in the population, there was 
anger and there were other problems. This was a power, you realise, 
that had lasted more than 20 years! 
 
I realised that in 2005. With Ely Mohamed Vall, it was in the same 
system – same people and same government as with Taya.  
 
In my view, he upheld his cousin [Abdel Aziz and joined the coup 
perpetrators] to avoid the settling of old scores [by the Afro-
Mauritanians that he mistreated in the course of the 1989-1991 ethnic 
upheaval] in the event that anyone else took the reins of the country. 
 
In the end, maybe he had not wanted to share [the spoils of government] 
with any others!267 Is it not General Abdel Aziz, his cousin, who carried 
out the “palace coup” of 2008?  
 
I am saying that the change was, “a door that opened and a door that 
closed”. Because it is the same people [that surrounded President Taya, 
were subsequently with Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall and] that are 
now “around” General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz... 
 
Yes it is the same, the same, the same people, but why? 
                                                 
267 Soon after the coup d’état of August 2005,  many elites in Nouakchott accused Ely Mohamed Vall  
     of pursuing his own interests, working to “enrich himself by taking over the mobile license from  
     Chinguitel and renegotiating the oil contracts” (Samuel 2013, 15) 
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There were other coups in the past, other attempted coup d’états, and 
well before the discovery of oil! 268  
 
The coup that ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya on 3 August 
2005 brought Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall to power, shadowed by his 
cousin then-Colonel Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. This period saw some 
positive socio-economic advances with the formation of a Petroleum Fund for 
future generations, as well as a signature of adherence to the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Index (EITI). Such moves helped to counterbalance 
claims made by dissidents in Mauritania, and some in the international 
community, of continuing fraud and embezzlement on the part of the ruling 
class during that period.  
 
The negative relations that the Junta developed with the petroleum industry as 
a result of the “Woodside Affair” and the growing dissatisfaction that 
Arabisation moves engendered in the general population, were, however, also 
characteristic of this period of “transitional rule”.  
 
The civilian elections of 11 March 2007 brought in Sidi Sheikh Ould 
Abdallahi, a seemingly weak puppet-president, but who was not as pliant as 
anticipated. In an environment of a troubled economy due to the failed 
materialisation of the anticipated post-2006 petroleum bonanza, added to 
which was the increasing pressures he was under to conform to the will of the 
military, the president fired several members of the army elites on 6 August 
2008, precipitating a coup which brought back military rule.  
 
Gaye Silly Soumaré sees no direct connection between oil and the coup, 
arguing that it was a grab for power. However, he also suggests that, in a 
reversal of an oil curse thesis, the lack of an expected oil bonanza contributed 
to a weakening of Abdallahi’s presidency: 
 
                                                 
268 Interview 27A with Mohamed Fouad Ould Barrada, 19 April 2011 
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Because the government lacked funds, Abdallahi cut salaries to 
government [employees and officials] and he dismissed military men 
from the government.... Money, meant to have flowed in from the 
production of 75,000 barrels per day, was missing [because flow rates 
had fallen at Chinguetti due to unforeseen technical problems].... By the 
time of Abdallahi’s presidency, it had fallen to less than 3,000 barrels 
per day.... This was nothing compared to what had been promised and 
what was expected.… Was the second overthrow of a civilian 
government [in 2008] due to the absence of oil? People did not talk 
about or mention oil.  
 
There is the fact that there was a General [Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz] 
who wanted total power and control… He “stood up” against the 
President [and overthrew him].269   
 
If the lack of oil revenues did contribute to political changes at that time, it 
could be argued with Gaye Silly Soumaré, that it did so in ways different to 
some versions of the oil curse. In the case of the fall of the Abdallahi regime, 
rather than a surfeit of revenues and an intensified scramble by governing 
elites and their opponents for those revenues, it was the failure of the oil 
industry to deliver which affected government’s ability to function. It deflated 
the ruling elite’s expectations of enhanced government largesse and enhanced 
these elites’ grievances and resentments, sharpening the rift between warriors 
and marabouts. In casually discussing the continuing regime of President 
Abdel Aziz with the researcher at an international convention in 2011, a highly 
placed, educated and well-travelled kinsman of the President, made the 
‘politically incorrect remark’ directed at the Marabout tribes from the 
southwest of the country: 
 
 “Ces marchands, ces commercants! On les a renversés, nous les 
guerriers! Ils ne sont plus rien, ces marchants ! Nous sommes les plus 
forts!” 270 
 
                                                 
269 Interview 11A with Gaye Silly Soumaré, 7 April 2011 
270 “These traders, these shopkeepers! We overthrew them, us warriors! They are nothing now these  
     traders! We are the strongest!” 
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The 18 July 2009 constitutional coup, for which General Abdel Aziz removed 
his uniform and replaced it with “suit and tie”, brought back a military man in 
civilian clothes through legitimate elections. Why did Abdel Aziz finally make 
this long-expected move for the presidency using all the manipulative and 
coercive power at his disposal via the powerful military machine? It was not 
a question of the failing petroleum industry or even its dwindling revenues 
stream. The fulfilment of personal ambitions was a real factor but depended 
upon the support of the Oualad Bousbaa tribe that sought to retain their power 
supremacy and business control.  
 
During the resurgence of relative economic scarcity with the sharp and 
unexpected 2007 downturn of petroleum revenues, Abdel Aziz sought to 
maintain political and social stability and hold off serious political 
mobilisations by marginalised Bidân, Haratin and Afro-Mauritanians who 
expected improved economic circumstances. He did this through an effective 
use of largesse in distributing everyday necessities and other favours. This was 
done through intelligent political manoeuvring and maintenance of the 
distributary regime that supported the Oualad Bousbaa, Smacides and Idawali 
at the top of the hierarchical tribal order. For example, President Aziz 
emphasising his care for the common people, mediatised his insistence on 
punishment for corrupt practices within the government being at the top of his 
agenda (US Department of State 2012, 27). Indeed, the law does provide 
criminal penalties for official corruption. However, the authorities seldom 
enforce such laws effectively as those in authoritative positions and doing the 
investigating are often related by tribal ties to those members of the powerful 
elites being investigated (op. cit, 25). Abdel Aziz’s moves to appeal to the 
masses were balanced by ensuring that his tribal relatives and collaborators 
were kept in high positions, keeping a tight rein on those who rule, but closing 
his eyes to what he considered small “dérapages”.  
 
The prospect of an oil bonanza led the dominant Bidân groups to tighten their 
grip on power by distancing themselves from smaller and less powerful tribal 
segments. However, this had the effect of increasing resentment among these 
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disfavoured Bidân tribes, and intensified the grievances among the other 
excluded communities of Afro-Mauritanians and Haratins.  
 
It must be noted, however, that “voracious” and “exclusionist” behaviours 
displayed in modern times and exemplified in what Samuel calls “financial 
anarchy and “economic fiction” (Samuel 2001, 9), have always been present 
in this economically and politically Maure-dominated region. As a high-level 
political elite and Bidân minister from Taya’s government pointed out in an 
anonymous interview, personal economic concerns were not the main factors 
that influenced the political upheavals prior to 2005. Rather, these upheavals 
were a result of intra-Bidân tribal struggles over which tribal segments would 
politically dominate the wider Mauritanian polity. However, it is important to 
note that obtaining political power gave the dominant tribal segments access 
to economic resources and the means to distribute them.   
 
Although lying outside the main period covered in this study, inter-Bidân 
struggles for power and control of the state apparatus continue to this day.  
For example, Isselmou Abdelkader, minister in the time of President Taya and 
long-time public servant since the mid-1970s, argues in the passage below that 
both inter-tribal rivalries and efforts to control the economic wealth of the 
country remain defining features of the political system in Mauritania.  
 
Beforehand, there were no economic interests in any of the coups…. 
Today [2011], there is an economic aspect that must be taken into 
consideration.... He who controls the state, controls the petroleum 
revenues from Chinguetti, the iron ore mine of Zouérat, the gold mine 
of Tasiast and the copper mine of Akjoujt.... Whoever carries out a coup 
today also has in mind the economic gains [that can be made] but must 
also have in mind intertribal links, interregional and economic links, as 
well as ethnic issues.… Those that carried out the coup against Ould 
Daddah [in 1978], did not think of the SNIM [iron ore mine] at the time. 
It was not important to them at all! 271  
 
                                                 
271 Interview 48A with Isselmou Abdelkader, 1 January 2012 
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Dr Niang, a Peulh entrepreneur exiled in France since the 1989 upheavals, 
summarises the situation and implies that economic issues did to some extent 
shape the pre-oil politics of the competing Bidân groups. He points out that 
the Bidân elites did not confine their activities to the political sphere, but 
branched out into business as the economic circumstances of the country 
changed. He stops short of attributing successive coups to oil, but sees it as a 
facilitating condition or catalyst: 
 
The Maures all became ship owners when they discovered that there 
was big money to be made in fish. With oil, it is the same; they “all” 
became oilmen. To answer your question, even if the enormous oil 
revenues [coming to the state] are not the principal goal of the coups 
that have recently occurred, they are a decisive catalyst272. The huge 
financial stakes created in a very short space of time between 2005 and 
2010 are enormous and up for grabs and the Bidân are watching [each 
other]...273  
 
Increasingly, there are public media accusations related to the president’s own 
tribe growing control of key government revenue sources, with the criticism 
that President Abdel Aziz was central in the three successful coups of 2005, 
2008 and 2009. For example, in March 2013, the online Mauritanian website, 
“Le Quotidien de Nouakchott” reported that the Council of Ministers had 
approved several new PSCs for Tullow Oil, the dominant foreign company in 
a much-awaited renewal of interest in Mauritania. Prominently noted was that 
the Tullow country representative, Kemal Ould Mouhamedou, is the cousin of 
the President (Le Quotidien, 21 March 2013). The French-based mining and 
petroleum industry analysts of “Africa Intelligence” likewise denounced the 
president’s entourage on their blog, “Insiders Mining” (2013): 
 
Since President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz came to power [as a 
civilian President] in 2009, a number of members of his Oualad 
Bousbaa tribe have obtained key posts in the Mauritanian 
                                                 
272 The enormity of the downturn in oil production from Chinguetti and therefore of oil revenues to  
      the government, had not yet been realised by the general public 
273 Interview 19A with Souleymane Niang, 14 April 2011 
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administration. Ahmed Salem Ould Tekrour [President Abdel Aziz’s 
nephew] formerly of Société Mauritanienne des Hydrocarbures 
(SMH)…has been promoted head of hydrocarbons at the Ministry of 
Petroleum, Energy and Mining. There was a similar promotion in 2010 
in the private sector for Melainine Ould Towmy, an Oualad Bousbaa 
who became head of external relations at Kinross, operator of the giant 
Tasiast gold mine, near the southern border of Western Sahara. Finally, 
Kemal Ould Mouhamedou, a cousin of President Abdel, has become 
the state representative at Tullow Oil, the company developing the 
Banda gas field.274   
 
Another comment from the Paris-based industry media group, Africa 
Intelligence, refers to dominant Bidân families seeking greater control over 
mining contracts: 
 
At the same time, numerous sub-contracts have been switched from 
companies, owned by members of the Smacides tribe of former 
president Maaouya Ould Taya, to Oualad Bousbaa entrepreneurs like 
the Azizi family. As a result, businessmen deprived of mining service 
contracts denounce the apparently unstoppable rise to prominence of 
figures close to the president.275   
 
These comments made in a widely circulated industry magazine suggest that 
the possibility of substantial future oil revenues is generating a scramble for 
positions of power. Thus, oil and other natural resources are likely to play a 
greater role in future domestic political development. However, no matter how 
close that relationship may become, it must be understood within the political 
and economic context of the development of Mauritanian society and its place 
within the political economy of regional and international relations. Central to 
that understanding remain the inter-tribal struggles that have pitted Bidân 
against Bidân elites for decades if not centuries, the transformation of Bidân 
cultural and material life over the past fifty years, especially the rapid 
urbanisation of the Bidân as a result of drought conditions in the 1960s and 
                                                 
274 Insiders Mining 2013 
275 “Insider’s Mining: Decision-makers business circles”; article created 4 February 2013  
     (www.africaintelligence/insiders/AMA/Mauritania/2013/02/04/mauritania--ouald--bou--sbaas--       
     deep--into--mining/ ) accessed 6 February 2013 
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1970s, the continuing economic and political tensions between the Bidân and 
settled black populations in the south of the country, and the changing role of 
Mauritania within the global economy.   
 
In the post-Taya period from 2005, petroleum has come to play a larger role 
in the elite politics of the country. These developments continue to unfold and 
the next section looks briefly at their main features. 
 
Geopolitics and Mauritanian oil: Post 2005 
The conflicts of 2003 and 2005 and the accompanying socio-economic 
instability caused by the palace coups of 2008 and 2009 damaged the 
international reputation of Mauritania. Beginning with the first successful 
coup in 2005, and the acrimonious relations between the Mauritanian 
government and Woodside, most small and larger companies departed the 
Taoudeni Basin and many stopped their operations in the coastal basin. 
However, because of Europe’s dependence on imported oil and gas, 
Mauritania continued to play a role in Europe’s geostrategic planning. In 2006, 
Gaz de France (GDF-Suez) announced an agreement with the then-Junta 
government of Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall to study the feasibility of a 
Liquid Natural Gas or LNG facility in Mauritania. Following the opening up 
of the gas-prone Taoudeni Basin in eastern Mauritania in 2006, several private 
and parastatal energy suppliers from Europe joined the rush to acquire permits. 
The companies included the German Wintershall and RWE, the Spanish 
Repsol, and the French company Total.  
 
The security of retaining several permits in Mauritania’s portion of the 
Taoudeni Basin by Total was bolstered by the successful military intervention 
of French troops in Mali from January 2013 in the reaffirmation of its 
involvement in security concerns in its Sahalian ex-colonies (Fessy, 2013). 
This could be regarded as a situation whereby France is reiterating its quasi-
territorial rights, retaining West Africa as its “chasse gardée”276. In early 
                                                 
276 Private hunting ground 
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2013, the Irish company Tullow Oil, guided by the President’s cousin, became 
interested in bringing the offshore Banda gas discovery to commercial 
production by 2016. This development-regenerated interest in Mauritania, but 
the project remains conditional on many factors, both commercial and 
political277 and recent press reports express disappointment with progress to 
date. Total has likewise recently increased its involvement in Mauritania and, 
following President Abdel Aziz’s “forced medical evacuation” to Paris in late 
2012, the company has acquired deep offshore permits close to Tullow’s, as 
has the American company, Kosmos Energy. The increased interest in 
Mauritania by sovereign foreign powers through involvement in the oil 
business is confirmed by several participants: 
 
You have witnessed how quickly the French recognised Aziz! 
Legitimising someone who has carried out a coup d’état! It is because 
they have interests here in the country. They have interest in our 
petroleum and our gas! Have you noticed how quickly and in what 
strength Total came back with the ascension of Abdel Aziz to power?278  
 
With the arrival to power of Abdel Aziz, it is Total that makes its 
appearance….It is Total!279  
 
 
Of course, of course there is a link [between political instability] and 
petroleum discovery! Nevertheless, it is also most certainly linked to 
the geostrategic interests of France and that of the USA.280  
 
Despite recent ventures entered into by Total in several countries of eastern 
Africa, the French government objective of maintaining its significant role in 
the affairs of its ex-colonies in Francophone Africa, is based on its 
requirements as a dominant but energy-dependent state to secure its 
geostrategic interest in oil and gas supplies and its access to essential natural 
                                                 
277 Tim O’Hanlon, Vice-President - African Business, Tullow Oil, personal communication, October   
     30, 2012  
278 Interview 07A with Ly Ciré, 6 April 2011 
279 Interview 32A with Mohamed Fall Ould Bah, 12 December 2011 
280 Interview 45A with Mohamed Ould Elabed, 26 December 2011 
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resources. The recent upheavals in Mauritania have been overtly used by the 
French government to maintain its political influence in the affairs of the 
region. Mauritania is a state that France sees as integral in achieving the 
strategic national objective of supplying natural resources “to the homeland”, 
and political instability in Mauritania caused by its newly discovered oil 
potential could threaten France’s own energy requirements. 
 
The Mauritanian public and the higher political elites involved in the 
opposition, as well as many in government, question the relationship that has 
developed between French authorities and President Abdel Aziz. They 
question the French authorities’ motives in retaining the purportedly 
convalescing President Mohamed (Ould) Abdel Aziz in Paris, 
incommunicado for over a month after allegedly being shot by an over eager 
soldier on 3 October 2012 (“Mauritanie: mais où est passé Aziz?” 2012). His 
lack of communication, verbal, visual or otherwise through official 
intermediaries  with Mauritania during his six weeks convalescence in Paris 
raised many questions, including that of France’s possible involvement in a 
foiled assassination attempt and Abdel Aziz’s subsequent docile regaining of 
a position within an African pantheon of authoritarian rulers under France’s 
control (Abdeljelil, 2013).    
 
Conclusion 
Claims made by some proponents of the oil curse hypothesis that a county’s 
anticipated and actual dependence on its natural resources inevitably leads to 
political instability is not fully supported by the analysis of petroleum in 
Mauritanian politics during the period 2001 to 2011. Rather, it has been 
argued that oil was but one of several political-economic factors that explain 
the several changes in elite power during the period.  
  
Political division and conflict have long been features of the tribal and multi-
ethnic society in Mauritania. Petroleum, or more accurately the promise of its 
revenues, acted as a contributory but not a decisive factor in the successful 
coups from 2003 to 2009. These coups and the associated political instability 
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that preceded and followed them were the product of many complexly related 
factors, as well as of the confluence of independent events. Some of the more 
important variables that influenced the flow of events in Mauritania in the 
period studied include the character of individual elites within the hierarchical 
Maure society as well as the leadership styles of various key Maure and non-
Maure players and their personal interactions. It also included the shifting and 
often tension-ridden relationships, channelled through formal and informal 
institutions, between these key people and the wider population.  
 
These domestic political changes were shaped by Mauritania’s historical and 
contemporary geopolitical relations with other regional states and its former 
colonial master, France, which played a strong role in guiding Mauritania’s 
development path between 2001 and 2011. 
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Chapter 7 – Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the research and their 
implications for future research, government policies and industry behaviour. 
The core theme of the study was the role played by the discovery of oil and 
the establishment of a petroleum industry in the political development of 
Mauritania from 2001 to 2011. The focus was the contribution of the oil 
industry to the political instability within government circles that 
characterised the period and the relevance of the oil curse hypothesis to the 
understanding of that political instability.  
 
It was argued that the discovery and prospective development of oil played a 
role in the political instability of Mauritania from 2001 to 2011, but that it was 
only one of many contributory factors. It was shown that the country’s 
political instability pre-dated the discovery of oil. At the core of this instability 
was, and still is, a political system dominated by the Bidân in which different 
factions and tribal segments vied for control of the state and other resources. 
Political instability manifested itself in the form of autocratic rule with regular 
and sometimes - albeit seldom - bloody changes in government, violence 
against various subordinate ethnic sections of the society seeking greater 
representation within the state, rising economic and political discontent among 
the general population and the corrupt practices of successive governments. 
Traditional formal and informal institutions rooted in Mauritania’s past had 
created fault-lines, divisions and hierarchical relationships between tribes and 
ethnicities, which shape the behaviour of leaders, elites and individuals 
operating within a neopatrimonial281 socio-political system. Oil acted as a 
lesser catalyst for the political struggles that characterised the period under 
study, rather than playing a determinative or more decisive role. 
 
In reviewing the wider political and other literature on oil and political 
instability, it was shown that there are diverse theories and approaches on the 
                                                 
281 Refer to footnote 4, page 22 
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nature of the relationship between them. The best-known approach is that of 
the oil curse hypothesis, which posits a strong relationship between the 
discovery and development of oil and political instability. This approach has 
been disputed by several writers who argue that the causal roots of political 
conflict and instability in contemporary African states lie in  an historical 
legacy derived from colonialism, the failure of the state to build a legitimate 
imagined national community, the persistence and promotion of sub-national 
ethnic and tribal identities, and a record of uneven economic development in 
which natural resource exploitation was one of several politically destabilising 
factors. These writers have recognised that the discovery of petroleum has 
contributed to political instability but that it is important to locate oil’s role 
within the wider historical and political-economic context of the country’s 
development.    
 
The study began by presenting a broad general historical account of the pre-
colonial and colonial context of Mauritania’s emergence as an independent 
post-colonial state in 1960. Particular attention was devoted to showing that 
political instability in the country pre-dated the discovery of oil in the 1990s. 
This was followed by a detailed examination of the early oil development 
period from 2001 to 2007 in which the Australian multi-national corporation, 
Woodside, was the key player on the industry side.   
 
In doing so, emphasis was placed on the voices of those involved directly and 
indirectly in Mauritanian politics during the post-oil discovery period. These 
included senior politicians and bureaucrats associated with various 
governments and the wider largely Bidân communities that provided the bulk 
of political leadership since independence. It also included oil executives, 
some opposition politicians and ordinary citizens of the country.   
 
The researcher was initially sceptical that oil played any role in Mauritania’s 
socio-political problems. However, participants’ comments and further 
research pointed to a more complex relationship between oil and political 
change. The majority of those interviewed, which included senior government 
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officials at the time, discerned a weak link between petroleum and political 
instability but all considered coups as endemic to Mauritania and pre-dated 
the discovery of oil. Very few attributed Mauritania’s problems to the 
discovery and development of petroleum, although there was some variation 
in responses as to the strength or weakness of the link. 
  
The main conclusion of the research was that the root causes of Mauritania’s 
political instability lie in the historical and present-day interaction between the 
traditional, segmentary Bidân tribal cultures and their constant struggle to 
retain political domination over the Haratin and Afro-Mauritanian population 
within a colonially imposed state system. The key manifestations of this 
interaction were shown to be the power struggles between rival Bidân tribal 
groups, led by competent and sometimes charismatic individuals within a 
society containing a formal, outsider-imposed system and an equally strong 
system of Bidân affinity and solidarity, termed Assabiya. The Bidân tribal 
society was shown to have evolved for over a millennium to survive in a harsh 
and unforgiving desert environment, and that the key elements of that society 
continued to evolve and adapt to the demands of modern urban living in 
Mauritania. The Bidân and the affiliated Haratin were shown to continue to 
follow many traditional, unwritten principles in their daily lives rooted in the 
Bedouin system, or as discussed in Chapter 3, the system of “those that live in 
the desert”, the root meaning of the word “Bedouin”. It was argued that the 
sub-national loyalties of the Bidân were based around the control of particular 
and shifting territories in which changing alliances, systems of lineage and 
clan-based reciprocities and the razzia, a system of organised raiding, was a 
central tactic of political control and expansion.  
 
While Bidân culture and their suite of traditional political tactics and 
institutions have their origins in centuries of pre-colonial desert living, their 
practices had evolved and adapted to changing political, economic and 
ecological circumstances. The practice of razzias for example, evolved and 
adapted to the modern setting and was given a new means of institutional 
expression in inter-tribal political struggles for administrative power and 
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ethnic domination. When elected or nominated state leaders found themselves 
in dispute with elite Bidân leaders, they were subject to political pressures that 
included internal re-shuffling of government and other positions, coups and 
more extreme forms of violence in some instances.  
 
In addition to the domestic struggles for power, direct intervention by 
interested foreign powers played a major role in the coups that have 
overthrown all political leaders in Mauritania since independence in 1960. 
France’s direct assistance with the overthrow of the first president, Ould 
Daddah, as well as their involvement in the ending of Colonel Haidallah’s 
reign, are just two examples of France’s influential position.  
 
However, it was argued that neither the development of oil resources nor the 
interactions of the nascent industry with the Mauritanian government and its 
citizenry were root causes in creating the country’s social and political 
instability from 2001 to 2011. At most, the petroleum industry provided yet 
another opportunity for rent seeking by the powerful political and business 
elites. In taking this position, the study rejected the populist “oil curse” works, 
such as those of Shaxson, Maass and Ross who relied on a somewhat crude 
idea of an almost mechanical relationship between oil and political 
development. Rather, it was argued that in order to understand resource 
politics, a more nuanced and specific analysis of the domestic and regional 
historical social, political and economic environment of the country under 
study is required. 
 
Future research directions 
The present study focused largely on elite Bidân politics. It pointed to a 
multiplicity of links between socio-political instability and unemployment, 
poverty, socio-political exclusion, marginalisation and ethnicity, all of which 
are rooted in Mauritanian history. Future research needs to take a wider 
societal view and include greater emphasis on the politics of expectation and 
resentment among the large numbers of less politically and economically 
powerful sections of the population, including the Haratin and Afro-
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Mauritanians, the urban residents outside Nouakchott, rural dwellers as well 
as foreign participants in private and parastatal petroleum companies. There 
are signs of growing opposition among the non-Bidân political and economic 
opposition to Bidân rule. There remains in Mauritania a key fault line between 
Afro-Mauritanians and the Bidân, in which the ambiguous ethnic-cum-class 
positioning of the Haratin is likely to play a greater role in the coming years. 
The Bidân or white Maures have been relatively successful in manipulating 
ethnic and other allegiances to retain a stranglehold on power but this may 
change in the future. 
 
A second fruitful future line of inquiry suggested by the study is a comparison 
of the experience of Mauritania with other oil-rich countries in the region and 
in Africa in general. Such a comparison will allow a clearer identification of 
the specific configuration of political and economic circumstances that have 
shaped the relationship between oil and political instability in Mauritania. It 
will also provide a means of identifying what Mauritania shares in common 
with other oil-rich states and thus contribute to a more theoretically rich 
analysis of the political economy of resource development in Africa and 
beyond. Such a comprehensive study of other newly oil-rich African and other 
countries and their political environment would complement the knowledge 
generated by the present research. Patterns and trends of political and social 
circumstances in relation to natural resources and generated wealth or promise 
of wealth may emerge that would extend and refine our understanding of the 
theoretical relevance of the “oil curse” theory as it relates to present-day 
Mauritania. 
 
Implication for the practices and procedures of the petroleum industry 
The study devoted considerable space to an examination of the relationship 
between Woodside and the Mauritanian polity. It was observed that Colonel 
Ely Mohamed Vall strongly criticised the actions of several Woodside 
employees, contractors and advisers, considering them to have acted 
inappropriately in their dealings with the Mauritanian government of the time. 
It was suggested that several of these individuals, who constituted the face of 
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Woodside in Mauritania, misjudged the sophistication and strategic business 
acumen of the Bidân with whom they were dealing at all levels of operations.  
 
The study was unable to provide definitive evidence of major graft and 
corruption in Woodside’s dealings with the government, although it is highly 
likely that some extra-legal collusion did occur at times between individuals 
on both sides to facilitate day-to-day business. Mauritanian political culture 
shares much in common with other neo-patrimonial states in Africa where 
traditional distributive practices clash with modern systems of legal-rational 
bureaucratic rationality. Such practices favour those with political-cum-kin-
based affiliations to political and economic leaders.   
 
Woodside’s lack of appreciation of the importance of a deeper understanding 
of local business practices was evident at all levels of operations, including 
board and management. For example, the expatriate workforce consisted of 
virtually no French or Arabic speakers. This serious limitation should have 
been resolved at the very beginning of onsite operations. 
 
On a broader level as a company, Woodside approached operating in 
Mauritania without first having acquired basic knowledge of what it might be 
like to work within a society dominated by deeply rooted tribal affinities and 
inter-tribal competition within a wider national context of clashing sub-
national loyalties. Although the broader operational plant and personnel 
security concerns were very likely adequately covered by Woodside’s 
Security Department, a major blindspot was the lack of awareness surrounding 
intercultural relations.  
 
The company was ill prepared for dealing with entrenched nepotism, 
paternalism, and rent-seeking and other seemingly self-serving behaviour of 
Mauritanian elites. It is not surprising, then, that Woodside personnel found it 
difficult if not impossible to ensure that Mauritanians followed what they 
regarded as proper legal and administrative procedure. Thus, at the policy 
level, it is important that companies operating in differing political and 
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cultural environments provide training to their staff in the wider history and 
cultural developments of the countries and regions in which they work. 
 
Implication for the policies of Mauritania 
The study has argued that oil development has played more of a catalytic than 
causative role in Mauritania’s political instability in the 2001 to 2011 period. 
However, it is also important to recognise that political instability itself can 
play a major role in deterring foreign investment, as was evident after the 
ethnic conflict of 1989-1991. There are obvious lessons in this for the ruling 
groups in Mauritania who must make greater efforts to provide greater security 
and predictability for foreign investors if they seek to ensure a steady and more 
durable flow of investment. Prospective foreign investors must be encouraged 
to see the country as having a stable and viable business environment with 
durable terms and reliable local partners. 
 
Unfortunately, in the last two years, Mauritania’s membership in the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been suspended. This 
is not good for its profile in the international investment community. 
Adherence to the demands of the EITI regulations for timely, accurate and 
transparent reporting of resource expenditures and revenues must be restored.  
 
Today, following the general downturn of business activity caused by 
Woodside’s departure in late 2007, there remains the potential for a renewal 
of petroleum activity and for oil revenues to contribute significantly to the 
development of the country. Tullow Oil’s website282 attests to the fact that the 
company, unlike the majority of firms that have felt the country since 2007, is 
working to bring the Banda gas discovery “on stream” by 2016. 
 
Such a renewal can result in benefits for the population of Mauritania but it 
must take place within a political system that is more responsive to the needs 
of the wider population. This will require a much greater openness of the 
                                                 
282 www. tullowoil.com  
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institutions of government and the state to members of the subordinate ethnic 
communities who are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with ‘politics-as-
usual’. It also means that investment decisions, whether in natural resources 
or other sectors of the economy, do not simply favour those with the ear of 
government. This study has shown what can happen when a ruling elite is 
determined to retain its political and economic hold over the majority of the 
population. Perhaps this is the main curse that Mauritania needs to overcome 
if it is to prosper. 
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Acronyms and Terms 
 
  Description283 
Abd  Abd means "servant of" or "slave of" as in 
Abdallah or "servant of God" or Abdelkader or 
"servant of the leader". 
Abid This is a Hassaniya word meaning "black". 
Note the similarity with the word meaning 
"servant" or "slave". 
Afro-Mauritanian This term denotes Mauritanians of pure and 
mixed black African descent, principally Peulh 
but also Soninké, Wolof and Bambara. They 
commonly speak French and the language of 
their ethnic group. Some of the more educated 
also know Hassaniya, but do not openly speak 
it. The term is often used interchangeably with 
'Peulh'. 
AGIP AGIP is a former Italian automotive gasoline, 
Diesel, LPG, lubricants, fuel oil, and bitumen 
retailer established in 1926. It is a subsidiary of 
the multinational petroleum company Eni, one 
of the ten largest oil companies in the world 
Ahmed Hamza Hamza is an influential mayor of Nouakchott. 
Ahmed Ould Daddah Ahmed Ould Daddah, born 7 August 1942, is a 
Mauritanian economist, politician and civil 
servant. He is the half-brother of Moktar Ould 
Daddah, first President of Mauritania, and like 
him belongs to the Marabout Oualad Béiri 
tribe. He is currently the President of the Rally 
of Democratic Forces (RFD) and was 
designated as the official leader of the 
opposition parties (COD) following the 2007 
presidential election, which he lost to Sidi Ould 
Cheikh Abdallahi. 
AMOCO Amoco Corporation, commonly known as 
AMOCO, is a multinational chemical and oil 
company, founded in 1889. AMOCO's 
contribution to our modern industry includes 
two essential innovations: the gasoline tanker 
truck and the drive-through filling station. 
                                                 
283 Descriptions sourced principally online from Wikipedia  
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AMOCO was merged into British Petroleum 
(BP) in the 1990s.  
Arabisation Arabisation describes growing cultural 
influence on a non-Arab population that 
changes into one that speaks Arabic and 
incorporates Arab culture and Arab identity. It 
was most prominently achieved during the 7th 
century Arabian Muslim conquests that spread 
the Arabic language, culture, and the religion 
of Islam to the lands they conquered. 
Arabisation in Mauritania is a government-
sponsored move for the whole of the 
Mauritanian community, irrespective of 
ethnicity. It requires all to speak Arabic and 
adopt Arab culture. It was tried several times 
and failed as a result of strong protest by the 
30% of non-Hassaniya speaking Afro-
Mauritanians.  
Assabiya  Assabiya refers to social solidarity with an 
emphasis on unity, group consciousness and 
sense of shared purpose, and social cohesion. 
The term is generally analogous to solidarity. 
However, the term is often negatively 
associated because it can sometimes suggest 
loyalty to one's group regardless of 
circumstances, or partisanship. 
ASX ASX stands for the Australian Securities 
Exchange. 
Bambara The Bambara are also Mandé people, primarily 
living in Mali where they are the dominant 
Mandé group with 80% of the population 
speaking the Bambara language, as well as 
Guinea, Burkina Faso and Senegal, with only a 
small number living in Mauritania. 
Beni Hassan The Beni Hassan warrior tribes migrated from 
the Southern Arabian peninsula into North 
Africa around the 15th century. They reputedly 
were responsible for finally driving most black 
inhabitants from the northern and central 
region of what is now Mauritania, southwards 
to the Senegal River Valley, taking many into 
slavery. They subjugated the Berber tribes, 
permanently defeating them in 1674 after a 
thirty-year war at Char Bobba, imposing 
themselves at the apex of the newly established 
Maurish social hierarchy that survives today. 
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The Berber tribes became tributaries to the 
Arab conquerers, many "giving up the sword 
for the Book" and became the bearers of 
religion. Berbers are lighter-skinned then the 
Arabic Beni Hassan and, as lighter skinned 
women were preferred by the conquerers, 
much intermarriage occurred. The rift between 
the religious Berber tribes and warrior tribes of 
purer Arabic blood is, however, still a character 
of the society that many still feel today. 
Berber The Berbers are an ethnically diverse group 
that inhabited the northwestern region of 
Africa, most especially along the 
Mediterranean coast. The diverse ethnicities 
that may have contributed to their genetic 
lineage are invaders that came from the north 
through the Iberian peninsula or from the 
regions bordering the northern and eastern 
shores of the Mediterranean Sea, interbreed 
with local and original, black African 
inhabitants. 
Bidân Or 'Beydanes' are self-denominated 'white' 
Hassaniya-speaking Maures. They continue to 
regard themselves principally as divided into 
religious or Marabou tribes and Beni Hassan or 
warrior tribes. Each tribe or grouping of tribes 
regard itself as descendant from a common 
ancestor responsible for the formation of the 
lineage, and it is often deemed, correctly or 
invented, as the Prophet himself. In addition, 
there are 'small' (insignificant) tribes of artisans 
(M'allmin) and entertainers (Igawen). A Bidân 
approached to participate in the present 
research refused to do so because he was "... a 
small man, with a small job from a small tribe, 
and he did not have any knowledge". He was 
from a minor tribe of entertainers and his 
humbleness contrasted greatly with those of the 
many 'warriors' and 'marabous' encountered in 
government and business settings in 
Mauritania. 
'Big' nomads "Big" or "Grand" nomads are so named by the 
Maures, because of their nomadic life roaming 
over vast territories of northern, desert 
Mauritania. They were principally of brown-
skinned Arab descent, intermixed with Berber 
and black African ancestors.  
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Biram Dah Abeid Biram Dah Abeid's paternal grandmother was 
a slave and his father was freed at birth. He is 
thus a Hartani human rights activist. He 
founded the movement "Initiative for the 
Resurgence of Abolitionists" (IRA- 
Mauritania), fighting against slavery in 
Mauritania. In 2013, he received the United 
Nations Front Line Award for Human Rights 
Defenders at Risk from the Irish NGO Front 
Line Defenders. 
Brakna Brakna is a region in southwest Mauritania. Its 
capital is Aleg. Another major city is Boghé, 
where racial confrontations resulted in the 
death of a Peulh student in 2011 at the 
beginning of the latest controversially executed 
government census. The Senegal River runs 
along the region's border with Senegal. 
Following the events of 1989, many Afro-
Mauritanian natives from the Brakna were 
forced into exile to Senegal. 
Bretton Woods' institutions  The Bretton Woods system of monetary 
management established the rules for 
commercial and financial relations among the 
world's major industrial states in the mid-20th 
century. The Bretton Woods system was the 
first example of a fully negotiated monetary 
order intended to govern monetary relations 
among independent nation-states. Preparing to 
rebuild the international economic system 
while World War II was still raging, all 44 
Allied nations gathered at the Mount 
Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, United States, for the United 
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, 
also known as the Bretton Woods Conference 
and signed the Bretton Woods Agreement, 
setting up a system of rules, institutions, and 
procedures to regulate the international 
monetary system and established the  
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), which today is part of 
the World Bank Group. These institutions 
became operational in 1945. The chief features 
of the Bretton Woods system were an 
obligation for each country to adopt a monetary 
policy that maintained the exchange rate by 
tying its currency to the U.S. dollar and for the 
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IMF to bridge temporary imbalances of 
payments. On 15 August 1971, the United 
States unilaterally terminated convertibility of 
the US$ to gold. This ended the Bretton Woods 
system. 
CAP The "Coalition for pacific Alternation" is one 
of the major political parties running in the 
present legislative elections. In these elections 
will be selected the 218 municipal councils and 
147 deputies who will sit in the National 
Assembly for the next five years. Prominent 
members are Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, 
Boïdiel Ould Houmeit, Abdel Salem Ould 
Horma. 
CAQDAS software Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data 
AnalysiS (CAQDAS) is the use of computer 
software to aid qualitative research such as 
transcription analysis, coding and text 
interpretation, recursive abstraction, content 
analysis, discourse analysis. 
Chinguetti Oilfield The Chinguetti oilfield is an oil field located off 
the Mauritanian coast in 800 m water depth. 
Discovered by the ELIXIR, HARDMAN, 
WOODSIDE and AGIP joint venture 
consortium in late May 2001, it is named after 
the city of Chinguetti. Originally estimated at 
123 million barrels, it is significant as the first 
commercial discovery of oil in the country, 
opening a new region for offshore petroleum 
exploration. Production of 75,000 barrels per 
day began in 2006, but declined rapidly after 
the start of production due to geological 
complexity. By November 2006 daily 
production has fallen as low as 3,000 barrel per 
day, but subsequently steadied at some 8,000 
barrels per day, enough to make it marginally 
economic. It is expected to continue production 
until 2015 at which time it will be 
decommissioned and abandoned. 
Christine Milne Christine Anne Milne (born 14 May 1953) 
became leader of the Greens in the Tasmanian 
Parliament and the first female leader of a 
political party in Tasmania when Bob Brown 
stood down in 1993 to contest the federal 
election. She is now an Australian Senator and 
has been leader of the parliamentary caucus of 
the Australian Greens since April 2012. 
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CNRS/CERI CNRS stands for National Centre of Scientific 
Research, a French government-funded and 
Paris-based research institute renowned for its 
ground-breaking work on many fronts. CERI, 
the International Centre for Research, is a 
government-funded think-tank of which some 
50% of its members are also CNRS members. 
CERI members often provide expertise as 
consultants to ministries, parliamentary 
committees, international organisations and 
private companies.  
COD "Coordination de l'opposition democratique" 
or the "Mauritanian Opposition for 
Democracy" is a coalition of fourteen 
opposition parties headed by the president of 
the RFD party, Ahmed Ould Daddah, brother 
of the first president of Mauritania. 
Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, born 1953 in 
Nouakchott, is a political and military figure, 
as well as a wealthy businessman in 
Mauritania. He served as the transitional 
military leader of Mauritania following the 
coup d'état in August 2005 until 19 April 2007 
when he relinquished power to an elected 
government. He was a long-time ally of 
President Maaouya Ould Taya, and 
participated in the December 1984 coup that 
brought Taya himself to power. Prior to the 
2005 coup, he had been director of the national 
police force, the Sûreté Nationale, since 1987. 
On 3 August 2005, Taya was ousted in a 
bloodless military coup by a group of officers. 
These took power as the Military Council for 
Justice and Democracy and announced that 
Vall was the head of the council. He did not 
take the title of President because he said it 
should be reserved for elected leaders. 
Colonel Mohamed Abdel Aziz Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, born 20 December 
1956, is the President of Mauritania at time of 
writing. A career soldier and high-ranking 
officer, he was a leading figure in the August 
2005 coup that deposed President Maaouya 
Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya. In August 2008, he led 
another coup toppling the elected civilian head 
of the country, President Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi. Following the 2008 coup, Abdel 
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Aziz became President of the High Council of 
State. He resigned from that post in April 2009 
in order to stand as a candidate in the July 2009 
presidential election, which he won in what 
many describe as a constitutional coup d'état. 
He was sworn in on 5 August 2009 and is due 
for re-election in 2014. 
Cost Oil Cost Oil is the portion of produced oil that the 
operator retains on an annual basis to recover 
certain costs that have been incurred in 
exploration and production, as defined and 
specified within a PSC and agreed to by the 
host government that passed the PSC as law. 
Convenience sampling Convenience sampling is a non-probability 
sampling technique where subjects are selected 
because of their convenient accessibility and 
proximity to the researcher. 
Democracy Democracy is a form of government in which 
all eligible citizens participate equally - either 
directly or through elected representatives - in 
the proposal, development and creation of 
laws. It encompasses social, economic and 
cultural conditions that enable free and equal 
participation by all eligible citizens. Several 
variants of democracy exist, but there are two 
basic forms, both of which concern how the 
body of all eligible citizens executes its will. 
One form of democracy is direct democracy, in 
which all eligible citizens have direct and 
active participation in the decision making of 
the government. In the other form of 
democracy, called representative democracy, 
the whole body of eligible citizens remain the 
sovereign power but political power is 
exercised indirectly through elected 
representatives. The concept of representative 
democracy arose in western Europe largely 
from ideas and institutions that developed 
during the European Middle Ages, the 
Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment, and 
the American and French Revolutions and 
many of its characteristics are not immediately 
applicable to African social and political 
environments. 
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Elite An elite in political and sociological theory, is 
a small group of people who control a 
disproportionate amount of wealth or political 
power. The basis for power elite membership is 
institutional power, namely an influential 
position within a prominent private or public 
organisation. An elite is a selected person, 
superior in terms of abilities or qualities to the 
rest of a group or society. In pre-colonial and 
colonial times, it denoted individuals who were 
selected or stood out for their inner abilities and 
capabilities, most especially in academic 
achievement. Today, the term has altered to 
mean people who have the most wealth or 
status in a society and are thus the most 
powerful group acting individually or in unison 
to maintain their position in society. 
Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd ELIXIR was a private, Perth-based oil 
exploration company founded by the 
researcher in 1998. It was bought out in June 
2001 by ROC Oil Company Limited on the 
discovery of the Chinguetti Oilfield for a return 
on investment of some 3200% for the 
shareholders of ELIXIR. 
Ethnicity Ethnicity or ethnic group is a socially defined 
category of people who identify with each 
other based on a shared social experience or 
ancestry. Membership is associated with 
shared cultural heritage, ancestry, history, 
homeland, language (dialect) or ideology, and 
with symbolic systems such as religion, 
mythology and ritual, cuisine, dressing style, 
physical appearance, etc. It is an important way   
by which people may identify themselves or by 
which they may be identified with a larger 
group. 
First Oil The term usually refers to the date on which the 
first barrel of oil is recovered from a newly 
producing oilfield. 
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FLAM The African Liberation Forces of Mauritania 
(in French: Forces de Libération Africaines de 
Mauritanie, or FLAM) is an Afro-Mauritanian 
paramilitary organisation primarily made up of 
Peulh. It was co-founded in 1983 by Ibrahima 
Moctar Sarr as tensions increased between 
Bidân and Afro-Mauritanians after severe 
political instability and a controversial land 
reform was enacted in 1981. The group 
endorsed, but did not initiate, a violent 
overthrow of the regime, and was quickly 
outlawed. In 1986, it published the Manifesto 
of the oppressed black Mauritanian, which 
detailed government discrimination, and 
demanded the overthrow of the Maurish elite 
rulers. Its main areas of strength were and still 
are in the southern areas of the country and 
especially among the Harpulaar population. 
Following the coup d'état of Col. Ely Mohamed 
Vall in August 2005, the transitional junta 
stated the government would handle the 
continuing question of resettlement of 
refugees. Following a recent rapprochement 
initiated by President Abdel Aziz, a reformist 
wing of the FLAM (FLAM-Renovation) split 
off from the main organization and its leader 
has returned to Mauritania in October 2013, in 
order to participate in Mauritania's political 
transition. 
Foreign Direct Investment or  FDI Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the direct 
investment into production or business in a 
country by an individual or company of another 
country, either by buying a company in the 
target country or by expanding operations of an 
existing business in that country. It is in 
contrast to portfolio investment, which is a 
passive investment in the securities of another 
country such as stocks and bonds. In a narrow 
sense, foreign direct investment refers to 
building new facilities, but more broadly, it 
includes "mergers and acquisitions, building 
new facilities, reinvesting profits earned from 
overseas operations and intra company loans". 
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GDP Gross domestic product is the market value of 
all officially recognised final goods and 
services produced within a country in a year, or 
other given period. On a per capita basis, GDP 
is considered an indicator of the standard of 
living of a country, although it does not give 
the distribution across the population and in a 
segmented society can give a distorted 
impression of the general wealth of a 
community. 
Hardman Resources Limited HARDMAN was a public ASX-listed 
company valued at some AUD 6 million at the 
time of entering into the Mauritanian joint 
venture with ELIXIR in 1996. It was absorbed 
by TULLOW Oil plc in 2005 for an estimated 
AUD 1.47 billion. 
Hartani (pl. Haratin) The Haratin or 'black' Maures are the freed-
slaves and descendants slaves of black African 
ethnic groups raided by Bidân since their 
arrival in the 8th century. They were Arabised; 
they lost knowledge of their ethnic roots, speak 
mostly Hassaniya and consider themselves of 
Arab descent. They constitute some 40% of 
Mauritania's population and, because of that, 
the Bidân fear their rapprochement to the Afro-
Mauritanian community and the end of the 
socio-political hegemony of the 'white' Maures. 
Hassaniya Hassaniya is an Arabic dialect originally 
spoken by the Beni Hassan Bedouin tribes that 
migrated into northwestern Africa and 
extended their authority over most of 
Mauritania and Western Sahara between the 
15th and 17th centuries. 
Idawali This is a "grand nomad" Maure supertribe 
originally inhabiting the region of Tagant in 
central Mauritania. Historically, after settling 
in the region of north Africa, the members of 
this tribe became able traders and merchants, 
also controlling several of the great caravan 
arteries along which goods moved north and 
south across the Sahara. Aligning themselves 
with the Smacides in the 1980s, the Idawali 
have grown in economic and political 
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importance since then. They have lost some 
political ground since 2008, with the stricter 
reign of President Mohamed Abdel Aziz, but 
their continuing economic strength is reflected 
by the growing economic importance of the 
BCI Bank throughout West Africa, ably lead by 
its president, Isselmou Ould Didi Ould 
Tajedine. 
Idouaich  A supertribe in southern Mauritania 
Inal Inal is a hamlet 255 km from Nouadhibou 
along the train line from Zouérat. In 1990, a 
detention camp was set up at the military base 
about a kilometre to the west of Inal. There 
some 550 military and civilian Afro-
Mauritanians, principally Peulh were  held, 
tortured and executed by Bidân military 
personnel, documented by the sole escapee 
Mahamadou Sy in "L'enfer d'Inal - Mauritanie: 
L'horreur des camps", 2000 L'Harmattan: 
Paris. 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania As an Islamic state, Mauritania has adopted 
Islam as the foundation for its political 
institutions and laws, but this application is 
moderate and it has not fully implemented the 
Islamic Khilafah ruling system, instead partly 
embodying French and western regulations in 
its body of laws. 
"La Baule" Franco-African 
Summit speech by President 
Mitterrand, June 1990 
 
  
Responding to a democratic movement in 
Africa after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, 
François Mitterrand made his La Baule speech 
in June 1990 that tied development aid to 
democratic efforts from former French 
colonies. Seeing an "East wind" blowing in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, he 
stated that a "Southern wind" was also blowing 
in Africa, and that state leaders had to respond 
to the populations' wishes and aspirations by a 
"democratic opening", which included a 
representative system, free elections, 
multipartism, freedom of the press, an 
independent judiciary, and abolition of 
censorship. Claiming that France was the 
country making the most important effort 
concerning development aid, he announced 
that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
would henceforth receive only grants from 
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France, as opposed to loans, in order to combat 
the massive increase of Third World debt 
during the 1980s. He criticised interventionism 
in sovereign matters, which was according to 
him only another form of "colonialism". 
However, according to Mitterrand, this did not 
imply lessened concern on the part of Paris for 
its former colonies.  
Lobby The dictionary definition is "a group of people 
seeking to influence legislators on a particular 
issue". In Mauritania, a lobby takes one 
particular political meaning, indicating a group 
of like-minded business and political elites that 
strive to influence the government to pass laws 
and regulations that give advantage to its 
members (rent seeking). 
Mahfoud Ould Bettah Minister of Justice in the Taya regime, he 
became Director General of the Ministry of 
Justice in 2005 after Taya's overthrow. He 
presently serves as President of the Bar in 
Mauritania. He was one of the seventeen 
lawyers assigned to the "Woodside Affair" in 
2006 by Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall. Like Ely 
Mohamed Vall, he is also an active and 
influential participant in the COD, as well as an 
aspiring contender in the upcoming 2014 
presidential election. He was also Director 
General of the Ministry of Justice in 2005, and 
is presently President of the Bar.  
Manifesto of the Oppressed Black 
Mauritanian 
The Manifesto of the Oppressed Black 
Mauritanian was published in April 1986 by 
the FLAM. It details racial discrimination in 
Mauritania against the Black Africans by the 
Arabophone Bidân minority. The document 
was in French, and principally targeted the 
sympathy of non-Mauritanian audiences. It 
focuses on the discrimination against Black 
African Mauritanians by the minority 
Arabophone political elite and documents the 
racial segregation in every sector of public life, 
in the educational system, the army, the mass 
media and the judicial system. The manifesto 
urged the Black majority of Mauritania to use 
any means necessary in order to overthrow the 
Arabophone military junta. In September 1986, 
the Arab military regime of Mauritania arrested 
thirty-six Mauritanians of Black African origin 
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for the publication and the distribution of the 
manifesto. Twenty-one of them were brought 
to trial on charges of "undermining national 
unity" and "making propaganda of a racial or 
ethnic character". Among them was Ibrahima 
Moctar Sarr the founder and president of 
FLAM, as well as many other prominent 
members of the academic life of Mauritania. 
All of defendants pleaded not guilty, but all 
were convicted, sentences varied from six-
month to ten-year prison sentences, exile, and 
loss of civil rights. 
Marabout or Marabou The term Marabout is derived from the Arabic 
word "Mourabit" or one who staffed the small, 
fortified bases that protected trade routes and 
isolated Muslim communities in early Muslim 
North Africa. Today the term refers to Muslim 
teachers who are religious leaders, preach at 
mosques or run religious schools. Others may 
be wandering holy men who survive on alms. 
Still others practice pre-Islamic traditions, 
making amulets for good luck, presiding at 
various ceremonies, telling the future, and in 
some cases actively guiding the lives of 
followers. 
Maure In the sense used in this research thesis, the 
word 'Maure' is used to denote inhabitants of 
Mauritania predominantly descendant from an 
Arab, Berber (and to a lesser extent Black 
African) ethnic mix as well as their Black 
African slaves and ex-slaves. The 'white' 
Maures refer to themselves as Bidân, while the 
Maures of black African ancestry are referred 
to as Hartani (plural; Haratin). 
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, born 1943, is 
among the first Haratin to become a political 
leader in Mauritania. He contributed 
significantly to the end of the racially 
motivated violence of the 1989 - 1991 period, 
and presently serves as founder and president 
of the People's Progressive Alliance party 
which strives to protect the right of the poor 
and the emancipation of slaves. Messaoud has 
also served as President of the National 
Assembly of Mauritania since April 2007. 
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Military junta A junta or military junta is a government led by 
a committee of military leaders. The term 
derives from the Spanish word 'junta' meaning 
a committee or a meeting, specifically by a 
board of directors. Sometimes it becomes a 
military dictatorship, though the terms are not 
synonymous. 
Mint “Mint” means “daughter of" as for “Ould” 
above. 
Mohamed Fall Ould Bah Mohamed Fall Ould Bah runs a respected 
accountancy practice in Nouakchott. He is well 
regarded as an elite of the Nouakchott society 
and a mature student who at 58 returned to 
formal studies and completed a doctorate in 
finance. 
Mohamed Ould Elabed Mohamed Ould Elabed. Ould Elabed is a 
member of the Idawali tribe, a tribe that shared 
power during the reign of Taya and the 
Smacides. He had been Adviser to the Prime 
Minister for many years during Taya’s reign 
right up to the 2005 coup that ousted Taya, then 
Minister of Economic Affairs for Ely 
Mohamed Vall's Junta. Ould Elabed, graduate 
of the elite ENA institution in Paris and the 
“eminence grise” of many economic “reforms” 
by the Mauritanian government since the 
1990s, is today a highly paid independent 
consultant to the government (Samuel 2011, 
25A). 
Mohamed Saïd Ould Hamody "Saïd", in spite of his alleged Smacide Hartani 
origin, is a respected member of the 
Nouakchott elites. He is highly educated and 
was ambassador to the USA for many years. 
Movement du 25 Février A younger generation of Mauritanians created 
the Movement February 25 in order to protest 
succession of military regimes in Mauritania, 
and most especially the interference of France 
in the internal affairs of the country and its 
debilitating influence. This influence became 
known most specifically in the six-week quasi-
abduction of President Abdel Aziz to Paris by 
French forces after his alleged accidental 
shooting on 13 October 2012. 
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Natural resources In the context of this research, natural resources 
are materials derived from the environment and 
are essential for our survival and used for 
satisfying our wants. Every fabricated product 
is composed of natural resources at its 
fundamental level. A subsoil natural resource 
is a material resource found underground and 
extracted by various mechanical or chemical 
means. The extracted material must be 
processed to obtain the precise added-value 
resource such as metal ores, oil, and most forms 
of energy. Natural resources can add 
substantially to a country's wealth, but may 
also be the root cause of socio-political 
problems, a condition known as the "resource 
curse". In cases such as for Mauritania, the 
implication that subsoil natural resources are 
the root cause of these problems is a simplistic 
approach to a complex set of conditions in a 
society predisposed to socio-political 
instability because of long pre-existing 
characteristics. 
OAF Afrique Occidentale Française or French West 
Africa was a federation of eight French 
colonial territories in Africa: Mauritania, 
Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French 
Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper 
Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now 
Benin) and Niger. The capital of the federation 
was Dakar. The federation existed from 1895 
until 1960. 
Oilfield The term refers to a region of many oil wells 
extracting crude oil and associated gas 
(petroleum) from one or several petroleum 
reservoirs below ground. In addition to the 
exploration, stimulation and production wells 
drilled over an extended region, there are 
usually also pipelines to transport the oil 
elsewhere, and support facilities that are typical 
of an oilfield development. 
OMVS The "Organisation pour la mise en valeur du 
fleuve Senegal" (OMVS, or  Senegal River 
Basin Development Authority) is an 
organisation grouping Guinea, Mali, 
Mauritania and Senegal for the purpose of 
jointly managing the Senegal River and its 
drainage basin.  
 Page 259 
 
Operation Lamantin Opération Lamantin was a December 1977 – 
July 1978 military intervention by France on 
the behalf of the Mauritanian government, in its 
war against Sahrawi guerrilla fighters of the 
Polisario Front, seeking independence for 
Western Sahara. Mauritania, a former French 
colony, had invaded and annexed the southern 
part of Western Sahara in 1975, with Morocco 
seizing the northern portion. Both states were 
opposed by the Polisario resistance movement. 
Contrary to expectations, Mauritania's weak 
army was nearly overrun by the Polisario, 
especially after the latter gained access to 
modern weaponry from Algeria. In December 
1977, President Giscard d'Estaing ordered the 
French Air Force to deploy in Mauritania and 
start bombing Polisario columns with napalm, 
after French technicians were taken as 
prisoners of war in a Polisario raid on the 
Zouérat iron mines, Mauritania's most precious 
economic asset. 
Opportunity sampling Opportunity sampling is a non-probability 
sampling technique that consists of taking the 
sample of participants from individuals readily 
available at the time of the study and that fit the 
criteria demanded of participants, eg. 
Mauritanian, Haratin. It is a popular sampling 
technique as it is easy in terms of time and 
therefore financial resources. It is particularly 
used when a researcher has no control over who 
is studied. There are many weaknesses of 
opportunity sampling. It can produce a biased 
sample, as it is easy for the researcher to choose 
people from a narrow group unrepresentative 
of the target population being researched. A 
further problem with opportunity sampling is 
that participants may decline to take part and 
sampling becomes a self-selected sample. 
Oualad Meaning "descendants of" and usually used to 
indicate a tribe or group of tribes with the same 
ancestral origins. 
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Oualad Bousbaa This is a major tribe from the Inchiri region of 
central western Mauritania. They are believed 
to have made their fortune by being able 
merchants and grabbing the opportunity that 
was offered in the 1960s of servicing the 
Zouérat Iron Ore Mine and associated railway 
line in terms of maintenance, personnel and 
supplies. Aligning themselves with the 
Smacides through their early link with 
President Taya, they also became prominent in 
the military and in politics. Their most 
prominent members are Colonel Ely Mohamed 
Vall and President Mohamed Abdel Aziz. 
Oualad Nasr Warrior tribe from southeast Mauritania and 
centred around Aloun el Altrouss. It is believed 
that Saleh Ould Hanenna is from this tribe.  
Ould Meaning “son of” is a Maure (Bidân and 
Haratin) way of denoting lineage affiliation, 
but is being increasingly dropped in recent 
years with the westernisation of surnames, 
most especially in those exposed to the 
international scene, such as politicians and 
businesspersons. 
Participant The word is used for individuals who assisted 
directly in the present research by being 
formally interviewed and agreed to the 
interview being recorded and used in the thesis. 
Many Mauritanians and non-Mauritanians 
contributed to the information included in this 
document. However, they are not mentioned as 
participants as they were not formally 
interviewed. 
Patrimonial patronage system Max Weber defined patrimonialism as a form 
of traditional domination. In its simplest form, 
it defines the authority of fathers within 
families. For Weber, patrimonial monarchies 
and similar forms of government were 
projections of the rule of the father within the 
family onto a broader set of social 
relationships. There are two main forms for 
Weber. One form of patrimonialism is 
characterised by a top-down structure where 
the emperor or sultan rules based on his own 
legitimate authority through traditional 
bureaucratic officials. The other form of 
patrimonialism is also top down. However, the 
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basis for its legitimate authority lies outside of 
the central ruler's authority. Of note and adding 
weight to President Abdel Aziz's utterance on 
democracy to President Sarkozy, is Weber's 
overarching argument that with modernity, 
traditional bureaucratic patrimonial forms of 
government eventually give way to modern 
capitalist bureaucratic rationalism as the main 
principle of both government and governance. 
Petroleum Petroleum is a naturally occurring complex 
mixture of organic hydrocarbons of various 
molecular weights ranging from semi-solid, 
waxy material to liquid and gaseous 
compounds. It is found beneath the Earth's 
surface in sedimentary rocks within ancient 
seas and basins and formed when large 
quantities of dead organisms are buried, 
undergo intense heat and pressure and the 
resulting hydrocarbons are concentrated within 
geological traps. It is discovered mostly 
through very expensive exploration for these 
traps and drilling. If enough quantity of 
hydrocarbons is found to make their production 
economic, a production plant is built to collect 
process and distribute the hydrocarbon 
commodities brought to the surface. 
Petroliferous  basin A sedimentary basin is a region of the earth's 
crust of long-standing subsidence creating a 
repository for material eroded from adjacent 
higher ground. There, organic material, derived 
from large quantities of dead organisms, is 
incorporated into the sedimentary layers that 
are deposited in the basin-like structure. When 
these organic material bearing rocks are 
subjected to intense pressure and heat, they 
produce petroleum potentially recoverable for 
use as a "fossil" fuel. 
Petronas PETRONAS, short for Petroliam Nasional 
Berhad, is a Malaysian oil and gas company 
founded on August 17, 1974. It is a wholly 
owned by the Government of Malaysia. It is 
ranked among Fortune Global 500's largest 
corporations in the world. Fortune ranks 
PETRONAS as the 68th largest company in the 
world in 2012, as well as the 12th most 
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profitable company in the world and the most 
profitable in Asia. 
Peulh Peulh are Mauritanian people of the Fulani 
ethnic group, the largest migratory cattle-
owning group in the world and one of the most 
widely dispersed and culturally most diverse 
people of the African continent. Some 
confusion exists as to their ethnic makeup as 
many of their former slaves present themselves 
as authentic Peulh. Many Peulh in Mauritania 
practiced, and many are reputed still to practice 
slavery in the same manner as the Bidân. 
Polisario or Polisario Front The Polisario Front, or simply POLISARIO 
from the Spanish abbreviation for "Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra 
and Río de Oro", is a Sahrawi rebel national 
liberation movement working for ending 
Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara. 
Since 1979, the Polisario Front has been 
recognized by the United Nations as the 
representative of the people of Western Sahara. 
Western Sahara has been a member of the 
African Union since 1982, the reason for 
Morocco retiring its membership in 1984. 
President Maaouya Ould 
Sid'Ahmed Taya 
Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, born 
November 28, 1941, was Prime Minister of 
Mauritania from 1981 to 1984 and president 
from 1984 to 2005. He was ousted by a military 
coup led by his closest military colleagues, 
Colonel Mohamed Abdel Aziz, General 
Muhammad Ould Al-Ghazwani and General 
Ely Mohamed Vall in 2005. 
President Moktar Ould Daddah Moktar Ould Daddah was born 25 December 
1924, to an important marabout family of the 
Oualad Béiri tribe in Boutilimit, Mauritania. 
Ould Daddah completed his secondary 
schooling in Nice, and then moved to Paris 
graduating in Law as the first Mauritanian to 
hold a university degree. Returning to 
Mauritania in 1957, Daddah joined the centre-
left Progressive Mauritanian Union and was 
elected President of the Executive Council. In 
1959, he established a new political party, the 
Mauritanian Regroupment Party. In the last 
pre-independence legislative elections held 
later that year, his party won every seat in the 
National Assembly, and he was appointed 
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Prime Minister. He was the first President of 
Mauritania from 1960, when his country 
gained its independence from France until 
1978, when he was deposed in a military coup 
d'état. After a period of detention in a jail in 
Oualata, he was exiled to Paris returning to 
Mauritanian in 2002. He died 14 October 2003 
after having written and edited his 
autobiography, "La Mauritanie contre vents et 
marées". 
President Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi 
Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, born 
1938, is a politician who served in the 
government during the 1970s. After a long 
period of absence from politics, he won the 
March 2007 presidential election, taking office 
on 19 April 2007. He was deposed in a military 
coup d'état on 6 August 2008. 
Production flow rate A facility's rate of production of oil measured 
in barrels per day, stored at an onsite facility for 
subsequent sale. At the offshore Chinguetti 
Oilfield production facility, flow rate into the 
onsite FPSO (Floating Production and Storage 
and Offloading) vessel, dropped from a high of 
75,000 barrels a day on first production on 26 
February 2006 to below 3,000 barrels a day in 
November 2006, later steadying at a barely 
viable 8,000 barrels a day.  
PSC PSCs or Production Sharing Contracts are a 
common type of contract signed between a 
government and an oil company (or group of 
companies) which govern the conditions of 
operation in the country for the operator and 
how the revenues or the oil itself will be 
apportioned between the government, the 
company operating the extraction plant and the 
joint venture partners. 
PSC amendments As PSCs are passed by decree into law in 
Mauritania, any change or amendment must be 
done constitutionally, since it is a formal 
change to the text of the written constitution of 
the state. In Mauritania, as in many other 
countries, the constitutions require that 
amendments cannot be enacted unless they 
have passed a special procedure that is more 
stringent than that required of ordinary 
legislation and may take from several months 
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to over a year to be passed by both houses of 
parliament. .  
Pulaar Pulaar is a Fula language spoken as a first 
language by the Peulh and related tribes 
originating from the Senegal River Valley. 
Speakers of Pulaar as known as Haalpulaar'en 
and inhabit not only Mauritania, but also 
Senegal, The Gambia and Mali. 
Purposive or judgemental 
sampling 
In purposive sampling, the researcher chooses 
the sample of participants from a particular 
population, based on whom the researcher 
thinks would be appropriate for advancing the 
research topic.  
Qabila A Hassaniya word roughly translated as 
'federation of tribes'. 
Radio-trottoir The term, meaning, "footpath radio” refers to 
the grassroots, informal communications 
networks that are used, primarily in urban 
African settings, to relay information that is 
deemed of sufficient interest. Information 
passed on by "footpath or pavement radio" is 
mistrusted by a number of academics, 
journalists and politicians, citing its 
anonymous nature, and the tendency to include 
tales and ludicrous notions. Some, however, 
argues that pavement radio is a modern 
continuation of the African oral tradition. 
Referral or snowball sampling Referral or snowball sampling is a method 
typically used with little known populations 
where members of these populations have not 
all been previously identified and are more 
difficult to locate or contact. Obtaining a 
sample from such a population typically does 
not allow for the use of traditional random 
sampling methodologies requiring that the 
entire population be known. Methodologies 
such as referral sampling employ the presumed 
social networks that exist between members of 
a target population to build a sample. 
Reign of the Colonels The period between 1978 to present is referred 
to by most Mauritanians as the "reign of the 
colonels', indicating that the military has 
reigned over government since the overthrow 
of the first president, Moktar Ould Daddah.  
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Rent seeking Rent seeking is the use of social institutions 
such as the power of government to redistribute 
wealth among different groups without 
creating new wealth. Lobbyists influence 
political leaders to redirect rents arriving in the 
country for the benefit of all, and ‘wasting’ 
resources in an effort at redirecting it to 
increase their personal wealth. 
Sahara Desert The Sahara, or 'the Great Desert' in Arabic, is 
the world's hottest desert and the third largest 
desert after Antarctica and the Arctic. At over 
9,400,000 sq km, it makes the Sahara almost as 
large as the United States. It stretches from the 
Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean and reaches to 
the Mediterranean Sea to the north. To the 
south, it is delimited by the Sahel, a belt of 
semi-arid tropical savannah that covers 
northern Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Sahel The Sahel is the semi-arid zone of transition 
between the Sahara Desert and the savannah to 
the south and stretches from Northern Africa to 
the Red Sea. Sahel is derived from an Arabic 
word meaning "shore", describing the Sahel as 
being a coastline delimiting the sand of the 
Sahara. 
Saleh Ould Hanenna Hanenna served in the Mauritanian Army and 
rose to the rank of Major before being forced 
out in 2000. In June 2003, he led an attempted 
coup, aiming to overthrow President Maaouya 
Ould Taya. He commanded a rebel section of 
the Army during two days of heavy fighting in 
Nouakchott during which some 300 civilians 
and military personnel are alleged to have died. 
With the failure of the coup, Hanenna initially 
escaped capture, but he was arrested on 
October 9, 2004. The Taya Government 
accused Hanenna of attempting to organise 
coups on two further occasions, in August and 
September 2004, with the alleged backing of 
Libya and Burkina Faso and he was given life 
imprisonment on 3 February 2005. In August 
2005, Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall led a 
successful coup in the country. The Military 
Council for Justice and Democracy, which took 
over from the government, released Hanenna in 
an amnesty in early September 2005 and he 
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took part as a candidate in the 2007 civilian 
elections. 
Sampling procedure The key requirement of sampling procedure in 
social sciences is for the sampling of a 
population to be representative of the target in 
order that meaningful information may be 
returned for evaluation. 
Sarakolé Sarakolé is another name for the Soninké. 
Saturation point The guiding principle affecting sample size in 
qualitative research should be the concept of 
saturation, or the point at which no new 
information or themes are observed in the data. 
Senegal River The Senegal River was demarcated by the 
French colonial authorities as the border 
between Mauritania and Senegal. It is not an 
ethnic divide as related black African families, 
clans and community groupings of Wolof, 
Soninké, Peulh, Bambara and other lesser 
tribes inhabit both sides of the fertile river 
valley. 
Senegal River A 1,790 km long river, the headwaters and 
lower portion forms the southern border of 
Mauritania with Senegal. 
Senegal River Valley The Senegal River has a drainage basin of 
270,000 sq km with fertile river flats on either 
bank. The French colonial power demarcated 
the river as the border between Senegal and 
Mauritania, insensitive to the familial link 
between inhabitants on either banks of the 
river. 
Serer or Seré The Serer people live principally in the west-
central part of Senegal but are also found in 
small numbers in the Gorgol and Guidimakla 
regions of Mauritania which also have large 
numbers of Soninké to whom they are related. 
Some notable Serer include Leopold Sedar 
Senghor and Abdou Diouf (first and second 
president of Senegal respectively). 
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SHELL Royal Dutch Shell plc, commonly known as 
'Shell' is an Anglo-Dutch multinational 
vertically integrated oil and gas corporation, 
the second largest company in the world in 
terms of revenue and one of the six oil and gas 
supermajors. 
Smacides The Smacides are a "grand nomad" Maure tribe 
originally inhabiting the region of Atar in 
northern Mauritania. It was originally a warrior 
tribe, converted to hold stronger Islamic faith. 
It "dropped the Sword for the Book" and is now 
regarded as a maraboutic tribe. Its most noted 
member is Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed 
Taya, president of the country between 1984 
and 2005. Since the ascent of Taya to the 
Presidency, many Smacides have retained 
government posts of influence and prestige in 
the Mauritanian bureaucracy. 
'Small' nomads "Small" nomads are so named by the Maures, 
because of the quasi-sedentary habits their 
forebears held prior to the great drought of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. They principally 
inhabited the Trarza and Brakna regions and 
were generally light-skinned people 
descendants of Berber ancestors, intermixed 
with Arab and some black Africans. 
Social fault lines Societies in all countries are split by major 
divisions or 'fault lines' caused by differences 
in race, religion, ethnicity, wealth, class or 
power. Some are plainly evident, whereas 
others are more concealed and may have a long 
gestation period, eventually erupting in conflict 
with little warning. 
Soninké The Soninké (also called Sarakolé or Serer) are 
a Mandé people who descend from the black 
African inhabitants that peopled the Sahara 
region prior to desertification and the arrival of 
Berber and Arabs into the region. They are 
closely related to the Imraguen of coastal 
Mauritania. They were among the first ethnic 
groups from Sub-Saharan West Africa to 
embrace Islam. They speak a Mandé language 
and predominantly live in the Guidimakla 
region of southernmost-central Mauritania. 
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State This is taken in its Westphalian meaning, a 
western concept conjuring up the concept of 
sovereignty over demarcated territory, with no 
role for foreigners in institutions of state or 
other public structures, and the ability for 
dedicated persons to act for the state within the 
international system. 
Supertribe Another word used for 'Qabila'. 
TEXACO TEXACO began as the Texas Fuel Company, 
founded in 1901 on the discovery of oil at 
Spindletop. TEXACO has now merged with 
Chevron. 
The 1885 Treaty of Berlin The Berlin Conference of 1884–85, also 
referred to as the "Congo Conference" or West 
Africa Conference, was called to establish 
guiding rules and regulations for systematic 
European colonisation and trade in Africa. It 
was called for by the King of Portugal and 
organised by Otto von Bismarck, first 
Chancellor of Germany, and coincided with his 
country's sudden emergence as an imperial 
power through his able leadership. The 
outcome, the General Act of the Berlin 
Conference, was the formalisation of the 
scramble for Africa. Its most significant result 
was the annexation of Congo by King Leopold 
of Belgium. Its achievements, in the closing 
words of Otto von Bismarck, were; Free access 
to Africa's interior for all Western nations, free 
trade in the Congo Basin and consideration for 
the welfare of the 'native races' in providing 
them with the benefits of 'civilisation'. The 
conference set the rules for trade, navigation 
and control of a partitioned "Dark Continent" 
in order to avoid conflict among the colonising 
European nations. Later the British Prime 
Minister, Lord Salisbury noted that "we have 
been giving away mountains and rivers and 
lakes to each other, only hindered by the small 
impediment that we never knew exactly where 
they were" (Adebajo 2010, 16). 
Total Total S.A. is a French multinational integrated 
oil and gas company and one of the six 
"Supermajors" oil companies in the world. Its 
businesses cover the entire oil and gas chain, 
from crude oil and natural gas exploration and 
production to power generation, transportation, 
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refining, petroleum product marketing, and 
international crude oil and product trading. 
Previously centred on oil exploration and 
production in the Maghreb, the Atlantic coast 
of Africa and Indonesia, Total has in the last 
decade expanded into eastern and southern 
Africa and beyond the traditional French 'pre 
carré'. 
Trarza Trarza is a region in southwest Mauritania. Its 
capital is Rosso. Other major cities and towns 
include Mederdra and Boutilimit, in the region 
where Moktar Ould Daddah's tribe, the Oualad 
Béiri, originally were camped. The 
Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, and the 
capital district are geographically part of the 
region. 
Tribe Used in the sense that Bidân themselves use the 
word; it means a group within the segmented 
society of Arab-Berbers, claiming descent 
from a common ancestor. The Bidân adage 
applies, “Me against my brother, my brother 
and I against my cousin and all of us against the 
outsider enemy” within a political unit. Tribes 
are social units of several hundred to thousands 
of individuals who are bonded socially, appoint 
a leader, can make war, and in the modern 
urban setting influence business and 
government affairs.  
Tullow Oil plc TULLOW is a multinational oil and gas 
exploration company with its headquarters in 
London, United Kingdom. It has interests in 
over 150 licenses across 25 countries with 67 
producing fields and in 2012 produced on 
average 79,200 barrels of oil equivalent per 
day. Its largest activities are in Africa and the 
Atlantic Margins, where it has discovered new 
oil provinces in Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and 
French Guiana. Tullow has a primary listing on 
the London Stock Exchange and is a 
constituent of the FTSE 100 Index. It had a 
market capitalisation of approximately £11.1 
billion as of 3 April 2013, and a reserves and 
resources of 1.2 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent. 
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Western Sahara, Western Sahara 
War 
Western Sahara or Spanish Sahara is a disputed 
territory in North Africa. Its surface area 
amounts to 266,000 sq km. The population was 
estimated at just over 500,000, principally of 
Maure descent, although since Moroccan 
annexation many Moroccans have settled 
there. Occupied by Spain since the late 19th 
century, in 1965 the UN General Assembly 
adopted its first resolution on Western Sahara, 
asking Spain to decolonise the territory. In 
1975, Spain relinquished the administrative 
control of the territory to a joint administration 
by Morocco and Mauritania, both having laid 
claim to it since 1957. The Western Sahara War 
erupted between those countries and the 
Sahrawi national liberation movement, the 
Polisario Front, proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR). Mauritania 
withdrew in 1979, and Morocco secured 
effective control of most of the territory, 
including all the major cities and its now-
apparent natural resources. Since a United 
Nations-sponsored ceasefire agreement in 
1991, most of the territory (including the entire 
Atlantic coastline) has been controlled by 
Morocco and the remainder by the SADR, 
strongly backed by Algeria. The Polisario 
Front has won formal recognition for SADR 
from many states, and extended membership of 
the AU, although recognitions have been 
extended and withdrawn according to changing 
international trends. 
Westphalian state Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of the 
sovereignty of nation-states on their territory, 
with no role for external agents in domestic 
structures. The concept of a Westphalian 
system refers to the Peace of Westphalia signed 
in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War. In 
this war, the major European countries at the 
time (the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, France, 
Sweden and the Dutch Republic) agreed to 
respect the principle of territorial integrity. In 
the Westphalian system, the national interests 
and goals of states were widely assumed to go 
beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States 
became the primary institutional agents in an 
interstate system of relations. The Peace of 
Westphalia is said to have ended attempts to 
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impose supranational authority on European 
states, most especially from the Church.  
Windfall revenues These are unhabitually large revenues earned 
by a government through production sharing, 
and/or through taxes and royalties, as a result 
of the newly established petroleum industry. 
Wolof The Wolof group is the single largest ethnic 
group of Senegal principally inhabiting its 
northwestern coastal region, The Gambia and 
Southwestern Mauritania. Their origin as a 
recognisable and organised ethnic entity dates 
to around the 12th or 13th century. Their 
principal occupation today is fishing. 
Woodside  Woodside Petroleum Limited is Australia's 
largest petroleum exploration and production 
company. It is a public company listed on the 
ASX, headquartered in Perth, Western 
Australia. Its share price rose from some AUD 
9 to AUD 60 during its first period of overseas 
expansion, 1996 - 2006. 
Worldview The overall perspective from which an 
individual sees and interprets the world, shaped 
by the beliefs and culture held and resulting 
from being part of a larger community. 
Zawiya The word is often used as a synonym to 
Marabout. It is also used to signify a certain 
type of "Maraboutic" or religious tribe of 
Berber origin. The traditional pre-colonial 
Maure society was stratified into several tribal 
castes, with the Beni Hassan warrior tribes 
ruling and extracting tribute from the 
subjugated and subservient or tributary Berber 
tribes. A middle caste was formed by the 
Zawiya, or tribes that "took up the book" and 
became the bearers of religion, providing 
religious teaching and services. The "smaller", 
lighter skinned Berber nomads from the more 
fertile Brakna and Trarza regions were most 
suited to this practice and many strong and 
lasting religious Madrasa or school became 
established in this region of Mauritania. On the 
death of the founder of a maraboutic school, 
their graves would turn into holy places of 
significance to the tribe. 
 Page 272 
 
Zeidane Ould H'Meida A brilliant engineer, Zeidane Ould H'Meida, 
was General Manager of the iron ore company 
at Zouérat when he was appointed Minister of 
Industry, Mines and Petroleum by President 
Taya in late 2001. He retained his position as 
minister for a few months after Taya's 
overthrow. However, he was accused of 
treason and embezzlement for his involvement 
in the "Woodside Affair". He was released a 
few months later on Woodside intervention and 
settlement of the disagreement.  
Znaga (or Senaga) Znaga, Senaga or Sanhadja were one of the 
largest Berber tribal confederations subjugated 
by the Arab tribes who displaced many towards 
the river to the South, from which the name 
"Senegal" River. 
Zouérat Zouérat is the largest town in northern 
Mauritania and the capital of Tiris Zemmour 
region, with an approximate population of 
38,000 (2005). It lies at the eastern end of the 
Mauritania Railway that takes iron ore in trains 
of up to 3 km long to the deep-water port of 
Nouadhibou. The town is a centre for iron ore 
mining, including the mines of Fderîck, 
Tazadit and Rouessa. Iron ore deposits were 
first discovered near Kediet ej Jill in 1952 and 
in 1958 concessions on iron extraction were 
given to MIFERMA (Société des mines de fer 
de Mauritanie), which was dominated by 
European-based mining companies. In 1974, 
the MIFERMA was nationalised by the 
Mauritanian government, which formed SNIM 
to manage the operations in its place. Between 
12 and 14 million tonnes a year, have been 
mined since the 1970s, but production is 
planned to increase to 44 million tonnes a year 
by 2017. Reserves are estimated at between 
200 and 300 million tonnes of recoverable iron 
ore. Other major companies exploring for iron 
ore in the region include Xstrata, Arcelor 
Mittal, Boumi and Charter Pacific Corporation 
Limited. 
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Online documentation: 
Between 2009 and 2012, a regular, and at times daily, watch was kept on 
certain Mauritanian and international information websites. These included:  
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/africa/; BBC African news, 
generally considered by the western audience it captures, as a 
relatively unbiased international news channel which still (necessarily) 
uses an outsider’s outlook towards events on the African continent and 
in reporting on  Mauritania. 
 http://www.quotidien-nouakchott.com/; “independent” Mauritanian 
online news outlet, affiliated with the daily newspaper sold in the 
streets of Nouakchott and other major cities. The independence of this 
news outlet is somewhat questionable as it appears pro-government 
and believed to be funded by the wealthy members of certain 
influential tribes, including and especially the Oualad Bousba, to 
which the present head of state, President Abdel Aziz belongs. 
 http://www.cridem.org/; an independent self-funded online news 
website that is dedicated to exposing problems and trouble spots in 
Mauritania. It is also owned and operated by Bidân businessmen and 
often gives an interpretation to national and international events and 
situations that have strong political content and a particular agenda in 
maintaining their socio-economic and political dominance. 
 http://www. Tempsforts.net/: an anti-government news and socio-
political commentary website operated from outside the country by 
Haratin. It is a media vehicle where sensitive subjects such as slavery, 
racism, socio-political instability, and crime and corruption are openly 
discussed in a very direct manner critical of the Bidân government.   
 
Background and current news information, relevant to the subjects discussed 
in this study, was gathered from these websites and used with discretion in the 
analysis of the socio-political events of the period examined.  
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Participants 
These named and anonymous participants contributed though formal, 
recorded and transcribed interviews used as reference in this research. Many 
hours of additional discussion on Mauritania were spent with Ly Ciré, 
M’Boye Ould Arafa, Professor Pierre Bonte, Mohamed Saïd Ould Hamody, 
as well as with the staff of Hotel Marhaba where I stayed during my visits to 
Nouakchott. 
  
1. Sidaty Fall; five interviews, Nouakchott, 4/4/11 and 13/4/11 
2. Toutane Diakité; one interview, Nouakchott,  4/4/11 
3. Amadou N’daye; one interview, Nouakchott,  4/4/11 
4. Dada Ould Mohamed Lamine; two interviews, Nouakchott, 4/4/11 
5. Anonymous; three interviews, Nouakchott, 4/4/11 
6. Fatimatou Doudou Diop; one interview, Nouakchott, 5/4/11 
7. Ciré Ly; thirteen interviews, Nouakchott, 6/4/11 5/5/11 
8. Habib Adaya Ould Jiddou; three interviews, Nouakchott,  6/4/11 to 10/4/11  
9. Anonymous; four interviews, Nouakchott, 7/4/11 to 14/4/11 
10. Maimouna Diallo; one interview, Nouakchott, 7/4/11 
11. Gaye Silly Soumaré; three interviews, Nouakchott, 7/4/11 to 13/4/11 
12. Abidine; two interviews, Nouakchott, 8/4/11 
13. Ely Ould Sneiba; one interview, Nouakchott, 10/4/11 
14. Ibrahim Mangane; one interview, Nouakchott, 10/4/11 
15. Mariam M’Bow; one interview, Nouakchott, 10/4/11 
16. Anonymous; two interviews, Nouakchott, 11/4/11 
17. Mohamed Traoré; one interview, Nouakchott, 13/4/11 
18. Ahmed Ould Cheikh; one interview, Nouakchott, 13/4/11 
19. Souleymane Niang; two interviews, Nouakchott, 14/4/11 to 15/4/11 
20. Ali Lamine Diallo; one interview, Nouakchott, 15/4/11 
21. Anonymous; one interview, Nouakchott,  15/4/11  
22. Isselmou Mohamed Lemine; one interview, 1 Nouakchott, 6/4/11 
23. Boubacar Alpha Athié; two interviews, Nouakchott, 16/4/11 
24. Anonymous; one interview, Nouakchott, 16/4/11 
25. Sidi Mohamed Ould Lemine; one interview, Nouakchott,  18/4/11 
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26. Dia Amadou; one interview, Nouakchott, 19/4/11 
27. Mohamed Faoud Barrada; one interview, Nouakchott, 19/4/11 
28. M’Boye Ould Arafa; ten interviews, Nouakchott, 20/4/11 to 16/11/11 
29. Mohamed Ba Abdouh Moussa; one interview, Nouakchott, 20/4/11 
30. Hamadi Ould Mohamed Hamadi; one interview, Nouakchott, 21/4/11 
31. Coulibaly Ali; one interview, Nouakchott, 21/4/11 
32. Mohamed fall Ould Bah; one interview, Nouakchott, 13/12/11 
33. Anonymous; one interview, Nouakchott, 4/12/11  
34. Professor Emeritus Pierre Bonte; one interview, Nouakchott, 5/12/11 
35. Zacharia Ould Ahmed Salem; one interview, Nouakchott, 11/12/11 
36. Mohamed Saïd Ould Hamody; three interviews, Nouakchott, 13 to 23/12/11 
37. Anonymous; one interview, Nouakchott, 14/12/11 
38. Anonymous; one interview, Nouakchott, 20/12/11 
39. Anonymous; one interview, Nouakchott, 21/12/11  
40. Mohamed Sidina Ould Khabuz; three interviews, Nouakchott, 22 to 2/01/12 
41. Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall; two interviews, Nouakchott, 23/12/11 
42. Anonymous; two interviews, Nouakchott, 24/12/11  
43. Mohamed Lemine Dahi; three interviews, Nouakchott, 24 to 31/12/11 
44. Abdou Salam Tabane; one interview, Nouakchott, 24/12/11 
45. Mohamed Ould Elabed; one interview, Nouakchott, 26/12/11 
46. Anonymous; three interviews, Nouakchott, 27/12/11 to 31/12/11 
47. Mahfoud Ould Bettah; two interviews, Nouakchott, 29/12/11  
48. Isselmou Ould Abdelkader; one interview, Nouakchott, 1/01/12  
49. Mohamed El Hacen Ould Lebatt; one interview, Nouakchott, 2/01/12 
50. Mohamed Lemine Abdallah; two interviews, Nouakchott, 2/01/12 
51. Agu Kantsler; one interview, Perth, 30/01/12 
52. Ex-Woodside International Manager; one interview, Perth, 3/02/12 
53. Ex-Woodside Mauritania Country Manager; one interview, Denmark, 3/02/12 
XXXXXX 
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Appendix 1 - Field Questionnaire for Field Interview 
 
 Below is the interview preamble given, in French where applicable, to all 
participants followed by the full list of questions likely to be asked of any 
one participant.   
 
The questions were selected according to the perceived level of 
comprehension of the participant and adjusted to the interview as thought fit 
at the time. Rarely were all questions asked of anyone participant, once 
confidence was gained after the trial period in Bamako, Mali.  
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INTERVIEWS PREAMBLE - given to participants prior to all interviews  
 
(In the field, all discussions and written material were in French) 
 
Once you have read the “Research information sheet” and we have completed the 
“Consent form” and the “Participant details form”. The interview I will conduct with 
you uses a question/answer format as well as, if we get to that, a more informal 
approach that will consist of a conversation on certain specific topics that you chose 
and allow me to cover. 
 
My key aim in the interview is to create a comfortable, informal conversational space 
in which you will tell me ‘stories’ and reflect on you experiences, bringing out your 
own personal way of seeing situations and events that evolved in your county since 
2001.  
 
The questions I will ask you are open-ended and designed to initiate and stimulate 
conversation. The conversations will be about your particular experiences, feelings 
and observations and the inferences you draw from these observations. They are 
selected and presented in a manner appropriate to the context of the interview, the 
situation at hand, and to your level of involvement in the society, the politics and 
economic activity related to the natural resources industry. Some of the questions I 
have here are examples of the type of question I will put to you, not all will be asked. 
They deal with sensitive issues relating to the particular period during which the 
petroleum industry established itself in your country, as well as prior to that, if we 
agree that some past events or situations are relevant to what is happening today.  
 
You may or may not require guidance from me in the interviews, as some people 
need more support to guide them through talking about the relevant aspects of their 
experiences.  
 
As indicated in the accompanying information sheet, you are under no obligation to 
answer any particular questions, if you are uncomfortable. 
 
My priorities are to evaluate the social, economic and political roles of certain formal 
and informal groups within the community. I am particularly interested in changes 
over the period since 2001 to so as to evaluate if there is a correlation between the 
establishment of a petroleum industry and changes in the social and political aspects 
of Mauritania, especially in the emergence of coup d’états. I will also ask questions 
covering institutions such as corruption, poverty, elites, the various coups (2003, 
2005, 2008, 2009), and about specific politicians. Again, you are not required to 
answer any question if you do not wish to do so. 
 
I will be gathering and analysing all this qualitative and quantitative data, to try to 
find the root cause - or the multiple causes - for particular undesirable situations we 
discuss and that affect Mauritania.  
 
God willing, my work with you may bring peace and happiness to the country.  
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Discussion on social issues, society & the future 
 
Are you happy with your life now?  
 
How will the future be different for you? 
 
How do you see the lives of children growing up today, to be different to yours? 
 
Are those issues important to you now?  
 
Tell me about your experiences and your family’s experience since the discovery of 
(Iron ore or petroleum in Mauritania and gold in Mali)? 
 
Tell me about your knowledge of the iron ore industry in Northern Mauritania? 
Petroleum offshore Mauritania? Gold in Mali?  
 
Do you think iron ore has helped improve the standard of living of the population 
since its discovery in the early 1970s and exploitation since? Will the oil industry do 
the same? Has gold in Mali?  
 
What problems or challenges do you think that the various natural resources 
industries (iron and petroleum for Mauritania and gold for Mali) have brought to the 
country? 
 
What opportunities or rewards do you think that the various natural resources 
industries have brought to your country? 
 
Do you think that your society has gained or lost through this new activity? 
 
What role do you think that the natural resources industries (iron, gold, petroleum) 
have played in the social changes in your country since 2001?  
 
Are social bonds within the tribal and ethnic groups strong or weak? 
 
Is there trust and confidence between tribal groups? Between ethnic groups? 
 
Is there trust and confidence between the citizens and the government? 
 
In what way has the general population gained from the establishment of natural 
resources industries in their country?  
 
What did the natural resources industries (whether gold, iron ore or petroleum) bring 
to you in particular? Has it brought material, lifestyle or spiritual benefits? 
 
Do you have a story that you would like to share that brings out your experience with 
the establishment of a particular natural resource industry in your country? 
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Do you think that your social background (ethnicity or tribal group) has played a role 
in your allocation of the social position you fill in life?  
 
Do you think that your social background (ethnicity or tribal group) has played a role 
in other factors that come into your live? 
 
Issues of importance that you may wish to discuss; 
 Is education an important issue to you? Should it be for the 
community? 
 Is health an important issue to you? Should it be for the community? 
 Is poverty reduction an issue to you? Should it be for the community? 
 Is the government doing enough? Why? 
 Is economic development an issue to you? Should it be for the 
community? 
 Is improved infrastructure (road, communication) an issue to you? 
Should it be for the community? 
 Is a better quality of life an issue to you? Should it be for the 
community?  
Is the Human Development Index an issue to you? Should it be for the 
community? 
 Is Foreign assistance an issue for you? Should it be for the 
community? 
 Is National security an issue for you? Should it be for the community? 
 Is water supply and distribution an issue to you? Should it be for the 
community? 
 Is electricity an issue for you? Should it be for the community? 
 Is slavery an issue for you? Should it be for the community? 
 
Would you like to comment on? 
 Electricity? Supply? Petronas and development of offshore gas 
reserves? 
 Public works? Transport and communication? 
 Water availability and supply? 
Agriculture? 
 Forestry and fisheries? 
 Labour and community? 
 Youth? 
 Ethnicity? Tribalism? 
 The 2003 coup attempt? 
 The 2005 Coup and the First Junta? 
 Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall? 
 The 2007 democratic elections? 
 The 2008 Putsch and the Second Junta? 
 President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz? 
 The 2009 democratic Elections? 
 2010 to 2011? 
 The future?  
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Discussion on the impact of Natural Resources (NR)  
 
What problems or challenges do you think that the petroleum industry has brought to 
Mauritania? 
 
Tell me about your experience and your family’s experience since the discovery of 
petroleum in Mauritania in 2001? 
 
What role do you think that the natural resources industries (iron, gold, petroleum) 
have played in the economic changes in your country since 2001?  
 
Do you think that the natural resources of the country and their revenues are well 
managed by the Government? 
 
If you were responsible for these industries in your country, how would you manage 
the industries? How would you manage the revenues?  
 
How would you use these revenues to create your vision of the future? 
 
Would you like to discuss the Government’s budget allocation?  
 
Would like to discuss how the government handles revenue funds that come in from 
the exploitation of Natural Resources? Withdrawals and use of the revenues from 
natural resources? Investment of the revenues from natural resources? 
 
Should there be a plan for the optimised exploitation of gold? Petroleum? Iron ore? 
For the greatest revenue as quickly as possible? For future generations?  
 
Would you like to discuss the government Budget and funds allocation?  
 
Should NR revenues be saved at all? Some? All?  
 
Should NR revenues be spent on agriculture? Should we build barriers to imports? 
 
Should NR revenues be spent on manufacturing? Should we build barriers to 
imports? 
 
Would it enhance employment / jobs for locals to any extent? 
 
Should NR revenue be sued to develop small local business opportunities for locals? 
 
Overall, do you think that the government manages the economy well? 
 
In what ways have politicians and the military used the nation’s oil revenues since 
2001? 
 
How have they allocated oil revenues? 
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In what ways have the general population gained from the petroleum industry? 
 
Do you think that Mauritania has the appropriate accountability and transparency 
mechanisms in place to ensure effective government? 
 
Which groups and communities in Mauritania does the government have to take 
account of in formulating policies? Making laws? Allocating budget? Infrastructure 
expenditure? 
 
Discussion on political issues 
 
What do you think of your country’s formal institutions? The government? The 
police? The army? 
 
What do you think of your country’s informal institutions? The tribal system? The 
ethnic divide? Trust? Confidence? Honesty? Sense of belonging?   
 
Can you describe the decision-making process in place? 
 
Can you describe the decision-making process you would use? 
 
Do you have trust in this process?  
 
Do you have confidence in the people that carry it out? 
 
What are the strengths of these people? 
 
What are their weaknesses? 
 
Will the country fall victim to the Resource curse? 
 
Do you think that the overthrow of the Taya government was related to the 
development of Chinguetti oilfield? 
 
How do you think the first military junta handled the presence of the Australian 
company, Woodside, on Mauritanian soil? 
 
What role did the petroleum industry play in the creation of the second military 
junta?  
 
Do you think that a person’s social background plays a role in the allocation of high-
level administrative and political positions? 
 
Would you like to comment on? 
 Ethnicity? Tribalism? 
 Foreign intervention? US? France? Russia? China? Others? 
 Al Qaeda?  
 Local government? 
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 Defence?  
 Fisheries protection? 
 Corruption?  
 Woodside? 
 Petronas? 
 Foreign oil and mining explorers? 
 The future?  
Social character of the country 
 
Is there an ethnic divide in the country?  
 
Has it and will it affect development of successful natural resources industries? 
 
Is there a tribal divide in the country?  
 
Has it and will it affect development of successful natural resources industries? 
 
Is there an elite class, and is the gap between rich and poor increasing or decreasing? 
 
 
 
Inchallah 
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Appendix 2 – Questionnaire presented to Woodside 
 
This list of simple questions was authorised by Woodside’s legal 
department. It was returned by email with no cover note, with answers which 
were very brief and devoid of any substance and several questions left 
unanswered, with a ‘N/A’. The explanation later given – verbally - was that 
Woodside personnel had been put under much stress in the course of the 
federal police inquiry and were unwilling to discuss the matter any further.  
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List of questions requested by Woodside Petroleum Limited’s Legal Department in lieu of 
face-to-face interviews with Woodside personnel involved with the Mauritanian project  
 
1. Would you give a brief on why Woodside involved itself in the development of 
Mauritania’s offshore reserves? 
 
2. What did the 2001 discovery of Chinguetti mean to Woodside? What do you think 
it meant for the Mauritanians? 
 
3. What was the general mood of Woodside at the time? Of the government? Of 
Mauritanians, especially that worked for Woodside? 
 
4. Do you think that the discovery was good for Mauritania? Was it good for 
Woodside? 
 
 
5. What is the “character” of the Maure? Easy to get along? Difficult? Of blacks versus 
Maures? 
 
6. How was the stability of the country perceived 2001-203, 2003-2005, post 2005? 
 
 
7. What did Woodside make of the coup in 2003? Do you think it was induced by a 
grab for power with the coming petroleum revenues? 
 
8. Was there pressure from the Taya government to bring development on quickly?  
 
 
9. What was argues about the PSC terms that Woodside changed and that the 2005 
Junta so rejected?  
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10. Did the Mauritanians grievances really were as enumerated in the public statement 
that was circulated to all embassies, including the Malian embassy in Japan to 
which I am responsible as Honorary Consul   for Mali in Perth?   
 
 
11. February 6, 2006, three weeks before first oil, the government issued that press 
statement. How did Woodside reach? Did Woodside repudiate the claims? How? 
Why? What was offered and how was it handled?  
 
12. Would you claim Senator <Milne was “off the track”? Maybe this is a chance to 
repudiate some of the untruths said about Woodside and its overseas employees? 
 
 
13. Is there a link between the grab for power (i.e. Coups and government overthrows) 
in Mauritania and the beginnings of the oil industry in that country? 
 
14. Are there lessons to be learned in this series of potentially related events and 
circumstances? For investors? For a foreign operator? For the country? 
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Appendix 3 – Requests / authorisations for research in Mali and Mauritania  
 
Letters of introduction from Dr Bob Pokrant, principal research supervisor at 
Curtin University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Social Science and 
International Studies, together with formal letters of authorisation for the 
research from the Ministers of Energy in Mali, where the trial interviews 
were conducted, and Mauritania, where the principal research was carried 
out in 2011 and 2012 
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Appendix 4 – Participants’ fact sheet and questionnaire  
 
As the research involved recording personal information, Ethical Approval 
of Research Involving Humans (Form A) HR 132/2010 was awarded to 
cover this research the project was explained at the beginning of all 
interview with new participants and some fifteen minutes was spent 
completing the two forms below. This allowed for setting a relaxed 
atmosphere to the interviews and allowing an easier flow of information 
exchange.    
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Appendix 5 – Participants’ details  
 
The 53 formal participants’ details are listed here below, principally 
indicating the length of time that each gave to the research effort. Many 
pointing out that if this project were to do well for the country’s economy 
and for its people; it would be a good project to achieve. Few participants 
asked for their names to be suppressed, even when radical anti-government 
propositions were voiced. When a participant asked for his or name to be 
supressed, that participant was referred to as ‘Sir’ or by his first name only - 
usually it was ‘Mohamed’- and the family name was struck out of all 
records. Few women were willing, or had the opportunity to be asked to take 
part in the project, but of the few that did take part, all were willing to be 
referred to by name, even when in one case, an emotionally disturbing event 
from 1989 was recounted.  
 
In total, 105 formal interviews were completed with the 53 formal 
participants. All interviews were recorded for a total interview time of 135 
hours and 25 minutes and consisting of 1,230,986 K bytes.  
 
In addition to these recorded interviews, recordings of informal discussions, 
radio interviews and group discussions with individuals unwilling to be 
named or sign any documentation, were also transcribed, remaining 
unnamed and untitled, but included as valid information for the qualitative 
analysis achieved with NVivo 9.3 software .   
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Appendix 6 – Evidence Woodside’s US$ 100 million entered the State budget 
 
Copy of a report obtained from Mohamed Ould Lemine Dahi on the request 
of Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. The report is entitled “Prime Minister’s 
summary report of the activities of the government during the “transition 
period”, 3 August 2005 to 5 March 2007”.  
 
In this report on page 34, Woodside’s US 100 million is mention as having 
entered into the state budget. Translated the following passage reads, “On 
the matter of public finances, our country is favoured by a budgetary surplus 
which had not been anticipated at the time that the 2006 budget was adopted 
(an exceptional bonus of US 100 million received as repayment for a 
payment shortfall from the petroleum company, Woodside ;...). 
 
NOTE: Photocopy machines were difficult to come by and copiers that 
worked effectively were impossible to find. This is the best copy proof I 
could muster for the quality of document in the first place. 
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Appendix 7 – Mauritanian government press release 6 February 2006 
 
In this document the Minister of Energy and Petroleum, a member of the 
Mauritanian military junta of Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall, accuses Woodside 
Petroleum Limited of corruption and of preparing for illegally future gain. 
Official production had not begun as yet from the Chinguetti oilfield, and the 
illegal gain was to be from production sharing amendments which were not 
formally agreed to by the Mauritanian government and thus were to be 
illegally applied to future production of petroleum from Chinguetti, meant to 
begin 26 February 2006, some two weeks later..  
 
The shortfall of revenue due to the government is indicated to be some US 
100 million, fortuitously almost equal to the loan acquired from Stirling 
Resources to acquire the full 16% of joint venture participation in the 
Chinguetti production venture.    
 
Woodside carried out an extensive environmental impact study (to ‘high’ 
Australian standard) and indicated that in the very remote event of an oil 
spill occurring and at a specific time of the year, high pollution of the 
heavily fished waters offshore from Banc d’Arguin would result. The 
Mauritanian political elites especially receive rent from (legal and illegal) 
agreements with foreign fishing fleets, and such an eventuality was seen by 
the junta personnel as a grave endangerment of their rent-seeking behaviour.  
 
NOTE: Photocopy machines were difficult to come by and copiers that 
worked effectively were impossible to find. This is the best copy proof I 
could muster for the quality of document in the first place. 
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Appendix 8 – Govt Memorandum explaining the dispute with Woodside 
This memorandum was circulated widely within Mauritania only (unlike the 
note in Appendix 7). The operators and active companies received this 
document as did the members of the government. 
 
The object of the document is to explain the position of the Mauritanian 
State in the dispute with Woodside. The argument revolves around three 
principal points of contention: 
 
1. The clauses of the production sharing contracts previously agreed 
with the Mauritanian Government  
 
2. The ‘problems’ caused by the amendments to these contracts that 
have only now been brought to light by the company. 
 
3. The conclusion that the state of Mauritania draws from this situation.  
 
NOTE: Photocopy machines were difficult to come by and copiers that 
worked effectively were impossible to find. This is the best copy proof I 
could muster for the quality of document in the first place. 
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Appendix 9 – Participants’ views on relationship of petroleum and upheavals 
 
Participants’ comments on the relevance of petroleum and its connection to 
social and political disruptive events between 2001 and 2011 in Mauritania 
 
Note: The quotes below make up 98 kilobytes of data and represent less than 
0.01% of the 1.2 million kilobytes of data collected in the course of 
participant interviews. 
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1.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q07A 110406 Peulh Bank employee       
      Ly Questionnaire> - § 2 references coded [1.03% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.41% Coverage 
 
Participant I believe that if it is well managed, the money from oil can be placed 
where it should be placed. That is to say in the health, education and 
development sectors. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.61% Coverage 
 
Participant  We have fishing. Well, unfortunately fishing has not been well 
managed. Ok, it has been well exploited but the country has not really 
taken advantage of the benefits because of the poor management of 
this sector. Right, now we must prevent this from happening in the oil 
sector.  
 
 
2.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q11A 110407 Maur Ex-Senator        
      Questionnaire 11A> - § 2 references coded [1.86% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.35% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Do you think that the "Taya" coup d’état with the removal of Taya 
and the set-up of the junta, with Mohammed Vall… had been 
hastened by oil? It happened before the discovery of oil. 
Participant In my opinion, no! In my opinion, it does not come from oil. 
Researcher Where does it come from? 
Participant No, because Taya’s regime had become unpopular, very unpopular! 
People did not… hum… there were elections, which were fraudulent 
each time, according to the majority of people …, but the common 
people could not accept that any longer. Well, all that, it is in … but 
the coup d’état … er … there was an attempt of a coup d’état at first 
in 2003, by the military. The civilians did not intervene in there. 
However, the military, themselves did not agree on the way to run 
things and they thought there were many injustices. Taya, he works 
for his family, because his family… the wealthiest people in 
Mauritania, are from his family… 
 
Reference 2 - 0.51% Coverage 
 
Participant  … there are both sides to the issue … That is to say the tribe tries to 
put its people around the President but the President … the one who 
has the power, he uses the people from his tribe to strengthen his 
power. This is because they are the first people he trusts, the people 
from his family and his tribe... In my opinion. 
No… in my opinion, oil has not played a part in it. 
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3.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q19A Maur Hotel PDG Niang     
      Questionnaire 19B> - § 1 reference coded [0.53% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.53% Coverage 
 
Participant  So to answer your question, even if the money from oil has not 
affected all sides, it was a determining factor. In what we call the 
financial issues, they were huge in a very short timeframe in 2005 and 
2010. 
 
 
4.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q20A 110415 Maur Hotel Pool     
      Attendant Questionnaire 20A> - § 3 references coded [1.34% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.31% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Did you find the system of the foreigners, who came for the oil, was 
good for example? 
Participant Yes, it was good to see them because economically it made the hotel 
profitable [telephone rings], which is our source of income. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.72% Coverage 
 
Participant  As far as the general Mauritanian society is concerned… Really. We 
have not seen the money from oil. However, within the hotel, we saw 
people come in and who represented good revenue for the hotel, and 
which is our source of income for us who work in the hotel. So that, 
we saw that. In return, too, the 2,000 employees who worked with 
Woodside were a good thing as well because I know some people 
who worked there; they were well paid and very pleased with their 
wages. Nevertheless, the population has not really seen the money 
from oil. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.31% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Do you believe that the 2005 coup was caused by oil? 
Participant … No. 
Researcher What caused the 2005 coup d’état? 
Participant Dissatisfied people. 
Researcher What with? 
Participant … With political management of Mauritania. 
 
 
5.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q21A 110415 Miscellaneous 
Questionnaire 20A> - § 3 references coded [3.92% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.60% Coverage 
 
Participant  … Four years ago or at the beginning of the oil era in Mauritania, 
hope rose from all corners of Mauritania. The work was there and 
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people were very happy about all that… However, Woodside started 
[and] a few years later, they left. However, I do not know what 
frightened them and made them go. I do not know. Maybe it is at the 
"highest levels" [the political elites]? 
 
Reference 2 - 1.24% Coverage 
 
Researcher  But oil had not yet arrived? It has to come really to make an effect? 
Because oil was going to come, they said "Let’s do it!" and overthrew 
the  
     others? 
 
Participant Because if oil is there, they will be the richest in Mauritania, they will  
do lots of things. Look at former President (Taya), he did nothing for 
the country, he did not even built infrastructures. He (Taya) did 
nothing for the country. He has done nothing for the country. Really, 
he has only made his entourage rich and the population suffered from 
hunger, and all that… 
Researcher So oil comes… Did he (Taya) have to be removed? 
Participant Yes, I think so, for me, I think it's [that]… 
Researcher So there is a link with oil. 
Participant Well, on one hand we can say that. On one hand, we can say that 
because of [or before] oil, we have to stop him (Taya). Nevertheless, 
he had already done a lot of damage and he was definitely very 
unpopular!!! 
 
Reference 3 - 2.08% Coverage 
 
Participant  There are people who did not even know that Mauritania has iron ore. 
We also have fish, we have… 
Researcher And yet, as we said, SNIM has not… 
Participant As I said, Sir, this SNIM building [the hotel building is owned by 
SNIM] is like a drop in the ocean. This is an asset… A property asset. 
For example, SNIM… … … … should have done a lot more… they 
could have major building sites in the country with warehouses, 
schools, health centres, they would have distributed "things", 
medicine in the schools, in the health centres. That, that is what 
people needed… Educate the children, build higher education 
institutions a bit everywhere in Mauritania, build health centres and 
equip them in the most remote places of Mauritania, set up 
agricultural permits to fight poverty. … Irrigated Agricultural permits 
for the fight against poverty, [for] food security in towns inside the 
country.  
It is there that the need is very important.  
Nevertheless, SNIM is there! SNIM, which is a big company, that 
turns over billions of ouguiyas per year in the infrastructure field and 
which has, [for example] the hotels.  
However, for all that, it fails to help the population, the poor who are 
in the country… They really are the sons of the country. We should 
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expect great social initiatives from SNIM or returns [from the 
petroleum production] in this country.  
However, people do not see any of this! We see nothing of iron ore or 
petroleum [revenues]!  
We do not see it. We do not see any of it! 
 
 
 
 
6.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q23A 110416 Maur Hotel Reception     
      Athié Questionnaire 23A> - § 1 reference coded [0.59% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.59% Coverage 
 
Participant  Maybe it is a coincidence [that Taya was overthrown as the petroleum   
began to be produced].   
Researcher A coincidence? 
Participant But maybe people had not wanted him anymore for a very long time. 
It is just that they did not have the opportunity to remove him 
officially.  
Researcher  A coincidence that is very, very difficult to deny? 
Participant But even so it is a coincidence, I do think it is a coincidence… 
 
 
7.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q26A 110419 Maur Hotel   
      Accountant Dia Questionnaire 26A> - § 1 reference coded [1.91% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.91% Coverage 
 
Participant  Us Mauritanians, we do not like petroleum. Where there is petroleum, 
there are problems.  
Researcher Exactly, that is indeed what I am studying!  
Participant Where there is petroleum, there are problems. For us, thank God, for 
the moment, we do not have this problem because in all of the oil 
operations, there are all the people working there; there are the Moors, 
there are the Harpulaar, there is everybody… There is no racial 
distinction. [His body language gives the appearance that he is not 
telling the truth?] … 
Researcher Wait, wait. I did not understand at all what you said. 
Participant I said that with oil… which people are interested in this resource? 
People that work in that industry to earn a living! The people who 
work in oil, they are Mauritanians. There are all sorts. There are the 
Harpulaar, there are… Moreover, everybody works. The Moors, the 
Harpulaar… Therefore, everyone gains something for his or her own 
life. That is why for us, we want God to help us overcome that 
problem of oil...  
Researcher  You do not want the oil? 
Participant Oil always brings problems because it comes from the Westerners. 
The Americans will do everything so people will fight each other; 
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they come to support someone, to win petroleum. The French, it is the 
same. What they do in Libya, Libya now, why haven't they started 
that with the Ivory Coast? Because there is oil! Qatar, they don't have 
any oil anymore, they want to come to Libya to take over the oil. Us, 
we're aware of that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q29A 110420 MAUR Entrepreneur   
      Ba Questionnaire 29A> - § 1 reference coded [1.04% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.04% Coverage 
 
Participant Well, that I don't know. Myself, I'm not… I don't make such analysis. 
I know that whenever there's been a coup d’état, there's been oil, but 
…. I heard that there's oil here in Mauritania, but I haven't seen 
anything of it yet. I have seen no benefits from it… 
 
 
9.   <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q37A 111214 Maur Senegal   
      Historian N’Gaïde General Disc Q37A> - § 1 reference coded [0.59% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.59% Coverage 
 
Participant Anyway, me, when they said that oil was discovered, I was scared. 
Because I thought about all those African countries, where there's 
been a real mess. Nigeria… The example that comes to my mind is 
Nigeria where there's all that crime! We're in an extremely fragile 
zone, here in Mauritania… What with the arrival of Al-Qaeda in this 
area, the lack of democracy in the Mauritanian situation… 
 
 
10. <Internals\\Interviews - Afro-Mauritanians\\Q38A 111220 Maur Street   
      Discussion on International Relations 38A> 
 
Reference 1 - 6.65% Coverage 
 
Participant: So, it's not possible that us, simple citizens, we shouldn't eat that little 
bit. Therefore, it stays, and you, you're on the right track. You know 
what's happening. You know the quantity that has gone. You know 
the quantity. You can estimate. 
Researcher: But you too can verify the quantity. You have access to the internet! 
Participant: I can verify the quantity. 
Researcher: Absolutely! 
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Participant:  I can verify the quantity but if I want to verify the quantity, and it's a 
lot, I become angry because I haven't “tasted” any. If it's little… 
there's no need to talk about oil or that oil is still under the sea. It's 
still in the same spot. It hasn't come out yet. 
Researcher: What needs to be done is that the country needs to understand how 
companies want to be treated. It's not… They don't want to steal. 
Nowadays, companies don't want to steal. There's too much control. 
Nevertheless, Mauritanians continue to say, "They're going to steal 
from us! They're going to steal from us!” No. The company needs to 
be managed in a certain way. The company has to come into a country 
like Mauritania, knowing how to deal with people because there's a 
great lack of… 
Participant: trust? 
Researcher:  Of trust, but which comes from a lack of cultural knowledge. They 
don't understand your culture but neither do you understand the 
foreigners' culture. It's the same. You both have this problem. 
Participant: Yes.  
Researcher:  Both of you! 
 
 
 
11. <Internals\\Interviews - Black Maures\\Q22A 110416 Maur Hotel Reception   
      Isselmou Questionnaire 22A> - § 1 reference coded [2.58% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.58% Coverage 
 
Researcher  The country could become sick with the 'oil curse' then? Which means 
social problems, coups d’état, clans… clan battles, ethnic battles… 
Participant Me, I don't know… because it's a bit complicated… Still I would say 
that if he [President Abdel Aziz] continues in the same vein, he would 
do a lot for the country... Nevertheless, there is a negative side that he 
refuses to acknowledge [the hardship of the population]... 
Researcher Which is? 
Participant It is that 'social justice'. We need this justice! 
Researcher This social justice must come…? 
Participant We need social justice for all Mauritanians. Put a just system in place 
for everybody and not just for a particular ethnic group. [He should 
attempt to] reunite all Mauritanians… something that the state… I can 
say it, refuses to do!! …. 
Researcher It refuses to do it? 
Participant … I emphasise that the state refuses to fully commit itself to settle an 
issue which is capital … the issue of society is a [grave] danger. 
That's what I say.  
I give the example of Tunisia; who would have believed… No one 
would have ever believed that it would happen in Tunisia one day. 
Researcher Tunisia was very stable, yes! 
Participant There's a Wolof proverb, which says, "If you carry on putting water 
into a pot, if water reaches the opening, the water will spill out. So 
before water reaches the lip of the pot, one has to find a solution to 
calm it, to settle it"… This means [in the case of the Mauritanian 
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society] that a social solution needs to be found. We're not a 
complicated population. Mauritania doesn't have a complicated 
population… All you have to do is sort out that social justice… to 
establish social justice and to give people food and water. That's all. I 
think that Mauritania is not a complicated country to manage… 
However, people mustn't take side with a particular community 
[ethnicity] you do this and favour one ethnicity over another … It is 
serious… 
 
 
12. <Internals\\Interviews - Black Maures\\Q35A 111211 Maur Political Science    
      Lecturer Zakaria gen disc Q35A> - § 1 reference coded [0.31% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.31% Coverage 
 
Participant  Yes, but we haven't taken our oil out yet. We don't plan much, do we? 
(laughter) 
Researcher Let's hope that it doesn't come yet, at least for a while, for the… 
Participant I agree with you.  
 
 
13. <Internals\\Interviews - Mixed-blood Mauritanians\\Q05A 110404 Maur Tourist   
      Shop partner Questionnaire 05A WMA> - § 1 reference coded [0.28% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage 
 
Participant Mauritanians expected this [oil] money. However, this money didn't 
reach the poor. Rich people become richer and richer instead… … 
 
 
14. <Internals\\Interviews - Mixed-blood Mauritanians\\Q06A 110405 Maur    
      Receptionist Fatimetou Questionnaire> - § 1 reference coded [3.98% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.98% Coverage 
 
Participant Frankly, I can't say much about oil, but I can say that at the time of 
[the discovery of the] oil deposits [offshore in 2001 to 2005], it did a 
lot of good for the country. [There was a lot of work] and the people 
really benefited from it. This did us… 
Researcher Money that came in? [There was a lot of economic] activities? 
Participant Money came in! 
Researcher Lots of employment? 
Participant There was a lot of employment, but it also caused some harm because 
lots of people… it's at that time that housing prices skyrocketed. 
Researcher Ah, inflation arrived? 
Participant … That's it! Therefore, because it was oil industry foreigners, they 
were ready to rent houses at any price. That meant, at the time, house 
owners were increasing rental prices on all houses. Therefore, we can 
say that on one side that was good for the country, while on the other 
hand, for the ordinary people, that wasn't so good at all... 
Researcher For the ordinary people, the situation was not the best? 
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Participant … That's it. It was very uncomfortable for the ordinary people 
because they could not meet those sorts of rents [as prices rose]. Live 
was in all becoming very expensive... 
Researcher … Do you think that the way of life, the standard of living that this oil  
activity brought about, in fact raised everybody's living standards? 
Participant … [It did, but] only for some. 
Researcher For some. For whom? 
Participant For some. For some, that brought change. 
Researcher For whom? 
Participant For people who owned houses or companies or something, how to say 
that? 
Researcher The wealthy have even richer lives, [although they already live well]? 
Participant … That's it! 
Researcher The poor became poorer. 
Participant They became poorer in general. The exception was for those that were 
recruited [in the petroleum industry] . For the rest, you can't say 
that… 
Researcher There wasn’t any improvement? 
Participant  [you can't say] that there were no improvements. 
 
 
15. <Internals\\Interviews - Mixed-blood Mauritanians\\Q09B 110407 Maur Hotel   
      Gen Manager Questionnaire 09B> - § 1 reference coded [0.54% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.54% Coverage 
 
Participant Already with that [the 1989 ethnic problems and the reign of the 
colonels], that's was the end [of the country]. If there now wasn't the 
beginning of activities related to geological exploration for oil and 
minerals… There would be no one [coming to Mauritania]… …  
 
 
16. <Internals\\Interviews - Mixed-blood Mauritanians\\Q27A 110419 Maur   
      Journalist Barrada Questionnaire 27A> - § 2 references coded [6.90% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.71% Coverage 
 
Participant  That will happen, I know, because where there is wealth at a 
geopolitical level, it can then create - how can you say that again -  it 
can cause a malevolent effects … That is to say the reverse of what 
we want. 
Researcher Isn’t that what has already happened…? 
Participant What? Ah yes... 
Researcher Isn’t that what has already happened…? 
Participant No, no, here we have nothing. 
 
Reference 2 - 6.19% Coverage 
 
Researcher  The flow of petroleum begins…. Oil production is forecast in 
February 2006; on February 26th, 2006 and there's the coup d’état in 
August 2005. 
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Participant … Yes... that… 
Researcher Skulduggeries by Woodside are reported by the government on 6th 
February 2006. 
Participant Yes, yes, yes, you're right, there is...  
Researcher There's a link, there's a link, isn't there? 
Participant No, no, that was an interpretation that there was the coup d’état and 
all that... Nevertheless, was there...? 
Researcher Wait, wait… That [event] was a coup or wasn't it a coup? 
Participant That was a coup d’état. 
Researcher But it happened six months before oil [began to flow]? 
Participant Yes  
Researcher [so you say that] there's no link? 
Participant As a researcher and a journalist there's a link. That was predicted, it 
was said that there would be issues with oil [revenues], [but] what is 
often [also] said, is that if there are other reasons, there are other 
issues, behind all that… 
Researcher So this tsunami [of revenues], the great wave of financial resources 
arrives in Mauritania… 
Participant No, but that [link] cannot be confirmed at 100%. 
Researcher No, no, no! Not everything can be confirmed, [I understand]… That's 
a dream?  
Participant No, no, I say that it was a coup d’état; is there a link between the coup 
d’état and the discovery of oil?  
Researcher Yes [that is what I am asking]? 
Participant That cannot be said at 100% because there was an accumulation of 
issues. 
Researcher And as a journalist, do you think there's a link? 
Participant We can say there's a link. We can say that. I don't confirm it. As a 
journalist, I cannot confirm that… 
Researcher Is a journalist always sure of what he says…?  
Participant No, no, no, no, come on…  
Researcher Even when there are stupidities…? (laughs) 
Participant No, no, no, no, but on the other hand, as a journalist… I am also an 
analyst.  
Researcher Oh, really? 
Participant If you have a hypothesis. If you can't talk about uncertainties on a 
socio-political phenomenon, since I know that, it has to be examined 
within an historical framework. There was an accumulation [of 
issues], there was frustration [in the population], there were several 
major problems and, a power, you realise that had lasted more than 20 
years and was beginning to really [be beyond the "use by date"]… 
people have changed; that's what is happening in Libya, there's 
already oil [at the centre of the issues]… 
Researcher … But, you're telling me that the cost of change was a door that 
opened and a door that shut. It's the same people around Abdel Aziz. 
So what are you telling me? 
Participant Ah yes, they are the same, the same, the same people but, but why? 
There were [many] other coups and other attempts before the 
discovery of oil. 
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Researcher The Oualad Nasr before? 
Participant Ah yes, so that adds to the issues…. Since the system in place is what 
we call "change from the street". "Change from the street" because 
people are really trying to regulate their living conditions so that in 
fact it doesn't affect them [there are no negative issues to deal with]. 
Look at what's currently happening in Egypt. Everyone is predicting 
that the president is going to be imprisoned because there's a change 
from the bottom. So we're going to arrange everything and so the 
previous system, we're going to set him up, and even the former 
minister and all {incomprehensible!] ... What happened with Ely 
Mohamed Vall since he was in the same system; he tried to talk and 
avoid the settling of [old] scores according to his vision. Maybe he 
didn't want to share things at 100% with others as they had carried out 
a “Palace coup". 
 
 
17. <Internals\\Interviews - Mixed-blood Mauritanians\\Q31A 110421 Maur Hotel     
      Restaurant Head Aly Questionnaire 28A (3)> - § 5 references coded [11.39%  
      Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.69% Coverage 
 
Participant  I am like a lot of Mauritanians who can't smell the scent of petroleum! 
(Laughs)… Like many Mauritanians, we only hear about "petroleum, 
petroleum, petroleum”… However, we have gained nothing… As for 
me, personally I have seen nothing [of petrol or of its revenues]! For 
me, a small clique [of elites] shares any revenues that come from this 
petroleum… … 
 
Reference 2 - 0.55% Coverage 
 
Participant … I remember when I was at college, for example. I had a teacher 
who used to tell me "If SNIM was well managed - if the mining 
operations were well managed - all Mauritanians would have a 
salary… There wouldn't be any poor people here! " 
 
Reference 3 - 5.23% Coverage 
 
Researcher  [Civil] society didn't gain anything from the exploitation of the 
country’s natural resources…? 
Participant … The fish? We were always told that Mauritania's waters were the 
richest waters in fish in the world. So there should normally be 
revenues [from these resources], and benefits should be huge… These 
benefits, what should they normally be used for in a country? They’re 
for infrastructures, for education, health and all that.  
That's it when we say that. For example, we say that the Ivory Coast 
has cocoa, sells cocoa. Normally the benefits must be used for other 
things. There's the example of Senegal; Senegal is rich, but knowing 
that the state compared to us - they have nothing. The subsoil in 
Mauritania is very rich, according to what we hear, what we see on… 
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Researcher " Rich" you say? in minerals [ore deposits] you mean?  
Participant Rich, as in ore deposits!! Normally when it's well managed, when the 
benefits are well managed, we should exceed regardless! The 
[Mauritanian] market economy should be greater than Senegal's, or 
greater than the other bordering countries' economies, really! 
However, [here in Mauritania] in my view, [we suffer from] poor 
management, embezzlement of funds, corruption and [much more of] 
all that … 
Researcher Nepotism? 
Participant Nepotism, what does that mean? 
Researcher Nepotism means: "I give the job to my brother or to my…" 
Participant That's it, that's it, all this is in the image of... 
Researcher But who does that? 
Participant Who does that? It's the state, which must prevent that… However, it's 
the state, which is doing it… The state is at fault…   
In addition, I say that the foreign companies themselves are guilty… 
... For example, the World Bank and the IMF, finance [a project]. 
Normally when you finance something, you come later to check 
[progress]; you ask, "Is what I financed well managed?” … … “I” 
[the foreign institutions and lenders] come to check, see that nothing 
has been done… However, they keep funding their project! 
I believe that there is complicity with the lending partners. For me, I 
could not accept to finance billions and billions [of dollars], to change 
something, to improve something… [Come back] two or three years 
[after], and see [that nothing has been done!], and still carry on giving 
more… There's complicity or what?... There's complicity! If it were I, 
I would punish both the state, and the lending partners! 
 
Reference 4 - 2.17% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Do you think that the government manages the country’s natural  
resources revenues well? Whether it may be iron ore, gold or oil? 
Participant That's what I told you from the beginning. I said that if it was well 
managed, normally, Mauritania revenues should far exceed the level 
[at which it is currently!] … For me, the country is poorly managed. It 
is very poorly managed.   
I believe there is a small minority of elites who line their pockets. 
Who do  not care for the general population… Who only care about 
[lining their] pockets with money and enriching themselves… 
Because for me, a country which takes care of its resources; 
Education should be [paramount]… now!!! As far as education is 
concerned, [Mauritania], lacks schools, lacks colleges… 
Infrastructures should be much more developed, it should far exceed 
[what it is today]! Aziz has had some roads tarred in Nouakchott 
recently… Nevertheless, Mauritania, it's huge, it's not only 
Nouakchott! Yes, admittedly Nouakchott, is the capital city, [but that 
is not all]?? 
 
Reference 5 - 2.74% Coverage 
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Researcher Petroleum arrived at the beginning of 2006. There was the coup d’état 
in 2005, few months before. You think they [these events] are linked?  
Participant Me, I would not say that they are linked… Because in reality, even 
before oil, you could have felt the tension [societal pressure] 
beginning to rise…  
Researcher But, oil took some time to come really… 2001 for the first discovery; 
were there tensions before that? 
Participant … We knew that Maaouya's government was instable...  
Researcher Even before that? 
Participant There are some that say that it's since his wife died, you know? …. 
Taya was not an open man towards people… Since his wife - the 
other one - died, he marries one of his relatives, and he came under a 
lot of pressure … There you are, that is what the Maures are like! 
Researcher [Taya was under a lot of pressure] from the family? 
Participant That's it, since then, it's started... Then, there were the problems as 
well within the Maure tribes… It is true that they are united when it 
comes to fight the Negro-Africans, but amongst themselves… 
Between tribes, there are many problems… It has to be said 
nevertheless, that [Maaouya] made all the Maure tribes very rich … 
 
 
18. <Internals\\Interviews - Nationalists\\Q02A 110404 Maur Hotel Reservation off    
      Questionnaire> - § 5 references coded [5.47% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.39% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Iron had been a resource for the country since the seventies, at least. 
Do you think that it has helped the life of people here? Your own life, 
personally, for example?   
Participant I would say yes, on one hand, because we're really an iron-producing 
country so it's thanks to iron that we have in this country and which 
today has enabled the whole population, including myself, to live 
really, I think… reasonably well. Because really it's a great potential 
that we have, and that we're trying to exploit... 
 
Reference 2 - 1.29% Coverage 
 
Participant Yes, I would say yes. Yes, I would say yes, there are people who are 
comfortably off, whether Negro-Africans or Maures, and I think that 
all are intimately linked to the resources revenues of the country… 
Researcher But the general population , does it gain from this [exploitation of 
resources]?  
Participant Yes, he does [eventually] gains from [the exploitation of natural 
resources] because in fact, because X or Y [who has some of this 
revenue] comes to my shop to make a purchase for example, and I 
gains from it. Just as X or Y, that's it… 
Researcher There's a cascade. It's a “cascade effect”? 
Participant That's it! It's a cascade effect really… 
 
Reference 3 - 0.44% Coverage 
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Participant  Some people are favoured. They are the elites that reap profits from 
revenues ahead of the disfavoured masses. That's it! 
Researcher Whether that may be Negro-Africans or Maure? 
Participant That's right. The race or the skin colour does not matter, there are 
always [elites] that… [take advantage of the situation ahead of the 
common man]… … 
 
Reference 4 - 1.47% Coverage 
 
Researcher [Do you think that] oil going to change things for Mauritania [and its 
people] if it come in a big, big, big way?  
Participant Normally, it should change things… normally.  
Researcher How? 
Participant If it comes in big, it must induce change, but [as it comes, the elites] 
would have time to change to… to “line their pockets”, that's the 
problem. While, in reality, that period should be an opportunity to 
generate opportunities, give work to the people, to create and grow... 
… 
Researcher [Create] employment? 
Participant Really to achieve things! If that's… 
Researcher  [Raise ] the standard of living? 
Participant [The standard of living] and much more normally… However, this 
remains to be seen… Will it be the case or not?  
 
Reference 5 - 0.88% Coverage 
 
Researcher If [the government] manages [this resource] poorly, what will they do 
wrong? What will go wrong? 
Participant … There'll be a higher rate of employment, maybe. Instead of prices 
being lowered, maybe there will be [inflation] … That's not what we 
need. What we need is that everyone… 
Researcher  [has] employment? 
Participant  …[That everyone] has his job, that staples’ prices are cut, and all, 
that's it… 
 
 
 
 
19. <Internals\\Interviews - Nationalists\\Q12A 110408 Maur Hotel employee 1   
      Questionnaire 12A WMA> - § 4 references coded [4.89% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.43% Coverage 
 
Participant Oil, frankly, frankly, frankly… Me, I don't even believe that oil exists 
[in Mauritania]. Because, for few years when we had started to talk 
about oil, we thought that it would make our life a little easier at least. 
However, it made it more difficult. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.18% Coverage 
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Participant In fact, here, frankly, regarding the political side. It is a country that is 
not very stable, and that, well before oil. 
 
Reference 3 - 1.91% Coverage 
 
Researcher [what do you think would happen if all of a sudden] revenues [from 
the exploitation of] resources arrive, if suddenly, we find great oil 
resources…? 
Participant Yes…? 
Researcher Do you think that this money will find its way straight into the elites' 
pockets? On the other hand, will the President [Abdel Aziz] be more 
careful? 
Participant Well, frankly, it's difficult to predict. Because when we see… when 
we see what happens everywhere in Africa, oil has only increased the 
problems. It has only increased [society’s] problems. It has only 
increased the problems. If you see… Countries that have fewer natural 
resources, have fewer problems. 
Researcher We call that the “Oil Curse”… Do you think that's real? 
Participant Yes. For example, if we take our neighbour, Senegal, it’s very true 
that life [there] is very difficult. They don't have natural resources [as 
we do]. There is a greater population than in [Mauritania]… However, 
if you look closely at the country, they have fewer problems than 
other countries, which are [wealthier]…, which have oil and all that. 
You have never heard of coup d’états there [as in Mauritania]. The 
coup d’états, we only hear about them in countries in Africa where 
there's oil (laughs) in general…! 
 
Reference 4 - 2.36% Coverage 
 
Researcher Do you think that the August 2005 coup d’état was linked to oil that 
came in 2006? Indeed, was the failed coup d’état attempt which 
occurred in 2003 also linked to the 2006 beginning of petroleum 
production? 
Participant I would say, yes. 
Researcher Why?   
Participant … Why? It was because everyone wanted to get something out of the 
revenues for themselves. 
Researcher When you have the power… When you are in government, you have 
the potential to put your hand in the till? 
Participant Yes, yes… That’s right...!  
Researcher OK. Do you think that this is correct, because I just put these words in 
your mouth? 
Participant No, it's true. It's true. It's true. It's true! 
Researcher Don't you think that petroleum industry could bring lots of 
opportunities for the Mauritanians? Bring revenues for the country? 
Participant Of course. Of course. There would be many opportunities… 
Researcher For the society [the people]? 
Participant For Mauritanian society. However, the problem remains… Will these 
revenues be better managed? That's why I'm very careful with what I 
say. I have, for the moment, great hope in this president [Aziz]. 
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Nevertheless, for this country [Mauritania] coup d’états are an integral 
part of our culture…  of our political scene. In that area,  Mauritania is 
not stable at all! That's why... We never know what's going to happen 
tomorrow. 
 
 
20. <Internals\\Interviews - Nationalists\\Q13A 110410 Maur Activist politician   
      Questionnaire> - § 1 reference coded [1.03% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.03% Coverage 
 
Participant  … Never! It's never been the case [that the exploitation of natural 
resources in this country was well managed]. Never! Never in 50 
years of independence, have natural resources ever been well 
managed! Never! That's the great problem with this country! 
Researcher [Is it due to a] lack of transparency? … [to] embezzlement? 
Participant No, it's not even due to a lack of transparency… It's the systematic 
plundering by the elites of state revenues. 
Researcher It is Plundering? Is it embezzlement, corruption? 
Participant Plundering! That is exactly what I mean. I am saying that the 
[political] elites who watch over [our country and its natural 
resources] … are full of greed. They take everything for themselves 
and leave nothing for the [the general, impoverished population]. 
 
 
21. <Internals\\Interviews - Nationalists\\Q17A 110413 Maur Hotel Audit controller   
      Questionnaire 017A> - § 2 references coded [3.14% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.02% Coverage 
 
Participant I'm very, very, very optimistic. Why? Because, according to official 
statements, in a year or two, the government will be working on the 
situation in place for the whole population. That's why, I believe that 
in few years’ time and according to a [inaudible], what I learnt very 
recently [inaudible] that [there are [major petroleum discoveries in the 
north]… I met some people… I have a friend who works with the oil 
people in the North… 
Researcher with Total ? 
Participant Yes, with Total… Last year, they confirmed that in 2012 or 2013, 
Mauritania would be like the Gulf countries, because… 
 
 
 
 
Reference 2 - 2.11% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Do you think that the coup attempt in 2003 and the successful 2005 
coup, had a link with the oil discovery? 
Participant No, no, no! It has nothing to do with oil.!!! 
Researcher You don't think so? 
Participant No! 
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Researcher Don't you think that it was a question of grabbing power because oil 
[and oil revenues] was soon arriving? 
Participant No, no, no.! That is not it. It had nothing to do with it! 
Researcher Why? How can you say that [with such certainty]? How can you say it 
with such conviction! 
Participant It is because [with] the 2005 coup, Mauritanian society was in a sad 
place from an economical point of view and especially for the [civil] 
society. [Social instability] That was one of the two [main reasons]. 
[Secondly] there was a tribe, you could nearly say, which 
monopolized the State. 
Researcher Are you talking about the Smacides? 
Participant Yes, I am sorry, the Smacides. Today, there is another problem. Yet 
more tribes are trying to monopolize the State [and its resources and 
sources of revenues]! 
Researcher Was it another tribe? 
Participant Yes, it was another tribe, The Oualad Bousba. So that's why there was 
[a coup]… It is not oil [the reason for the 2005 coup]. If we now look 
at the State. There are people who have monopolised State [and its 
resources] in favour of the Oualad Bousba. They have taken all the 
opportunities…. They [have] "lots of luck" [in that position], while 
the others, the Smacides; they have lost everything! 
Researcher You mean that the family or the tribe at the top "turns the economic 
[resources and revenues]" towards themselves? 
Participant Yes! 
 
 
22. <Internals\\Interviews - Nationalists\\Q41A 111223 ex-President Ely M Vall on   
      US 100 million> - § 1 reference coded [3.56% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.56% Coverage 
 
Participant  I think that all companies in the world, be they oil companies [or 
others] ... … steal, cheat and often do so in an [open] way… What I 
am interested in, is that I do not let myself be ripped off, that's all. 
Researcher … does any agreement needs to be fair and equitable? 
Participant That's it! Fair! I told to Woodside; "… I will not treat you any other 
way but legally. Nevertheless, you are all guilty as accessories to this 
[unjust] situation. I will [now] request of you to restore the [legal and 
agreed] rights of my country! Once you have done that, I will treat 
you as if nothing had happened with the territory of Mauritania…. It 
will not be my problem [I will not hound you]… [It is just that] your 
accounts”... Never mind, all oil companies “cheat”, all companies 
“steal”, if they can get away with it. It's up to us to protect our 
national rights! 
Researcher [Rather than cheating, don’t you think that] It may be a matter of 
business negotiations? 
Participant Yes, that's what I mean! That is it, exactly! These are business 
negotiations. If someone is duped in a negotiation, or if someone 
yields, or even if an authority - official or not official – is conned, it's 
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his or her problem! I personally have no resentment towards the 
company, Woodside. I have absolutely no problem at all [with 
Woodside].  
I told Woodside; "You have despoiled [you have violated] Mauritania, 
you and your partners. I am not aware if it is you alone, because 
you're the leader of the group, or if it is all the partners [but you must 
restore the agreed contract clauses and pay a penalty]…” 
 
 
23. <Internals\\Interviews - Westerns\\Q39A 111221 Maur Anon French Nouakchott     
      Hotel owner on effect of oil> - § 9 references coded [10.90% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.27% Coverage 
 
Participant Basically, what has come about is that everyone has had his or her 
eyes full of… [duped]… there were dollar signs in their eyes, and 
everyone speculated. Everyone was persuaded that they would 
become rich and everything collapsed just as quickly. So, people who 
owned houses, etc., evicted the people who were lived there and 
began to rent at a price six times higher [bringing about inflation], and 
thinking to themselves: "The oil people will come an live in it [and 
we will become rich]!! ". Basically, there was the common impression 
"that something is going to happen". Everybody that invested 
themselves in this "something ", when [in the end] there was nothing! 
 
Reference 2 - 0.57% Coverage 
 
Participant  Well me, when, at a certain moment, I was told, finally, there may be 
things which will come out, etc. I wasn't persuaded that it was a good 
thing. First, because we have not seen lots of countries, which have oil 
[and at the same time] have a political stability. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.66% Coverage 
 
Participant   They [the elites] were persuaded that we were going to end up like an 
“African Dubai”. 
Researcher  Were you going to be rich? 
Participant  … Yes, and it would be like Dubai… Of course, you understand, that 
there is a lot to be done in order to create a place so structured as to 
resemble Dubai, "there is a big margin" and we have a major problem 
of "organisational skill" here in Mauritania [but, still they dreamt]!! 
 
Reference 4 - 1.43% Coverage 
 
Participant At one period, huge advertisement billboards went up. The 
enthusiasm [Woodside’s 2001 petroleum discovery generated]  was 
fascinating! What did these billboards say? … The billboard showed a 
huge photo that was the Dubai skyscrapers with the Nouakchott Saudi 
mosque photoshopped in the middle… It was meant to show 
Nouakchott… I wonder if it was not political.  
Researcher Was that supposed to represent Nouakchott? 
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Participant Yes, it was represent Nouakchott in 2020…  
Researcher That was not a political [poster]. It was one of the business elites… I 
think that it was Ould Nouegued. That billboard panel was on the road 
leaving the airport, at the roundabout. 
Participant Yes, that is correct! 
Researcher A big billboard said "Nouakchott 2020".  
Participant  That's it! 
 
Reference 5 - 1.01% Coverage 
 
Researcher   Don’t you think that the Mauritanian [government] has the mentality 
[to be able to manage a tsunami of benefits from the natural resources 
in the country]?  
Participant  Well look, hasn't the government indeed negotiated, or will negotiate, 
exclusively for his [Aziz] benefit and for the benefit of his tribe? 
Researcher Why? Has this happened? Will it happen? 
Participant But of course! Hasn't it happened already? The arrival of Woodside and the 
perturbed [period in Mauritania] was “financed”… There's was [plenty of] 
"money passed under the table"? Where did it go? Have “the people” seen 
it? 
 
Reference 6 - 3.39% Coverage 
 
Participant What I see and make of this… [This corruption is] in the real estate, 
and the industry faltered. [It is present in the] hospitality industry, that 
industry has faltered. Which means it's the same [everywhere in 
Mauritania]. Many people had constructed houses [and hotels}, thinking that 
they could also participate in “eating the cake”… 
Researcher Ah, so it's not the oil's fault, then? 
Participant   It is not the fault of oil! It is not the fault of oil at all! 
Researcher  Is it not the fault of oil? 
Participant  I don't put the blame on oil [at all]. I mean, oil like any other “thing”, 
we need it. I don't have a problem with that. What I mean is that I'm 
not sure that it is a good thing to learn that there's oil in Mauritania. 
It's not the same thing at all!  
I don't put any blame on oil.  
I say that according to the current situation, and seeing how it works 
here, seeing that the “faults” [of Mauritania]! … That's it, I mean, let's 
imagine that indeed we do find significant oil. I have no problem with 
oil. It's as if I said I had a problem with water. "I don't like that there's 
too much water in this country”. That's not the question. [The 
question] is "Are we capable of managing it or not? ", and for me, 
"[it's] no! ". 
Researcher Don't you think so? 
Participant    Honestly, I would prefer that we restrict ourselves to our fishery, our 
ores and you know, kind of [leave the petroleum for] the Senegalese [ 
to deal with]. It would work out very well! I think that [oil] can be 
detrimental [to the development and security of a country], just as it can be 
[a] positive [precipitator of development]… I saw examples where [indeed] 
it was detrimental, and here [in Mauritania], where we have nearly 
nothing… I felt that it was going to be very harmful. Therefore, if we indeed 
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have [significant reserves of] of oil, I can imagine the extent to which it 
could be more than harmful. That's all, full stop…   
 
Reference 7 - 0.86% Coverage 
 
Researcher  When a country discovers oil and the country next to it does not 
discover oil, the Gross National Product of the country that does not 
have oil increases whereas the GNP of country with oil decreases. 
Why do you think that happens?  
Participant Well, that wouldn't surprise me… How many oil-producing countries 
either are in civil war or have a high level of instability? 
 
Reference 8 - 0.37% Coverage 
 
Participant If [oil] is indeed a catalyst of events that cause instability, [then] in a 
[socio-political] climate which is not going very well [as in 
Mauritania], then you are not supposed to add to it [such a detrimental 
catalyst], you see? 
 
Reference 9 - 1.34% Coverage 
 
Participant We have had, and that for a long time, what is needed to meet the 
needs of people of Mauritania effectively and for [economic 
activities] to be into place [by now]… However, there has been 
absolutely no development, none at all! In addition, no one [of the 
ordinary population] receives adequately in order to maintain an 
appropriate standard of living. No one even sees the colour [of the 
money that comes in to the country], is able to smell it or whatever 
you want. Therefore, because of this environment, does it not seem 
logical that I consider most dangerous the petroleum industry [and its 
revenues] which are being established [in my country]! Especially 
given that it does not and will not [feed the population]. Consider the 
fact that we still have people in this country who are suffering from 
hunger, that it is difficult to get food, and this in spite of the fact that 
our waters have the most abundant resources of fish on the planet… 
 
 
24. <Internals\\Interviews - Westerns\\Q51A 120130 Maur Woodside Exploration   
      Director 51A> - § 1 reference coded [1.26% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.26% Coverage 
 
Participant I recall at the time, and through your research, you may be able to get 
a handle on this as well: it was that… The story I heard, whether it’s 
true or not but the story I heard, was that there was a US$ 100 million 
blowout in the Mauritanian government budget for the [2007] 
financial year. 
Researcher Yes? 
Participant In order to balance their books and demonstrate that they were 
managing their funds well, the government needed to find US$ 100 
million. That is where I think the magic number of US$ 100 million 
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came from. As I said, you are probably in a better position to 
understand the background of that. However, that was something I do 
remember hearing at the time. 
 
 
25. <Internals\\Interviews - Westerns\\Q52A 120130 Maur Woodside Exploration   
      Manager in Maur 52A> - § 1 reference coded [3.58% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.58% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Was there a link between the petroleum and the coups that occurred in 
2003, 2005 or 2008. Was instability in the government causing the 
problem or…? 
Participant This is… One can never be certain on any of these things because it’s 
politics. Nevertheless, the country, when we went there, was very 
much ruled by “The President” who had been there since the late 
seventies [actually 1984]. In addition, he is… He’d been very 
autocratic in what he’d done. He was looking after his own tribal 
people [but] he was quite well respected. Still, he was getting older 
and you could sense that the people were waiting for a little change in 
the future. Probably the change was accelerated when hydrocarbons 
were found, because that then said their economy was likely to change 
from being nomadic or… Most of their economy was “laundering” 
and fish… 
 
26. <Internals\\Interviews - Westerns\\Q53A 120227 Maur Woodside Maur Country   
      Manager 53A> - § 2 references coded [5.05% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.46% Coverage 
 
Participant If you go back to the changes made in government, there was this 
desire to bring an oil ministry into fruition. 
Researcher And an oil company as well. Remember? 
Participant And the Chinguetti production project under the oil Ministry! That 
was an interesting situation because the models that they were 
proposing, were models that were drafted and put together by the 
Tunisians. These was influenced by the [Shankar?] group which had 
close ties to the Trabelsi family [the family of the wife of ex-President 
Ben Ali] … because its leader was [also] Tunisian, tied to many elite 
families in that country, and tied himself to the [Trabelsi] tribe. Thus, 
out of nowhere comes the influence of the Tunisians in setting up an 
organisation [for the petroleum industry]. 
Researcher Very, very interesting and very messy… 
Participant That was not that clear and transparent. It was to the chagrin of the 
World Bank, because the World Bank saw that “governance and 
transparency were keys, if this revenue stream was going to be 
established”. They had a project called PRISM 2. It was particularly 
aligned with the mining industry. Part of that PRISM project was to 
enhance the government’s capability to manage the new revenue 
streams. Therefore, there was a big push to try to see if PRISM 2 
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could actually be broadened to take it on board, [and] help structure 
the government to manage these new streams, educating them with 
the new capability to do so. However, that was rejected by ministers 
and certain other people, because of the tie-up between the contractors 
such as Shankar, and the ministers and elites.  
 
Reference 2 - 1.59% Coverage 
 
Researcher  Is there a link between the grab for power and oil in that country,     
[especially in the light of] the beginning of the oil industry? 
Participant … There's no question that is this case, that it is a significant 
[factor]… I don't think it's the only thing. It's a significant [factor]. 
Because there [was] a perception… that any revenue stream [or] 
benefit was going to go to the privileged lot… Because of that, it 
probably emboldened people to say, “No, we can't keep doing this… 
Here is probably, our one and only opportunity to really do something 
significant and give us the ability to better ourselves… We’re not just 
going to sit by and let it happen without us doing something about it!” 
 
 
27. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q08A 110406 Maur Commercial 
Manager   
      Habib Questionnaire> - § 2 references coded [1.58% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.45% Coverage 
 
Participant In the industry, in which I am working, it has created many activities, 
it has created investments, it has attracted new foreign companies are 
based here in our country… Therefore, that is very positive. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.13% Coverage 
 
Participant So, the criticism that is levelled at this situation, you see, is that the 
government is becoming dependent upon these foreign companies and 
will facilitate a company’s entry and operations, instead of making 
live more pleasant for the voters that have brought in the government. 
The government does obtain some taxes for population, and so the 
government must treat the voting individual very well, as it is his vote 
that count! In fact, here, I am in fact talking about my pet-subject, but 
in cases where a company pays big revenues, for example an oil 
company, the government [does its bidding and] doesn't give a damn 
about the little people. Nevertheless, that is where Abdel Aziz does 
very well at the moment. 
 
 
28. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q16A 110411 Maur Hotel accountant   
      Questionnaire 16A WMA> - § 2 references coded [0.82% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.14% Coverage 
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Participant Mauritania is a very rich country. It has all the opportunities... to 
grow. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference 2 - 0.68% Coverage 
 
Researcher  So there are huge revenues (inaudible). How would Mauritania handle 
this? 
Participant … Even if [Mauritania found] its own], Mauritania would never 
develop… Because of its elites!! 
Researcher Does money runs into the elites' pockets? 
Participant The people who… the people who run this [country]… They don't… 
There's no transparency. There's always…there's always [social] 
injustice. 
 
 
29. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q25A 110418 Maur Hotel Economist 
Sidi   
      Questionnaire 25A> - § 2 references coded [1.73% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.27% Coverage 
 
Participant  Well, I have an idea but I can't tell you exactly. I don't know what was 
really generated by petroleum. I know, however, that during the years 
2003, 2002, 2004, until 2005, regarding the hotel business… …. Oil 
brought much [revenues]... 
 
Reference 2 - 1.46% Coverage 
 
Participant  For example, we are in a country where there is a decree that forbids 
alcohol. The thing is, I would prefer a [special] site to be demarked 
[for its consumption]… Because I have seen [things]! Because there 
are things that we [culturally] do not know! If children, our children 
went in there [his hands go into the air in supplication]… We are 
Maures… It is the Westerners who come, who do these [bad things]… 
[It is] those who come… What our religion forbids us [to do]; we 
have to respect [its rules]. So [special places] should have been 
created. That is what has now to be done…  
Researcher So that Westerners can [have their entertainment]? 
Participant So that Westerners can… Even if it i on the beach, or in private 
hotels, or in closed places. It has to be for them. However, it is not 
going to be… 
Researcher Open? 
Participant  [It must be]… Divided, [not] open. It is not good for the country's 
religion. You know, when you're told, that it's a Muslim country… 
Researcher It has to be respected! 
Participant … And [at the present time] it's not being respected. There may be 
other changes [driven by the westerners’ influence] which will drive 
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[some] to terrorism, which will drive to lots of things, [people] who 
don't want their country to be poor, well we'll have an idea… 
Researcher Is it Corruption?  
Participant … We will have an impression that the country may be conquered 
[overrun?] by Westerners [and their values]. 
 
 
30. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q28A 110420 Maur ex-DG Geology & 
Mines Arafa Questionnaire 28A> - § 1 reference coded [0.62% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.62% Coverage 
 
Participant There were projects that brought a lot to the country, really.  
Researcher: What opportunities have they brought? 
Participant: They … created jobs. This is very important, because they have 
brought us a contribution towards the national budget. Well, [the 
contribution from the exploitation of our minerals] was a very small 
[budgetary contribution]; at the time of the Morak company [copper-
gold mining company at Akjoujt); at the time of MIFERMA [iron ore 
mining venture], but as time went on, these operations became more 
efficient and benefits [from these] towards the budget increased… 
[bringing] a positive knock-on effect for the country. 
 
 
31. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q28H 110421 Maur Ex-DG Geol &   
      Mines Arafa Questionnaire 28H> - § 1 reference coded [12.58% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 12.58% Coverage 
 
Participant I believe that it is the people with a rentier-attitude that [drove the 
socio-political development of Mauritania of the last twenty years]… 
In the 1990s, there was a lot of money around… Some people say it 
might have been the World Bank or some other institutions that gave 
funds [to the internal economy] in anticipation of the oil boom to 
come. Others say that it may have been moneys from drug trafficking. 
I don't know… Some also say that it may have been connected to 
money laundering… Nevertheless, there were many, many large 
constructions projects in the country and intense [economic] activity. 
As a result [of this], “lobbies’ began to form which envied those that 
they could see taking advantage [rent] of state revenues , and could 
see that those people who obtained these projects [rents] from the 
state were [the elites associated to the president and his tribe]… 
Researcher That is it! That is what I mean by “rentier elites”. 
Participant Those people extracted finances [from the state]… They obtained all 
the projects. This caused envy in other people who wanted these 
[lucrative] projects. They thus sought to change the system so that 
they too [or in place] would be rentier- beneficiaries themselves.  
This then, can explain to some extent what happened prior to the 
coming of petroleum… However, it is not for me [to point the finger] 
… In any case, it is not oil which [caused the socio-political problems 
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of the last ten years]… but it is the anticipation of oil [and its 
revenues]… [An elite] had to be well positioned in wait for the 
[coming of] oil [revenues]…  
Researcher  And that's what may have caused problems? 
Participant It was these lobbies that created the problem… In my opinion, I think 
that [it is those] lobbies, which in combination with other particular 
circumstances combined and lead to… 
Researcher Did the tribal system [have a role to play in this]?… 
Participant A little… That's the explanation given by people... It is the cover 
people give to these events… It is either a tribal explanation that is 
given, or a racial one or a regional cover… Nevertheless, it is in fact 
mainly about personal interests… [personal] interests… 
 
 
32. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q32A 111213 Maur accountant M Fall   
      Ould Bah General disc 32A> - § 4 references coded [6.34% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.29% Coverage 
 
Participant … at the end of the 1990s, Maaouya Ould Taya, the president at the 
time, had some “minor” disagreements with France. He began to 
move away a little from France, and in doing so got closer to the 
Americans. That's how we see things here [in Mauritania]… From our 
point of view, in 1984 Maaouya came to power with France's 
assistance. At the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of years 2000, 
Maaouya moved away from France and even threw out few French 
diplomats, etc.  
He got closer, or rather, he “would have gotten closer” to the United 
States… … It has to be put in the conditional as it is not as clear as all 
that. However, it may be close to the truth.  
It is said that petroleum in Mauritania came about under his 
encouragement with the backing [of foreigners?]. Under his authority 
and backing [because he was now] free of France.  
That is why it is not Total that discovered oil in Mauritania.  
That is the way we reason [explain the events], and we say that, with 
the 2005 coup, France began to rebuild its [dominant] position in the 
political scene of Mauritania… That's what is what is commonly 
believed. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.55% Coverage 
 
Researcher In 2003, there was already an attempted coup. There was a coup d’état 
which did not fail in 2005, There was a “palace coup”, if you want [to 
call it that], in 2008. You think there's a link with oil? 
Participant: According to most people, according to analysts there's a link, there's 
a link somewhere.  
The potential of [revenues from] oil is behind all the greed, of the 
personal as well as the tribal greed [you see].  
  Because it is not for nothing [for misery] that you “kill” someone.  
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If we kill each other, it's because there are indeed some real prospect 
[of enrichment] and it is said that petroleum does cause [such as effect 
on people]. Some authors even say that "oil goes hand-in-hand with 
social conflict… 
 
Reference 3 - 0.72% Coverage 
 
Participant In the period that petroleum began to be talked about, the [social and 
political] situation was relatively stable. The socio-political situation 
[of Mauritania] is [indeed] relatively complex, but Ould Taya had 
managed to stabilize it. However, “seeds of violence” remained, most 
especially with the Negro-Africans [population] in particular…. … 
There were “seeds of violence” [racial tensions]... 
 
Reference 4 - 1.78% Coverage 
 
Participant In 2003, there was a coup attempt that failed, and we were scared. We 
were scared but we thought to ourselves, "it is normal". It's normal, 
because there is petroleum potential being proven and the political 
elites don't want to share its revenues. It is [therefore] normal that 
people [agitate, so as to make known that they] want a share in it. 
Researcher: A share of the revenues?  
Participant: Then, there was the 2005 putsch; we thought to ourselves, "that's it; 
all the problems of Mauritania are solved!" Mauritania is a country 
potentially rich in oil, and we have now the political in place to have 
an [equitable] sharing [in it]… We now have [hope]. Moreover, the 
military came to power saying, "we don't want to hang onto power". 
They emphasised, "we don't want the power for ourselves, we are 
going to organise elections and we will leave. We are going to 
stabilize the situation and bring democracy to Mauritania"… …  
 
 
33. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q43C 111231 Maur chief of cabinet Dahi   
      & wife on WOODSIDE 46A> - § 1 reference coded [1.07% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.07% Coverage 
 
Participant No, that was not Woodside [that brought problems to Mauritania], it 
was petroleum! 
Wife  It was the “oil”! We dreamt of “oil”! We told you, we dreamt of it!!! 
 
 
34. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q45A 111226 Maur ex-Mins Econ 
Affairs    
      Elabed on Mauritanian politics 45A> 
 
Reference 1 - 0.42% Coverage 
 
Researcher: No link at all with oil then? 
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Participant: Most probably there is one! most probably there is! There most 
probably is a link with oil! …. Also very probably, there is a link with 
the geostrategic interests of France and of the United States...  
 
Reference 2 - 2.11% Coverage 
 
Participant  An attachment to a country that is where you have your childhood 
memories! It is when certain places give rise to emotions within you. 
[It is] where there are the graves over which you can recollect 
yourself in silent contemplation… However, for “him” [President 
Abdel Aziz], he does not have that link with the country. We, we have 
it in our hearts! [As for] him, he has that “link” only with his pocket! 
It's clear that through his behaviour that the only things in which he is 
interested in are the natural resources of this country, which he wishes 
to keep to himself and increase his own personal fortune.  
Researcher: Do you think so? 
Participant: Oh yes, I do. That is why I say that the story of petroleum is related. It 
definitely is involved… Everybody has said that Mauritania has an 
enormous potential… That it could become one of the principal 
African producers, and we realised that through the present rush of 
[oil] companies into the country. I have welcomed many, many 
investment parties; Europeans, South-Americans, North-Americans, 
Asians and Arabs, everyone has come [to Mauritania].  
 
Reference 3 - 1.03% Coverage 
 
Participant We were even told that … "That the [petroleum] potential [of 
Mauritania] has been well known for years… since the end of the 
1960s, when there was “Western Sahara” war. During the Saharan 
war, and the nationalisation of the iron-ore company MIFERMA by 
President Ould Daddah, given that the [world oil] reserves were large 
and that world production at the time was sufficient and met [world] 
demand relatively well, the big oil groups thought to themselves, "it's 
not worth [developing Mauritania’s petroleum resource] at the 
moment, we have to leave the Mauritanian [offshore] oil and in the 
other area [onshore Taoudeni basin] in reserve…. " 
 
Reference 4 - 0.26% Coverage 
 
Participant Petroleum was certainly an issue [of importance], at the national level 
just as much as the regional level… for Morocco, Algeria… and most 
[especially] for France. 
 
Reference 5 - 0.59% Coverage 
 
Participant  There's the reversal of the contract modifications [of 2004]!.  
We now have a more balanced set of conditions that are much more 
favourable towards Mauritania [rather than for the contractor].  
By way of compensation [for the problems it created for Mauritania], 
Woodside “offered” [to compensate the government] US 100 million. 
 Page 366 
 
That US 100 million, we included in the 2007 state budget and made a 
documented financial note [submitted for record]. 
 
Reference 6 - 7.00% Coverage 
 
Participant No, no, I don't believe that the country went into debt based on the 
belief that it would be able to repay loans through future oil revenues. 
The fact was that we were considered [by the World Bank] to be 
within the group of nations designated as “Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries” (HIPC) and had to follow the HIPC Initiative [as set by the 
IMF]. The PPTE is the economic programme set for the very poor 
countries which have become heavily in debt and that therefore have 
obligations in terms of keeping the level of debt at a sustainable level. 
In addition, we still always had, even if there were periods when it 
wasn't the case, a program with the World Bank that applied very 
strict conditions in terms of resorting to debt above the allowed 
monetary ceiling.  
Therefore, I do not think that we were subjected to this setback 
because of oil. We could examine a possible second setback, a sort of 
"Dutch Disease". We wanted to avoid it through a specific fund 
management mechanism of the expected oil revenues. We felt that we 
should use oil [revenues], if they came to reality. [We would use the 
oil revenues] as a tool to develop other sectors [of the economy]; to 
develop agriculture; to develop tourism; to develop [needed] services 
and we [thus planned] to consider this. I think the unsuccessful 
experiences of countries like the oil-producing countries of Algeria, 
Nigeria and Libya [for example] helped to open our eyes as well as 
those of other new oil-producing countries. 
Researcher: Mauritania took that [aspect of development] into account? 
Participant: [Mauritania indeed] took that into account. At the time, we had 
studied the experiences of all the countries and drew our inspiration 
from two countries in particular which had managed very well their 
oil resources; [the UK with its] North Sea oil, which is very carefully 
managed; and that of the Norwegian system, I believe. [We also 
studied] another African country, I am not sure if it's Botswana... We 
consulted them on several occasions; there were several trade 
missions, there were several study missions and we took that 
information into account as the petroleum industry developed.  
So, from a purely conceptual basis, I think the country was ready to 
efficiently manage its oil revenues in a manner that would not render 
it slave to that rent, and in a manner that mean development without 
dependency… This was because, as we believed at the time, it was 
out of the question to engage in large [costly] projects while we 
awaited these oil revenues. We would not enter into such projects, we 
were to be very prudent, giving priority to first regularising 
government income.  
First we knew that the country has a relatively limited absorption 
capacity, compelling us to create savings. That is why we created the 
[Petroleum] Fund. On the other hand, we told ourselves, this wealth 
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was also not renewable and we have to preserve a share for the benefit 
of future generations. To safeguard [future generations’] share, we 
were compelled to deposit [these funds] and invest them in a way that 
would generate appropriate revenues in 10, 20 or even 30 years. [We 
had to ensure that not all the oil revenues were wasted immediately] 
in certain projects, I do not know, such as [useless?] buildings. We 
should not try to create a Dubai out of Mauritania!!! No, no, we 
wanted infrastructures for people and above all, we wanted to develop 
social sectors that created human capital, education, health…  
If production had carried on – had continued as it had been initially 
anticipated; at 75.000 barrels a day, our forecasts at the end of ten 
years would have been that state funds from the investment revenue of 
the oil takings, would have been equal to the revenues from oil 
production itself. That was an envisaged scenario...   
 
 
35. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q46B 111231 Maur ex-Director of    
      Treasury Dhehbi on internal politics 46B WMA> 
      Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.58% Coverage 
 
Participant They showed us some barrels on the television. The Minister said 
"There's oil [in Mauritania], here is the proof". There is nothing! We 
had started to dream! There is nothing! 
 
Reference 2 - 0.67% Coverage 
 
Participant In any case, for us, the Mauritanian people, we don't care about oil 
deposits, because the common people find no gain in it. Look, we 
[apparently] have gold [produced from this country], [but] There is a 
crisis all the same!. We [the people] see nothing of the gold. This 
gold, being produced in this country, is put in airplanes and it goes…. 
 
 
36. <Internals\\Interviews - White Maures\\Q48A 120101 Maur ex-Minister 
Isselmou   
      Abdelkader on politics 48A> - § 5 references coded [4.60% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.31% Coverage 
 
Participant  With the discovery of petroleum, and really beginning when concrete 
policies concerning mining and oil exploration were being formulated 
[by the government]… … yet more greed began emerging [in the 
elites]! … From 2001… the discovery of oil had changed ambitions… 
Oil had especially changed the ambitions of the army and ruling 
[elites]. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.60% Coverage 
 
 Page 368 
 
Participant Not only had [wealth] disparities [between rich and poor] had 
increased under Ould Taya's regime, [but oil] had especially begun to 
“sharpen”… and heighten the greed of the army [elites]… [in 
addition] the [economic] potential of Mauritania… having petroleum 
[revenues], as well as mining [revenues] from Tasiast, and other 
[mining projects]… produced new [and heightened] political and 
economic ambitions in certain the "groups" [lobbies or tribes?] 
… These had lost importance [for a while]. However, they now found 
rebirth, grew stronger and developed under Ould Taya. These same 
groups altered the country's history [when they overthrew President 
Taya]. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.28% Coverage 
 
Participant And that's why there was a coup… but [Taya] had already been 
undermined by his entourage… or [rather] by the tribal [elites] and 
officers around him, those that had benefited the most maybe from his 
generosity; in particular the wealthy Smacide Bouamatou, the wealthy 
Oualad Bousba army officer, Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. 
 
Reference 4 - 1.07% Coverage 
 
Participant It's a very rich country. There are lots of resources. It's a new country, 
extremely vast… (Inaudible) … It's a country where the state is in its 
infancy, where the state… is in a complete formational genesis from 
all point of views. The historical point of view, human point of view, 
political point of view, ideological point of view…   
… … There are tribes… which try to acquire the "shadow" of the 
state [create for themselves a monopoly of accessible state rents]. In 
such circumstances [where rent-seekers elites compete with the state 
for its revenues], a [foreign] mining [or petroleum] company may 
avoid systematically and substantially contributing to the stabilization 
of the state and its political system [and help certain business and 
political elites to line their pockets].  
However, such a company will invariably suffer from a political 
backlash [when the political structure changes] and invariably loose 
its investments. That is absolutely obvious!   
In order to have stability in the political system, however, there's only 
one avenue. The avenue to follow in the first place is to accelerate the 
[ethnic] integration process that will allow the setting up of a 
democratic system… Secondly, [there is the set-up of] a transparency 
regarding the management of resources, good governance, and a good 
distribution of revenues. It is therefore paramount that business 
entities, the companies, involved themselves with the political system. 
[NOTE: this is the same demand as that presented by Colonel Ely 
Ould Mohamed Vall]. 
 
Reference 5 - 2.34% Coverage 
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Researcher So… we talked about Babana, we talked about Daddah. Let's talk 
about Taya. In all three cases, it is said that external influences were 
involved… [With] Babana, there was fear [of foreign intervention]… 
outsiders were not wanted… "We want to resolve our own problems 
as Mauritanians"… All the same, there was an indeed external 
influence that toddled Babana and which brought in Daddah [as first 
President]. The French were in that? In 1978, Saleck came… Was 
Daddah bothering someone? Maybe it was the French [again]? 
Participant No. That's… No. It is automatic…   
Researcher OK, wait… there was [the nationalisation of] MIFERMA, [there was 
the war of] Western Sahara.… Saleck!... The French [who were 
behind the fall of Daddah, were [also] behind Taya’s [fall]?  
As well, in 2005, 2003, 2005 and 2008. There was oil. There was Al-
Qaeda. There was Ely. There was Aziz… Was it the French, or maybe 
the Americans this time, who were playing the game of external 
interference?   
[First] Babana, [then] Daddah, [then] Saleck, [then] Taya, [now] 
Aziz??? 
Participant Everywhere… there has never been a coup in Mauritania that was not 
instigated… or supported by the French Embassy. 
Researcher The French Embassy was involved in all… [the coups d’état]? 
Participant The French Embassy was involved in all [of them]! It was involved! 
Because in 1975, 1978, it's true… the French Jaguar planes helped 
Mauritania, etc. [The French President] Giscard d’Estaing helped 
[our] President Daddah. It's true! Nevertheless, we also knew very 
well, that Mauritania could not win the war without the strong 
implication of France.   
However, there was something much more important [than the 
support of the French]. It was the cooperation between President 
Daddah and the Moroccans, a cooperation that had come to a level 
that worried the French politicians. There is something fundamental, 
something constant in the French politics. In French politics, the 
desire is that Morocco never becomes too closely allied with 
Mauritania. That's a fact…  
It is believed that Morocco is a country with political ambitions of 
enlarging its territory. It is an Arab country, a country that acted as the 
starting point, the origin of the Arab invasion of Europe in the 8th 
century. Do you understand?   
The French have always wanted to keep Mauritania as a buffer zone, a 
neutral zone that it does not wish to see fall under the influence of 
either Algeria or that of Morocco [and continue to sway its national 
and international policies and thus influence its political landscape]. 
 
 
End of the selected quotes. 
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Appendix 10 – Participants’ perception of “Oil Curse” for Mauritania  
 
Each participants’ perception of the relevance of the “Oil Curse” to 
Mauritania, on a direct question of a link between petroleum and the 
coup attempts, government overthrows and successful coup d’états of 
2003, 2005, 2008 and 2009 
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Participant's Name 
Quote from each participant relevant to the "oil curse"  
(answers divisible into four categories; Totally blame oil,  
partially blame oil, don’t blame oil, question not 
answered)  
      
1 Sidaty Fall Chose not to answer the question 
2 Toutane Diakité "Oil can be a blessing and generate wealth for all, but”... 
3 Amadou N'daye  "If you did not cheap and embezzle you didn't get 
anywhere. Now with Aziz, things are straightening out, 
but let's see?" 
4 Dada O/M. Lemine "No, oil had no link with the 2005 coup. Maaouya Had 
been in power too long and his management of the 
country had been  failing"  
5 Anonymous "Because of oil there is inflation and elite enrichment" 
6 Fatimatou Doudou Diop Chose not to answer the question 
7 Ciré Ly "there is mismanagement of revenues by the 
government" 
8 Habib O/Adaya O/Jiddou Chose not to answer the question 
9 Anonymous "The discovery of oil was good for the economy" 
10 Maimouna Diallo "Unfortunately the country will be hit by the "oil curse". 
Because here, the majority (of elites) are driven by 
greed" (blame greed) 
11 Gaye-Silly Soumare "The 2005 coup occurred due to dissatisfaction with 
Taya" 
12 Abidine "It is not a very stable country. Well before oil" 
13 Ely O/Sneiba "Instability due to plundering of state resources by elites" 
14 Ibrahim Mangane "No, oil was not the reason. Maaouya have made many 
errors over a long time. He had to be removed. In 2008, 
it was the corruption" 
15 Mariam M'Bow "In Mauritania, coups are the norm. In 2008, Aziz 
overthrew Abdallahi because he was mismanaging the 
country. His wife ran it" 
16 Anonymous Chose not to answer the question 
17 M. Traore "A tribe monopolised the state and its revenues" 
18 Ahmed O/Cheikh "No it was not oil's arrival that caused the coups. Taya 
has sat in the president's chair for more than twenty 
years!" 
19 Souleymane Niang "Oil money acts as a catalyst to problems" 
20 Ali Lamine Diallo "There was strong dissatisfaction Taya's management of 
the country" 
21 Anonymous "No, it was not oil! It was elites' power grabbing. Also, 
some were dissatisfied with the government's 
mismanagement" 
22 Isselmou M. Lemine "Social problems occupied his interest" 
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23 Boubacar Alpha Athié "It is only a coincidence for oil and overthrow of Taya 
together" 
24 Anonymous Chose not to answer the question 
25 Sidi M O/M. Lemine Chose not to answer the question 
26 Dia Amadou "Where there is oil, there are problems!" (general blame 
on oil) 
27 M. Faoud Barrada "social problems predated oil discovery" 
28 M'Boye O/Arafa "They sought to gain power so that they too could draw 
future rents" 
29 M. Ba Abdouh Moussa "I fear the discovery of oil ,because it means trouble" 
(general blame on oil) 
30 Hamadi M. Hamadi "I do not think there is a direct link. There were many 
other problems at the same time as a President that was 
being used" 
31 Coulibaly Aly "It is the state and the foreign companies that are at fault" 
32 M. Fall O/ Bah "because there is the prospect of enrichment with oil, 
men will kill each other for it" (blame greed) 
33 Anonymous Chose not to answer the question 
34 Pierre Bonte "When there is petroleum, there will always be someone 
to share in the loot. And tribal alliances change 
accordingly" 
35 Zacharia O/Ahmed Salem "It may have played a minor role, but we must admit that 
it was the final days of a nepotistic and corrupt regime" 
36 M. Said O/Hamody "when a country has limited means, inequalities arise. 
When oil comes, the foreign companies must help to 
manage it" 
37 Anonymous "I don’t believe the upheavals of 2003, 2005, etc were 
related to petroleum. There are deeper causes... since 
1978" 
38 Anonymous "Inflation came with oil. Unstable regimes do not need 
oil discoveries" (blame oil for inflationary effect) 
39 Anonymous "I was not sure the coming of oil was a good event. 
There were dollar signs in everyone's eyes"  (blame oil 
for inflationary effect) 
40 M. Sidina O/Khabuz Chose not to answer the question 
41  Ely Ould Mohamed Vall Chose not to answer the question 
42 Anonymous "with the multiparty system, came back tribalism and all 
its related problems of nepotism, corruption, etc" 
43 M. Lemine Dahi "No, it was not Woodside that brought problems, it was 
the petroleum!" (general blame on oil) 
44 Abdou Salam Tabane Chose not to answer the question 
45 Mohamed O/ Elabed  "there are geostrategic interests, but also Abdel Aziz has 
that link with his pocket" 
46 Mohamed Ould Dhehbi Chose not to answer the question 
47 Mahfoud O/Bettah "I do not think there is a link. It was more the corrupt 
government in place that was the cause”. 
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48 Isselmou O/Abdelkader "The discovery of oil changed ambitions, and sharpened 
the greed of the army elites" (blame greed) 
49 M. El Hacen O/Lebatt Chose not to answer the question 
50 M. Lemine Abdallah "Petroleum? That was not the motivation. Taya and the 
elites were there, and they ate all!" 
51 Agu Kantsler - Ex-expl 
Director 
Chose not to answer the question 
52 Woodside International  
Exploration Manager 
"Oil may have acted as a catalyst to the 2005 Govt 
overthrow" 
53 Ex-Woodside In-country 
Manager 
"It is a significant factor, but it is not the only factor" 
 
 
 
Categorisation of participants answers to blaming petroleum for the political 
upheavals  
 
 
Petroleum discovery and development in Mauritania is totally to 
blame for the political problems suffered since 2001 (many were 
emotional responses) 
5 13% 
Petroleum discovery and development in Mauritania maybe partially 
to blame, and to varying degree, for the political problems suffered 
since 2001 
14 35% 
Petroleum is not to blame for the political upheavals that have 
occurred since 2001. The Mauritanian conditions and factors predating 
petroleum are to blame 
21 
 
52% 
 
Consciously or unconsciously, the question was not answered, 
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Summary and conclusion 
 
5 participants, or 13% of those that gave an answer, put total blame on petroleum for 
the “problems” of Mauritania. Where assigned in a general manner, it was usually 
put to the researcher in an emotional context. In one case, the wife of Mohamed Ould 
Dahi (Participant 43) interjected with an angry outburst against the foreign 
participants, blaming Woodside for the inflationary turn the economy had taken in 
the last few years.  
 
14 participants (35%) placed partial blame for the political upheavals on petroleum 
but to varying degree. The most prevalent effect blamed of petroleum, was that it had 
awaken the greed of elites, and this came from participants in the lower economic 
categories (Afro-Mauritanians and Haratin participants). The greed of elites had been 
the cause of great inflation that had influenced in  a very negative way on the poorer 
segments of the Mauritanian society.   
 
21 participants, or 52% of participants and including the majority of the more learned 
and read Maures that participated in the research , felt that the government 
overthrows would have occurred anyway, as it is within the character of the 
Mauritanians and the manner of the society. Several pointed out that all changes in 
country leadership had been by military overthrows.  
 
13 chose not to answer the question, ignoring it wilfully in the case of elites, 
including Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall, one of the leading perpetrators of the 2005 
overthrow of President Taya and leader of the military council 2005 to 2007. In 
many case with participants of lower economic class and often of an low educational 
level, the question was willingly or unconsciously left unanswered merely out of 
ignorance. 
 
In summary, 87% of participants downplayed the role of petroleum in the social and 
political upheavals that occurred between 2001 and 2011.  
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Appendix 11 - The presidents and leaders of Mauritania  
 
President / Leader Period Upheaval / immediate reason 
France granted independence to Mauritania in November 1960.  
Moktar Ould Daddah was named Acting President of the new republic. He was confirmed in office in the 
first post-independent election in August 1961 
Moktar Ould Daddah 20 August 1961 – 10 July 1978 
Deposed in a Coup d’état / 
Issue over Western Sahara 
War 
Imposition of a Military Committee for National Salvation (CMRN) 
Mustapha Ould Saleck 10 July 1978  - 6 April 1979 
Reduced to a figurehead  /  
Resigned as Head of State 
 
Ahmad Ould Bouceif 6 April 1979 – 27 May 2979 Died in suspicious air crash  / 
 
Mohamed M. Ould Louly 3 June 1979 – 4 January 1980 
Deposed in a coup d’état / 
Different tribal objectives to 
Haidallah 
 
Mohamed K. Ould Haidallah 
4 January 1980 – 12 December 
1984 
Deposed in a coup d’état / 
Arabisation and issue-related 
Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya 12 December 1984 – 18 April 1992 Military - civilian transition 
Civilian rule and multiparty system demanded by France 
Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya 19 April 1992 – 3 August 2005 Deposed in a coup d’état / 
Too long as Head of State 
Imposition of a Military Council for Justice and Democracy 
Ely Mohamed Vall 3 August 2005 – 19 April 2007 Military – civilian transition 
Civilian elections 
Sidi Ould  Cheikh Abdallahi 19 April 2007 – 6 August 2008 Deposed in a coup d’état /  
Corrupt and weak  
Imposition of Military High Council of State 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz 6 August 2006 – 15 April 2009 Steps down as Head of State 
Ba Mamadou M’Baré 15 April 2009 – 5 August 2009 Interim Head of State 
Civilian elections Constitutional Coup 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz 
5 August 2009 – 2nd term begins 
after 2014 elections  
President of Mauritania 
 
